Recommendations & Conclusions
17 items
3
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should also review its consultation and engagement approach with industry stakeholders, civil society and the wider public on matters of national security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 23)
Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the importance of engagement and describes its existing comprehensive approach, which includes extensive stakeholder engagement during the National Security Strategy development, various audits, public surveys, and forthcoming strategies like the Defence Industrial Strategy.
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Cabinet Office
9
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will be a limited achievement if it does not create any additional resilience capability for the UK beyond what was already allocated in the 2025 Spending Review. We appreciate that the 1.5% target is still new, …
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Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will be a limited achievement if it does not create any additional resilience capability for the UK beyond what was already allocated in the 2025 Spending Review. We appreciate that the 1.5% target is still new, but a long-term lack of clarity over what will be included within the target creates uncertainty for private and public bodies involved in resilience planning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 46) 62
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Government response AI summary
The government explains that NATO has agreed on the definition of the 1.5% spending target for resilience and security, addressing the lack of clarity. They expect to meet the target by 2027 and will report spending lines to NATO shortly.
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Cabinet Office
11
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), but necessary detail on these plans is lacking. Private sector organisations with responsibility for the protection of CNI also need a clearer steer on what they will be expected to do to bolster resilience of …
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We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), but necessary detail on these plans is lacking. Private sector organisations with responsibility for the protection of CNI also need a clearer steer on what they will be expected to do to bolster resilience of CNI, including in cyber-resilience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 57)
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the need for clarity, committing to mapping resilience standards and developing guidance for CNI owners and operators. It also mentions amending the Reserve Forces Act and an upcoming National Cyber Action Plan to strengthen resilience, including for CNI.
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Cabinet Office
13
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as a result of the NSS and provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill. It should then work with those operators to identify what support will be needed for them to …
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The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as a result of the NSS and provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill. It should then work with those operators to identify what support will be needed for them to adapt to the new regime. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59)
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Government response AI summary
The government commits to supporting CNI operators in meeting new Cyber Bill requirements by issuing implementation guidance for regulators and a code of practice to clarify expectations. They are also mapping resilience standards and developing NPSA guidance to identify and address gaps in support and …
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Cabinet Office
14
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is unclear at this stage how effective its scrutiny will be. How far its scrutiny remit will stretch, and whether this will include reviewing preparedness plans in the event of a crisis or warfighting situation, and/or …
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While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is unclear at this stage how effective its scrutiny will be. How far its scrutiny remit will stretch, and whether this will include reviewing preparedness plans in the event of a crisis or warfighting situation, and/or increasingly sophisticated attacks facilitated through novel technologies, are all outstanding questions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 66)
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Government response AI summary
The government addresses the committee's questions about the UK Resilience Academy's effectiveness and remit by stating it is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness for whole-system civil emergencies and is developing a national exercising hub linked to risk monitoring.
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Cabinet Office
15
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in relation to the estimated impacts of Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios as set out in the National Risk Register, including the possibility of direct threat to the homeland. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67) 63
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The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in relation to the estimated impacts of Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios as set out in the National Risk Register, including the possibility of direct threat to the homeland. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67) 63
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees, stating the UK Resilience Academy is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness plans for whole-system civil emergencies, including through document reviews and interviews. The UKRA is also developing a national exercising hub.
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Cabinet Office
16
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen institutional links between the UK Resilience Academy (UKRA) and central government, including by: ○ enabling the UKRA to report into Cabinet Office-led exercises to refresh the National Risk Register to inform impact and preparedness estimates; …
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The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen institutional links between the UK Resilience Academy (UKRA) and central government, including by: ○ enabling the UKRA to report into Cabinet Office-led exercises to refresh the National Risk Register to inform impact and preparedness estimates; ○ reporting into the National Exercising Programme; and ○ ensuring there is always UKRA representation in these exercises. (Recommendation, Paragraph 68)
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendations, stating the UKRA will convene expert panels to scrutinise plans and preparedness, and is a key partner in developing a national exercising hub to link exercising with risk monitoring.
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Cabinet Office
17
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through a national conversation, but it is not evident that this message is getting through to the public. There is a long way to go to realise the whole-of-society approach to defence and security. (Conclusion, Paragraph …
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The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through a national conversation, but it is not evident that this message is getting through to the public. There is a long way to go to realise the whole-of-society approach to defence and security. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges that the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort already underway, citing high-level speeches and ongoing public surveys. It confirms commitments made in the Resilience Action Plan and Strategic Defence Review and will publish updated information in due course.
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Cabinet Office
18
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience will look like, including who will be leading it and how it will ensure oversight between different Government departments responsible for its delivery. As part of this, the Ministry of Defence should publish the public …
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The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience will look like, including who will be leading it and how it will ensure oversight between different Government departments responsible for its delivery. As part of this, the Ministry of Defence should publish the public version of its Joint Concept Note as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75) Pillar 2 – Strength Abroad
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Government response AI summary
The government states the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort, with various senior figures already contributing to raise public awareness. They committed to communicating actions through the Resilience Action Plan, publishing public survey findings on risk perception, and will publish the …
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Cabinet Office
20
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and Europe’s security through investing in partnerships and multilateral dialogues with other ‘middle powers’, for example Canada, Australia and India, to avoid being squeezed by great power competition between the United States and China. UK long-term …
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The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and Europe’s security through investing in partnerships and multilateral dialogues with other ‘middle powers’, for example Canada, Australia and India, to avoid being squeezed by great power competition between the United States and China. UK long-term strategy should seek to ease the increasing tensions of great power competition between the United States and China, and the global diplomatic and economic decoupling this is resulting in. In turn, this will bolster both UK and global security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80) 64
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the recommendation, stating it largely summarises what is already set out in the National Security Strategy 2025, which acknowledges radical uncertainty and adapts statecraft to a more competitive global environment.
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Cabinet Office
22
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against the UK and its European allies, the Government must ensure that momentum in imposing ever greater costs on Russia is maintained. The UK must continue to take a leadership role in this within European NATO. …
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As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against the UK and its European allies, the Government must ensure that momentum in imposing ever greater costs on Russia is maintained. The UK must continue to take a leadership role in this within European NATO. With this in mind, the Government should hasten publication and progress of strategies, legislation and reviews relevant to the hardening and sharpening of the UK’s conventional, hybrid and cyber capabilities, including the Defence Investment Plan, the Defence Readiness Bill and the Rycroft Review. The Government should also set out its priorities in the Arctic and the High North in the response to this report, and engage fully and constructively with the Defence Committee’s inquiry in this area. (Recommendation, Paragraph 89)
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the importance of maintaining momentum against Russia and a leadership role. It commits to publishing the Defence Investment Plan shortly, responding to the Rycroft report in coming months with immediate implementation steps, and describes the purpose of the Defence Readiness Bill.
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Cabinet Office
25
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While it is positive that the Government has recognised the need for the UK to prepare for a future where the United States makes a less active contribution to European 65 security, …
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The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While it is positive that the Government has recognised the need for the UK to prepare for a future where the United States makes a less active contribution to European 65 security, more must be done to ensure Europe and the UK are better able to protect themselves. At the same time, the UK should continue communicating to the United States about the mutual benefits of the US-UK security relationship and ensure that areas of national strategic importance are not undermined by other challenges (for example, US-led peace negotiations over Ukraine, or commitments to the situation in Iran). (Conclusion, Paragraph 118)
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Government response AI summary
The government affirmed its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and new investments in sovereign capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
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Cabinet Office
26
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government must also develop a clear plan, along with other European allies, for a transition towards greater European leadership of NATO. Preparing for a ‘worst-case scenario’ whereby Europe can no longer rely on US support in …
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As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government must also develop a clear plan, along with other European allies, for a transition towards greater European leadership of NATO. Preparing for a ‘worst-case scenario’ whereby Europe can no longer rely on US support in the event of a crisis, the Government must work with European partners to invest in its own capabilities to offset this potential withdrawal. (Recommendation, Paragraph 119)
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Government response AI summary
The government stated its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and investments in capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
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Cabinet Office
27
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies in other parts of the world. In addition to working to shore up European NATO’s capabilities, the UK should plan to move away from a bilateral relationship with the United States that is so …
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The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies in other parts of the world. In addition to working to shore up European NATO’s capabilities, the UK should plan to move away from a bilateral relationship with the United States that is so dependent on the latter for nuclear and intelligence operations, and conventional defence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 120)
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Government response AI summary
The government stated its commitment to diversifying relationships beyond NATO, citing programmes like AUKUS, the Global Combat Air Programme, and partnerships with India and Indonesia as examples of how it is already developing strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies to reduce dependencies.
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Cabinet Office
29
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and national security objectives as it pursues new strategic relationships and bolsters existing ones. The scale of this work should be expanded, and its speed accelerated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 126)
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The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and national security objectives as it pursues new strategic relationships and bolsters existing ones. The scale of this work should be expanded, and its speed accelerated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 126)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the principle of pursuing strategic relationships and outlines existing partnerships and instruments like the National Security and Investment Act, without committing to specific new or accelerated actions as requested.
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Cabinet Office
31
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending choices and future nuclear security programmes. It should set out how it plans to extend UK-France collaboration on nuclear security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 136) 66 Pillar 3 – Sovereign Capabilities
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The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending choices and future nuclear security programmes. It should set out how it plans to extend UK-France collaboration on nuclear security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 136) 66 Pillar 3 – Sovereign Capabilities
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Government response AI summary
The government states it has already outlined the threat publicly via the NSS and SDR, and announced £6bn for submarine production facilities. It also noted deepened nuclear cooperation with France through the Northwood Declaration.
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Cabinet Office
35
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
Additionally, the Government should set out the order of priorities for the different sovereign capabilities it intends to develop. The Defence Investment Plan would be a useful place for this, as a signal to industry. (Recommendation, Paragraph 154)
Government response AI summary
The government committed to setting out the UK’s capability priorities for the next ten years within the Defence Investment Plan, providing a clear signal to industry, while explaining its preference for a dynamic rather than restrictive approach.
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Cabinet Office