| Title | HC No. | Published | Items | Response |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3rd Report - Political finance and foreign influence | HC 720 | 18 Mar 2026 | 23 | — |
The risk of foreign influence in the UK’s political finance system is real. We believe the threat is likely to grow out to the next election, particularly as the value of influencing the UK’s position on international policy increases. The lack of adequate safeguards means that it is not possible …
The governance and accountability arrangements for criminal enforcement of illegal political finance interference are inadequate. Responsibilities and capabilities are dispersed across the Electoral Commission, the Metropolitan Police Service, Counter Terrorism Policing, MI5, the National Crime Agency, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, and regional police forces. There would be operational value …
The Government should establish a centralised Political Finance Enforcement Unit. This should be a joint unit, which could be housed in the National Crime Agency. It should hold the overall national lead and accountability for proactive assessments and criminal investigations into political finance. It should involve secondees from relevant specialisms …
The Unit should have formalised information sharing agreements with the parent organisations of participating personnel, to ensure the parent organisation’s powers may be deployed during the course of investigations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48) Crypto
Crypto donations pose an unnecessary and unacceptably high risk to the integrity of the political finance system and public trust in it. We accept that future regulations may institutionalise the use of alternative payment systems for use in donations. At present, however, the opportunity to evade rules is too high, …
Crypto also poses wider upstream risks to the integrity of political finance: donors can convert ‘dirty’ foreign crypto funds into ‘clean’ UK fiat and then donate it without arousing much suspicion. A ‘last mile’ ban on crypto donations is therefore not a panacea. Specialist capabilities to address upstream risks are …
The Government should introduce a binding moratorium on crypto donations as an amendment to the Representation of the People Bill. This moratorium should remain in place until the Electoral Commission has issued statutory guidance on crypto donations which applies to its regulated entities. The Bill should be further amended to …
The Representation of the People Bill contains inexplicable deficiencies on corporate donations. We support limiting donations to those carrying out meaningful activity in the UK. However, the Bill contains a loophole, which would allow companies to donate the upper limit of their UK-generated revenue hundreds of times over to individual …
The Government should amend Part 4 of the Representation of the People Bill to specify that limits on corporate donations apply to the total amount per company, rather than per recipient. (Recommendation, Paragraph 77) 39 Criminal liability for acting as a foreign conduit
The Representation of the People Bill does not include strong enough safeguards to prevent UK subsidiaries donating on behalf of foreign parent companies or wealthy individuals. There are further loopholes enabling donors to receive large sums of foreign money in connection with a donation and not declare it. And it …
We welcome the Government’s commitment to commence Section 54A of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act. But the provisions need more work to adequately address concerns about donors acting as conduits for foreign money. We are sceptical about simply commencing 54A via secondary legislation without amendments. (Conclusion, Paragraph 91)
The Government should amend the Representation of the People Bill to introduce an alternative version of Section 54A in primary legislation. This would create a critical mechanism to implement much needed changes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92)
The alternative version of Section 54A should reduce the declaration threshold of funds received in connection with a donation to £500. This would limit the risk of foreign money being channelled through permissible donors. (Recommendation, Paragraph 93)
The alternative version of Section 54A should specify that the relevant persons are liable if they fail to act on ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ that a false declaration or otherwise impermissible donation is being facilitated. Such changes would bring the legislation in line with money laundering rules and the Proceeds …
The alternative version of Section 54A should specify that a regulated recipient may not accept a donation where there is ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ that it derives from an impermissible foreign source, or has been provided in connection with an impermissible foreign source. Serious failures to conduct adequate due diligence …
The Government should amend the Representation of the People Bill to increase maximum custodial sentences to three years for the most serious breaches of political finance laws involving impermissible foreign money. This would improve deterrence and also enable law enforcement to deploy more intrusive investigatory powers, which are currently curtailed …
The Government should review options to reduce the risk of foreign money entering UK political finance via individual donors whose primary long- term residence is overseas. For example, individual donors whose primary residence is overseas could be required to have UK financial assets registerable with HM Revenue and Customs for …
We welcome the proposed improvement to the Electoral Commission’s data sharing powers under Clause 69. (Conclusion, Paragraph 107)
The Electoral Commission needs new powers to ask for information about whether the source of funds used in political donations is permissible. This is vital to ensuring effective deterrence and enabling the regulator to identify risks of foreign money. At the moment the Electoral Commission’s powers are too circumscribed: it …
The Government should create a power for the Electoral Commission to compel financial institutions to provide information relating to the source funds used in regulated political donations and regulated campaign spending. This power should also apply to crypto currency platforms. This power should be deployable where the Electoral Commission has …
The Electoral Commission and law enforcement should have powers to receive relevant information from HM Revenue and Customs in connection with an investigation into suspicions of foreign money. We further recommend exploring options to make better use of existing powers, for example deploying Unexplained Wealth Orders in relation to suspicions …
The Government’s legislative changes will only be meaningful if the Electoral Commission, police and National Crime Agency are adequately resourced to enforce the rules. (Conclusion, Paragraph 123)
We recommend the Electoral Commission, Metropolitan Police Service and National Crime Agency provide an annual resourcing update to this Committee. This should set out their resourcing levels and the extent to which these are adequate to deliver on objectives to deter, investigate and prosecute the use of impermissible foreign money …
| Date | Witnesses | |
|---|---|---|
| 9 Feb 2026 | Graeme Biggar CBE · National Crime Agency, Rachael Herbert · National Crime Agency | View ↗ |
| 12 Jan 2026 | Dr Sam Power · University of Bristol, Duncan Hames · Transparency International UK, Natasha Powell · Kraken Digital Asset Exchange, Tom Keatinge · RUSI | View ↗ |
| 8 Sep 2025 | Dr Susan Hawley · Spotlight on Corruption, Ian Taylor · CryptoUK, Jackie Killeen · Electoral Commission, Peter Geoghegan · openDemocracy, Vijay Rangarajan · Electoral Commission | View ↗ |
| 17 Mar 2025 | Dan Jarvis MP · Home Office, Nanyamka Brown · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, Shaun Hipgrave · Home Office, The Baroness Jones of Whitchurch · Department for Science, Innovation and Technology | View ↗ |
| Date | Direction | Title |
|---|---|---|
| 23 Jun 2026 | — | The Electoral Commission's response to the Committee's report on political fina… |
| 16 Mar 2026 | To cttee | Response from the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Governm… |
| 16 Mar 2026 | From cttee | Letter to the Commissioner, Metropolitan Police relating to Political finance, … |
| 24 Feb 2026 | To cttee | Letter from the Chair to the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Lo… |
| 9 Feb 2026 | To cttee | Letter from the Chair to Vijay Rangarajan, Chief Executive, Electoral Commissio… |
| 21 Oct 2025 | — | Correspondence from Dan Jarvis MBE MP, Security Minister relating to the Defend… |
| 17 Jul 2025 | — | Correspondence to Dan Jarvis MBE MP, Security Minister relating to the Defendin… |
| 1 May 2025 | To cttee | Letter from Ofcom on Defending Democracy and the Online Safety Act, dated 23 Ap… |
| 1 May 2025 | From cttee | Letter to Ofcom on Defending Democracy and the Online Safety Act, dated 28 Marc… |
| 1 May 2025 | — | Correspondence to Dan Jarvis MBE MP, Security Minister following oral evidence … |
| 1 May 2025 | — | Correspondence from Dan Jarvis MBE MP, Security Minister following oral evidenc… |