Rail investment pipelines: ending boom and bust

The UK rail network is a core national asset, supporting its own industrial ecosystem and underpinning broader economic growth and employment. The message from the rail industry has been clear: investment in that asset has too often been characterised by cycles of ‘boom and bust’, with uneven and uncertain funding and procurement putting the viability of employers (including SMEs) at risk and delaying much-needed improvements to the network. The capacity of the railway to flourish under Great British Railways would be undermined by a weakened rail industry sector. (Conclusion, Paragraph 9)

Even major programmes which should be providing a pipeline of large-scale work far into the future have previously been subject to radical changes of scope and timetable. The January 2026 announcement about Northern Powerhouse Rail brings great expectations—but at present, few confirmed details. The announcement of new investment is hugely welcome, but the industry needs that spending to be steady, carefully sequenced and clearly communicated to deliver the best results for passengers and the economy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 10) The need for a steady and stable pipeline

There is a widespread consensus that establishing a smooth and stable pipeline of investment would bring manifold benefits to both the railway and the rail supply industry. With more certainty and visibility of upcoming work, and fewer peaks and troughs, resources could be allocated more effectively, capabilities could be maintained and projects could be delivered more quickly and at a lower cost. The boom and bust pattern of electrification is a conspicuous example of where this planning has been lacking, leading to losses of capability, poor value for money—and a network that is still only 39 per cent electrified. (Conclusion, Paragraph 37) 49

A steady pipeline would support jobs at all levels of the supply chain, facilitate workforce planning, help industry address skills shortages and foster innovation. Success stories from Scotland, where there has been greater certainty of future workload, show the relationship between steady investment and industry’s ability to invest in its people and provide high- quality employment. (Conclusion, Paragraph 38)

Injection of private sector investment into rail assets, including track and other infrastructure, has been hindered by the lack of a clear, credible pipeline of projects and a failure by Government to identify where such investment would be welcomed and could best contribute. There is also a need for a better framework to allow regional and mayoral authorities to identify opportunities where alignment of funding, priorities and business case processes is expected to be achievable. A rail investment pipeline should clearly highlight opportunities and mechanisms for private and public sector funders alike to invest in. (Conclusion, Paragraph 39) How well do existing tools work?

The five-year funding settlement provided through the Control Period process, which is set to be continued through Funding Period Reviews, gives a reasonable degree of certainty and visibility of spend on operations, maintenance and renewals. Nonetheless, the mechanism could be improved. Spending profiles for particular categories of work can be uneven and delays to contracting at the start of a new Control Period can cause damaging uncertainty. It is apparent that industry experienced significant disruption to volumes of work and continuity of contracting at the beginning of Control Period 7. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)

We recommend that the Government commission an independent review of the beginning of Control Period 7 in comparison to the beginning of previous Control Periods. The review should also survey the volatility of spend within Control Periods, identify whether this is systemic, and consider whether they could be better managed to smooth the flow of work. It should seek early lessons from the new partnership model being pursued in the Southern region, and consider whether more certainty could be provided on a five-year rolling basis. This review should be published in advance of the establishment of Great British Railways, so that the new organisation is able to act on key findings from the outset. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59)

The Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline (RNEP) was a sound idea, undermined by a chronic lack of updates and by poor decisions to add immature or unfunded projects to the list. If these weaknesses were 50 addressed, it could form the basis of mature, informed communication with the rail sector and industry about enhancement projects. (Conclusion, Paragraph 66)

The Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline should be revamped and updated, taking account of all the decisions made by the Government on enhancements since July 2024. It should then be revised and re-published at least annually. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67)

The delay or withdrawal of immature schemes is disruptive for industry and disappointing for communities who expected to benefit from new or upgraded facilities and services. It erodes confidence in the ability of the system to prioritise the right projects, identify what is viable, match it to supply chain capability, and secure the necessary funding. (Conclusion, Paragraph 68)

The RNEP should set out clearly how much funding has been committed, from what sources, and for the purpose of reaching which milestones. It should provide certainty at least five years into the future on a rolling basis, with an indicative pipeline of up to 15 years beyond that. (Recommendation, Paragraph 69)

The RNEP should not become an unfunded wishlist: there must be a high bar of viability for projects to be included, and a commensurately high bar for any subsequent decision to remove them from the pipeline. The inclusion and status of projects should be regularly reviewed by the Secretary of State, the Office of Rail and Road and, when established, Great British Railways and the Passenger Watchdog. (Recommendation, Paragraph 71)

The RNEP should also be a tool for promoting rail infrastructure investment from sources other than central government. We urge the Government to implement the findings of the Office of Rail and Road’s review of the Rail Network Investment Framework, and in the next iteration of the RNEP, identify projects where private sector investment would be welcome, or could be decisive. (Recommendation, Paragraph 71)

The RNEP should also identify those schemes which are most appropriate for funding and delivery at a regional level, such as those where alignment with national objectives is not sufficient to warrant full central government funding but which would be viable with local contributions. Confirmed enhancements projects being delivered or partially delivered by devolved authorities should be included in the RNEP for full industry visibility. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)

The 2025 Spending Review has provided welcome clarity on what inherited enhancements the Department is proceeding with and those which it has decided to pause. Such announcements do not, however, provide 51 information in the format or detail necessary to populate a pipeline which can be traced clearly over time and which provides consistency of information to the rail sector. The outcomes of Spending Reviews, fiscal events and other Government announcements, insofar as they affect railway enhancements, should be reflected promptly in updates of the RNEP. (Recommendation, Paragraph 76)

While we recognise the fledging status of the UK Infrastructure Pipeline, we are unconvinced of its current usefulness to stakeholders in the rail industry because of its lack of detail at the necessary scale. We ask the Department for Transport to set out how the UK Infrastructure Pipeline will relate to the RNEP, the purpose of each, and where industry should look for the latest and most detailed information. Wherever there are overlapping sources of information, care is needed to ensure that these are congruent, complementary and up to date. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80)

The pattern of boom and bust has been especially apparent in rolling stock investment. There is widespread agreement, including from the Government, that the absence of a long-term rolling stock strategy, aligned to a similar strategy for infrastructure, has resulted in damaging missed opportunities and fluctuations in orders over many years. (Conclusion, Paragraph 90)

We welcome the Government’s commitment to publishing a rolling stock strategy in 2026: this work is urgent. The strategy must be clearly aligned with the pipeline of both major projects and enhancements, so that decisions about track and about the trains that will run on it can be taken in a timely, coordinated way. It should provide near-term certainty as well as a basis for industry to undertake medium and long-term planning, and it must be drawn up in collaboration with industry with the explicit intention of avoiding unnecessary peaks and troughs in procurement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 91)

The Department should set out in the Long Term Rail Strategy a clear policy statement on its intention to limit the proliferation of rolling stock types. Within two years, the Department and Great British Railways should define a small number of standard train families for use across the national network, to achieve better value for money and an improved experience for passengers, including through more widespread level boarding. These should be deployed and refreshed over successive procurement cycles. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92) 52 Insulating the pipeline from instability

A consistent strategic vision of what the railway is for and how it will contribute to the wider priorities of Government is fundamental to achieving stable investment pipelines. Successive governments have failed to articulate what they want the railway network to achieve as a core national asset and, therefore, how it will invest in the network to meet those objectives. (Conclusion, Paragraph 108)

We found little appetite during our inquiry for a detailed, confirmed pipeline of railway projects lasting decades into the future; this would be unrealistic. What is needed instead is a consistent strategic vision that predictably informs shorter-term planning, and which provides a reliable guide to strategic investment decisions for both Government and industry. (Conclusion, Paragraph 109)

We welcome the provision made in the Railways Bill for a Long Term Rail Strategy: it is long past time that such a vision is set out for the railways. The Strategy must provide a basis for consensus and certainty about long- term investment priorities. If it puts in place stable scaffolding for practical plans and pipelines, the LTRS has the potential to insulate those plans from unnecessary changes of direction or delay, to convey confidence to industry and to bring improvements to the network forward more efficiently. (Recommendation, Paragraph 110)

In order to achieve this: • the Strategy should set out firm objectives on matters of long- term infrastructure policy including electrification, rolling stock, accessibility and capacity; • the Strategy should be the means for setting out commitments to the largest infrastructure programmes on the railway—those at the level of HS2 or Northern Powerhouse Rail which take more than a decade— with a clear articulation of how these programmes will achieve the Government’s strategic objectives; • the Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline must be informed by the Long Term Rail Strategy, with schemes at all stages of development clearly matched to its strategic objectives; • the new rolling stock strategy must also be transparently and closely aligned to the strategic objectives set out in the LTRS; and 53 • the Strategy should set out how and by what criteria proposed infrastructure projects and enhancements will be assessed, including their potential to deliver the Government’s strategic aims for the railway. (Recommendation, Paragraph 111)

We welcome the Government’s recognition that industry fragmentation has contributed to siloed decision-making and misaligned incentives between stakeholders, and its commitment to establishing a whole- system organisation, Great British Railways, to tackle this. We look forward to holding GBR and Ministers accountable for delivering on the promise of better and more integrated investment decisions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 117)

The advent of Great British Railways provides a golden opportunity for decision-makers on the railway to approach investment planning differently. Successive governments must be prepared to commit to reaching a long-term consensus on which investments should be prioritised, and to following through on those decisions. While we accept the legitimacy of different political choices about how to allocate public resources, chopping and changing decisions on infrastructure investment is almost always an irresponsible use of those resources in the long term. It will require self-restraint from the politicians who oversee GBR long into the future to resist tinkering with pipelines to satisfy short-term goals, and to recognise the value of consistent investment over the long term. (Conclusion, Paragraph 118)

The Long Term Rail Strategy guiding Great British Railways needs to have a timescale of at least 30 years to provide the necessary vision for underpinning shorter-term decisions on specific projects and funding. It also needs to be protected from unnecessary or radical changes of direction that would undermine its value. Significant amendments to the LTRS should require formal consultation with industry and with Parliament. We recommend that the Secretary of State be required to lay the Strategy before Parliament, and that, where the Secretary of State makes substantive changes, it be required to be laid again in its amended form. (Recommendation, Paragraph 119)

We want Great British Railways to reach its potential for making unified decisions over track and train informed by expertise in railway systems. We expect political leaders to set its strategic direction and hold it accountable for delivery, but micromanagement would work against the best interests of passengers and industry. The Department must be clear about the level of autonomy it expects GBR to exercise in enhancements planning, and how ministerial oversight will be exercised in a way that does not jeopardise the investment pipeline. (Recommendation, Paragraph 120) 54