Withdrawal from Afghanistan

The signing of the Doha Agreement served domestic US Administration priorities, by enabling the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan to a defined schedule. The absence of the United Kingdom, other allies and the Afghan Government from the negotiating table was unfortunate, although it is unclear whether the United Kingdom Government made any request to be included. The agreement emboldened the Taliban and gave it a timeframe in which to plan its future operations. The Afghan National Security and Defence Forces had become reliant under Western tutelage on air support and logistics contractors to operate effectively. Their withdrawal made the subsequent collapse of the Afghan Government inevitable.

Although the Defence Secretary assured us that he had attempted to find a way to retain a military presence in Afghanistan without the US, we recognise how difficult this would have been in practice. This shows the limits of NATO’s military capability without US involvement.

Optimism bias and failures in intelligence and analysis meant that the rapid collapse of the Afghan Government was a greater surprise to the military establishment than it might have been.

If the initial goal of the NATO deployment was mainly to prevent terrorist attacks against Western nations originating in Afghanistan, current evidence suggests that while there have been no such recent attacks to date, Afghanistan is once again becoming a safe haven for international terrorism. And it is impossible to argue that the mission has been a success if its goal was in part to ensure Afghanistan’s stability as a functioning state, with basic human rights for its population, including women and girls. The fall of the Afghan Government represented a serious strategic blow to NATO and its allies.

Technically, NATO forces were not defeated in Afghanistan. However, this must not prevent the recognition that the end of the NATO mission has been severely detrimental both to the people of Afghanistan and to the security of the region, as well as to Alliance and UK military credibility. (Paragraph 36) The Evacuation and Relocation of Eligible Afghans

We welcome the award of medals to Armed Forces personnel who served on Operation PITTING, and recognise the success of the military operation element of the evacuation from Afghanistan—though this must not mask the wider context that the operation was only necessary because of the Taliban’s advances following the end of the NATO mission.

The same praise, however, cannot be given to the efforts of the UK Government’s civilian operations in support of the evacuation. Our colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee have taken extensive evidence and reached persuasive findings in these areas. While it was never going to be possible to evacuate everyone who met Withdrawal from Afghanistan 23 the eligibility criteria as part of the operation, there was an obvious lack of effective co-ordination across Government, with real and painful human consequences for those who reasonably expected to be evacuated but were not. The processing and prioritisation of potential evacuees under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) could and should have been much further advanced by the time that the need for the evacuation became urgent.

We recognise the ongoing efforts of the UK Government and of organisations including the Afghan Solidarity Coalition and the Sulha Alliance to evacuate eligible Afghans remaining in Afghanistan or in third countries. It is concerning, however, that, according to the MOD’s own estimates, several thousand eligible Afghans— whose safety is by definition at risk in Afghanistan—remain to be evacuated under the ARAP well over a year after the end of Operation PITTING. We recommend that the Government set out in their response to this report what action they are taking to ensure safe passage to the United Kingdom for eligible Afghans who remain to be evacuated under the ARAP. (Paragraph 54) Mental Health of Veterans

The withdrawal from Afghanistan and end of the UK’s twenty-year military involvement in the country has understandably had a negative impact on veterans’ mental health. This has increased demand on services provided by organisations such as Combat Stress and Help for Heroes as well as the NHS. The announcement of £2.7 million extra funding for veteran’s mental health through Operation Courage was welcome, as was the Government commitment to another £5 million for military charities to support veterans. We urge the Government to have an ongoing dialogue with charities working in this area to ensure that they are suitably resourced to engage in their important work. (Paragraph 59) Learning Lessons from Afghanistan

The UK contribution to the war in Afghanistan took the lives of 457 UK armed forces personnel and injured thousands more, and cost more than £27 billion. The evacuation from Afghanistan in August 2021 resulted in 15,000 people being brought to the UK but left many behind. It is therefore of critical importance that the UK Government conduct an open, honest and detailed review of the UK’s involvement in the country. This review should include military operations and political decisions covering the full timeline of the UK’s involvement, from the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 and the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, to the evacuation from Kabul in August 2021. This thinking would have been helpful to contribute to the update to the Integrated Review that is currently under way. (Paragraph 65) 24 Withdrawal from Afghanistan