Recommendations and conclusions 13 shown
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
The announcement of this policy appears to have been made prematurely. When the Government has been asked for details, it has consistently responded that these were being worked out. Announcing a policy before finalising the details is bad practice, particularly when that policy area is so sensitive. We question why such a premature announcement was made.
Recommendation · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Recommended (the committee's words)
In line with our general policy on shipbuilding, we call on the Home Office to ensure that any new vessels are built in British yards, to ensure national capacity is maintained
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
A successful military strategy requires clear ends, ways and means. The ends (or in this case the objectives) are anything but. The MOD appears to regard its objective as ensuring that no migrant lands on their own terms, but the Home Office sees the objective as deterrence. Whilst these are not mutually exclusive, nor do they necessarily reinforce each other. The MoD’s objective is in any case at best incoherent, since the migrants’ over-riding aim is to land in the UK, regardless of whether or not on their own terms.
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
We are seriously concerned by the lack of a clear endpoint for this operation. Restoring public confidence in the immigration system is a task at which numerous governments have failed. It is not a task Defence is equipped to undertake. The MOD has its own policy failings which it needs to remedy – it should not be made responsible for the failings of other government departments as well.
Recommendation · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Recommended (the committee's words)
We recommend that the Home Office and the MOD agree realistic indicators of success and explain them to both Houses of Parliament. Furthermore, we recommend that an agreed date for the operation to be handed over to the Border Force is published, with the option of extension if so required. This cannot be an open-ended deployment, occupying scarce Royal Naval vessels and personnel.
Recommendation · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Recommended (the committee's words)
We believe that the Government ought to reconsider its refusal to publish the details of strategic and operational responsibility. This confusion around where responsibility for the policy lies is compounded by the fact that, as noted above, the solution to this issue does not lie at sea and therefore is outside the control of the Royal Navy (and indeed the MOD), despite its assuming primacy of the maritime operation. The fact that, six weeks on from the initial announcement, the Government is still unable (or unwilling) to answer questions about this issue does not inspire confidence.
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
A public disagreement between two great offices of state, played out in the House and on Twitter, is deeply unedifying. If one of the objectives is to restore public 30 Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings confidence then this disagreement has done the opposite and the operation has failed before it has even started. We question whether announcing the policy before agreeing the detail was a wise move or rather one borne of desperation. We hope that lessons will be learned from this experience.
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
It is clear that if Royal Navy vessels are to be committed to the operation in the Channel, some existing commitments will be given up. The Government ought to be clear, both with Parliament and the public what it is prioritising this task against and which commitments will be unfulfilled as a result.
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
The Defence budget (despite its recent uplift and multi-year commitment) is already inadequate. Adding responsibility for immigration without a further uplift in the budget takes scarce resources from an already overstretched Department. We do not understand why this operation is not being treated as a MACA request and accordingly resourced by the Home Office.
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
Operation Isotrope’s potential to cause reputational damage to the Royal Navy (and even UK Defence as a whole) is significant. That risk comes from a number of areas: those who believe that this is not a defence task (but rather ought to be carried out by civil authorities); those who believe that the Royal Navy ought to have other, more pressing priorities; and those who believe that the Royal Navy is ineffective in the role, instead becoming a ‘taxi service’ for those crossing the Channel. This reputational damage could likely be countered by clear messaging of what the expectations are upon Royal Navy assets in the Channel and cross-Government agreement of the strategic objective of the operation. However, we have not seen any evidence that that will happen.
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
The manner in which this decision was announced leaves a lot to be desired. The confusion around the ways and means which will be used to achieve the strategic objective (let alone the strategic objective itself) is unhelpful and does not lend itself to effective scrutiny, particularly when Ministers provide the bare minimum of information. This is compounded by the fact that, more than six weeks after the decision had been announced and we had requested more information from them, we have not received any evidence, written or oral from either of the Departments involved.
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
Furthermore, this operation distracts from other Defence tasks, which is a particular concern given the shortfalls we identified in our recent Report ‘We’re going to need a bigger Navy’. The operation will likely have long-term impacts on training, personnel leave allocation and asset maintenance. It is also unclear why Op Isotrope is not being funded under the normal MACA arrangements. The reputational risk to the Royal Navy, particularly if this becomes a long-term operation, is significant. We can see few positives and many negatives should the Royal Navy assume primacy as suggested.
Conclusion · Fourth Report - Operation Isotrope: the use of the military to counter migrant crossings · Addressed to Ministry of Defence
Concluded (the committee's words)
In short, the Government has not attempted to persuade us that Operation Isotrope is anything but an ill-defined policy, prematurely announced. The best case scenario for the Royal Navy is that it will leave with its reputation unharmed: there is no prospect of leaving with its reputation enhanced.