Source · Select Committees · Defence Committee
Recommendation 6
6
Acknowledged
Paragraph: 32
The outcome of the Doha Agreement was the return of the Taliban to power in...
Conclusion
The outcome of the Doha Agreement was the return of the Taliban to power in a country where the UK lost 457 service personnel and the MOD assessed that it had spent £27.7 billion on Operations Herrick and TORAL. We examine the decisions made in relation to the Doha Agreement more fully in our Report on Afghanistan. However, it is clear that the signing of the Doha Agreement served domestic US Administration priorities of the time. The absence of other NATO Allies and the Afghan Government at the Doha negotiations meant that decisions taken did not necessarily reflect the interests of all involved.
Government Response Summary
The government acknowledges that US negotiations were bilateral, and the UK's influence was limited, despite efforts to maintain a strategic direction and broker peace; the UK also requested an extension to the withdrawal date which was rejected.
Paragraph Reference:
32
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government
Acknowledged
US Ambassador Khalilzad’s (Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation) negotiations were bilateral and did not include Coalition partners. Ministers, CDS and other senior officials at the time worked with the Afghans, and Allies including the US to try to maintain our strategic direction and broker a workable peace. UK influence on the decision to withdraw was ultimately limited by a decision process and timescale that was led by the US President himself. The UK made clear our concerns and advocated strongly for a continued presence in some form. Extensive attempts by NATO and smaller groups of nations failed to gain traction in no small part due to the large gap left by US withdrawal. The UK also requested an extension to the withdrawal date which was rejected. Noting the extensive support structures in place at the time of the drawdown of NATO and Coalition forces, there was an increasing chance of a collapse at some point. The key question was when, on which estimates differed. A collapse was predicted by many sources despite the withdrawal process markedly reducing the intelligence footprint. Noting that President Ghani fled the country on 15 Aug 21, this further damaged our ability to hold the initiative as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. 4 Special relationships? US, UK and Nato: Government Response