Recommendations & Conclusions
37 items
1
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
The Government must balance transparency with the public about the reality of threats the UK faces with not causing alarm and making sensitive information unnecessarily accessible to adversaries. However, there is a sense among industry stakeholders and civil society organisations that they were not sufficiently consulted in the development of …
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The Government must balance transparency with the public about the reality of threats the UK faces with not causing alarm and making sensitive information unnecessarily accessible to adversaries. However, there is a sense among industry stakeholders and civil society organisations that they were not sufficiently consulted in the development of the National Security Strategy, and a subsequent lack of transparency on certain important aspects such as the China Audit and timelines. The lack of publicly available detail, particularly around the issue of China, risks eroding public trust that progress is being made to improve national security. The lack of engagement with stakeholders makes securing the buy- in needed for a whole-of-society approach to resilience more challenging. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the importance of public awareness and engagement, detailing efforts for transparency through stakeholder consultation, an update on the China Audit, and a "transparent by default" approach for the NSRA. They also commit to publishing annual public survey findings on risk perception …
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Cabinet Office
2
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
The Government must reconsider how it discusses security challenges, and avoid being unduly opaque. The Government should provide annual progress updates to this Committee on commitments in the National Security Strategy and in other related strategies such as the Resilience Action Plan. The first of these updates should be provided …
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The Government must reconsider how it discusses security challenges, and avoid being unduly opaque. The Government should provide annual progress updates to this Committee on commitments in the National Security Strategy and in other related strategies such as the Resilience Action Plan. The first of these updates should be provided alongside the Government’s response to this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the importance of public awareness and engagement, detailing efforts for transparency through broad stakeholder consultation, an update on the China Audit, and a "transparent by default" approach for the NSRA. They commit to making an annual statement to Parliament on resilience …
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Cabinet Office
3
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should also review its consultation and engagement approach with industry stakeholders, civil society and the wider public on matters of national security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 23)
Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the importance of engagement and describes its existing comprehensive approach, which includes extensive stakeholder engagement during the National Security Strategy development, various audits, public surveys, and forthcoming strategies like the Defence Industrial Strategy.
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Cabinet Office
4
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
Soft power is a crucial source of UK influence and security abroad. Its erosion would have direct security consequences, most clearly in Africa, where Russia and China are increasingly filling the space left by the withdrawal of the soft power presence of the UK and allies. Official Development Assistance and …
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Soft power is a crucial source of UK influence and security abroad. Its erosion would have direct security consequences, most clearly in Africa, where Russia and China are increasingly filling the space left by the withdrawal of the soft power presence of the UK and allies. Official Development Assistance and bodies such as the BBC World Service and the British Council play an important role in regions where the UK has clear security interests. The recent funding commitments to the BBC World Service are welcome in this regard. (Conclusion, Paragraph 32) 61
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Government response AI summary
The government agreed on the vital role of soft power and described its ongoing efforts, including the establishment of the UK Soft Power Council and a refined ODA approach focused on stability and conflict prevention, while ensuring stable grant funding for key institutions.
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Cabinet Office
5
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
The Government should ensure it has a full and robust assessment of the national security risks of reducing the Official Development Assistance budget, resisting further cuts that could have a damaging effect for UK strategic interests. We note the International Development Committee is further examining the future of UK aid …
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The Government should ensure it has a full and robust assessment of the national security risks of reducing the Official Development Assistance budget, resisting further cuts that could have a damaging effect for UK strategic interests. We note the International Development Committee is further examining the future of UK aid and hope the Government will engage with that inquiry constructively. The Government should ensure stable and predictable funding for bodies such as the BBC World Service and British Council, and draw on the advice of experts represented on the Soft Power Council. The next iteration of the National Risk Register should account for the possible impacts of reducing UK and allied soft power. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33) Oversight and implementation
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Government response AI summary
The government defends ODA budget reductions but commits to engaging constructively with the International Development Committee's inquiry. They agree on the importance of stable funding for key soft power institutions, will continue to draw on the Soft Power Council's advice, and will ensure soft power …
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Cabinet Office
6
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
The lack of clarity over which departments are responsible for which areas of national security policy hampers the possibility for external scrutiny and challenge of national security policy delivery. Our opinion was further solidified when the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology declined to put forward a minister to give …
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The lack of clarity over which departments are responsible for which areas of national security policy hampers the possibility for external scrutiny and challenge of national security policy delivery. Our opinion was further solidified when the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology declined to put forward a minister to give evidence to this inquiry alongside the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Minister for Security. (Conclusion, Paragraph 40)
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Government response AI summary
The government described its internal approach for accountability, assigning lead departments and offering to update the committee on progress. It supported the principle of ministerial accountability but reserved the right to determine which minister is best placed to attend.
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Cabinet Office
7
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
The Government must clarify how follow-up and oversight of Lead Government Departments responsible for delivering the commitments in the National Security Strategy (NSS) will be sustained over time. This should involve accountability mechanisms at fixed points, for example through regular reporting to the National Security Adviser and his Deputies. These …
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The Government must clarify how follow-up and oversight of Lead Government Departments responsible for delivering the commitments in the National Security Strategy (NSS) will be sustained over time. This should involve accountability mechanisms at fixed points, for example through regular reporting to the National Security Adviser and his Deputies. These reporting updates should be included in the regular updates to the Committee, called for in an earlier recommendation. The Government should also publish an addendum to the NSS, which assigns delivery responsibilities for the commitments made in the Strategy to named Ministers within each department. (Recommendation, Paragraph 41)
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Government response AI summary
The government describes its internal implementation approach for accountability and periodic reporting on National Security Strategy objectives and commits to updating the Committee on progress. However, it does not agree to publish an addendum assigning delivery responsibilities to named ministers, affirming departmental and ministerial accountability …
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Cabinet Office
8
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
All Ministers with responsibility for delivery of aspects of the National Security Strategy should make themselves available for scrutiny by this Committee at regular intervals, and as requested, to ensure proper parliamentary accountability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)
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All Ministers with responsibility for delivery of aspects of the National Security Strategy should make themselves available for scrutiny by this Committee at regular intervals, and as requested, to ensure proper parliamentary accountability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)
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Government response AI summary
The government accepted the principle of ministerial accountability and that ministers should attend when called upon, but stated that the government should be able to confirm which minister is best placed to represent the issue.
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Cabinet Office
9
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will be a limited achievement if it does not create any additional resilience capability for the UK beyond what was already allocated in the 2025 Spending Review. We appreciate that the 1.5% target is still new, …
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Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will be a limited achievement if it does not create any additional resilience capability for the UK beyond what was already allocated in the 2025 Spending Review. We appreciate that the 1.5% target is still new, but a long-term lack of clarity over what will be included within the target creates uncertainty for private and public bodies involved in resilience planning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 46) 62
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Government response AI summary
The government explains that NATO has agreed on the definition of the 1.5% spending target for resilience and security, addressing the lack of clarity. They expect to meet the target by 2027 and will report spending lines to NATO shortly.
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Cabinet Office
10
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
The Government must provide greater clarity on its plans to develop additional resilience capabilities beyond 2027, and ensure that the 1.5% target spend on security and resilience prioritises investment in systems that can help build long-term resilience, in addition to spending on maintenance of basic civil infrastructure. The Government should …
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The Government must provide greater clarity on its plans to develop additional resilience capabilities beyond 2027, and ensure that the 1.5% target spend on security and resilience prioritises investment in systems that can help build long-term resilience, in addition to spending on maintenance of basic civil infrastructure. The Government should also clearly outline what additional capabilities it envisages developing through the target spend by the time of the next NATO summit in July 2026. (Recommendation, Paragraph 47) Pillar 1 – Security at Home
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the 1.5% NATO target for security and resilience spending, stating it expects to reach it by 2027 and will report spending lines to NATO shortly. However, it does not provide specific clarity on plans for developing additional resilience capabilities beyond 2027 or …
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Cabinet Office
11
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), but necessary detail on these plans is lacking. Private sector organisations with responsibility for the protection of CNI also need a clearer steer on what they will be expected to do to bolster resilience of …
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We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), but necessary detail on these plans is lacking. Private sector organisations with responsibility for the protection of CNI also need a clearer steer on what they will be expected to do to bolster resilience of CNI, including in cyber-resilience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 57)
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the need for clarity, committing to mapping resilience standards and developing guidance for CNI owners and operators. It also mentions amending the Reserve Forces Act and an upcoming National Cyber Action Plan to strengthen resilience, including for CNI.
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Cabinet Office
12
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Not Addressed
The Government must accelerate its plans for improving the size and state of the reserves, and provide more detail for its plans to involve the reserves in the protection of Critical National Infrastructure. This should include planning for their use to replace uniformed specialists who have been moved to frontline …
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The Government must accelerate its plans for improving the size and state of the reserves, and provide more detail for its plans to involve the reserves in the protection of Critical National Infrastructure. This should include planning for their use to replace uniformed specialists who have been moved to frontline services; the continued functioning of services in a communications and supplies-degraded environment; and plans for deployment in a crisis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 58)
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Government response AI summary
The government's response largely discusses cyber resilience for Critical National Infrastructure. While it mentions amending the Reserve Forces Act in 2026, it provides no detail on accelerating plans for improving the size and state of the reserves or their specific involvement in CNI protection as …
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Cabinet Office
13
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as a result of the NSS and provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill. It should then work with those operators to identify what support will be needed for them to …
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The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as a result of the NSS and provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill. It should then work with those operators to identify what support will be needed for them to adapt to the new regime. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59)
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Government response AI summary
The government commits to supporting CNI operators in meeting new Cyber Bill requirements by issuing implementation guidance for regulators and a code of practice to clarify expectations. They are also mapping resilience standards and developing NPSA guidance to identify and address gaps in support and …
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Cabinet Office
14
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is unclear at this stage how effective its scrutiny will be. How far its scrutiny remit will stretch, and whether this will include reviewing preparedness plans in the event of a crisis or warfighting situation, and/or …
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While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is unclear at this stage how effective its scrutiny will be. How far its scrutiny remit will stretch, and whether this will include reviewing preparedness plans in the event of a crisis or warfighting situation, and/or increasingly sophisticated attacks facilitated through novel technologies, are all outstanding questions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 66)
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Government response AI summary
The government addresses the committee's questions about the UK Resilience Academy's effectiveness and remit by stating it is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness for whole-system civil emergencies and is developing a national exercising hub linked to risk monitoring.
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Cabinet Office
15
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in relation to the estimated impacts of Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios as set out in the National Risk Register, including the possibility of direct threat to the homeland. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67) 63
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The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in relation to the estimated impacts of Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios as set out in the National Risk Register, including the possibility of direct threat to the homeland. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67) 63
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees, stating the UK Resilience Academy is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness plans for whole-system civil emergencies, including through document reviews and interviews. The UKRA is also developing a national exercising hub.
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Cabinet Office
16
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen institutional links between the UK Resilience Academy (UKRA) and central government, including by: ○ enabling the UKRA to report into Cabinet Office-led exercises to refresh the National Risk Register to inform impact and preparedness estimates; …
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The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen institutional links between the UK Resilience Academy (UKRA) and central government, including by: ○ enabling the UKRA to report into Cabinet Office-led exercises to refresh the National Risk Register to inform impact and preparedness estimates; ○ reporting into the National Exercising Programme; and ○ ensuring there is always UKRA representation in these exercises. (Recommendation, Paragraph 68)
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the recommendations, stating the UKRA will convene expert panels to scrutinise plans and preparedness, and is a key partner in developing a national exercising hub to link exercising with risk monitoring.
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Cabinet Office
17
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through a national conversation, but it is not evident that this message is getting through to the public. There is a long way to go to realise the whole-of-society approach to defence and security. (Conclusion, Paragraph …
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The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through a national conversation, but it is not evident that this message is getting through to the public. There is a long way to go to realise the whole-of-society approach to defence and security. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges that the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort already underway, citing high-level speeches and ongoing public surveys. It confirms commitments made in the Resilience Action Plan and Strategic Defence Review and will publish updated information in due course.
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Cabinet Office
18
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience will look like, including who will be leading it and how it will ensure oversight between different Government departments responsible for its delivery. As part of this, the Ministry of Defence should publish the public …
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The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience will look like, including who will be leading it and how it will ensure oversight between different Government departments responsible for its delivery. As part of this, the Ministry of Defence should publish the public version of its Joint Concept Note as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75) Pillar 2 – Strength Abroad
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Government response AI summary
The government states the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort, with various senior figures already contributing to raise public awareness. They committed to communicating actions through the Resilience Action Plan, publishing public survey findings on risk perception, and will publish the …
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Cabinet Office
19
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
Global and UK security is poorly served by the increasing tensions brought about by great power competition between the United States and China. If this process continues to accelerate, the economic shock costs of military confrontation will go down, making conflict more likely. The post-war security settlement has served the …
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Global and UK security is poorly served by the increasing tensions brought about by great power competition between the United States and China. If this process continues to accelerate, the economic shock costs of military confrontation will go down, making conflict more likely. The post-war security settlement has served the UK, Europe and the world well for over 80 years, and while the UK’s influence is less than it once was, there is still an imperative to do what it can to maintain and bolster these arrangements. (Conclusion, Paragraph 79)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the committee's conclusion that global security is challenged by increasing tensions, stating that it aligns with the National Security Strategy's acknowledgement of radical uncertainty and the need for statecraft to adapt.
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Cabinet Office
20
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and Europe’s security through investing in partnerships and multilateral dialogues with other ‘middle powers’, for example Canada, Australia and India, to avoid being squeezed by great power competition between the United States and China. UK long-term …
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The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and Europe’s security through investing in partnerships and multilateral dialogues with other ‘middle powers’, for example Canada, Australia and India, to avoid being squeezed by great power competition between the United States and China. UK long-term strategy should seek to ease the increasing tensions of great power competition between the United States and China, and the global diplomatic and economic decoupling this is resulting in. In turn, this will bolster both UK and global security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80) 64
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the recommendation, stating it largely summarises what is already set out in the National Security Strategy 2025, which acknowledges radical uncertainty and adapts statecraft to a more competitive global environment.
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Cabinet Office
21
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
The Government has identified Russia as the primary threat to the UK’s national security and continues to do good work to deter further Russian aggression. The Committee commends the Government for its continued military and financial assistance for Ukraine and its planned investment in sharpening the UK’s hard power, including …
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The Government has identified Russia as the primary threat to the UK’s national security and continues to do good work to deter further Russian aggression. The Committee commends the Government for its continued military and financial assistance for Ukraine and its planned investment in sharpening the UK’s hard power, including through maintenance of the independent nuclear deterrent. In conjunction with NATO allies, the UK also continues to demonstrate a united front against Russian aggression by tightening the pressure on Moscow through use of sanctions and acting against the shadow fleet. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)
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Government response AI summary
The government welcomes the committee's support for its work against the Russian threat and in aiding Ukraine. It reaffirms its commitment to working with NATO allies, taking a leadership role in European security, and mentions forthcoming plans like the Defence Investment Plan and Defence Readiness …
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Cabinet Office
22
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against the UK and its European allies, the Government must ensure that momentum in imposing ever greater costs on Russia is maintained. The UK must continue to take a leadership role in this within European NATO. …
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As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against the UK and its European allies, the Government must ensure that momentum in imposing ever greater costs on Russia is maintained. The UK must continue to take a leadership role in this within European NATO. With this in mind, the Government should hasten publication and progress of strategies, legislation and reviews relevant to the hardening and sharpening of the UK’s conventional, hybrid and cyber capabilities, including the Defence Investment Plan, the Defence Readiness Bill and the Rycroft Review. The Government should also set out its priorities in the Arctic and the High North in the response to this report, and engage fully and constructively with the Defence Committee’s inquiry in this area. (Recommendation, Paragraph 89)
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the importance of maintaining momentum against Russia and a leadership role. It commits to publishing the Defence Investment Plan shortly, responding to the Rycroft report in coming months with immediate implementation steps, and describes the purpose of the Defence Readiness Bill.
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Cabinet Office
23
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
China poses a clear long-term national security threat to the UK—both directly through its malicious targeting of UK interests, and indirectly through its support to Russia over the Ukraine conflict. We have concerns that the Government is not striking the right balance—and indeed about whether it is prepared to accept …
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China poses a clear long-term national security threat to the UK—both directly through its malicious targeting of UK interests, and indirectly through its support to Russia over the Ukraine conflict. We have concerns that the Government is not striking the right balance—and indeed about whether it is prepared to accept the unpalatable reality that long-term security has short-term financial costs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 104)
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges China's long-term national security threat and states it is taking a strategic approach that balances economic engagement with robust challenge, citing existing measures like the NSI Act and ongoing diplomatic engagement with China regarding Russia.
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Cabinet Office
24
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Not Addressed
The Government must articulate more clearly how it will balance extensive security and supply chain risks with its desire for closer economic ties with China. It should, for example, be more proactive in raising the issue of Beijing’s ongoing support for Moscow continuing to pursue its war in Ukraine. Additionally, …
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The Government must articulate more clearly how it will balance extensive security and supply chain risks with its desire for closer economic ties with China. It should, for example, be more proactive in raising the issue of Beijing’s ongoing support for Moscow continuing to pursue its war in Ukraine. Additionally, when signing new international treaties and economic agreements, the Government should commit to publishing an accompanying statement which makes it clear how national security considerations have been accounted for in detail. These assessments should make sure to include examination and mitigation of emerging challenges including, but not limited to, espionage, transnational repression and AI-enabled harms. (Recommendation, Paragraph 105)
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Government response AI summary
The government outlined its existing strategic approach to China, balancing threats and opportunities, and described current actions to challenge risks and engage on issues like Russia's war. However, it did not commit to articulating its balancing act more clearly or publishing detailed national security statements …
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Cabinet Office
25
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While it is positive that the Government has recognised the need for the UK to prepare for a future where the United States makes a less active contribution to European 65 security, …
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The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While it is positive that the Government has recognised the need for the UK to prepare for a future where the United States makes a less active contribution to European 65 security, more must be done to ensure Europe and the UK are better able to protect themselves. At the same time, the UK should continue communicating to the United States about the mutual benefits of the US-UK security relationship and ensure that areas of national strategic importance are not undermined by other challenges (for example, US-led peace negotiations over Ukraine, or commitments to the situation in Iran). (Conclusion, Paragraph 118)
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Government response AI summary
The government affirmed its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and new investments in sovereign capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
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Cabinet Office
26
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government must also develop a clear plan, along with other European allies, for a transition towards greater European leadership of NATO. Preparing for a ‘worst-case scenario’ whereby Europe can no longer rely on US support in …
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As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government must also develop a clear plan, along with other European allies, for a transition towards greater European leadership of NATO. Preparing for a ‘worst-case scenario’ whereby Europe can no longer rely on US support in the event of a crisis, the Government must work with European partners to invest in its own capabilities to offset this potential withdrawal. (Recommendation, Paragraph 119)
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Government response AI summary
The government stated its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and investments in capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
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Cabinet Office
27
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies in other parts of the world. In addition to working to shore up European NATO’s capabilities, the UK should plan to move away from a bilateral relationship with the United States that is so …
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The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies in other parts of the world. In addition to working to shore up European NATO’s capabilities, the UK should plan to move away from a bilateral relationship with the United States that is so dependent on the latter for nuclear and intelligence operations, and conventional defence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 120)
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Government response AI summary
The government stated its commitment to diversifying relationships beyond NATO, citing programmes like AUKUS, the Global Combat Air Programme, and partnerships with India and Indonesia as examples of how it is already developing strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies to reduce dependencies.
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Cabinet Office
28
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
We welcome the Government’s efforts to diversify partnerships, illustrated by deepening trade and security collaboration with India and engagements with Gulf countries. This work is crucial both to ensuring the UK can draw on breadth and depth in its partnerships to support economic growth, and improve resilience during periods of …
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We welcome the Government’s efforts to diversify partnerships, illustrated by deepening trade and security collaboration with India and engagements with Gulf countries. This work is crucial both to ensuring the UK can draw on breadth and depth in its partnerships to support economic growth, and improve resilience during periods of heightened international tension. Recent support by the UK in deploying the RAF to the collective self-defence of Gulf countries in the face of Iranian strikes is welcome. (Conclusion, Paragraph 125)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees on the importance of pursuing strategic relationships and highlights its ongoing efforts, including new partnerships with Japan, Indonesia, and India, and the use of instruments like the National Security and Investment Act.
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Cabinet Office
29
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and national security objectives as it pursues new strategic relationships and bolsters existing ones. The scale of this work should be expanded, and its speed accelerated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 126)
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The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and national security objectives as it pursues new strategic relationships and bolsters existing ones. The scale of this work should be expanded, and its speed accelerated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 126)
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Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the principle of pursuing strategic relationships and outlines existing partnerships and instruments like the National Security and Investment Act, without committing to specific new or accelerated actions as requested.
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Cabinet Office
30
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
A credible, sustainable and independent UK nuclear deterrent is integral to UK national security, and as a buffer against allied proliferation in an era of fast-changing nuclear risks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 135)
Government response AI summary
The government agrees with the conclusion, highlighting existing measures such as the NSS and SDR outlining the threat, £6bn investment in nuclear submarine facilities, and deepened nuclear cooperation with France.
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Cabinet Office
31
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending choices and future nuclear security programmes. It should set out how it plans to extend UK-France collaboration on nuclear security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 136) 66 Pillar 3 – Sovereign Capabilities
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The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending choices and future nuclear security programmes. It should set out how it plans to extend UK-France collaboration on nuclear security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 136) 66 Pillar 3 – Sovereign Capabilities
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Government response AI summary
The government states it has already outlined the threat publicly via the NSS and SDR, and announced £6bn for submarine production facilities. It also noted deepened nuclear cooperation with France through the Northwood Declaration.
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Cabinet Office
32
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Rejected
The National Security Strategy is clear that sovereignty over certain national security capabilities, including nuclear, emerging technologies, shipbuilding and steelmaking, is important. However, beyond this, there is no clear definition of how the Government defines what it considers to be a sovereign capability. Nor is there sufficient indication of what …
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The National Security Strategy is clear that sovereignty over certain national security capabilities, including nuclear, emerging technologies, shipbuilding and steelmaking, is important. However, beyond this, there is no clear definition of how the Government defines what it considers to be a sovereign capability. Nor is there sufficient indication of what specific capabilities and technologies the Government intends to prioritise as part of this work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 151)
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects providing a strict definition or published list of sovereign capabilities, citing risks. It states clarity is instead provided through existing strategic frameworks like the Industrial Strategy and the National Security and Investment Act, with further details coming in the Defence Investment Plan.
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Cabinet Office
33
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
We appreciate that the definition of sovereignty will differ by sector and by degree. However, the general lack of clarity on definitions and objectives complicates research and development planning and investment. The UK has a strong base of talent and skills in emerging technologies— artificial intelligence in particular—where some level …
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We appreciate that the definition of sovereignty will differ by sector and by degree. However, the general lack of clarity on definitions and objectives complicates research and development planning and investment. The UK has a strong base of talent and skills in emerging technologies— artificial intelligence in particular—where some level of sovereignty will be desirable and the Government must ensure that this advantage is utilised. (Conclusion, Paragraph 152)
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need for clarity but states they will not provide a strict definition of sovereignty, opting instead for a flexible approach through strategic frameworks like the Industrial Strategy and National Security and Investment Act. They believe these existing mechanisms, alongside the forthcoming …
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Cabinet Office
34
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Rejected
The Government should provide a clear, written definition of what a sovereign capability is, including different levels of sovereignty. The Government should also outline which specific existing and emerging technologies it is seeking to develop, and to what level of sovereignty. These definitions should be informed by risk assessments of …
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The Government should provide a clear, written definition of what a sovereign capability is, including different levels of sovereignty. The Government should also outline which specific existing and emerging technologies it is seeking to develop, and to what level of sovereignty. These definitions should be informed by risk assessments of critical supply chains, critical minerals and investment, and export security, and should be agreed across government. Relevant departments must have regard to these definitions when making any decisions around investment and support both for firms developing sovereign capabilities and for higher education institutions researching emerging technologies. (Recommendation, Paragraph 153)
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Government response AI summary
The government rejected the need for a strict written definition of sovereign capability or a restrictive list of technologies, arguing a flexible approach through existing strategic frameworks like the Industrial Strategy and NSIA provides clarity while avoiding risks of obsolescence or revealing vulnerabilities.
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Cabinet Office
35
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
Additionally, the Government should set out the order of priorities for the different sovereign capabilities it intends to develop. The Defence Investment Plan would be a useful place for this, as a signal to industry. (Recommendation, Paragraph 154)
Government response AI summary
The government committed to setting out the UK’s capability priorities for the next ten years within the Defence Investment Plan, providing a clear signal to industry, while explaining its preference for a dynamic rather than restrictive approach.
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Cabinet Office
36
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Deferred
Industry lacks an adequate signal from Government on the allocation of spending across the defence, security and resilience sectors. This impacts the ability to plan research and development spending in a way that aligns with Government objectives, and prioritises the most important sovereign technologies. For SMEs in particular, this contributes …
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Industry lacks an adequate signal from Government on the allocation of spending across the defence, security and resilience sectors. This impacts the ability to plan research and development spending in a way that aligns with Government objectives, and prioritises the most important sovereign technologies. For SMEs in particular, this contributes to their vulnerability to acquisition by foreign investors, compromising their ability to contribute to security and sovereignty goals. (Conclusion, Paragraph 163)
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Government response AI summary
The government commits to addressing the issue of inadequate signals by publishing a forthcoming Defence Finance and Investment Strategy and an SME action plan with a direct spending target, once the Defence Investment Plan is finalised.
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Cabinet Office
37
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Deferred
The Defence Investment Plan must be completed and published as soon as possible. Within the Plan, the Government should provide further detail on the funding mechanisms it will use to support firms as it seeks to revitalise 67 the UK’s defence-industrial base and develop sovereign capabilities. SMEs in particular need …
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The Defence Investment Plan must be completed and published as soon as possible. Within the Plan, the Government should provide further detail on the funding mechanisms it will use to support firms as it seeks to revitalise 67 the UK’s defence-industrial base and develop sovereign capabilities. SMEs in particular need further financial support and guidance to grow and develop capabilities and avoid the risk of homegrown talent and capabilities being acquired by foreign investors. (Recommendation, Paragraph 164) 68
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Government response AI summary
The government stated that the MOD’s forthcoming Defence Finance and Investment Strategy will detail measures to improve SME access to finance, and an SME action plan and direct spending target will be published once the Defence Investment Plan is finalised.
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Cabinet Office