The National Security Strategy

The Government must balance transparency with the public about the reality of threats the UK faces with not causing alarm and making sensitive information unnecessarily accessible to adversaries. However, there is a sense among industry stakeholders and civil society organisations that they were not sufficiently consulted in the development of the National Security Strategy, and a subsequent lack of transparency on certain important aspects such as the China Audit and timelines. The lack of publicly available detail, particularly around the issue of China, risks eroding public trust that progress is being made to improve national security. The lack of engagement with stakeholders makes securing the buy- in needed for a whole-of-society approach to resilience more challenging. (Conclusion, Paragraph 21)

The Government must reconsider how it discusses security challenges, and avoid being unduly opaque. The Government should provide annual progress updates to this Committee on commitments in the National Security Strategy and in other related strategies such as the Resilience Action Plan. The first of these updates should be provided alongside the Government’s response to this report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)

The Government should also review its consultation and engagement approach with industry stakeholders, civil society and the wider public on matters of national security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 23)

Soft power is a crucial source of UK influence and security abroad. Its erosion would have direct security consequences, most clearly in Africa, where Russia and China are increasingly filling the space left by the withdrawal of the soft power presence of the UK and allies. Official Development Assistance and bodies such as the BBC World Service and the British Council play an important role in regions where the UK has clear security interests. The recent funding commitments to the BBC World Service are welcome in this regard. (Conclusion, Paragraph 32) 61

The Government should ensure it has a full and robust assessment of the national security risks of reducing the Official Development Assistance budget, resisting further cuts that could have a damaging effect for UK strategic interests. We note the International Development Committee is further examining the future of UK aid and hope the Government will engage with that inquiry constructively. The Government should ensure stable and predictable funding for bodies such as the BBC World Service and British Council, and draw on the advice of experts represented on the Soft Power Council. The next iteration of the National Risk Register should account for the possible impacts of reducing UK and allied soft power. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33) Oversight and implementation

The lack of clarity over which departments are responsible for which areas of national security policy hampers the possibility for external scrutiny and challenge of national security policy delivery. Our opinion was further solidified when the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology declined to put forward a minister to give evidence to this inquiry alongside the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the Minister for Security. (Conclusion, Paragraph 40)

The Government must clarify how follow-up and oversight of Lead Government Departments responsible for delivering the commitments in the National Security Strategy (NSS) will be sustained over time. This should involve accountability mechanisms at fixed points, for example through regular reporting to the National Security Adviser and his Deputies. These reporting updates should be included in the regular updates to the Committee, called for in an earlier recommendation. The Government should also publish an addendum to the NSS, which assigns delivery responsibilities for the commitments made in the Strategy to named Ministers within each department. (Recommendation, Paragraph 41)

All Ministers with responsibility for delivery of aspects of the National Security Strategy should make themselves available for scrutiny by this Committee at regular intervals, and as requested, to ensure proper parliamentary accountability. (Recommendation, Paragraph 42)

Hitting the target to spend 1.5% of GDP on resilience and security by 2027 will be a limited achievement if it does not create any additional resilience capability for the UK beyond what was already allocated in the 2025 Spending Review. We appreciate that the 1.5% target is still new, but a long-term lack of clarity over what will be included within the target creates uncertainty for private and public bodies involved in resilience planning. (Conclusion, Paragraph 46) 62

The Government must provide greater clarity on its plans to develop additional resilience capabilities beyond 2027, and ensure that the 1.5% target spend on security and resilience prioritises investment in systems that can help build long-term resilience, in addition to spending on maintenance of basic civil infrastructure. The Government should also clearly outline what additional capabilities it envisages developing through the target spend by the time of the next NATO summit in July 2026. (Recommendation, Paragraph 47) Pillar 1 – Security at Home

We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), but necessary detail on these plans is lacking. Private sector organisations with responsibility for the protection of CNI also need a clearer steer on what they will be expected to do to bolster resilience of CNI, including in cyber-resilience. (Conclusion, Paragraph 57)

The Government must accelerate its plans for improving the size and state of the reserves, and provide more detail for its plans to involve the reserves in the protection of Critical National Infrastructure. This should include planning for their use to replace uniformed specialists who have been moved to frontline services; the continued functioning of services in a communications and supplies-degraded environment; and plans for deployment in a crisis. (Recommendation, Paragraph 58)

The Government should clarify what will change for private sector Critical National Infrastructure operators as a result of the NSS and provisions of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill. It should then work with those operators to identify what support will be needed for them to adapt to the new regime. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59)

While we welcome ambitions to scrutinise resilience plans through the UK Resilience Academy, it is unclear at this stage how effective its scrutiny will be. How far its scrutiny remit will stretch, and whether this will include reviewing preparedness plans in the event of a crisis or warfighting situation, and/or increasingly sophisticated attacks facilitated through novel technologies, are all outstanding questions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 66)

The Government should ensure that the UK Resilience Academy is reviewing preparedness plans specifically in relation to the estimated impacts of Reasonable Worst Case Scenarios as set out in the National Risk Register, including the possibility of direct threat to the homeland. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67) 63

The Government should also set out, in response to this report, how it will strengthen institutional links between the UK Resilience Academy (UKRA) and central government, including by: ○ enabling the UKRA to report into Cabinet Office-led exercises to refresh the National Risk Register to inform impact and preparedness estimates; ○ reporting into the National Exercising Programme; and ○ ensuring there is always UKRA representation in these exercises. (Recommendation, Paragraph 68)

The Government has identified the need for a whole-of-society approach to security and resilience through a national conversation, but it is not evident that this message is getting through to the public. There is a long way to go to realise the whole-of-society approach to defence and security. (Conclusion, Paragraph 74)

The Government must provide more detail on what the national conversation on security and resilience will look like, including who will be leading it and how it will ensure oversight between different Government departments responsible for its delivery. As part of this, the Ministry of Defence should publish the public version of its Joint Concept Note as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 75) Pillar 2 – Strength Abroad

Global and UK security is poorly served by the increasing tensions brought about by great power competition between the United States and China. If this process continues to accelerate, the economic shock costs of military confrontation will go down, making conflict more likely. The post-war security settlement has served the UK, Europe and the world well for over 80 years, and while the UK’s influence is less than it once was, there is still an imperative to do what it can to maintain and bolster these arrangements. (Conclusion, Paragraph 79)

The UK must be prepared to take on more of the cost for its and Europe’s security through investing in partnerships and multilateral dialogues with other ‘middle powers’, for example Canada, Australia and India, to avoid being squeezed by great power competition between the United States and China. UK long-term strategy should seek to ease the increasing tensions of great power competition between the United States and China, and the global diplomatic and economic decoupling this is resulting in. In turn, this will bolster both UK and global security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80) 64

The Government has identified Russia as the primary threat to the UK’s national security and continues to do good work to deter further Russian aggression. The Committee commends the Government for its continued military and financial assistance for Ukraine and its planned investment in sharpening the UK’s hard power, including through maintenance of the independent nuclear deterrent. In conjunction with NATO allies, the UK also continues to demonstrate a united front against Russian aggression by tightening the pressure on Moscow through use of sanctions and acting against the shadow fleet. (Conclusion, Paragraph 88)

As long as Russia continues its war in Ukraine, and acts of hybrid aggression against the UK and its European allies, the Government must ensure that momentum in imposing ever greater costs on Russia is maintained. The UK must continue to take a leadership role in this within European NATO. With this in mind, the Government should hasten publication and progress of strategies, legislation and reviews relevant to the hardening and sharpening of the UK’s conventional, hybrid and cyber capabilities, including the Defence Investment Plan, the Defence Readiness Bill and the Rycroft Review. The Government should also set out its priorities in the Arctic and the High North in the response to this report, and engage fully and constructively with the Defence Committee’s inquiry in this area. (Recommendation, Paragraph 89)

China poses a clear long-term national security threat to the UK—both directly through its malicious targeting of UK interests, and indirectly through its support to Russia over the Ukraine conflict. We have concerns that the Government is not striking the right balance—and indeed about whether it is prepared to accept the unpalatable reality that long-term security has short-term financial costs. (Conclusion, Paragraph 104)

The Government must articulate more clearly how it will balance extensive security and supply chain risks with its desire for closer economic ties with China. It should, for example, be more proactive in raising the issue of Beijing’s ongoing support for Moscow continuing to pursue its war in Ukraine. Additionally, when signing new international treaties and economic agreements, the Government should commit to publishing an accompanying statement which makes it clear how national security considerations have been accounted for in detail. These assessments should make sure to include examination and mitigation of emerging challenges including, but not limited to, espionage, transnational repression and AI-enabled harms. (Recommendation, Paragraph 105)

The UK has strategic dependencies on the United States for core capabilities in nuclear, intelligence and conventional defence. While it is positive that the Government has recognised the need for the UK to prepare for a future where the United States makes a less active contribution to European 65 security, more must be done to ensure Europe and the UK are better able to protect themselves. At the same time, the UK should continue communicating to the United States about the mutual benefits of the US-UK security relationship and ensure that areas of national strategic importance are not undermined by other challenges (for example, US-led peace negotiations over Ukraine, or commitments to the situation in Iran). (Conclusion, Paragraph 118)

As well as continuing its strategic collaboration with the United States where practical, the Government must also develop a clear plan, along with other European allies, for a transition towards greater European leadership of NATO. Preparing for a ‘worst-case scenario’ whereby Europe can no longer rely on US support in the event of a crisis, the Government must work with European partners to invest in its own capabilities to offset this potential withdrawal. (Recommendation, Paragraph 119)

The Government should also pursue this contingency through continuing to develop strategic partnerships with non-NATO allies in other parts of the world. In addition to working to shore up European NATO’s capabilities, the UK should plan to move away from a bilateral relationship with the United States that is so dependent on the latter for nuclear and intelligence operations, and conventional defence. (Recommendation, Paragraph 120)

We welcome the Government’s efforts to diversify partnerships, illustrated by deepening trade and security collaboration with India and engagements with Gulf countries. This work is crucial both to ensuring the UK can draw on breadth and depth in its partnerships to support economic growth, and improve resilience during periods of heightened international tension. Recent support by the UK in deploying the RAF to the collective self-defence of Gulf countries in the face of Iranian strikes is welcome. (Conclusion, Paragraph 125)

The Government should continue to ensure that sensible trade-offs are made between economic growth and national security objectives as it pursues new strategic relationships and bolsters existing ones. The scale of this work should be expanded, and its speed accelerated. (Recommendation, Paragraph 126)

A credible, sustainable and independent UK nuclear deterrent is integral to UK national security, and as a buffer against allied proliferation in an era of fast-changing nuclear risks. (Conclusion, Paragraph 135)

The Government would benefit from having a more open public conversation about nuclear threats, spending choices and future nuclear security programmes. It should set out how it plans to extend UK-France collaboration on nuclear security. (Recommendation, Paragraph 136) 66 Pillar 3 – Sovereign Capabilities

The National Security Strategy is clear that sovereignty over certain national security capabilities, including nuclear, emerging technologies, shipbuilding and steelmaking, is important. However, beyond this, there is no clear definition of how the Government defines what it considers to be a sovereign capability. Nor is there sufficient indication of what specific capabilities and technologies the Government intends to prioritise as part of this work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 151)

We appreciate that the definition of sovereignty will differ by sector and by degree. However, the general lack of clarity on definitions and objectives complicates research and development planning and investment. The UK has a strong base of talent and skills in emerging technologies— artificial intelligence in particular—where some level of sovereignty will be desirable and the Government must ensure that this advantage is utilised. (Conclusion, Paragraph 152)

The Government should provide a clear, written definition of what a sovereign capability is, including different levels of sovereignty. The Government should also outline which specific existing and emerging technologies it is seeking to develop, and to what level of sovereignty. These definitions should be informed by risk assessments of critical supply chains, critical minerals and investment, and export security, and should be agreed across government. Relevant departments must have regard to these definitions when making any decisions around investment and support both for firms developing sovereign capabilities and for higher education institutions researching emerging technologies. (Recommendation, Paragraph 153)

Additionally, the Government should set out the order of priorities for the different sovereign capabilities it intends to develop. The Defence Investment Plan would be a useful place for this, as a signal to industry. (Recommendation, Paragraph 154)

Industry lacks an adequate signal from Government on the allocation of spending across the defence, security and resilience sectors. This impacts the ability to plan research and development spending in a way that aligns with Government objectives, and prioritises the most important sovereign technologies. For SMEs in particular, this contributes to their vulnerability to acquisition by foreign investors, compromising their ability to contribute to security and sovereignty goals. (Conclusion, Paragraph 163)

The Defence Investment Plan must be completed and published as soon as possible. Within the Plan, the Government should provide further detail on the funding mechanisms it will use to support firms as it seeks to revitalise 67 the UK’s defence-industrial base and develop sovereign capabilities. SMEs in particular need further financial support and guidance to grow and develop capabilities and avoid the risk of homegrown talent and capabilities being acquired by foreign investors. (Recommendation, Paragraph 164) 68