Source · Select Committees · Public Accounts Committee
Recommendation 11
11
Rejected
The Department’s fraud and error statistics show that the biggest growth area for Universal Credit...
Conclusion
The Department’s fraud and error statistics show that the biggest growth area for Universal Credit overpayments in 2021–22 was claimants ‘failing to provide evidence or engage with the process’. This category applies to cases where the claimant had given up their benefit entitlement rather than fully engage in the Department’s fraud and 12 Committee of Public Accounts, Department for Work and Pensions Accounts 2020–21 – Fraud and error in the benefits system, Twenty-Fifth Report of Session 2021–22, HC 633, 17 November 2021 13 HM Treasury, Treasury Minutes - Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Twenty- Second to the Twenty-Sixth reports from Session 2021–22, CP 603, January 2022 14 Correspondence from Peter Schofield CB, Permanent Secretary, Department for Work and Pensions, Re: Fraud and Error Targets, 18 May 2022 15 Qq 41–42 16 Q 43 17 Qq 44–45 18 Q 18; DWP ARA 2021–22, pages 60, 76 19 Q 22 12 The Department for Work and Pensions’ Accounts 2021–22 – Fraud and error in the benefits system error measurement exercise, and where the Department was unsure of the reason why. Claimants failing to engage or provide evidence accounted for 14.4% (£852 million) of all Universal Credit overpayments in 2021–22, an increase of £328 million compared with 2020–21. The Department assumes for statistical purposes that all claims in this category are fraudulent.20 We asked the Department whether it considered non-engagement as a red-flag for fraud, or as proof of fraudulent activity. It told us that the logic underlying was based on the principle that “non-engagement means that your money stops” and its assumption was that a legitimate claimant would need the money and be highly motivated to engage and keep their claim active.21
Government Response Summary
The government disagrees with the committee's recommendation and believes there is a well-established methodology for dealing with customers who do not co-operate with the benefit review process. They are seeking to understand better how it might change benefit policy, process, or service design to prevent this type of customer fraud in the future and continually review all of its customer letters.
Government Response
Rejected
HM Government
Rejected
The government disagrees with the Committee’s recommendation. 2.2 There is a well-established and accepted methodology for dealing with customers who do not co-operate with the benefit review process and should not be receiving benefit. These customer’s claims are classed as customer fraud, for fraud and error measurement and reporting purposes. The department continues to gain further understanding of these customers, their circumstances, their behaviours and how they came to be in receipt of benefits in the first place. The department does not expect to find a different outcome than customer fraud but wants to understand better how it might change benefit policy, process, or service design to prevent this type of customer fraud in the future. 2.3 With regards to communications, the department continually reviews all of its customer letters to ensure they are consistent, understandable, and clear. This work is led by communication professionals. Customer letters relating to the sampling exercise are subject to the same approach and seek to strike the right balance between encouraging compliance with the process but also the ability to deal with customer fraud if it is uncovered.