1st Report - An analysis of the asylum system

The Home Office has yet to demonstrate that it has learned from previous attempts to reform the asylum system, putting it at continued risk of repeating past failures. Recent reform efforts give us little confidence that the Home Office has … Read more The Home Office has yet to demonstrate that it has learned from previous attempts to reform the asylum system, putting it at continued risk of repeating past failures. Recent reform efforts give us little confidence that the Home Office has learned from previous attempts to restructure the asylum system. Too often, the Home Office has pursued major policy and operational change without a realistic grip on delivery risks, costs or system-wide impacts. The consequences are visible across the system today – for example, costly missteps such as acquiring Northeye, Bibby Stockholm and Scampton, which have now largely been abandoned. Furthermore, the NAO found that of 5,000 individuals who claimed asylum in January 2023, 41% were effectively “in limbo” – they were not granted asylum and their cases were still unresolved in the system. This includes failed asylum seekers, and those whose claims have been disqualified, suspended or withdrawn. Many remain in the UK for extended periods while awaiting deportation or without a final decision. This leaves a large cohort of people stuck in the asylum system for prolonged periods, creating uncertainty for individuals and driving up support costs. At the same time, pressures elsewhere have intensified, with appeals currently taking around 60 weeks to be heard. While the government has proposed further structural reform, including a new independent appeals body, which will be introduced through a phased transition alongside the existing tribunal, departments could still not explain how the new body will be resourced, how long dual running will last or how risks during this transition will be managed. They made repeated references to reforms being “in train”, but provided little evidence of a firm grip on effective delivery. This lack of realism echoes previous failed initiatives and leaves the Home Office at continued risk of repeating the same costly mistakes. 3 recommendation The Home Office should, alongside its Treasury Minute Show less

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Planning for how resources are allocated across the asylum system is fragmented and often reactive, repeatedly shifting backlogs rather than reducing them. There is a recurring pattern in which delays are not fully resolved but instead shift from one part … Read more Planning for how resources are allocated across the asylum system is fragmented and often reactive, repeatedly shifting backlogs rather than reducing them. There is a recurring pattern in which delays are not fully resolved but instead shift from one part of the asylum system to another. For instance, recent increases in caseworking productivity have not been matched by sufficient capacity in the appeals system, creating new bottlenecks at this stage of the process. Although the Home Office has noted that the government has funded additional sitting days in the First-tier Tribunal, this does not amount to a coordinated, system-wide capacity plan. Long-term demand management remains underdeveloped, with planning often focused on short-term fixes rather than the needs of the system as a whole. While we welcome the recruitment of additional judges, the Ministry of Justice could not explain how this aligns with wider resourcing decisions or how competing pressures across the tribunal are being balanced. We are disappointed by the clear lack of coordinated planning and the extent to which departments are still operating largely in silos. Without joint planning, shared modelling and agreed performance measures, the reforms are unlikely to deliver sustained reductions in backlogs, costs or delays. recommendation The Home Office, working with the Ministry of Justice, MHCLG and other partners, should develop and share with the Committee, no later than by the end of 2026, its understanding of the current capacity gaps across the system, their underlying causes and its plan for addressing them. As part of this, the departments should set out how they are bringing together and building on their existing modelling and system-design work to create a single shared evidence base that enables joint planning and decision-making. Show less

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The Home Office has not demonstrated it has the commercial capabilities needed to manage asylum accommodation effectively. Managing asylum accommodation at scale requires strong in-house commercial expertise to oversee complex contracts, manage risks, and monitor provider performance. However, both the … Read more The Home Office has not demonstrated it has the commercial capabilities needed to manage asylum accommodation effectively. Managing asylum accommodation at scale requires strong in-house commercial expertise to oversee complex contracts, manage risks, and monitor provider performance. However, both the previous Public Accounts Committee and the Home Affairs Committee have repeatedly identified significant weaknesses in the Home Office’s commercial capability, including weak contract oversight, limited specialist capacity and poor transparency about provider performance. But the Home Office still cannot demonstrate that it fully understands the levers and controls available to it – for example, are providers delivering what is required or can the Home Office effectively monitor and respond when performance falls short? The Home Office has highlighted steps it is taking to strengthen its commercial capability, 6 including commissioning an external review of asylum accommodation and contract management arrangements, but it has not yet demonstrated that these weaknesses have been addressed or that it can prevent similar failures in future. It is also unclear whether risks are being shared appropriately between the Home Office and its providers, especially when assumptions on demand or delivery prove overly optimistic. While the Home Office asserts that it “clawed back £46 million of excess profit” from providers last year, we do not find this wholly reassuring. Rather than showing effective oversight, it highlights weaknesses in the original contract design and raises questions about whether the Home Office has the skills to manage these or future contracts in a way that prevents excessive profits accruing in the first place. Under the current system of cost-plus contracts, permitted profits are in many cases excessive. However, when we suggested that excess profits clauses be applied either retrospectively or prospectively, there was clear reluctance to do so. recommen Show less

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Poor data quality and weak management information continue to prevent effective management of the asylum system and undermine Parliament’s ability to assess performance. There is no single, reliable view of cases across the asylum system, with data spread across multiple systems, spreadsheets and local records. Basic information we would reasonably …

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The Home Office does not yet have a credible long-term strategy for asylum accommodation and local authorities still lack a meaningful say over accommodation decisions. Asylum support costs rose to around £4.0 billion in 2024–25, driven largely by the Home Office’s continued reliance on costly hotel accommodation. At the end …

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The system of monitoring failed asylum seekers needs a complete overhaul. The Home Office told us, in relation to asylum seekers who have been processed through the system and had their application rejected and appeals rights exhausted, it knows “where some of them are”, but that individuals “not complying with …

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On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) about government’s management of the end-to-end asylum system.1

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Officials described new governance arrangements intended to strengthen system-wide accountability. The Home Office highlighted the creation of the asylum group within the Home Office, led by a Director General, to support end-to-end asylum operations. It said the group brings together intake, casework, operational policy and commercial functions and comprises “around …

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We requested further details on how these arrangements operate in practice, including how departments consider the system-wide impacts of decisions. Officials described areas of joint work, including forecasting, modelling of demand for appeals and discussions on pressures affecting accommodation and local authority services.14 We also asked how trade-offs will be …

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The same underlying barriers to improvement of the asylum system have persisted for years, despite multiple attempts at reform. The NAO reported that past interventions were often introduced quickly in response to rising backlogs or changes in asylum policy, without sufficient consideration of wider system impacts.16 It also found that …

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When we asked officials how lessons from earlier reforms had been embedded, the Home Office said it had “learned a lot of lessons” from its work to clear the initial backlog of legacy claims in 2023.18 It highlighted improvements it made following that exercise, including changes to caseworking processes, increases …

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The NAO analysed a sample of 5,000 people who claimed asylum in January 2023 and found that 41% of claims remained open but were not awaiting an appeal decision or outcome of further submissions from the Home Office.22 When we asked for updated figures during our evidence session, the Home …

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We also examined lessons learned from recent accommodation initiatives. The NAO’s 2024 investigation into the acquisition of the Northeye site identified significant weaknesses in due diligence, 17 C&AG’s Report, paras 2.8, 2.11-2.16 18 Q 5 19 Qq 17, 137 20 C&AG’s Report, paras 13, 2.9 21 Qq, 5, 52-54 22 …

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Efforts in 2023 to clear the backlog of legacy claims also led to a notable increase in individuals who had been granted protection status presenting to local authorities as homeless and requiring support, exacerbated by the requirement to leave Home Office-provided accommodation within 28 days.29 In response, MHCLG explained that …

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Departments rely on accurate and timely data to understand how people move through the asylum system, but significant gaps remain in the information held across different parts of the process. The NAO found that a reliable, single record is not yet available for each asylum seeker, and that data needed …

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We raised concerns that departments were often unable to respond to parliamentary questions because they did not hold information at the level of granularity requested.32 The NAO identified several examples where data was not routinely collected or available, including the number of people who had absconded from the asylum system …

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Officials from both departments described ongoing challenges joining up information across systems. The MoJ explained that achieving fuller interoperability “needs money and a focused effort,” and that enabling systems to “talk to each other and share data” is difficult given the different digital systems in use.35 The Home Office said …

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We also heard evidence on how data is shared with local authorities, who require up-to-date information to plan housing and support services. MHCLG told us that local authorities need timely notice when people are due to enter or leave asylum accommodation, particularly where individuals may be at risk of homelessness.38 …

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We also raised concerns about limitations in data used to monitor people who are no longer in active contact with the Home Office after exhausting their appeal rights. The Home Office told us that it knows “where some of them are”, but explained that individuals who are “elsewhere in the …

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Planning across the asylum system has had to respond to shifting pressures at different stages of the process, and departments’ ability to model demand and plan ahead has been limited by the absence of shared data and a single, end-to-end view of system performance.47 Capacity constraints in casework, appeals, legal …

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There is also no systematic approach for capturing learning from upheld appeals, which could otherwise help reduce avoidable demand and unnecessary pressure on the appeals system.49 These issues have been intensified by pressures on the legal aid system, which the MoJ highlighted, noting that more individuals are now representing themselves …

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On caseworking capacity, the Home Office told us that caseworker numbers had fluctuated in recent years, rising from 623 in 2021 to 2,547 in 2024 before reducing to 2,168 in 2025. The NAO found that increased demand for caseworker capacity to tackle a backlog of claims awaiting decisions in 2023 …

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We also questioned departments on the increasing pressure on asylum accommodation and social housing across the UK. Shortages of dispersal accommodation have contributed to continued reliance on hotels, and efforts to expand alternative options, such as large sites, have faced operational challenges.56 The Home Office told us it had increased …

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Accommodation continues to account for a large proportion of asylum-related spending, with pressure shifting as demand and system capacity change. Spending on asylum accommodation reached around £3.4 billion in 2024–25, and hotels continue to be used as contingency accommodation.58 The Home Office told us that the number of hotels in …

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We raised concerns that local authorities often do not receive early notice of accommodation decisions. We referred to previous examples, including Northeye and the Bibby Stockholm, where local authorities had not been consulted early enough.61 The Home Office told us it had introduced new “asylum accommodation plans,” agreed jointly with …

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In May 2025, the NAO reported that the Home Office was still reviewing its 10-year accommodation strategy, which it had committed to develop by spring 2024, and that no updated strategy had yet been published.67 When we asked about the Home Office’s longer-term plans, it said the current approach envisages …

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The Home Office also outlined funding available to local authorities to support asylum accommodation. It said the current grant package provides a single annual payment of £1,200 per asylum seeker in all accommodation types, including dispersal, overflow dispersal, initial and contingency accommodation, and a further £100 per month for each …

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The NAO, Public Accounts Committee and Home Affairs Select Committee have each identified longstanding weaknesses in how the Home Office manages its asylum accommodation contracts. The NAO’s May 2025 briefing found that projected spending under the asylum accommodation and support contracts had risen from £4.5 billion to £15.3 billion, and …

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The Home Office set out actions it is taking to strengthen its commercial capability and contract-management arrangements. It confirmed it was “considering the options available” for exercising break clauses and renegotiating contracts, and stated that it had “clawed back £46 million of excess profit” from providers in the previous year.75 …

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We also asked the Home Office about its approach to commercial incentives. The NAO had reported gaps in current contract performance information and the Home Affairs Committee found that providers faced few performance penalties and, in some cases, had incentives to prioritise higher-cost hotel accommodation. The Home Office said that …

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We questioned the Home Office specifically on how it would use excess profit clauses within its cost-plus hotel contracts. The Home Office accepted that “in general”, cost-plus contracts do not represent good value for the taxpayer and acknowledged the risk that providers could earn higher margins under such models.81 However, …

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