Recommendation 7

HM Government Acknowledged

In the run up to the fall of Kabul, it was vitally important to reassure the Government of Afghanistan that the Coalition, and by implication the UK, were in support. The UK was subject to rules in force from the Government of Afghanistan and open acknowledgement of the advanced work on evacuations would have sent a message that UK were wavering. We note the Committee’s reflection on supporting civilians as part of the end of the Afghanistan campaign. We would offer the following observations: a) Paragraph 38 a) of the report highlights a “lack of preparedness for the actual number of potential applicants, resulting in under-resourcing, which in turn caused backlogs in applications and errors in decision-making.” We note that ARAP was initially designed primarily to support those who worked directly for HMG, covering a maximum of 829 principals (approximately 4100 people) over a timeframe of 5 years. The speed of the collapse of the Afghan government changed the pace of relocations, increasing the scope and number of people that HMG sought to protect and relocate under ARAP. By the end of Operation PITTING 7055 people had been relocated to the UK under ARAP, substantially more than the scheme was designed for and over a considerably shorter period; b) Paragraph 38 a) also notes that “Only one locally employed civilian had been relocated to the UK as at 1 June 2021.” ARAP came into force on 1 April 2021. However, this figure does not account for the 1400 eligible people who were relocated to the UK as part of the ex-gratia scheme (EGS) that preceded the launch of ARAP. It also does not reflect preparatory work undertaken to enable relocations to the UK to begin at scale, in the context of COVID, and other factors described below; c) Paragraph 38 c) cites “unclear, frequently changing scheme criteria.” HMG took decisions to ensure we could protect the most vulnerable as the security situation deteriorated. There was a responsibility on HMG to ensure that it did not accelerate a loss of functioning security or confidence in the Afghanistan Government by relocating Afghans who were contributing to it. d) Paragraph 38 c) highlights exclusions to ARAP stating 35% of all interpreters were excluded. Defence did dismiss a number of locally employed civilians for a range of disciplinary and conduct-related reasons, some of which were very serious. These decisions were reviewed in the context of the situation in Afghanistan based on the information available at the time. We now have provision in the Immigration Rules that allow those dismissed for minor reasons to be eligible for ARAP; e) Paragraph 38 c) also notes that those who had fled Afghanistan were also not in scope of the policy. A decision was initially taken to focus on those at most 4 Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Government Reponse to the Committee’s Fifth Report risk as they were in Afghanistan and therefore not prioritise those living in safe third countries. However, the rules and policy were amended to support those individuals who had fled to third countries; f) Paragraph 39 notes that 16 Air Assault Brigade deployed first. The operation was led by Joint Forces Headquarters who were the first to deploy; g) Paragraph 45 highlights that written evidence submitted to the Committee “found that Government departments lacked co-ordination and consistency in their dealings and communications with Afghan applicants for evacuation, through the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy.”2 The ARAP process was by necessity a two-stage process: firstly the MOD or the sponsoring Department would confirm eligibility and then once eligible, an individual would be called forward to provide documentations and biometric checks. If they failed these checks, they were subsequently excluded; h) Paragraph 51 notes “Theoretically the ARAP remains open at the time of writing.” The Secretary of State for Defence has confirmed that ARAP remains open;3 and, i) Overall ARAP operated in a context of considerable external constraints placed upon relocation efforts e.g., the difficulties posed by operating the scheme from a non-permissive environment and “red list” country during the COVID-19 pandemic. Eligible Afghans were subject to requirements not only from HMG (e.g., COVID-19 test), but also from the Afghan government which stipulated identity documents were needed for all eligible individuals to travel.