Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)
Recommendation 10
10
Acknowledged
The Government must provide greater clarity on its plans to develop additional resilience capabilities beyond...
Recommendation
The Government must provide greater clarity on its plans to develop additional resilience capabilities beyond 2027, and ensure that the 1.5% target spend on security and resilience prioritises investment in systems that can help build long-term resilience, in addition to spending on maintenance of basic civil infrastructure. The Government should also clearly outline what additional capabilities it envisages developing through the target spend by the time of the next NATO summit in July 2026. (Recommendation, Paragraph 47) Pillar 1 – Security at Home
Government response summary AI-generated
The government acknowledges the 1.5% NATO target for security and resilience spending, stating it expects to reach it by 2027 and will report spending lines to NATO shortly. However, it does not provide specific clarity on plans for developing additional resilience capabilities beyond 2027 or by the next NATO summit.
Summary of the government's response below — read the verbatim text to verify.
Government Response
Acknowledged
HM Government · verbatim extract
Acknowledged
NATO has already agreed the definition of 1.5% as spending to protect critical infrastructure, defend networks, ensure civil preparedness and resilience, innovate, and strengthen the defence industrial base. We have long argued that investment in areas like energy security is vital to national security. That is reflected in our National Security Strategy, Resilience Action Plan and in our Spending Review settlement and we are pleased it is now recognised by NATO. We expect we will reach the 1.5% target by 2027 and will report our spending lines to NATO shortly. As with many national security capabilities we would expect this to be a combination of both capital and non-capital spending. Conclusion: We welcome the greater use of Armed Forces Reserves in protecting Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), but necessary detail on these plans is lacking. Private sector organisations with responsibility for the protection of CNI also need a clearer steer on what they will be expected to do to bolster resilience of CNI, including in cyber-resilience. (Paragraph 57).
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