1st Report - UK defence policy: from aspiration to reality?

The government's response

What the committee recommended 64

1. 1
   The strategic assumptions that underpinned the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper have changed. Conclusion · paragraph 57
2. 2
   The conventional nature of the Ukraine war may call into question the emphasis in the... Conclusion · paragraph 58
3. 3
   Nevertheless, the Committee is aware that the idea of the Integrated Review was to outline... Conclusion · paragraph 59
4. 4
   Caution should be exercised in conclusively drawing lessons from the battlefield in Ukraine. Conclusion · paragraph 60
5. 5
   Nevertheless, the Ukraine conflict has served as a reminder of the nature of modern conventional... Conclusion · paragraph 61

See all 64 recommendations and conclusions

Sources

• 1st Report - UK defence policy: from aspiration to reality? ↗The committee's report, parliament.uk
• Government response to the UK defence policy: from aspiration to reality? report ↗The government's response, 11 March 2023, parliament.uk

Recommendations and conclusions 64

1. 1
   The strategic assumptions that underpinned the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper have changed. Conclusion · paragraph 57 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The strategic assumptions that underpinned the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper have changed. In particular, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally changed the European security environment. We wholeheartedly welcome the Government’s continued support for Ukraine in the face of Russia’s aggression.
2. 2
   The conventional nature of the Ukraine war may call into question the emphasis in the... Conclusion · paragraph 58 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The conventional nature of the Ukraine war may call into question the emphasis in the Integrated Review on “sub-threshold” threats in the short term. As the Government updates the Integrated Review, it should carefully consider the relative emphasis it places on conventional versus sub-threshold threats, particularly from Russia.
3. 3
   Nevertheless, the Committee is aware that the idea of the Integrated Review was to outline... Conclusion · paragraph 59 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Nevertheless, the Committee is aware that the idea of the Integrated Review was to outline possible threats within a 10-year timespan, and the fact that threats falling below the threshold of war are not prominent now does not mean that they will not gain further prominence in the coming years.
4. 4
   Caution should be exercised in conclusively drawing lessons from the battlefield in Ukraine. Conclusion · paragraph 60 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Caution should be exercised in conclusively drawing lessons from the battlefield in Ukraine. The conflict is ongoing and the outcome remains uncertain.
5. 5
   Nevertheless, the Ukraine conflict has served as a reminder of the nature of modern conventional... Conclusion · paragraph 61 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Nevertheless, the Ukraine conflict has served as a reminder of the nature of modern conventional warfare, particularly regarding the high attrition rates of equipment and ammunition stocks.
6. 6
   Both the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff suggested that the UK’s... Recommendation · paragraph 62 Recommendation (the committee's words)

   Both the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff suggested that the UK’s approach to its own weapons stocks may need to be reviewed in the light of the Ukraine conflict. We agree. As well as replenishing the equipment it has donated to Ukraine, the Government will need to build greater resilience into its own stocks, supply chains, and industrial capacity. We call on the Government to set out its plans in this regard in its response to this report, as a matter of urgency.
7. 7
   The Ukraine war has also seen novel and innovative uses of technology on the battlefield,... Conclusion · paragraph 63 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The Ukraine war has also seen novel and innovative uses of technology on the battlefield, particularly drones and commercial satellites. We welcome the close level of monitoring by the Ministry of Defence of the conflict and its efforts to learn lessons from the Ukrainians where possible. It should continue this approach as the conflict continues.
8. 8
   Although this inquiry did explore the initial implications of the conflict in Ukraine, it did... Conclusion · paragraph 64 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Although this inquiry did explore the initial implications of the conflict in Ukraine, it did so in the context of a much broader inquiry. In our view, there is a continuing need for dedicated further scrutiny of the war’s implications for UK defence and security, particularly as the conflict remains ongoing.
9. 9
   The economic assumptions that underpinned the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper have also... Conclusion · paragraph 65 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The economic assumptions that underpinned the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper have also changed significantly since the documents were published. In particular, we are concerned that with current levels of inflation and foreign exchange rates, the Government may not be able to deliver on the aspirations of the two papers unless further resources are made available. As the Defence Secretary told us, high levels of capital spending mean that the defence budget is particularly vulnerable to inflation.
10. 10
    We welcome the Defence Secretary’s personal commitment to shielding the defence budget from inflation over... Conclusion · paragraph 66 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We welcome the Defence Secretary’s personal commitment to shielding the defence budget from inflation over the coming years, though we recognise that this will be subject to Treasury-led decisions on Government spending. We ask the Government to update the Committee on the ongoing impact of inflation on defence spending when it responds to this report.
11. 11
    In their response to this report, we request that the Government set out its assessment... Conclusion · paragraph 67 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    In their response to this report, we request that the Government set out its assessment of the impact of the changing economic environment on what the Defence Secretary called the “planned marker” of raising defence expenditure to 3 per cent of GDP by 2030.
12. 12
    Overall, these major changes in the strategic and economic context highlight the need to update... Conclusion · paragraph 68 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Overall, these major changes in the strategic and economic context highlight the need to update the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper. We welcome the Government’s commitment to doing so and we look forward to scrutinising the updated documents when they are published.
13. 13
    The Integrated Review’s identification of Russia as a major threat has been thoroughly vindicated by... Recommendation · paragraph 144 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The Integrated Review’s identification of Russia as a major threat has been thoroughly vindicated by the latter’s reckless and illegal invasion of Ukraine. However, as it updates the Integrated Review, the Government should consider carefully whether there is sufficient emphasis on the conventional military threat from Russia as well as its sub-threshold capabilities.
14. 14
    Russia’s military failures in Ukraine have highlighted some of its weaknesses. Recommendation · paragraph 145 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    Russia’s military failures in Ukraine have highlighted some of its weaknesses. But Russia also has many enduring strengths, including cyber, nuclear, space, maritime, and underwater capabilities. Some of these have not featured strongly in the war in Ukraine. There is no room for complacency, and the Government must remain vigilant in the face of the multifaceted threat from Russia. In its response to this report, the Government should set out its assessment of current Russian strengths and weaknesses in the light of events in Ukraine.
15. 15
    The aggressive nuclear rhetoric from Russia in recent months has been deeply concerning, and reinforces... Conclusion · paragraph 146 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The aggressive nuclear rhetoric from Russia in recent months has been deeply concerning, and reinforces the importance of the UK’s own nuclear deterrent. In light of the threat from Russia, the British nuclear deterrent must remain credible.
16. 16
    We call on the Government to continue its support for NATO allies bordering Russia—the Baltic... Recommendation · paragraph 147 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We call on the Government to continue its support for NATO allies bordering Russia—the Baltic States and Poland—and possible future members, Finland and Sweden.
17. 17
    As the Government recognises, the Ukraine conflict has reinforced the central importance of the Western... Conclusion · paragraph 148 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    As the Government recognises, the Ukraine conflict has reinforced the central importance of the Western alliance, particularly NATO, to the UK’s security and defence policy. The UK makes an important contribution to NATO, which gives it a degree of influence within the alliance. Within the Western alliance, the United States remains by far the most capable military and defence partner.
18. 18
    The Integrated Review rightly recognises the importance of cooperating with the UK’s European partners. Conclusion · paragraph 149 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Integrated Review rightly recognises the importance of cooperating with the UK’s European partners. However, we are concerned that this could be undermined by the poor quality of UK-EU relations in recent years. We also note that current UK-EU arrangements do not provide for structured cooperation on foreign policy, security or defence. We believe that improved relations between the UK and the EU would be beneficial for the western alliance as a whole.
19. 19
    We have been particularly concerned by the deterioration in the bilateral relationship with France, which... Recommendation · paragraph 150 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We have been particularly concerned by the deterioration in the bilateral relationship with France, which has bled into defence cooperation despite the two countries’ historic ties and shared interests. We urge the Government to seek to improve this vital bilateral relationship as a matter of priority.
20. 20
    We note the increasing momentum towards greater defence cooperation between the EU and NATO. Recommendation · paragraph 151 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We note the increasing momentum towards greater defence cooperation between the EU and NATO. In their response to this report, the Government should set out its view on the implications of increased EU-NATO cooperation for the UK, given the UK’s status as a non-EU member of NATO.
21. 21
    Given that the UK fights as part of alliances and coalitions, it is vital that... Conclusion · paragraph 152 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Given that the UK fights as part of alliances and coalitions, it is vital that its Armed Forces continue to be fully integrated with those of its NATO allies. Careful thought should also be given to the appropriate division of labour within NATO, which may require the UK to prioritise and specialise in certain military capabilities over others.
22. 22
    The UK’s defence capabilities must be credible in the eyes of its allies, and their... Conclusion · paragraph 153 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The UK’s defence capabilities must be credible in the eyes of its allies, and their expectations must be met. To that end, we are concerned that the UK is currently not capable of deploying an armoured division of the quality that the United States, in particular, expects. Although we welcome the frankness of the Defence Secretary in admitting this problem, we request that the Government sets out whether deploying an armoured division to fight alongside the US is still an objective.
23. 23
    Like many other European countries, the UK’s force size has long been generated through alliance... Conclusion · paragraph 154 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Like many other European countries, the UK’s force size has long been generated through alliance and coalitions, particularly NATO, rather than unilaterally. The question of whether the UK’s Armed Forces have sufficient mass must be considered in this context.
24. 24
    In our previous report on the UK-China relationship, we concluded that the Integrated Review’s characterisation... Conclusion · paragraph 155 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    In our previous report on the UK-China relationship, we concluded that the Integrated Review’s characterisation of China as both a “systemic competitor” and an “important partner” was ambiguous and added to the uncertainty over the Government’s China strategy. This remains our view.
25. 25
    The question of whether the updated Integrated Review will re-designate China as a “threat” to... Conclusion · paragraph 156 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The question of whether the updated Integrated Review will re-designate China as a “threat” to the UK has been the source of considerable speculation. We note that the Prime Minister’s recent foreign policy speech referred to China as a “systemic challenge”. As the Government updates the Integrated Review, it must consider carefully whether the “competitor” framing is still appropriate, particularly in the light of China’s increasingly aggressive posture towards Taiwan and its partnership with Russia.
26. 26
    The Defence Secretary told us that the UK “wants a peaceful process” towards China’s “reunification”... Conclusion · paragraph 157 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Defence Secretary told us that the UK “wants a peaceful process” towards China’s “reunification” with Taiwan. We request further clarification from the Defence Secretary on his words and what he meant by them.
27. 27
    The “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific region was a key theme of the Integrated Review. Conclusion · paragraph 158 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific region was a key theme of the Integrated Review. However, it was primarily conceived as an economic and diplomatic concept, with a secondary defence and security component.
28. 28
    As such, the Indo-Pacific “tilt” need not be incompatible with prioritising NATO and the Euro-Atlantic... Recommendation · paragraph 159 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    As such, the Indo-Pacific “tilt” need not be incompatible with prioritising NATO and the Euro-Atlantic region as the cornerstone of UK defence policy, the importance of which was highlighted in the Integrated Review and has been reinforced by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nevertheless, the Government should remain wary of the risk of over-committing resources to the Indo-Pacific given the deterioration in the European security environment.
29. 29
    The Middle East is home to several ongoing UK military commitments, as well as several... Conclusion · paragraph 160 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Middle East is home to several ongoing UK military commitments, as well as several key partners. It remains an important region for UK engagement.
30. 30
    Some of our witnesses felt that the Middle East was neglected in the Integrated Review,... Conclusion · paragraph 161 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Some of our witnesses felt that the Middle East was neglected in the Integrated Review, a criticism the Defence Secretary strongly rejected. But, whether intentionally or not, the Middle East was not given the same prominence as other regions in the Integrated Review’s discussion of the UK’s strategic priorities; simply mentioning the UK’s commitments and partnerships there does not change this. We hope that the Government revisits the emphasis placed on the Middle East as it updates the Integrated Review.
31. 31
    The Committee acknowledges that the military soft power of the United Kingdom in general, and... Conclusion · paragraph 162 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee acknowledges that the military soft power of the United Kingdom in general, and of Military Academies in particular, should be recognised and praised. The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth, the Royal Air Force College, and the Defence Academy are important educational institutions and critical tools of British soft power.
32. 32
    The Committee welcomes the ambitions set out in the Defence Command Paper for the Royal... Conclusion · paragraph 221 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee welcomes the ambitions set out in the Defence Command Paper for the Royal Navy, and agrees with its assessment about the importance of the UK’s naval capabilities. However, we are concerned about the impact of the economic environment, and inflation in particular, on the Government’s investment plans for the Royal Navy.
33. 33
    The Government rightly recognises the urgent need to transform the British Army’s capabilities for the... Conclusion · paragraph 222 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Government rightly recognises the urgent need to transform the British Army’s capabilities for the modern era. But it will be challenging for the Army to translate these ambitions into reality, and a great deal of work needs to be done.
34. 34
    We agree with the Government that headline troop numbers are not the most appropriate metric... Conclusion · paragraph 223 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We agree with the Government that headline troop numbers are not the most appropriate metric by which to judge the Army’s capabilities. The more important question is whether the Army has the resources and capabilities it needs to deliver on the Government’s ambitions. This depends not only on the number of troops, but also on how well-equipped and trained they are.
35. 35
    We await with interest the outcome of the budget negotiations between the Treasury and the... Conclusion · paragraph 224 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We await with interest the outcome of the budget negotiations between the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence. If the results of these negotiations have an impact on the British Army’s size, equipment levels and training, we request that the Government explains the rationale for and implications of this in its response to this report.
36. 36
    The Committee understands that limited resources and a need to prioritise have an impact on... Conclusion · paragraph 225 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee understands that limited resources and a need to prioritise have an impact on the UK’s airpower capabilities, but sees an opportunity to deepen cooperation with our NATO partners and allies. There is a space for the RAF to take lead on the European SEAD/DEAD airpower capabilities.
37. 37
    The Committee believes that both the weapon and ammunition stocks are inadequate across all three... Conclusion · paragraph 226 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee believes that both the weapon and ammunition stocks are inadequate across all three services, and remedying this situation should be the highest priority for the Government.
38. 38
    We note the renewed emphasis on the nuclear deterrent in the Integrated Review. Conclusion · paragraph 227 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We note the renewed emphasis on the nuclear deterrent in the Integrated Review. It is vital that the UK’s nuclear deterrent remains credible, particularly in the current security environment.
39. 39
    We are satisfied that the UK’s nuclear deterrent is politically and operationally independent, though it... Conclusion · paragraph 228 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We are satisfied that the UK’s nuclear deterrent is politically and operationally independent, though it remains dependent on the US for the supply of missiles.
40. 40
    The Government has never explained the rationale for the Integrated Review’s announced increase in the... Recommendation · paragraph 229 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The Government has never explained the rationale for the Integrated Review’s announced increase in the overall nuclear warhead stockpile ceiling. While we acknowledge the need for some secrecy in this area, we were surprised that the Defence Secretary promised to submit “the exact figures” for the number of warheads to the Committee (in apparent contradiction to Government policy), but then did not do so. We call on the Ministry of Defence to provide as much detail as it can on the rationale for the increased stockpile ceiling.
41. 41
    The Committee believes that all aspects of public spending should be scrutinised by Parliament and... Recommendation · paragraph 230 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The Committee believes that all aspects of public spending should be scrutinised by Parliament and that the Government is too often reluctant to admit the scale of expenditure by citing security concerns. We call on the Government to consider allowing Parliamentary Committees responsible for scrutiny of the UK’s defence policy to access (on a confidential basis) information about how funds are allocated and spent on, for example, the nuclear deterrent.
42. 42
    The announcement that both the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper will be updated... Conclusion · paragraph 231 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The announcement that both the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper will be updated provides an opportunity for the Government to outline clearly how it plans to translate the aspirational language into practice. The Government has to outline what it wants to prioritise and which hard choices it is willing to make to fulfil those aspirations. The Integrated Review did not provide such priorities. Therefore, the Defence Command Paper lacked the required focus.
43. 43
    Although there are different perspectives as to whether the Government’s decision to prioritise investment in... Conclusion · paragraph 295 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Although there are different perspectives as to whether the Government’s decision to prioritise investment in new technologies over mass can be considered a “bet”, the Government has decided to take this risk.
44. 44
    We welcome the Defence Secretary’s explanation of the need to take this risk but remain... Conclusion · paragraph 296 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We welcome the Defence Secretary’s explanation of the need to take this risk but remain concerned about the possible impact on the country’s defence capabilities. Ukraine’s successful resistance of the Russian invasion has demonstrated the way that technology can be leveraged to defeat mass, and can in some circumstances act as a force multiplier, but it has also shown the need for a balanced approach between legacy and new capabilities and for sufficient mass of both.
45. 45
    It is too early to assess whether new technology can act as a force multiplier... Conclusion · paragraph 297 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    It is too early to assess whether new technology can act as a force multiplier in the case of the United Kingdom. Investment in R&D requires long-term planning and consistency in terms of priorities and funding. We believe that the Government is on the right track, but plans and promises (including funding pledges) have to be implemented.
46. 46
    We are concerned that the level of the UK’s overall R&D spending is insufficient. Conclusion · paragraph 298 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We are concerned that the level of the UK’s overall R&D spending is insufficient. The Government’s ambition of reaching 2.4 per cent of GDP would merely put the UK on a par with the OECD average. In particular, we are concerned that the level of R&D defence funding, as outlined by the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, may be insufficient to meet the ambition of “sustaining strategic advantage through science and technology”.
47. 47
    In their response to this report, the Government should outline how the Defence Science and... Recommendation · paragraph 299 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    In their response to this report, the Government should outline how the Defence Science and Technology structures will co-operate with the newly established Advanced Research and Invention Agency. We understand that it was difficult to assess it during our inquiry, as the leadership of ARIA was appointed shortly before our evidence sessions with the Ministry of Defence officials. The time that has passed since then should allow for a more comprehensive response.
48. 48
    The Committee is concerned by the evidence we received that companies, start-up and new technology... Conclusion · paragraph 300 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee is concerned by the evidence we received that companies, start-up and new technology enterprises in particular, face significant bureaucratic obstacles. This may be holding back innovation and could become one of the main obstacles to the Government’s agenda of investing in new capabilities; or one of the reasons why the “bet” on new technologies, as identified by many of our witnesses, may fail.
49. 49
    The Committee understands that defence and private R&D share similar obstacles when it comes to... Recommendation · paragraph 301 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The Committee understands that defence and private R&D share similar obstacles when it comes to translating ideas into capabilities. The Government should set out the practical steps it is taking in order to mitigate the risk of the so-called “Valley of Death” between theoretical innovations and practical capabilities.
50. 50
    The Committee welcomes the Government’s decision to further strengthen cooperation with allies on research and... Conclusion · paragraph 302 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee welcomes the Government’s decision to further strengthen cooperation with allies on research and development, and agrees with the contention that AUKUS can act as a technology accelerator agreement.
51. 51
    However, while Australia and the US are critical security and defence partners for the UK,... Recommendation · paragraph 303 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    However, while Australia and the US are critical security and defence partners for the UK, with a long-shared history and trust developed through the Five Eyes network, the Government should set out how it is planning to facilitate similar close cooperation with our European NATO allies.
52. 52
    The Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper have put additional pressure on the Ministry... Conclusion · paragraph 359 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper have put additional pressure on the Ministry of Defence and its current structures. The Committee welcomes the Defence Secretary’s announcement of a forthcoming head office reform and looks forward to further details.
53. 53
    We welcome the establishment of the Secretary of State’s Office for Net Assessment and Change... Conclusion · paragraph 360 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We welcome the establishment of the Secretary of State’s Office for Net Assessment and Change (SONAC) and trust that it will bring the required intellectual vigour and creativity. We hope that SONAC becomes a permanent feature of the Ministry of Defence, beyond the tenure of the current Defence Secretary.
54. 54
    The Committee acknowledges the need for culture change within the Ministry of Defence, including the... Conclusion · paragraph 361 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee acknowledges the need for culture change within the Ministry of Defence, including the need to evolve the MoD’s approach to taking risk; the need to establish new types of partnership and cooperation with the industry and academia; and the need for clear communication, by the MoD, of its expectations, goals and requirements.
55. 55
    The Committee notes that the leadership of the Ministry of Defence is aware of these... Conclusion · paragraph 362 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee notes that the leadership of the Ministry of Defence is aware of these challenges and we request that adequate action be taken. In the case of the Ajax programme, we request that the Defence Secretary provides regular updates to the Committee.
56. 56
    The Committee looks forward to the implementation of the recently published strategic documents, including the... Conclusion · paragraph 363 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee looks forward to the implementation of the recently published strategic documents, including the Defence Command paper, the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, the Defence Science and Technology Strategy and the Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy. We hope that the Government will put words into deeds, meeting the expectations of the defence industry.
57. 57
    The Committee was disappointed to hear that, from the perspective of one tech company, the... Conclusion · paragraph 364 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee was disappointed to hear that, from the perspective of one tech company, the Ministry of Defence can be considered “one of the worst customers in the world”. The Committee hopes that the full implementation of Government’s objectives outlined in its strategic documents will lead to a change in this perception.
58. 58
    The Committee acknowledges that there is always an element of risk that has to be... Conclusion · paragraph 365 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee acknowledges that there is always an element of risk that has to be taken when investing in emerging and disruptive technologies. We are concerned that the Ministry of Defence is not prepared to take the appropriate level of risk. We call upon the Government to clarify how the MoD assesses risk in its procurement practices.
59. 59
    The Committee recognises the challenges posed by the rewards system within the Ministry of Defence... Conclusion · paragraph 366 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee recognises the challenges posed by the rewards system within the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, where promotion often means a need to rotate to a different area of responsibilities.
60. 60
    The Committee recommends a reform of the Government’s reward system, especially for MoD project managers... Conclusion · paragraph 367 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee recommends a reform of the Government’s reward system, especially for MoD project managers working on long-term defence procurement programmes, both with legacy and start-up companies. Officials should be able to receive promotion while doing the same jobs or receive a pay rise. Losing institutional memory as a result of antiquated HR processes can be detrimental to the process of translating ideas into defence capabilities.
61. 61
    The Committee acknowledges the unprecedented pressure on the wider British defence enterprise created by Russia’s... Conclusion · paragraph 368 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee acknowledges the unprecedented pressure on the wider British defence enterprise created by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and welcomes assurances that the defence industry has responded well. The Ukraine war has illustrated the rapid exhaustion of stocks of munitions and key assets in the context of conventional warfare. Our witnesses confirmed that just-in-time supply chain responses to these resource shortages cannot meet the challenge.
62. 62
    Given the renewed focus on conventional capabilities, it is essential that the MoD urgently remodels... Conclusion · paragraph 369 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Given the renewed focus on conventional capabilities, it is essential that the MoD urgently remodels its supply options. Without such a response our forces remain without any depth in terms of response to conventional threats, whether to the UK or to our friends and allies. For example, restocking of the most in-demand munitions, like NLAW anti-tank weapons, should be accelerated as soon as possible.
63. 63
    The lack of industrial capacity, exposed by the conflict in Ukraine, means that the UK... Conclusion · paragraph 370 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The lack of industrial capacity, exposed by the conflict in Ukraine, means that the UK does not have the necessary resilience. The Committee believes that industrial capacity will only be sufficient if the people who are investing in those industries see a short-term and a long-term return on their investment.
64. 64
    The Committee agrees with the assessment that the defence industry should be treated as a... Conclusion · paragraph 371 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Committee agrees with the assessment that the defence industry should be treated as a strategic asset in its own right and expects that the Government will treat it as such.