Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Thirty-Ninth Report - Lessons from major projects and programmes
Public Accounts Committee
HC 694
Published 29 January 2021
Conclusions (29)
2
Conclusion
We are concerned about the continued lack of transparency to Parliament about the progress of government projects. This Committee has examined many programmes where issues were emerging for some time that only became public knowledge much later. For example, the Committee was kept in the dark for over a year …
3
Conclusion
We welcome the IPA’s plans to strengthen how it assures government’s major projects and the recent clarification of it roles and responsibilities, but it remains to be seen whether the IPA will be able to effectively ensure those delivering projects make the level of improvement required. In the past, we …
4
Conclusion
There is scope for a more mature approach to setting and monitoring cost and schedule estimates by using ranges which narrow over time. The UK government has some of the most novel and complex programmes in the world. The issues that major programmes face are not unique to the public …
5
Conclusion
The calibre and number of people in leadership positions in major projects is still not strong enough. Skills and leadership remain a persistent problem in delivering major projects, particularly in getting the appropriate mix of skills across areas such as civil engineering and digital systems. While the tenure of Senior …
6
Conclusion
It is vital that Parliament’s own major project, the Restoration and Renewal programme, is an exemplar of an open and transparent project which welcomes scrutiny. The restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster is a highly complex programme with a number of uncertainties that underpin it, including the condition …
1
Conclusion
On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (the IPA) about the delivery and assurance of government major programmes.1
7
Conclusion
We asked about the capacity of both government and the private sector to deliver large increases in activity efficiently and effectively. The Government’s commitment to reach net zero carbon emissions by 2050 will add further challenges to meeting these commitments.8 The IPA told us that it sees the government’s plans …
8
Conclusion
The NIC stated that new economic infrastructure must take a cross-sectoral, evidence- based and long-term perspective.11 It said that this should increase the likelihood that the strategic case will remain relevant and persuasive as time goes on, which is likely to make it easier for delivery bodies to match the …
9
Conclusion
Within the National Infrastructure Strategy, the government also announced the initiatives that had come out of Project Speed, which it set up over the summer to review the infrastructure project life cycle and identify where improvements could be made in delivering them faster. These initiatives include measures such as reforms …
10
Conclusion
Government has also made changes to its Green Book guidance on evaluating investment proposals, such as reducing the dominance of benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) in project appraisal and introducing a new public value framework.15 The IPA stated that being fixated on the BCR in the past has tended to lead to …
11
Conclusion
In discussing the historic performance on managing major programmes and the challenges they have faced, the IPA stated that the UK government has some of the most novel and complex programmes in the world, that are probably more complex than many encountered in the private sector. Programmes in both sectors …
12
Conclusion
The NIC agreed, stating that when building infrastructure, government needs to spend sufficient time at the start deciding on the exact outcomes it wants and the ways those outcomes can be best achieved. This involves rigorous option appraisal and, critically, meaningful engagement with the public and stakeholders to understand key …
13
Conclusion
The IPA stated that it is working with government to improve the quality of cost estimation and is currently working on a standard for developing guidance on cost estimating. It has also set up a cross-departmental cost estimating community to share best practice.21 The NIC told us that the Government’s …
14
Conclusion
The IPA and NIC stated that programmes should provide a reasonable range of outcomes for likely costs and schedule that reflects the level of uncertainty in a programme.23 The Comptroller and Auditor General has also recommended the use of 16 Q 82 17 Q 85 18 Q 3 19 Q …
15
Conclusion
Skills and leadership remain a persistent problem in delivering major projects. Our report on specialist skills in the civil service concluded that skills shortages were responsible for delays, inefficiencies and increased costs in government projects, with the lack of skills in the Home Office partly responsible for the 3-year delay …
16
Conclusion
However, the IPA stated that many SROs manage more than one programme, and typically have four or five, which means they are “not being afforded the time in role to do the necessary work.”30 The IPA said that government needed to recruit 25 to 35 more senior responsible owners with …
17
Conclusion
The IPA told us that, to remedy this issue, in addition to making attendance at the Major Projects Leadership Academy mandatory for SROs, the IPA aims to give them an assessment and an accreditation to ensure that they have the necessary skills for their roles. This is in addition to …
18
Conclusion
This Committee has examined many government programmes where problems had arisen and were known by those within the programme for some time, but the issues only became public knowledge much later. For example, the Committee was kept in the dark for over a year before being told about the difficulties …
19
Conclusion
The IPA agreed that creating a culture of transparency and openness are the foundations of effective project delivery. It promotes these values within its principles of project success, namely “Prioritise people and behaviour” and “Tell it like it is”.35 It used Crossrail as an example, where people at the working …
20
Conclusion
Projects need good data to appropriately track programme performance, but the underlying data which communicates progress can be poor. The Comptroller and Auditor General’s report refers to multiple estimates and numbers being in use within Departments and insufficient or out of date evidence supporting reporting.37 As we noted recently in …
21
Conclusion
The IPA stated that releasing all data at the detailed level would cause issues within the supply chain. It argued that it does not release its own assurance reviews so that it can have effective and candid discussions with programme leaders, which would be undermined if the reviews were made …
22
Conclusion
The IPA provides a range of assurance and support services to major programmes, with one of its key activities being gateway reviews of programmes at key decision points, such as each approval stage of the Business Case. Major programmes typically join the GMPP as they approach the strategic outline business …
23
Conclusion
The IPA considers that while its gateway review process is good, government has not always applied it with the rigour needed.45 This has meant that programmes with significant issues have proceeded through Gateways even when they were given a delivery confidence assessment rating of amber or red. The IPA is …
24
Conclusion
The IPA pointed to the Lower Thames Crossing as a recent example of where it has made meaningful impact on a programme’s delivery. It stated that the programme had an ambitious schedule and was larger than any other scheme that Highways England had taken on before. The IPA refused to …
25
Conclusion
We noted that the number of projects rated as red has increased from four to eleven in the IPA’s most recent annual report and questioned the IPA on how we should measure its success going forward.49 The IPA stated that one would expect to see more issues being raised in …
26
Conclusion
The IPA told us that it is looking to introduce metrics to help it understand whether it is making a material difference to projects passing through stage gates, and what impact it is having on programmes that are underway.51 The IPA also told us it has in place a “get …
27
Conclusion
Since the IPA’s remit covers the government major programmes portfolio, it does not extend to the restoration and renewal of the Houses of Parliament, or the associated Northern Estates programme.54 The Restoration and Renewal programme is overseen by a Sponsor body and a Delivery authority, both of which are ultimately …
28
Conclusion
Whilst the IPA has provided support and advice in an advisory capacity to the programme, it does not currently fall within the IPA’s formal remit. The IPA was engaged in implementing the recommendations of the Joint Committee report on the Palace of Westminster of September 2016, and did support the …
29
Conclusion
When asked, the IPA stated that it could not see a reason why it could not provide further assurance over the programme, if asked to by Parliament.59 When we reported on the programme in October 2020, we welcomed the decision of the Sponsor body to engage with the IPA and …