3rd Report - Political finance and foreign influence

The risk of foreign influence in the UK’s political finance system is real. We believe the threat is likely to grow out to the next election, particularly as the value of influencing the UK’s position on international policy increases. The lack of adequate safeguards means that it is not possible to identify or interdict many problematic sources of finance. Moreover, the corrosive public perception that our system is open to foreign influence risks jeopardising trust in outcomes, even if real-world impacts are small. The Government must not waste this opportunity to introduce more robust protections. (Conclusion, Paragraph 28) Who’s in charge?

The governance and accountability arrangements for criminal enforcement of illegal political finance interference are inadequate. Responsibilities and capabilities are dispersed across the Electoral Commission, the Metropolitan Police Service, Counter Terrorism Policing, MI5, the National Crime Agency, the National Police Chiefs’ Council, and regional police forces. There would be operational value in simplifying this set up. That would also probably help address worryingly low levels of public trust in the adequacy of enforcement. (Conclusion, Paragraph 46)

The Government should establish a centralised Political Finance Enforcement Unit. This should be a joint unit, which could be housed in the National Crime Agency. It should hold the overall national lead and accountability for proactive assessments and criminal investigations into political finance. It should involve secondees from relevant specialisms (Counter Terrorism Policing, MI5 and the Electoral Commission) with temporary involvement from seconded regional police representatives for specific cases. (Recommendation, Paragraph 47) 38

The Unit should have formalised information sharing agreements with the parent organisations of participating personnel, to ensure the parent organisation’s powers may be deployed during the course of investigations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48) Crypto

Crypto donations pose an unnecessary and unacceptably high risk to the integrity of the political finance system and public trust in it. We accept that future regulations may institutionalise the use of alternative payment systems for use in donations. At present, however, the opportunity to evade rules is too high, the adequacy of mitigations too low, and the resource cost of attempting to implement acceptable oversight is disproportionate. We see no democratic imperative to permit the use of crypto in political finance until adequate safeguards are in place. (Conclusion, Paragraph 68)

Crypto also poses wider upstream risks to the integrity of political finance: donors can convert ‘dirty’ foreign crypto funds into ‘clean’ UK fiat and then donate it without arousing much suspicion. A ‘last mile’ ban on crypto donations is therefore not a panacea. Specialist capabilities to address upstream risks are underpowered and require further work. (Conclusion, Paragraph 69)

The Government should introduce a binding moratorium on crypto donations as an amendment to the Representation of the People Bill. This moratorium should remain in place until the Electoral Commission has issued statutory guidance on crypto donations which applies to its regulated entities. The Bill should be further amended to provide for that guidance to be subject to the affirmative procedure to provide Parliament with an appropriate scrutiny opportunity and an opportunity to object. We suggest the Electoral Commission must develop satisfactory safeguards in time for the next General Election. (Recommendation, Paragraph 70) Corporate donations

The Representation of the People Bill contains inexplicable deficiencies on corporate donations. We support limiting donations to those carrying out meaningful activity in the UK. However, the Bill contains a loophole, which would allow companies to donate the upper limit of their UK-generated revenue hundreds of times over to individual MPs and candidates. That needs fixing. (Conclusion, Paragraph 76)

The Government should amend Part 4 of the Representation of the People Bill to specify that limits on corporate donations apply to the total amount per company, rather than per recipient. (Recommendation, Paragraph 77) 39 Criminal liability for acting as a foreign conduit

The Representation of the People Bill does not include strong enough safeguards to prevent UK subsidiaries donating on behalf of foreign parent companies or wealthy individuals. There are further loopholes enabling donors to receive large sums of foreign money in connection with a donation and not declare it. And it has missed opportunities to amend the terminology on donor and recipient due diligence responsibilities, which currently hamper law enforcement from launching adequate investigations and bringing prosecutions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 90)

We welcome the Government’s commitment to commence Section 54A of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act. But the provisions need more work to adequately address concerns about donors acting as conduits for foreign money. We are sceptical about simply commencing 54A via secondary legislation without amendments. (Conclusion, Paragraph 91)

The Government should amend the Representation of the People Bill to introduce an alternative version of Section 54A in primary legislation. This would create a critical mechanism to implement much needed changes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92)

The alternative version of Section 54A should reduce the declaration threshold of funds received in connection with a donation to £500. This would limit the risk of foreign money being channelled through permissible donors. (Recommendation, Paragraph 93)

The alternative version of Section 54A should specify that the relevant persons are liable if they fail to act on ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ that a false declaration or otherwise impermissible donation is being facilitated. Such changes would bring the legislation in line with money laundering rules and the Proceeds of Crime Act. Donors should also have to make an explicit declaration subject to criminal liability that they are not donating money for or on behalf of a foreign entity. Related changes should apply to other relevant aspects of PPERA and the Representation of the People Bill. (Recommendation, Paragraph 94)

The alternative version of Section 54A should specify that a regulated recipient may not accept a donation where there is ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ that it derives from an impermissible foreign source, or has been provided in connection with an impermissible foreign source. Serious failures to conduct adequate due diligence in this regard should be subject to criminal proceedings. (Recommendation, Paragraph 95) 40

The Government should amend the Representation of the People Bill to increase maximum custodial sentences to three years for the most serious breaches of political finance laws involving impermissible foreign money. This would improve deterrence and also enable law enforcement to deploy more intrusive investigatory powers, which are currently curtailed by 12-month sentencing levels. We further recommend exploring additional civil and criminal sanctions as well. (Recommendation, Paragraph 98)

The Government should review options to reduce the risk of foreign money entering UK political finance via individual donors whose primary long- term residence is overseas. For example, individual donors whose primary residence is overseas could be required to have UK financial assets registerable with HM Revenue and Customs for the past 12 months which are sufficient to cover the cost of their donation. This would broadly mirror the Bill’s other requirements for corporate donors to have generated sufficient money in the UK. (Recommendation, Paragraph 103) Source of funds

We welcome the proposed improvement to the Electoral Commission’s data sharing powers under Clause 69. (Conclusion, Paragraph 107)

The Electoral Commission needs new powers to ask for information about whether the source of funds used in political donations is permissible. This is vital to ensuring effective deterrence and enabling the regulator to identify risks of foreign money. At the moment the Electoral Commission’s powers are too circumscribed: it cannot launch investigations without high evidence thresholds, and it cannot obtain that evidence without a formal investigation. (Conclusion, Paragraph 114)

The Government should create a power for the Electoral Commission to compel financial institutions to provide information relating to the source funds used in regulated political donations and regulated campaign spending. This power should also apply to crypto currency platforms. This power should be deployable where the Electoral Commission has reasonable grounds to suspect there is a risk of impermissible activity, including outside the context of a live formal investigation. (Recommendation, Paragraph 115)

The Electoral Commission and law enforcement should have powers to receive relevant information from HM Revenue and Customs in connection with an investigation into suspicions of foreign money. We further recommend exploring options to make better use of existing powers, for example deploying Unexplained Wealth Orders in relation to suspicions of impermissible foreign sources of donations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 116) 41 Resourcing

The Government’s legislative changes will only be meaningful if the Electoral Commission, police and National Crime Agency are adequately resourced to enforce the rules. (Conclusion, Paragraph 123)

We recommend the Electoral Commission, Metropolitan Police Service and National Crime Agency provide an annual resourcing update to this Committee. This should set out their resourcing levels and the extent to which these are adequate to deliver on objectives to deter, investigate and prosecute the use of impermissible foreign money in the political finance system. This should be superseded by the Political Finance Enforcement Unit once that is in place. (Recommendation, Paragraph 124) 42