US, UK and NATO

It is a testament to the depth of the defence, security and intelligence relationship between the UK and the US that changes in direction and political leadership in both countries have not undermined the relationship. However, that depth requires regular engagement at multiple levels. It cannot be taken for granted.

The UK benefits from the UK-US relationship through its access to US military thinking, equipment and research as well as the opportunity to train and deploy alongside US counterparts. The UK-US relationship enhances the UK’s security.

It is also important to recognise that the US also benefits from the relationship, through the UK’s expertise in niche capabilities, as well as through the leadership role that the UK plays in NATO. Furthermore, the role the UK has played in co- ordinating assistance to Ukraine has demonstrated not just to the US but the whole of NATO its reliability as an Ally and partner.

The UK clearly has some difficult decisions to make about investments in the modernisation of capabilities as a result of current levels of inflation and unfavourable foreign exchange rates. Whilst it is vital to maintain some sort of technology sharing with the US, UK efforts to develop innovative technological solutions with allies should also look wider afield.

The UK should explore the value of linking contracts to increase UK exports to the US and lobby the US Administration to reduce the regulatory burdens placed on UK defence companies.

The outcome of the Doha Agreement was the return of the Taliban to power in a country where the UK lost 457 service personnel and the MOD assessed that it had spent £27.7 billion on Operations Herrick and TORAL. We examine the decisions made in relation to the Doha Agreement more fully in our Report on Afghanistan. However, it is clear that the signing of the Doha Agreement served domestic US Administration priorities of the time. The absence of other NATO Allies and the Afghan Government at the Doha negotiations meant that decisions taken did not necessarily reflect the interests of all involved.

The US have engaged widely with allies and partners on Ukraine. Although this did not deter President Putin from his course of action, it helped to build a unified response. The US is to be commended for its approach in declassifying intelligence and combatting Russian narratives. UK Defence Intelligence have also kept the public informed about the situation on the ground in Ukraine. Their clear and sustained analysis is partly responsible for continuing public support for Ukraine. (Paragraph 37) Special Relationships? US, UK and NATO 35

We welcome the US public commitment to greater engagement with partners and allies. However, the UK Government needs to encourage the US to engage at the planning stage for any operations that could have an impact on the UK or UK armed forces. (Paragraph 38) The UK-NATO relationship

The UK makes an impressive contribution to NATO. We welcome the decision within the Integrated Review of 2021 to ensure that the UK maintained its prominent role in NATO. However, we are concerned that if the Government fails to protect the defence budget from inflationary and foreign exchange pressures combined with the withdrawal of a battle group from Estonia, it will send the wrong message to Allies and adversaries alike. Unity is vital in understanding what the threat is and how best to counter it.

The Joint Expeditionary Force has proven itself to be effective, acting as a force multiplier for both its constituent countries and NATO. We have heard that the UK should focus its efforts within NATO on the High North. Given that UK Defence is calling for greater NATO focus on the High North, it appears obvious that under the SACEUR’s new regional plans the UK should be looking to reinforce the borders of its JEF counterparts. We therefore recommend that the Government ensure that it has the necessary personnel and capabilities available to lead NATO operations in the High North.

We welcome the likely accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. We recommend that the Government continue to engage with interlocuters in both Hungary and Türkiye to lobby for ratification in the near future.

NATO has been revitalised by the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine—there is a unity of purpose and agreement on what the threat posed is. However, it is still in the relatively early stages of its shift to refocusing on the defence of continental Europe, and political and technological developments are required to ensure NATO maintains its technological edge.

We welcome NATO-EU engagement, both on China and defence capabilities, where it is complementary, rather than duplicative. We are also supportive of the UK’s application to join PESCO. (Paragraph 82) Wider issues

It is clear that the UK and its NATO Allies have allowed ammunition stockpiles to dwindle to dangerously low levels. Whilst Russia is also facing the diminution of its stockpiles, other adversaries are able to maintain and potentially increase their own. This inability to replenish UK stockpiles therefore puts at risk not just our ability to resupply Ukraine but also to counter any threat to our own security.

Defence industrial capacity needs to be both resilient and scalable. In order to secure supply chains the Secretary of State acknowledged that the Government needs to address skills shortages as well as committing to significant orders alongside allies 36 Special Relationships? US, UK and NATO to ensure that production lines are maintained in the long term and to replace stockpiles of munitions in the short term. Capacity (including redundant capacity) is also key if industry is to be able to ramp up production.

It is clear that the manner in which Western Governments procure armaments is not fit for purpose. The MOD produced a strategy aimed at improving the way that it engages with industry and allies almost two years ago and yet we have been told it will take at least a decade to replenish (and then increase to a sustainable level) UK ammunition stockpiles. We have previously recommended that the Department report annually on its implementation of the Defence, Security and Industrial Strategy—a recommendation which was ignored. We therefore recommend that the Department produce an action plan of how it intends to grow defence industrial capacity and reduce the time taken to replenish UK stockpiles. We further recommend that the Department brief this and other relevant Committees on the steps required to fulfil those goals.

We welcome the Government’s acknowledgement that resilience requires investment in increasing the medium and high skills base. We recommend that the MOD enter into a joint programme of work with other relevant Government Departments to identify and remove barriers which stop UK educational institutions from preparing their students to become the workers required for the UK defence industrial base. Furthermore, we recommend that the MOD pilot a procurement approach whereby a set percentage of apprentices are required to be attached to an acquisition programme.

The events of the past year demonstrate the need for effective deterrence against aggressive actions which undermine the rules-based international order. The UK must work within NATO to ensure that there is an agreed approach and unity of action. But capable, sustainable armed forces are also a vital part of a credible deterrence. Adversaries must believe that the UK (alongside Allies and partners) will retaliate against aggressive actions which undermine the international rule of law, making aggressors pay a disproportionate price. (Paragraph 102) Special Relationships? US, UK and NATO 37