Recommendations & Conclusions
37 items
1
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
The Government must balance transparency with the public about the reality of threats the UK faces with not causing alarm and making sensitive information unnecessarily accessible to adversaries. However, there is a sense among industry stakeholders and civil society organisations that they were not sufficiently consulted in the development of …
Government response. The government agrees on the importance of public awareness and engagement, detailing efforts for transparency through stakeholder consultation, an update on the China Audit, and a "transparent by default" approach for the NSRA. They also commit to publishing annual public …
Cabinet Office
2
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
The Government must reconsider how it discusses security challenges, and avoid being unduly opaque. The Government should provide annual progress updates to this Committee on commitments in the National Security Strategy and in other related strategies such as the Resilience Action Plan. The first of these updates should be provided …
Government response. The government agrees on the importance of public awareness and engagement, detailing efforts for transparency through broad stakeholder consultation, an update on the China Audit, and a "transparent by default" approach for the NSRA. They commit to making an annual …
Cabinet Office
3
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should also review its consultation and engagement approach with industry stakeholders, civil society and the wider public on matters of national security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 23)
Government response. The government agrees on the importance of engagement and describes its existing comprehensive approach, which includes extensive stakeholder engagement during the National Security Strategy development, various audits, public surveys, and forthcoming strategies like the Defence Industrial Strategy.
Cabinet Office
4
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
Soft power is a crucial source of UK influence and security abroad. Its erosion would have direct security consequences, most clearly in Africa, where Russia and China are increasingly filling the space left by the withdrawal of the soft power presence of the UK and allies. Official Development Assistance and …
Government response. The government agreed on the vital role of soft power and described its ongoing efforts, including the establishment of the UK Soft Power Council and a refined ODA approach focused on stability and conflict prevention, while ensuring stable grant funding …
Cabinet Office
5
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
The Government should ensure it has a full and robust assessment of the national security risks of reducing the Official Development Assistance budget, resisting further cuts that could have a damaging effect for UK strategic interests. We note the International Development Committee is further examining the future of UK aid …
Government response. The government defends ODA budget reductions but commits to engaging constructively with the International Development Committee's inquiry. They agree on the importance of stable funding for key soft power institutions, will continue to draw on the Soft Power Council's advice, …
Cabinet Office
6
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
The lack of clarity over which departments are responsible for which areas of national security policy hampers the possibility for external scrutiny and challenge of national security policy delivery. Our opinion was further solidified when the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology declined to put forward a minister to give …
Government response. The government described its internal approach for accountability, assigning lead departments and offering to update the committee on progress. It supported the principle of ministerial accountability but reserved the right to determine which minister is best placed to attend.
Cabinet Office
7
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
The Government must clarify how follow-up and oversight of Lead Government Departments responsible for delivering the commitments in the National Security Strategy (NSS) will be sustained over time. This should involve accountability mechanisms at fixed points, for example through regular reporting to the National Security Adviser and his Deputies. These …
Government response. The government describes its internal implementation approach for accountability and periodic reporting on National Security Strategy objectives and commits to updating the Committee on progress. However, it does not agree to publish an addendum assigning delivery responsibilities to named ministers, …
Cabinet Office
8
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted in Part
All Ministers with responsibility for delivery of aspects of the National Security Strategy should make themselves available for scrutiny by this Committee at regular intervals, and as requested, to ensure proper parliamentary accountability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)
Government response. The government accepted the principle of ministerial accountability and that ministers should attend when called upon, but stated that the government should be able to confirm which minister is best placed to represent the issue.
Cabinet Office
9
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will be a limited achievement if it does not create any additional resilience capability for the UK beyond what was already allocated in the 2025 Spending Review. We appreciate that the 1.5% target is still new, …
Government response. The government explains that NATO has agreed on the definition of the 1.5% spending target for resilience and security, addressing the lack of clarity. They expect to meet the target by 2027 and will report spending lines to NATO shortly.
Cabinet Office
10
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
The Government must provide greater clarity on its plans to develop additional resilience capabilities beyond 2027, and ensure that the 1.5% target spend on security and resilience prioritises investment in systems that can help build long-term resilience, in addition to spending on maintenance of basic civil infrastructure. The Government should …
Government response. The government acknowledges the 1.5% NATO target for security and resilience spending, stating it expects to reach it by 2027 and will report spending lines to NATO shortly. However, it does not provide specific clarity on plans for developing additional …
Cabinet Office
11
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), but necessary detail on these plans is lacking. Private sector organisations with responsibility for the protection of CNI also need a clearer steer on what they will be expected to do to bolster resilience of …
Government response. The government accepts the need for clarity, committing to mapping resilience standards and developing guidance for CNI owners and operators. It also mentions amending the Reserve Forces Act and an upcoming National Cyber Action Plan to strengthen resilience, including for …
Cabinet Office
12
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Not Addressed
The Government must accelerate its plans for improving the size and state of the reserves, and provide more detail for its plans to involve the reserves in the protection of Critical National Infrastructure. This should include planning for their use to replace uniformed specialists who have been moved to frontline …
Government response. The government's response largely discusses cyber resilience for Critical National Infrastructure. While it mentions amending the Reserve Forces Act in 2026, it provides no detail on accelerating plans for improving the size and state of the reserves or their specific …
Cabinet Office
13
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as a result of the NSS and provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill. It should then work with those operators to identify what support will be needed for them to …
Government response. The government commits to supporting CNI operators in meeting new Cyber Bill requirements by issuing implementation guidance for regulators and a code of practice to clarify expectations. They are also mapping resilience standards and developing NPSA guidance to identify and …
Cabinet Office
14
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is unclear at this stage how effective its scrutiny will be. How far its scrutiny remit will stretch, and whether this will include reviewing preparedness plans in the event of a crisis or warfighting situation, and/or …
Government response. The government addresses the committee's questions about the UK Resilience Academy's effectiveness and remit by stating it is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness for whole-system civil emergencies and is developing a national exercising hub linked …
Cabinet Office
15
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in relation to the estimated impacts of Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios as set out in the National Risk Register, including the possibility of direct threat to the homeland. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67) 63
Government response. The government agrees, stating the UK Resilience Academy is being instructed to convene expert panels annually to scrutinise preparedness plans for whole-system civil emergencies, including through document reviews and interviews. The UKRA is also developing a national exercising hub.
Cabinet Office
16
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen institutional links between the UK Resilience Academy (UKRA) and central government, including by: ○ enabling the UKRA to report into Cabinet Office-led exercises to refresh the National Risk Register to inform impact and preparedness estimates; …
Government response. The government accepts the recommendations, stating the UKRA will convene expert panels to scrutinise plans and preparedness, and is a key partner in developing a national exercising hub to link exercising with risk monitoring.
Cabinet Office
17
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through a national conversation, but it is not evident that this message is getting through to the public. There is a long way to go to realise the whole-of-society approach to defence and security. (Conclusion, Paragraph …
Government response. The government acknowledges that the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort already underway, citing high-level speeches and ongoing public surveys. It confirms commitments made in the Resilience Action Plan and Strategic Defence Review and will publish …
Cabinet Office
18
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience will look like, including who will be leading it and how it will ensure oversight between different Government departments responsible for its delivery. As part of this, the Ministry of Defence should publish the public …
Government response. The government states the national conversation on security and resilience is a government-wide effort, with various senior figures already contributing to raise public awareness. They committed to communicating actions through the Resilience Action Plan, publishing public survey findings on risk …
Cabinet Office
19
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
Global and UK security is poorly served by the increasing tensions brought about by great power competition between the United States and China. If this process continues to accelerate, the economic shock costs of military confrontation will go down, making conflict more likely. The post-war security settlement has served the …
Government response. The government agrees with the committee's conclusion that global security is challenged by increasing tensions, stating that it aligns with the National Security Strategy's acknowledgement of radical uncertainty and the need for statecraft to adapt.
Cabinet Office
20
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and Europe’s security through investing in partnerships and multilateral dialogues with other ‘middle powers’, for example Canada, Australia and India, to avoid being squeezed by great power competition between the United States and China. UK long-term …
Government response. The government agrees with the recommendation, stating it largely summarises what is already set out in the National Security Strategy 2025, which acknowledges radical uncertainty and adapts statecraft to a more competitive global environment.
Cabinet Office
21
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
The Government has identified Russia as the primary threat to the UK’s national security and continues to do good work to deter further Russian aggression. The Committee commends the Government for its continued military and financial assistance for Ukraine and its planned investment in sharpening the UK’s hard power, including …
Government response. The government welcomes the committee's support for its work against the Russian threat and in aiding Ukraine. It reaffirms its commitment to working with NATO allies, taking a leadership role in European security, and mentions forthcoming plans like the Defence …
Cabinet Office
22
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against the UK and its European allies, the Government must ensure that momentum in imposing ever greater costs on Russia is maintained. The UK must continue to take a leadership role in this within European NATO. …
Government response. The government accepts the importance of maintaining momentum against Russia and a leadership role. It commits to publishing the Defence Investment Plan shortly, responding to the Rycroft report in coming months with immediate implementation steps, and describes the purpose of …
Cabinet Office
23
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
China poses a clear long-term national security threat to the UK—both directly through its malicious targeting of UK interests, and indirectly through its support to Russia over the Ukraine conflict. We have concerns that the Government is not striking the right balance—and indeed about whether it is prepared to accept …
Government response. The government acknowledges China's long-term national security threat and states it is taking a strategic approach that balances economic engagement with robust challenge, citing existing measures like the NSI Act and ongoing diplomatic engagement with China regarding Russia.
Cabinet Office
24
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Not Addressed
The Government must articulate more clearly how it will balance extensive security and supply chain risks with its desire for closer economic ties with China. It should, for example, be more proactive in raising the issue of Beijing’s ongoing support for Moscow continuing to pursue its war in Ukraine. Additionally, …
Government response. The government outlined its existing strategic approach to China, balancing threats and opportunities, and described current actions to challenge risks and engage on issues like Russia's war. However, it did not commit to articulating its balancing act more clearly or …
Cabinet Office
25
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While it is positive that the Government has recognised the need for the UK to prepare for a future where the United States makes a less active contribution to European 65 security, …
Government response. The government affirmed its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and new investments in sovereign capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
Cabinet Office
26
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government must also develop a clear plan, along with other European allies, for a transition towards greater European leadership of NATO. Preparing for a ‘worst-case scenario’ whereby Europe can no longer rely on US support in …
Government response. The government stated its commitment to interdependence and burden-sharing within NATO, detailing existing collaborations with European partners and investments in capabilities to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security and reduce overdependence on any single state.
Cabinet Office
27
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies in other parts of the world. In addition to working to shore up European NATO’s capabilities, the UK should plan to move away from a bilateral relationship with the United States that is so …
Government response. The government stated its commitment to diversifying relationships beyond NATO, citing programmes like AUKUS, the Global Combat Air Programme, and partnerships with India and Indonesia as examples of how it is already developing strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies to reduce …
Cabinet Office
28
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
We welcome the Government’s efforts to diversify partnerships, illustrated by deepening trade and security collaboration with India and engagements with Gulf countries. This work is crucial both to ensuring the UK can draw on breadth and depth in its partnerships to support economic growth, and improve resilience during periods of …
Government response. The government agrees on the importance of pursuing strategic relationships and highlights its ongoing efforts, including new partnerships with Japan, Indonesia, and India, and the use of instruments like the National Security and Investment Act.
Cabinet Office
29
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and national security objectives as it pursues new strategic relationships and bolsters existing ones. The scale of this work should be expanded, and its speed accelerated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 126)
Government response. The government agrees with the principle of pursuing strategic relationships and outlines existing partnerships and instruments like the National Security and Investment Act, without committing to specific new or accelerated actions as requested.
Cabinet Office
30
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
A credible, sustainable and independent UK nuclear deterrent is integral to UK national security, and as a buffer against allied proliferation in an era of fast-changing nuclear risks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 135)
Government response. The government agrees with the conclusion, highlighting existing measures such as the NSS and SDR outlining the threat, £6bn investment in nuclear submarine facilities, and deepened nuclear cooperation with France.
Cabinet Office
31
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending choices and future nuclear security programmes. It should set out how it plans to extend UK-France collaboration on nuclear security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 136) 66 Pillar 3 – Sovereign Capabilities
Government response. The government states it has already outlined the threat publicly via the NSS and SDR, and announced £6bn for submarine production facilities. It also noted deepened nuclear cooperation with France through the Northwood Declaration.
Cabinet Office
32
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Rejected
The National Security Strategy is clear that sovereignty over certain national security capabilities, including nuclear, emerging technologies, shipbuilding and steelmaking, is important. However, beyond this, there is no clear definition of how the Government defines what it considers to be a sovereign capability. Nor is there sufficient indication of what …
Government response. The government rejects providing a strict definition or published list of sovereign capabilities, citing risks. It states clarity is instead provided through existing strategic frameworks like the Industrial Strategy and the National Security and Investment Act, with further details coming …
Cabinet Office
33
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Acknowledged
We appreciate that the definition of sovereignty will differ by sector and by degree. However, the general lack of clarity on definitions and objectives complicates research and development planning and investment. The UK has a strong base of talent and skills in emerging technologies— artificial intelligence in particular—where some level …
Government response. The government acknowledges the need for clarity but states they will not provide a strict definition of sovereignty, opting instead for a flexible approach through strategic frameworks like the Industrial Strategy and National Security and Investment Act. They believe these …
Cabinet Office
34
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Rejected
The Government should provide a clear, written definition of what a sovereign capability is, including different levels of sovereignty. The Government should also outline which specific existing and emerging technologies it is seeking to develop, and to what level of sovereignty. These definitions should be informed by risk assessments of …
Government response. The government rejected the need for a strict written definition of sovereign capability or a restrictive list of technologies, arguing a flexible approach through existing strategic frameworks like the Industrial Strategy and NSIA provides clarity while avoiding risks of obsolescence …
Cabinet Office
35
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Accepted
Additionally, the Government should set out the order of priorities for the different sovereign capabilities it intends to develop. The Defence Investment Plan would be a useful place for this, as a signal to industry. (Recommendation, Paragraph 154)
Government response. The government committed to setting out the UK’s capability priorities for the next ten years within the Defence Investment Plan, providing a clear signal to industry, while explaining its preference for a dynamic rather than restrictive approach.
Cabinet Office
36
Conclusion
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Deferred
Industry lacks an adequate signal from Government on the allocation of spending across the defence, security and resilience sectors. This impacts the ability to plan research and development spending in a way that aligns with Government objectives, and prioritises the most important sovereign technologies. For SMEs in particular, this contributes …
Government response. The government commits to addressing the issue of inadequate signals by publishing a forthcoming Defence Finance and Investment Strategy and an SME action plan with a direct spending target, once the Defence Investment Plan is finalised.
Cabinet Office
37
Recommendation
4th Report – The National Security Stra…
Deferred
The Defence Investment Plan must be completed and published as soon as possible. Within the Plan, the Government should provide further detail on the funding mechanisms it will use to support firms as it seeks to revitalise 67 the UK’s defence-industrial base and develop sovereign capabilities. SMEs in particular need …
Government response. The government stated that the MOD’s forthcoming Defence Finance and Investment Strategy will detail measures to improve SME access to finance, and an SME action plan and direct spending target will be published once the Defence Investment Plan is finalised.
Cabinet Office