Parliamentary activity

Answering body: Home Office

The Government remains committed to protecting the public from the threats posed by dangerous substances that could be misused to cause serious harm. As part of this responsibility, the Government keeps the framework that governs explosives precursors and poisons under regular review to ensure that it remains effective, proportionate and responsive to any evolving risks.

Today I announce the Government's intention to launch a six-week public consultation regarding proposed amendments to the Poisons Act 1972. This process will seek views from the public on several changes that are intended to strengthen public safety and national security and is expected to launch during the Conference Recess.

The proposals support the Government’s commitment to respond decisively to the findings of the Southport Inquiry, particularly by strengthening controls where substances present a clear risk. They also form part of a broader approach to reducing access to means of harm in a proportionate way.

Overview

The consultation follows ongoing policy development and consideration of the current legislative framework in light of evolving threats, lessons learnt from recent incidents, evidence provided to public inquiries, and wider concerns regarding the accessibility of certain hazardous substances.

The consultation will invite views on a number of proposals, including:

the introduction of controls on materials containing the highly toxic plant-derived substances ricin and abrin, in particular castor beans and rosary peas;

the reclassification of sodium nitrite from a reportable poison to a regulated poison above a specified concentration threshold;

the regulation of explosives precursors sodium nitrate and potassium nitrate above specified concentration thresholds;

amendments to specified concentration thresholds of already regulated explosives precursors sodium chlorate, sodium perchlorate, potassium chlorate and potassium perchlorate; and

a range of technical and operational improvements to the underpinning framework, including updates to licensing arrangements, record-keeping requirements and existing concentration thresholds.

The Government recognises that many of these substances have legitimate commercial, scientific, agricultural, educational and recreational uses. The purpose of the consultation is therefore to assess the potential impact, proportionality and deliverability of any proposed changes before decisions are taken. No final decisions have been made at this stage. Consultation responses will help inform the Government's consideration of whether legislative changes should be brought forward.

The consultation proposes a range of options, from maintaining the current arrangements through to a broader package of reforms. Responses will help determine the most effective and proportionate approach to managing the risks presented by these substances while supporting legitimate users and minimising unnecessary burdens on business. The consultation will be supported by targeted stakeholder engagement, to ensure that a balanced and well evidenced view is obtained.

Consultation

The consultation will be available on GOV.UK and accessible for six weeks. It is intended to:

gather further evidence on the impacts of the proposed measures across affected sectors, including businesses, suppliers, online marketplaces and individual users;

improve understanding of the nature and scale of legitimate uses;

test the proportionality and seek insight into the practical implications of any proposed controls or thresholds; and

inform final ministerial decisions ahead of any legislative changes.

Following the consultation period, the Government will carefully consider responses and publish a summary of the findings. Subject to the outcome of the consultation and subsequent ministerial decisions, any necessary legislative changes will be delivered through secondary legislation.

Explosives precursors and poisons legislation is reserved in Scotland and Wales, and officials will continue to engage with the Devolved Governments throughout the consultation process. Northern Ireland authorities will be engaged as appropriate, recognising the distinct legislative context.

Protecting the public is the first duty of Government. This consultation represents an important opportunity to ensure that the legislative framework governing dangerous substances remains effective, proportionate and responsive to current risks, while continuing to support legitimate use.

Upon publication, a copy of the consultation will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

Answering body: Home Office

On 13 April 2026, the Chair of the Southport Inquiry, Sir Adrian Fulford published his Phase 1 report. Sir Adrian sets out five fundamental failings, and makes 67 recommendations for central government, and a range of national and local partners to consider. He concludes that the attack was foreseeable and avoidable.

I am grateful to Sir Adrian and his team for their diligent work in producing this comprehensive report. When I addressed Parliament on 13 April, I committed to publish our response by summer. Today that response has been published. The response has been laid before Parliament as a Command Paper (CP 1623) and copies are available in the Vote Office and on gov.uk.

In the response, we recognise the five fundamental failings. We accept all the recommendations that are for central government to deliver and set out how we are working at pace to implement these in full. There are recommendations that government has already made progress against, or in some cases, completed. The pace of this work demonstrates the urgency with which government is working towards meeting the outcomes set by the Inquiry. I have committed to formally report to Sir Adrian again in a year’s time.

I am clear that government expects other organisations to implement their recommendations. We have written to all organisations to highlight the findings of the Inquiry and will facilitate and support on delivery as far as possible.

The government has already acted across a number of areas.

We have published our Halving Knife Crime plan with the ambition to halve the level of knife crime across ten years. We have also taken the Crime and Policing Act 2026 through Parliament to significantly tighten the law on knives and other bladed articles. We have also recently held a public consultation about introducing licensing for sellers of knives and importers.

We published a Youth Justice White Paper setting out a comprehensive programme of reform to modernise the youth justice system, establishing a clear direction toward earlier intervention and taking action to encourage and strengthen the use of parenting orders.

The government is introducing legislation this session to criminalise lone individuals planning an attack without an ideological motive, closing a gap and strengthening our ability to disrupt the most serious threats from violence-fixated individuals.

We have announced that we will ban social media companies from offering their services to under 16s, in addition to new action to restricting their access to livestreaming and communication with strangers on services including gaming. We will also introduce legislation to tackle extreme violence content, to create a safer online environment, particularly for children and young people.

Alongside delivering the recommendations in Phase 1, we will work with the Inquiry throughout Phase 2 to strengthen our understanding of the evolving threat from extreme violence and the effectiveness of different interventions.

In the immediate aftermath of the attack, my predecessor appointed Lord Anderson as the Interim Independent Prevent Commissioner and asked him to review the Southport attack along with the tragic murder of Sir David Amess. Today I am also publishing a letter accepting all the recommendations Lord Anderson made and setting out how we have delivered against them.

Today my thoughts remain with Alice da Silva Aguiar, Bebe King and Elsie Dot Stancombe, their families and friends, and the survivors. We owe it to them to act on the findings of these reports.

Answering body: Home Office

The total costs for the Southport Inquiry have not yet been published. However, the inquiry will be expected to publish its costs periodically and intends to make these available in due course on its website, which is available here: https://www.southport.public-inquiry.uk/

Answering body: Home Office

Where existing statutory frameworks underpin safeguarding processes, there is no requirement for parents or carers to co-operate. However, parental or carer consent is not required for agencies to share information relating to safeguarding and child protection. This is set out in Department for Education guidance on information sharing for safeguarding practitioners.

Government is making this even clearer through the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which includes a new Information Sharing Duty for the purposes of safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children, and will be accompanied by statutory guidance to support frontline practitioners to understand their responsibilities.

Where a safeguarding concern has been identified relating to a child or young person, or there is suspected criminality relating to knife-related violence, multi-agency and law-enforcement partners can share information and conduct investigations without the consent of the relevant parent or guardian.

In relation to Youth Justice processes, there are legal obligations that can be placed on parents and carers, to ensure that any risk relating to a minor can be appropriately managed. A court can issue a Parenting Order in a number of different circumstances, where children are engaged in criminal or antisocial behaviour. Parenting Orders require the parent or guardian to attend counselling or parenting support sessions and comply with other requirements the court considers necessary. Non-compliance can lead to breach proceedings in court and is punishable with a fine.

Criminal orders that are placed on a child or young person themselves are applied by the court and generally (with few exceptions) parental or carer consent is not required.

Where there are concerns that a child or young person is involved in criminality, and to protect public safety and prevent harm, the police will take forward their enquiries as appropriate, and parental or carer cooperation is not required to share information, conduct an investigation, place a minor under caution, or charge a minor with a criminal offence.

The law already provides significant stop and search and wider enforcement powers, enabling police to disrupt immediate risk and remove weapons from the streets, including without the need for reasonable suspicion. Police can also arrest suspects, seize weapons, and evidence, and conduct searches of persons and premises where legal thresholds are met. These powers apply to children as well as adults. Where these powers are used on children, they are subject to additional statutory safeguards under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its Codes of Practice to protect welfare and ensure proportionality.

The Southport Inquiry Phase 1 report, published on 13 April, considers in detail the actions of the perpetrator’s parents and many of the issues raised here. The Chair has rightly raised the challenging question of how to minimise the risk that parents may choose not to co-operate or report concerns to safeguarding agencies such as social care or healthcare, or the police about their child having knives or other weapons, and has made two recommendations relevant to parents.

In relation to future changes to strengthen oversight and powers, Government is considering these recommendations alongside the others in the report and will respond by summer 2026.

Answering body: Home Office

There is no existing standalone legal duty to compel a parent, carer or any other bystander to report any criminality, including the procurement or possession of knives and weapons.

Where parents are unable or unwilling to respond to potential safeguarding risk relating to knives, the strength of the system around the child (including schools, children’s services, police and youth justice) is vital in spotting concerns and linking children to support.

The Government keeps legislation around knives under constant review. We are clear that knives should not be sold to those under 18 and measures in the Crime and Policing Bill (currently going through Parliament) are strengthening the legislation in this area by introducing a new two-step age verification process for online sale and delivery of knives. This will require buyers to provide a copy of their identification document, alongside a current photo, which will be verified at the point of sale and on delivery. It will be unlawful to deliver a parcel containing a knife to anyone except the verified buyer or to leave it on the doorstep or with a neighbour.

We are also creating a new offence of possessing a knife with the intention to commit unlawful violence, a duty on sellers to report bulk sales, and giving the police a new power to seize knives when they believe they are likely to be used in connection with unlawful violence. Additionally, measures are being introduced to provide the police with the power to require social media, marketplaces, and search services to take down content about illegal knives and offensive weapons.

In relation to bringing forward new legislation, the Chair of the Southport Inquiry recommended that the Law Commission review the merits of legal reform to introduce a legal duty on specified categories of person to report the criminality of another person. The Government will provide a full response to the recommendations from the Phase 1 report by the summer 2026.

Answering body: Home Office

There is no existing standalone legal duty to compel a parent, carer or any other bystander to report any criminality, including the procurement or possession of knives and weapons.

Where parents are unable or unwilling to respond to potential safeguarding risk relating to knives, the strength of the system around the child (including schools, children’s services, police and youth justice) is vital in spotting concerns and linking children to support.

The Government keeps legislation around knives under constant review. We are clear that knives should not be sold to those under 18 and measures in the Crime and Policing Bill (currently going through Parliament) are strengthening the legislation in this area by introducing a new two-step age verification process for online sale and delivery of knives. This will require buyers to provide a copy of their identification document, alongside a current photo, which will be verified at the point of sale and on delivery. It will be unlawful to deliver a parcel containing a knife to anyone except the verified buyer or to leave it on the doorstep or with a neighbour.

We are also creating a new offence of possessing a knife with the intention to commit unlawful violence, a duty on sellers to report bulk sales, and giving the police a new power to seize knives when they believe they are likely to be used in connection with unlawful violence. Additionally, measures are being introduced to provide the police with the power to require social media, marketplaces, and search services to take down content about illegal knives and offensive weapons.

In relation to bringing forward new legislation, the Chair of the Southport Inquiry recommended that the Law Commission review the merits of legal reform to introduce a legal duty on specified categories of person to report the criminality of another person. The Government will provide a full response to the recommendations from the Phase 1 report by the summer 2026.

Answering body: Home Office

Where existing statutory frameworks underpin safeguarding processes, there is no requirement for parents or carers to co-operate. However, parental or carer consent is not required for agencies to share information relating to safeguarding and child protection. This is set out in Department for Education guidance on information sharing for safeguarding practitioners.

Government is making this even clearer through the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which includes a new Information Sharing Duty for the purposes of safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children, and will be accompanied by statutory guidance to support frontline practitioners to understand their responsibilities.

Where a safeguarding concern has been identified relating to a child or young person, or there is suspected criminality relating to knife-related violence, multi-agency and law-enforcement partners can share information and conduct investigations without the consent of the relevant parent or guardian.

In relation to Youth Justice processes, there are legal obligations that can be placed on parents and carers, to ensure that any risk relating to a minor can be appropriately managed. A court can issue a Parenting Order in a number of different circumstances, where children are engaged in criminal or antisocial behaviour. Parenting Orders require the parent or guardian to attend counselling or parenting support sessions and comply with other requirements the court considers necessary. Non-compliance can lead to breach proceedings in court and is punishable with a fine.

Criminal orders that are placed on a child or young person themselves are applied by the court and generally (with few exceptions) parental or carer consent is not required.

Where there are concerns that a child or young person is involved in criminality, and to protect public safety and prevent harm, the police will take forward their enquiries as appropriate, and parental or carer cooperation is not required to share information, conduct an investigation, place a minor under caution, or charge a minor with a criminal offence.

The law already provides significant stop and search and wider enforcement powers, enabling police to disrupt immediate risk and remove weapons from the streets, including without the need for reasonable suspicion. Police can also arrest suspects, seize weapons, and evidence, and conduct searches of persons and premises where legal thresholds are met. These powers apply to children as well as adults. Where these powers are used on children, they are subject to additional statutory safeguards under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its Codes of Practice to protect welfare and ensure proportionality.

The Southport Inquiry Phase 1 report, published on 13 April, considers in detail the actions of the perpetrator’s parents and many of the issues raised here. The Chair has rightly raised the challenging question of how to minimise the risk that parents may choose not to co-operate or report concerns to safeguarding agencies such as social care or healthcare, or the police about their child having knives or other weapons, and has made two recommendations relevant to parents.

In relation to future changes to strengthen oversight and powers, Government is considering these recommendations alongside the others in the report and will respond by summer 2026.

Answering body: Home Office

Where existing statutory frameworks underpin safeguarding processes, there is no requirement for parents or carers to co-operate. However, parental or carer consent is not required for agencies to share information relating to safeguarding and child protection. This is set out in Department for Education guidance on information sharing for safeguarding practitioners.

Government is making this even clearer through the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which includes a new Information Sharing Duty for the purposes of safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children, and will be accompanied by statutory guidance to support frontline practitioners to understand their responsibilities.

Where a safeguarding concern has been identified relating to a child or young person, or there is suspected criminality relating to knife-related violence, multi-agency and law-enforcement partners can share information and conduct investigations without the consent of the relevant parent or guardian.

In relation to Youth Justice processes, there are legal obligations that can be placed on parents and carers, to ensure that any risk relating to a minor can be appropriately managed. A court can issue a Parenting Order in a number of different circumstances, where children are engaged in criminal or antisocial behaviour. Parenting Orders require the parent or guardian to attend counselling or parenting support sessions and comply with other requirements the court considers necessary. Non-compliance can lead to breach proceedings in court and is punishable with a fine.

Criminal orders that are placed on a child or young person themselves are applied by the court and generally (with few exceptions) parental or carer consent is not required.

Where there are concerns that a child or young person is involved in criminality, and to protect public safety and prevent harm, the police will take forward their enquiries as appropriate, and parental or carer cooperation is not required to share information, conduct an investigation, place a minor under caution, or charge a minor with a criminal offence.

The law already provides significant stop and search and wider enforcement powers, enabling police to disrupt immediate risk and remove weapons from the streets, including without the need for reasonable suspicion. Police can also arrest suspects, seize weapons, and evidence, and conduct searches of persons and premises where legal thresholds are met. These powers apply to children as well as adults. Where these powers are used on children, they are subject to additional statutory safeguards under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and its Codes of Practice to protect welfare and ensure proportionality.

The Southport Inquiry Phase 1 report, published on 13 April, considers in detail the actions of the perpetrator’s parents and many of the issues raised here. The Chair has rightly raised the challenging question of how to minimise the risk that parents may choose not to co-operate or report concerns to safeguarding agencies such as social care or healthcare, or the police about their child having knives or other weapons, and has made two recommendations relevant to parents.

In relation to future changes to strengthen oversight and powers, Government is considering these recommendations alongside the others in the report and will respond by summer 2026.

Answering body: Home Office

Where there are safeguarding concerns, or where youth justice services are involved with an individual, decisions on these cases must be based on the individual circumstances of the case alone. Protected characteristics, such as ethnicity, should not influence the judgement of risk relating to that individual, or the assessment of whether statutory provision should be made.

As the Home Secretary said in the House of Commons debate on the Southport Inquiry, the only factors that should be taken into account are the potential risks posed by an individual and how best to manage those risks.

The Department for Education is developing a set of practice standards and training for Lead Child Protection Practitioners (LCPPs). The standards will describe the knowledge and skills expected of LCPPs to work effectively in Multi-Agency Child Protection Teams, to take evidence-informed child protection decisions. The standards will reflect the importance of not letting social bias or professional anxiety influence actions or outcomes when working with children and adults from different cultural and racial backgrounds.

Youth justice services are supported to identify and assess safeguarding risk through case management guidance.

Answering body: Home Office

On 7 April 2025, the then Secretary of State for the Home Department announced the establishment of an Inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005, to be chaired by the Right Honourable Sir Adrian Fulford. This Inquiry was to examine the appalling events that took place at a children’s dance class in Southport on 29 July 2024.

Three young girls were tragically murdered on that day, Elsie Dot Stancombe, Alice da Silva Aguiar and Bebe King, and many more were seriously harmed. Our thoughts remain with the families who have suffered such devastating loss, as well as those who survived the attack but live with the lasting physical and psychological impact.

The Chair has today published his findings from the first phase of this Inquiry, which provides a detailed account of the events leading up to the attack, and the attack itself. The Inquiry examined the perpetrator’s history and interactions with a range of state systems including policing and criminal justice, education, health and social care, as well as considering the account of all those who were impacted by the attack.

The findings point to missed opportunities which could have stopped this attack from occurring. They indicate systematic failures, structural gaps, and a lack of ownership of the risk from the many agencies involved. The Inquiry also highlights how agencies failed to adequately share information and take all the facts about the risk the perpetrator posed to the community into consideration, which ultimately meant that his risk was not managed effectively.

Sir Adrian has examined these issues thoroughly, and I welcome the recommendations he has made. The Government is determined to learn the lessons identified by the Inquiry and to take the necessary action to reduce the risk of such an attack happening again. I must thank the Chair, his team, and all those that took part in the Inquiry, for the speed, rigour and professionalism with which they have conducted their work.

The Government will consider the report and its recommendations and will respond in full later this summer. Alongside this, the Government will respond to the recommendations made by the Prevent Commissioner, Lord Anderson KC, in his Lessons for Prevent report, which examined Prevent’s role in the Southport attack and the murder of Sir David Amess.

While the first phase of the Inquiry has looked specifically at the failings in this case, it has identified wider gaps in how to address the risk from individuals who hold a fascination with extreme violence. Following consultation with the Chair and those most affected by this attack, I am today publishing the Terms of Reference for the second phase of the Southport Inquiry.

I have asked the Chair in Phase 2, to examine the adequacy of arrangements for identifying and managing the risk posed by individuals who are fixated with extreme violence. The Inquiry will consider the role of multi-agency management, the interventions needed to reduce risk to the public, the effectiveness of laws around knives and weapons, and the extent to which the internet and social media are influencing and enabling people to carry out violent attacks.

This next phase of the Inquiry will begin immediately and is expected to report in Spring 2027. A copy of the Terms of Reference for Phase 2 of the Southport Inquiry will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

The Government will provide the Inquiry with the resources it needs to complete this next phase and will fully support the Chair in the discharge of his duties. We will continue to engage with those affected by the events in Southport, to ensure that their questions are answered, and their views are heard, as this next stage commences.

Answering body: Home Office

Government published the report 'Lessons for Prevent' from the Interim Independent Prevent Commissioner on 16 July, in which Lord Anderson set out his view that the perpetrator's engagement with Prevent prior to the attack on Sir David Amess has been fully explored. The Government will act immediately on Lord Anderson's findings, building on the work that has already been completed following the Home Secretary's statement on Prevent reform in December 2024.

Currently, there is no evidence of the perpetrator having any contact with the state in a way that would have alerted authorities to his radicalisation or intent in the intervening years between his time on Prevent and his attack on Sir David. However, this intervening period does merit further exploration, so the Home Secretary has confirmed we will appoint a senior figure to scrutinise all the previous reviews that have taken place. We will act as necessary if any gaps are identified as a result of that process.

Answering body: Home Office

Following the horrific attack in Southport in July 2024, I announced that a new, dedicated permanent oversight function for Prevent would be created. This would provide continuous independent scrutiny of Prevent legislation, policy, and delivery, to assess Prevent’s effectiveness and to ensure proper standards are met.

Lord Anderson KC was appointed as interim Prevent Commissioner to provide that independent scrutiny. He was tasked specifically with scrutinising the Southport attack and the murder of Sir David Amess, examining whether Prevent had failed to intervene effectively in those two cases. Lord Anderson was also asked to consider the improvements that have been made since the perpetrators were referred to Prevent, and to identify areas for further reform. Today he has published his findings, and a copy of the report will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses. The report will also be available on Gov.UK.

I would like to express my gratitude to Lord Anderson and his team, for the progress they have made in a short space of time. The report clearly highlights the failings of Prevent in both the Southport case and that of Sir David Amess, whilst also recognising the energy and urgency that has been shown in making changes to strengthen Prevent.

Lord Anderson’s findings

On the tragic murder of Sir David Amess, Lord Anderson has upheld the conclusions of the Prevent Learning Review (PLR) that was published on 12 February 2025. He explains that once the case was adopted into Channel in 2014, several failures took place, including poor communication with the Intervention Provider and the lack of a 6-month review.

With regards to the perpetrator of the Southport attack, Lord Anderson agreed with the findings of the PLR that was published on 5 February 2025. The first referral should have been passed to the local authority Channel coordinator for information gathering (the process in place at the time). He comments that ‘it is hard to see how the test of ‘reasonable grounds to believe that there are no Prevent concerns’ could have been satisfied on the known facts of the case’. Lord Anderson also agreed with the PLR finding that there were sufficient concerns to warrant progression to Channel.

Lord Anderson concludes that in both cases their schools referred the individuals to Prevent ‘for the best of reasons – but Prevent failed to provide what might have helped them. Whether different decisions might have spared their victims will never be known: both attacks came years later, and many imponderables intervened. But wrong decisions were taken; more should have been done; and from these failures, lessons must continue to be learned’.

Lord Anderson also outlined the importance of having a prevention programme like Prevent in place for tackling radicalisation. Whilst Prevent cannot stop every attack, we must continue to drive reform where it is found lacking.

Lord Anderson made a series of recommendations on how Prevent can be further strengthened or areas that require further exploration. These include:

Prevent should remain open to individuals falling within the existing category of “fascination with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks”. Alongside this, consistent efforts should be made to improve the quality of referrals and encourage those that are appropriate, including by providing clear and consistent messaging to potential referrers and to Prevent practitioners.

A task force should be established to lead exploratory work into the possibility of formally connecting Prevent to a broader safeguarding and violence prevention system.

Compliance with respective agency mandates to share information should be more closely monitored by their regulators and inspectorates. Consideration should be given to introducing a duty to cooperate with speed and candour in reviews after adverse incidents.

Public transparency about the structures and systems of Prevent should be the default position. The Home Office and CT Policing should adopt a pro- active approach to the release of such information and be ready to publicise the successes of Prevent.

All feasible and rights-compliant avenues should be explored as a matter of priority to enable evidence of online activity to be more effectively used:

o to gauge risk factors, assess risk, identify clusters and escalation and activate and manage responses;

o to assist in the identification of potential subjects for Prevent; and

o to evaluate and address the risk factors attaching to individuals referred to Prevent.

The Government welcomes the findings of this rigorous review and will immediately act on its findings. We will:

Clarify Prevent thresholds in guidance and training to ensure that frontline public sector workers subject to the Prevent Duty understand that those ‘fascinated with extreme violence or mass casualty attacks’ should be referred to Prevent. We will complete this work by the end of September.

Improve transparency and information sharing, including by upskilling and training Prevent practitioners, frontline workers, and civil society organisations. We will complete this work before the end of the year.

We will take steps to strengthen our approach to tackling online radicalisation, through work with tech companies, like-minded international partners, and considering new approaches to identifying and supporting susceptible people online. This includes developing new capabilities to better equip Prevent to manage online radicalisation risks.

Continue exploratory work on how Prevent connects into wider safeguarding and violence prevention pathways to ensure no-one can fall between the cracks.

Whilst we must look immediately at how Prevent works alongside wider safeguarding mechanisms to stop further missed opportunities, we also look forward to the outcome of the first phase of the Southport Public Inquiry, led by Sir Adrian Fulford, which will publish its findings later this year. Where Lord Anderson’s review has identified the need to explore broader and long-term reforms to safeguarding and violence prevention, we will consider this alongside the Inquiry’s recommendations. The Inquiry will comprehensively examine all aspects of the events that led to the Southport attack, and identify where further changes should be made.

Alongside the work we will take forward in response to this report, swift progress has already been made on the reforms to strengthen Prevent I announced in December 2024:

o Prevent has launched new guidance which is designed to ensure that repeat referrals to Prevent get the multi-agency consideration they require;

o The end-to-end review of Prevent thresholds has concluded. Its recommendations will strengthen our approach to the assessment and management of Prevent referrals. It will ensure that clear and unambiguous policy, guidance, and training is in place, so that Prevent can offer the right interventions to the right people. It includes specific action to improve our approach on Islamist extremism and for those individuals who are being radicalised into extreme violence;

o The first stage of the strategic policy review into how Prevent manages people with mental ill-health or who are neurodivergent has also concluded. Action is underway to implement those findings;

o Pilots are now running across the country to ensure that where people do not meet Prevent thresholds, they receive the support they need from wider services; and

o From 1 August, we will pilot new practical mentoring interventions for people at risk of radicalisation in Channel, to enable Channel panels to better support individuals without a clear ideology.

o Prevent training is being rolled out at pace to educate frontline professionals about the ideologies, such as Islamist extremism, that drive terrorism.

In addition, to enable the vital independent oversight of Prevent to continue while a recruitment process is underway for the permanent Commissioner, I am delighted that Lord Anderson has agreed to extend his tenure as Interim Commissioner until the end of the year.

My department remains steadfast in its commitment to keeping the public safe and safeguarding people at risk of radicalisation.

The victims, their families and those who survived the Southport attack but continue to live with the physical and emotional pain, and Sir David Amess’s family remain in our hearts and prayers.

Answering body: Home Office

On 29 July 2024, a brutal attack took place at a children’s dance club in Southport. Tragically, the perpetrator murdered three young girls, Elsie Dot Stancombe, Alice da Silva Aguiar and Bebe King, and injured ten other people. My thoughts remain with their families as they come to terms with this devastating loss as well as with those injured and with all those who were present that day who survived the attack but live with the serious emotional consequences.

Nothing will ever take away their trauma and loss and we will ensure they receive the support and care they need in the years to come.

It is of vital importance that there is a clear understanding of how this terrible attack was able to happen, and the lessons learnt, so that we can take all necessary steps to minimise the risk of a future tragedy. That is why I announced in my statement to the House on 21 January that the Government would establish an independent public inquiry to do this.

Today I am formally announcing the establishment of an Inquiry, under the Inquiries Act 2005. It will need to be able to swiftly receive evidence from the full range of relevant organisations. After careful consideration, including the representations made by some of the families and victims of the attack, I have decided to set the inquiry up on a statutory basis from the beginning. The formal date of establishment of the Inquiry is today and the inquiry will begin its work immediately.

The Inquiry will be chaired by The Right Honourable Sir Adrian Fulford. Sir Adrian will bring an impartial and extensive legal background to the inquiry, particularly on issues related to policing, the criminal justice system and multi-agency working. In accordance with the provision of section 3(1)(a) of the Inquiries Act 2005, Sir Adrian will sit alone as Chair.

The Inquiry will take place in two phases. The first phase will thoroughly investigate the circumstances surrounding the attack, as well as the events leading up to it – including the perpetrator’s interactions with different public bodies. I am today publishing the terms of reference for this first phase, and I will place a copy in the Libraries of both Houses.

A later, second phase will examine the wider issue of young people being drawn into extreme violence and will be informed by the first phase.

The direction of the Inquiry’s investigation will be a matter for the Chair. The Government will provide support and ensure that the Inquiry has the resources needed to fulfil its terms of reference.

I had the privilege to meet with some of the victims and families last month. I would like to put on record my thanks to them for taking the time to meet with me and the Safeguarding Minister and sharing their deeply personal experiences. Their courage and strength in recounting these painful memories is greatly appreciated. I know Sir Adrian is planning to travel to meet with them soon, as his first priority.

I also had the opportunity to discuss the public inquiry and how it could be approached to support victims and their families, to ensure they get answers they need and to minimise further distress from this terrible attack. I am grateful for their willingness to engage so constructively in this important conversation. Their input will be crucial in shaping the inquiry’s approach and ensuring the voices of all victims are heard during the process.

Answering body: Home Office

I would like to update the House on the report commissioned by the Home Secretary and published today by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation into law in the wake of the Southport attack.

The barbaric murder of three young girls in Southport last Summer is a scarring moment in our history. We think of those little girls, Elsie Dot Stancombe, Bebe King and Alice da Silva Aguiar, whose lives were devastatingly cut short. We think of their families’ agony. And we think of those who survived the attack but live with physical and emotional scars.

In January, the perpetrator was sentenced to 52 years in prison for his horrifying crimes. It is highly likely he will never be released.

As the Prime Minister said, the responsibility for this barbaric act lies with the vile individual who carried it out, but that provides no comfort.

When the Home Secretary addressed the House on this matter in January, she set out the next steps the Government would take – including on establishing a public inquiry, on reforms to Prevent and on the legislative framework.

The inquiry will examine the issues raised in this case but also wider challenges around the rising levels of predominantly young men and boys fixated with extreme violence who may pose a risk to society. We are moving swiftly to set up the inquiry. It is expected to begin within weeks, once we have completed the important consultation with the families and victims. We intend to announce further details by the end of this month.

Within the wider Prevent system, we are learning lessons to get ahead of this changing threat, and to ensure we have the early intervention capabilities we need to keep the public safe. The Home Secretary has previously announced new measures to strengthen Prevent decision-making.

Since then, we have extended Channel multi-agency support to new cohorts, launched new pilots to ensure those below Prevent thresholds get the support they need, and appointed an interim Prevent Commissioner to bring robust independent oversight.

The appalling attack in Southport terrorised an entire community. The police and CPS determined that it was not an act of terrorism under the legal definition of terrorism set out in the Terrorism Act 2000, because there is no evidence that the perpetrator’s purpose was to advance a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause. The court accepted that conclusion.

However, we should be in no doubt about its seriousness. The judge described the attack as ’equivalent in its seriousness to terrorist murders’. And as the Prime Minister and Home Secretary have set out, this case comes against a backdrop of growing numbers of cases of violence-fixated individuals and young people being drawn into extreme violence and radicalisation.

The Met Commissioner has warned of “young men who are fixated on violence… grazing across extremist and terrorist content”, whilst Five Eyes counter-terror partners have also warned about growing radicalisation of minors.

The most significant terror threat remains from Islamist extremism, followed by extreme right-wing activity, and we must be continually vigilant against these ideological threats.

But we also need to ensure that the legal framework is strong enough to respond to extreme violence where ideology is not apparent or is less clear.

In the light of this serious and growing problem, the Home Secretary announced to Parliament in January that she had asked the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation to examine the legal framework around terrorism and the powers available to tackle this kind of extreme violent attack. The Reviewer has published that report today.

Firstly, we are grateful to the Independent Reviewer for his thorough analysis of the terrorism framework in response to this horrific attack and his important conclusion which the Government accepts that the law does need to change to respond to the rise in extreme violence in cases where ideology is unclear or cannot be proven.

Jonathan Hall KC concludes that the legal definition of terrorism is already wide and should not be changed any further. The Government accepts his conclusion.

However, the Independent Reviewer considers there is a gap in the wider criminal law. The Prime Minister has been clear that if the law needs to change to recognise this new and dangerous threat, then we will change it – and quickly.

The Reviewer notes there is no offence currently for possession of an article in private with intent to carry out a mass casualty attack, or other offence of extreme violence.

We are grateful for his consideration of this point and his conclusion that this point is already being addressed by a new measure, currently before Parliament in the Crime and Policing Bill. This will make it an offence to possess a bladed article with intent to cause unlawful violence and applies whether the possession is in public or private.

The Reviewer also concludes that within existing criminal law, ‘there is a real and not theoretical gap for lone individuals who plan mass killings’. On that basis, he recommends that Government consider creating a new offence where an individual intends to kill two or more persons and prepares for such an attack. We accept and strongly support this recommendation. I can confirm we will fix the legislation to close the gaps identified.

Finally, the Independent Reviewer draws attention to the challenges of communicating transparently and effectively following an act of extreme violence in the digital age.

It is a cornerstone of our democracy and our tradition of trial by jury that trials are fair, and justice is served. For that reason there have long been restrictions on what can be said before and during a trial.

However, the tragic events in Southport in July last year showed how social media is putting those long-established rules under strain, especially where partial or inaccurate information appears online.

That’s why the Home Secretary, the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General have asked the Law Commission to expedite elements of their ongoing review into Contempt of Court, and why Counter Terrorism Policing are also already considering what information can be released in the aftermath of major incidents.

The Government has been clear that we wish to maximise transparency and ensure that public authorities are able to take into account the wider risks to public safety to counter misinformation and disinformation. We are grateful to the Law Commission for agreeing to accelerate their consideration of this important issue and will carefully consider their findings when they are published later this year.

I would like to reiterate our thanks again to the Independent Reviewer for his comprehensive report and contribution to our efforts to fully learn the lessons of this terrible case. As the Home Secretary has already set out, today’s report is an important step in the search for answers, and to tackle horrific acts driven by a fixation on extreme violence.

Answering body: Home Office

Significant improvements have been made to Prevent over the last few years and a further package of work to strengthen Prevent was announced by the Home Secretary in December 2024. New reforms include the creation for the first time of an independent Prevent Commissioner role. This dedicated permanent oversight function will provide continuous independent scrutiny of Prevent legislation, policy and delivery to maximise Prevent’s effectiveness. To begin this work swiftly, Lord David Anderson KC was announced as the interim Commissioner on 21 January.

In relation to the cases raised by the Rt Hon member, we have published the Prevent Learning Reviews into each case and tasked Lord Anderson with conducting a rapid review of both cases. Lord Anderson will identify whether there is further learning regarding the specific handling of each case; examine improvements made to Prevent since each case and determine whether they have sufficiently strengthened the Prevent system; and identify any remaining gaps or shortcomings that require further improvement. This review will be published and swift action will be taken to implement the findings.

The Home Secretary has already announced a public inquiry into the Southport attack. We are moving swiftly to set up the inquiry and we expect to announce further details later this month, after consultation with families and others most affected.

Answering body: Home Office

We are moving swiftly to set up the inquiry.

We will consult the families and other interested parties on its scope to ensure all critical issues are addressed while remaining manageable and sensitive to the needs of those most affected.

We will announce further details about the inquiry in due course.