Select Committee · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)

The National Security Strategy

Status: Open Opened: 17 Jun 2025 21 recommendations 16 conclusions 1 report

The Government published a new National Security Strategy (NSS) on 24 June 2025. The NSS reviews the risks facing the UK and sets out plans to address them, structured under three themes: security at home, strength abroad, and sovereign and asymmetric capabilities. The Committee is seeking views on how well the NSS addresses the range …

Clear

Reports

1 report
Title HC No. Published Items Response
4th Report – The National Security Strategy HC 1045 27 Mar 2026 37 Responded

Recommendations & Conclusions

17 items
3 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The Government should also review its consultation and engagement approach with industry stakeholders, civil society...

The Government should also review its consultation and engagement approach with industry stakeholders, civil society and the wider public on matters of national security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 23)

Government response. The government agrees on the importance of engagement and describes its existing comprehensive approach, which includes extensive stakeholder engagement during the National Security Strategy development, various audits, public surveys, and forthcoming strategies like the Defence Industrial Strategy.
Cabinet Office
9 Conclusion 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will...

Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will be a limited achievement if it does not create any additional resilience capability for the UK beyond what was already allocated in the 2025 Spending Review. We appreciate that the 1.5% target is still new, …

Government response. The government explains that NATO has agreed on the definition of the 1.5% spending target for resilience and security, addressing the lack of clarity. They expect to meet the target by 2027 and will report spending lines to NATO shortly.
Cabinet Office
11 Conclusion 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI),...

We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), but necessary detail on these plans is lacking. Private sector organisations with responsibility for the protection of CNI also need a clearer steer on what they will be expected to do to bolster resilience of …

Government response. The government accepts the need for clarity, committing to mapping resilience standards and developing guidance for CNI owners and operators. It also mentions amending the Reserve Forces Act and an upcoming National Cyber Action Plan to strengthen resilience, including for …
Cabinet Office
13 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as...

The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as a result of the NSS and provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill. It should then work with those operators to identify what support will be needed for them to …

Government response. The government commits to supporting CNI operators in meeting new Cyber Bill requirements by issuing implementation guidance for regulators and a code of practice to clarify expectations. They are also mapping resilience standards and developing NPSA guidance to identify and …
Cabinet Office
14 Conclusion 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is...

While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is unclear at this stage how effective its scrutiny will be. How far its scrutiny remit will stretch, and whether this will include reviewing preparedness plans in the event of a crisis or warfighting situation, and/or …

Government response. The government addresses the committee's questions about the UK Resilience Academy's effectiveness and remit by stating it is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness for whole-system civil emergencies and is developing a national exercising hub linked …
Cabinet Office
15 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in...

The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in relation to the estimated impacts of Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios as set out in the National Risk Register, including the possibility of direct threat to the homeland. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67) 63

Government response. The government agrees, stating the UK Resilience Academy is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness plans for whole-system civil emergencies, including through document reviews and interviews. The UKRA is also developing a national exercising hub.
Cabinet Office
16 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen...

The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen institutional links between the UK Resilience Academy (UKRA) and central government, including by: ○ enabling the UKRA to report into Cabinet Office-led exercises to refresh the National Risk Register to inform impact and preparedness estimates; …

Government response. The government accepts the recommendations, stating the UKRA will convene expert panels to scrutinise plans and preparedness, and is a key partner in developing a national exercising hub to link exercising with risk monitoring.
Cabinet Office
17 Conclusion 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through...

The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through a national conversation, but it is not evident that this message is getting through to the public. There is a long way to go to realise the whole-of-society approach to defence and security. (Conclusion, Paragraph …

Government response. The government acknowledges that the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort already underway, citing high-level speeches and ongoing public surveys. It confirms commitments made in the Resilience Action Plan and Strategic Defence Review and will publish …
Cabinet Office
18 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience...

The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience will look like, including who will be leading it and how it will ensure oversight between different Government departments responsible for its delivery. As part of this, the Ministry of Defence should publish the public …

Government response. The government states the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort, with various senior figures already contributing to raise public awareness. They committed to communicating actions through the Resilience Action Plan, publishing public survey findings on risk …
Cabinet Office
20 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and...

The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and Europe’s security through investing in partnerships and multilateral dialogues with other ‘middle powers’, for example Canada, Australia and India, to avoid being squeezed by great power competition between the United States and China. UK long-term …

Government response. The government agrees with the recommendation, stating it largely summarises what is already set out in the National Security Strategy 2025, which acknowledges radical uncertainty and adapts statecraft to a more competitive global environment.
Cabinet Office
22 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against...

As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against the UK and its European allies, the Government must ensure that momentum in imposing ever greater costs on Russia is maintained. The UK must continue to take a leadership role in this within European NATO. …

Government response. The government accepts the importance of maintaining momentum against Russia and a leadership role. It commits to publishing the Defence Investment Plan shortly, responding to the Rycroft report in coming months with immediate implementation steps, and describes the purpose of …
Cabinet Office
25 Conclusion 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence...

The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While it is positive that the Government has recognised the need for the UK to prepare for a future where the United States makes a less active contribution to European 65 security, …

Government response. The government affirmed its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and new investments in sovereign capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
Cabinet Office
26 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government...

As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government must also develop a clear plan, along with other European allies, for a transition towards greater European leadership of NATO. Preparing for a ‘worst-case scenario’ whereby Europe can no longer rely on US support in …

Government response. The government stated its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and investments in capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
Cabinet Office
27 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO...

The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies in other parts of the world. In addition to working to shore up European NATO’s capabilities, the UK should plan to move away from a bilateral relationship with the United States that is so …

Government response. The government stated its commitment to diversifying relationships beyond NATO, citing programmes like AUKUS, the Global Combat Air Programme, and partnerships with India and Indonesia as examples of how it is already developing strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies to reduce …
Cabinet Office
29 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and...

The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and national security objectives as it pursues new strategic relationships and bolsters existing ones. The scale of this work should be expanded, and its speed accelerated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 126)

Government response. The government agrees with the principle of pursuing strategic relationships and outlines existing partnerships and instruments like the National Security and Investment Act, without committing to specific new or accelerated actions as requested.
Cabinet Office
31 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending...

The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending choices and future nuclear security programmes. It should set out how it plans to extend UK-France collaboration on nuclear security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 136) 66 Pillar 3 – Sovereign Capabilities

Government response. The government states it has already outlined the threat publicly via the NSS and SDR, and announced £6bn for submarine production facilities. It also noted deepened nuclear cooperation with France through the Northwood Declaration.
Cabinet Office
35 Recommendation 4th Report – The National Security Stra… Accepted

Additionally, the Government should set out the order of priorities for the different sovereign capabilities...

Additionally, the Government should set out the order of priorities for the different sovereign capabilities it intends to develop. The Defence Investment Plan would be a useful place for this, as a signal to industry. (Recommendation, Paragraph 154)

Government response. The government committed to setting out the UK’s capability priorities for the next ten years within the Defence Investment Plan, providing a clear signal to industry, while explaining its preference for a dynamic rather than restrictive approach.
Cabinet Office

Oral evidence sessions

7 sessions
Date Witnesses
26 Jan 2026 Dan Jarvis · Home Office, Matthew Collins · Cabinet Office, Rt Hon Darren Jones MP · Cabinet Office View ↗
17 Nov 2025 Air Commodore (retd) Blythe Crawford CBE · Tiberius Aerospace, Lieutenant Colonel (retd) Haydn Gaukroger OBE · Syos Aerospace, Professor Sir Anthony Finkelstein CBE · City St George’s, University of London, Professor Sir Nigel Shadbolt · Jesus College, University of Oxford, Sophia Gaston · AUKUS Industry Forum View ↗
3 Nov 2025 Isabel Hilton OBE, Jonathan Hall KC · Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Lord Sumption OBE PC, FSA, FRHistS, Nigel Inkster CMG · MI6, The Rt Hon. the Lord Patten of Barnes KG CH View ↗
20 Oct 2025 Asoke Mukerji, Dr Marion Messmer, Rose Gottemoeller, Will Todman · Middle East Program, CSIS View ↗
13 Oct 2025 Brigadier General Eero Rebo · Embassy of Estonia, Captain (Navy) Juha Ravanti · Embassy of Finland, Lisa Hollins · Voluntary & Community Sector Emergencies Partnership (VCSEP), Lord Toby Harris · National Preparedness Commission, Steve Vincent · West Midlands Local Resilience Forum View ↗
14 Jul 2025 Matthew Collins · Cabinet Office, Rt Hon Pat McFadden MP · Cabinet Office View ↗
23 Jun 2025 Grace Cassy · CyLon Ventures, Lord Peter Ricketts GCMG GCVO · Lords European Affairs Committee, Professor Michael Clarke · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Rachel Ellehuus View ↗

Correspondence

6 letters
DateDirectionTitle
24 Jun 2026 From cttee Letter to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, relating to the Government'…
16 Mar 2026 To cttee Response from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster relating to the NSS inqu…
26 Jan 2026 To cttee Letter from the Chair to the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, Chancellor …
28 Oct 2025 To cttee Letter from Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government re…
8 Sep 2025 Correspondence from Matt Collins, Deputy National Security Adviser following th…
23 Jun 2025 Correspondence from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster relating to the fo…