Recommendation 8

SROs described how it would be helpful if resets were seen more positively, which HM Treasury suggested government was moving towards.18 They also commented that resets can be seen as a failure and can be a traumatic event for programme staff, after which the confidence of the team would need to be rebuilt.19 Negative perceptions could mean government bodies continue trying to resolve unresolvable issues and lead to wasted effort and costs.20 The SRO for electronic monitoring commented that “sometimes, the easier path is to simply carry on doing the same thing, but it is negligent if, as an SRO, you do not call it.”21 He spoke about how the IPA confirming a ‘red’ delivery confidence status helped validate their own assessments and made it easier to have conversations about a more fundamental reset. It took the Ministry of Justice nine months from starting to think 7 C&AG’s Report, para 8 8 Qq 2, 4, 8 9 C&AG’s Report, para 26 10 Qq 97, introductory remarks before q102, 134 11 Qq introductory remarks before q102, 157, 169 12 Q 135 13 Qq 142, 169 14 Qq 17, 32 15 C&AG’s Report, para 8 16 Qq 4, 20–21, 66–67, 88 17 C&AG’s Report, para 8 18 Qq 97, introductory remarks before q102, 102 19 Qq 4–5, 18–19 20 C&AG’s Report, para 9 21 Q97 10 Resetting government programmes about a reset to confirming the decision.22 The IPA recognised how its response to red programme could provide a trigger if the Department or the project team did not realise the need for a reset.23 It told us it was now in a better place to discuss with departments when things can no-longer be achieved and what should be done about it.24