Recommendations & Conclusions
12 items
2
Recommendation
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
The Department risks allowing high levels of fraud and claimants disengaging with its compliance processes to become normal. The Department has repeatedly claimed that there is an increasing propensity to fraud in society in general since the pandemic. It believes that this is in part driving the record levels of …
Government response. The government disagrees, stating that there is a well-established methodology for dealing with customers who do not co-operate with the benefit review process and should not be receiving benefit. They also state that they continually review all of its customer …
HM Treasury
3
Recommendation
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
The success of the Department’s strategy to bring down fraud and error is dependent on highly uncertain assumptions. The Department has set out its strategy to tackle fraud and error in Fighting Fraud in the Welfare System. This includes a £613 million investment in counter-fraud activities. The plan is dependent …
Government response. The government disagrees with the recommendation, stating that setting out detailed contingency plans for various scenarios is unnecessary and could distract from the delivery of its existing plan to reduce fraud and error.
HM Treasury
5
Recommendation
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
The Department’s lack of transparency over its use of data analytics risks eroding public trust in the benefit system. The Department’s strategy to bring down fraud and error will depend increasingly on the use of data analytics and machine learning to identify potentially fraudulent claims. It has trialled a model …
Government response. The government disagrees with the recommendation, stating that the recommendation does not fall within the remit of the Social Security Advisory Committee.
HM Treasury
7
Conclusion
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
We challenged the Department to explain why benefit fraud remained so high and had not yet returned to pre-pandemic levels. The Department could not tell us when it expected fraud and error to return to pre-pandemic levels, nor could it tell us when Universal Credit overpayments were likely to reach …
Government response. The government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation and states that the OBR is the government’s independent forecaster, and the department is working with OBR to review its baseline assumptions, and to ensure fraud and error is more visible within the …
HM Treasury
10
Conclusion
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
The Department has repeatedly linked the high level of benefit fraud since the pandemic to an increase in the propensity to commit fraud in society more generally. It told us “there is no doubt” that underlying fraud in society is going up, and that the fraud and error in the …
Government response. The government disagrees with the committee's recommendation and believes there is a well-established methodology for dealing with customers who do not co-operate with the benefit review process. They are seeking to understand better how it might change benefit policy, process, …
HM Treasury
11
Conclusion
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
The Department’s fraud and error statistics show that the biggest growth area for Universal Credit overpayments in 2021–22 was claimants ‘failing to provide evidence or engage with the process’. This category applies to cases where the claimant had given up their benefit entitlement rather than fully engage in the Department’s …
Government response. The government disagrees with the committee's recommendation and believes there is a well-established methodology for dealing with customers who do not co-operate with the benefit review process. They are seeking to understand better how it might change benefit policy, process, …
HM Treasury
12
Conclusion
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
We asked the Department whether it had considered explanations for failure to engage other than deliberate dishonesty, such as concern about the impact on employment or housing if a claimant appeared to under investigation. It stressed that the labelling of claimants who fail to engage as fraudsters was only for …
Government response. The government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation and asserts there is a well-established and accepted methodology for dealing with customers who do not co-operate with the benefit review process and should not be receiving benefit, classifying them as customer fraud, …
HM Treasury
14
Conclusion
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
We observed that some claimants may struggle to understand the Department’s communications and use its services. We questioned the Department on how it might improve its customer service to make it easier for claimants to engage, especially where they have less experience of understanding of the benefits process. It acknowledged …
Government response. The government disagrees with the committee's recommendation, stating that there is a well-established and accepted methodology for dealing with customers who do not co-operate with the benefit review process.
HM Treasury
15
Conclusion
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
In May 2022 the Department published its strategy to reduce fraud and error following the pandemic, which is set out in Fighting Fraud in the Welfare System. The three main strands of this are:26 • £613 million investment in counter-fraud measures during the Spending Review period. Most of this will …
Government response. The government disagrees with the committee's recommendation and reiterates its existing plan to reduce fraud and error, focusing on frontline staff, legal powers, and public/private sector collaboration, funded by existing investments and seeking further opportunities to clamp down on fraud …
HM Treasury
16
Conclusion
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
We questioned the Department on the challenges it may face in implementing its strategy. The Department told us that it will achieve the planned increase in frontline counter-fraud staff to 9,500 full-time equivalents by July 2022. It explained that its plan to review over two million Universal Credit cases will …
Government response. The government disagrees with the committee's recommendation and reiterates its existing plan to reduce fraud and error, focusing on frontline staff, legal powers, and public/private sector collaboration, funded by existing investments and seeking further opportunities to clamp down on fraud …
HM Treasury
17
Conclusion
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
We have previously recommended that the Department should communicate to Parliament what additional powers or changes to legislation it needed to improve controls on specific fraud and error risks.30 The Department set out the new powers it believes it requires in Fighting Fraud in the Welfare System, which includes greater …
Government response. The government disagrees with the committee's recommendation and reiterates its existing plan to reduce fraud and error, focusing on frontline staff, legal powers, and public/private sector collaboration, funded by existing investments and seeking further opportunities to clamp down on fraud …
HM Treasury
18
Recommendation
Twenty-Sixth Report - The Department fo…
Rejected
During our examination of the Department’s 2020–21 Annual Report and Accounts we concluded that the Department was taken by surprise by the significant increase in the levels of Universal Credit fraud attributed to misreporting of self-employment earnings during the pandemic.33 The Department accepted that it needed to more and claimed …
Government response. The government disagrees, pointing to its existing plan to reduce fraud and error, the £613 million investment received through Spending Review 2021 and Spring Statement 2022, and the plan to legislate for additional powers. They also reference HMRC sharing information …
HM Treasury