Select committee: Transport Committee

7th Report - Rail investment pipelines: ending boom and bust

HC 575 Published 10 February 2026

Transport Committee Rail investment pipelines: ending boom and bust Report on parliament.uk ↗

At a glance15 recommendations and 12 conclusions · Government response published 1 May 2026 (deadline 10 April 2026)

The government's response

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The Government shares the Committee's ambition to reduce unnecessary volatility in rail investment, but does not accept that rail funding has been characterised by systemic "boom and bust" and partially agrees with or departs from several recommendations.

On the independent review of Control Period 7, the Government partially agrees: it agrees the experience should be examined, but does not agree this "requires commissioning and publishing an independent review" before GBR is established, saying the work can use existing assurance and regulatory processes.
On rolling stock, the Government agrees on the need for an aligned strategy and says the forthcoming Rolling Stock and Infrastructure Strategy, rather than the Long Term Rail Strategy, will set out a vision for simplifying the national fleet over time.
On pipeline publication, the Government does not consider annual re-publication of a static RNEP document to be the most effective mechanism, and instead points to the National Infrastructure Pipeline, the Enhancements Delivery Plan and milestone announcements. It intends to establish a "potential pipeline" that will not be a funding commitment.
On the Long Term Rail Strategy, the Government agrees on a statutory 30-year strategy and commits to publishing a discussion document alongside Bill passage through the House of Lords, and to laying a Written Ministerial Statement and a copy of the strategy in the library of both Houses.

Read the government's response ↗ Report an error

What the committee recommended 27

See all 27 recommendations and conclusions

Sources

7th Report - Rail investment pipelines: ending boom and bust ↗The committee's report, HC 575, parliament.uk
5th Special Report - Rail investment pipelines: ending boom and bust: Government Response ↗The government's response, 1 May 2026, parliament.uk

Recommendations and conclusions 27

1
Uncertain and uneven rail investment cycles weaken the UK rail industry sector. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
The UK rail network is a core national asset, supporting its own industrial ecosystem and underpinning broader economic growth and employment. The message from the rail industry has been clear: investment in that asset has too often been characterised by cycles of ‘boom and bust’, with uneven and uncertain funding and procurement putting the viability of employers (including SMEs) at risk and delaying much-needed improvements to the network. The capacity of the railway to flourish under Great British Railways would be undermined by a weakened rail industry sector. (Conclusion, Paragraph 9)
2
Major rail programmes require steady, sequenced, and clearly communicated investment spending. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
Even major programmes which should be providing a pipeline of large-scale work far into the future have previously been subject to radical changes of scope and timetable. The January 2026 announcement about Northern Powerhouse Rail brings great expectations—but at present, few confirmed details. The announcement of new investment is hugely welcome, but the industry needs that spending to be steady, carefully sequenced and clearly communicated to deliver the best results for passengers and the economy. (Conclusion, Paragraph 10) The need for a steady and stable pipeline
3
Smooth, stable rail investment pipelines are crucial but often lacking in practice. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
There is a widespread consensus that establishing a smooth and stable pipeline of investment would bring manifold benefits to both the railway and the rail supply industry. With more certainty and visibility of upcoming work, and fewer peaks and troughs, resources could be allocated more effectively, capabilities could be maintained and projects could be delivered more quickly and at a lower cost. The boom and bust pattern of electrification is a conspicuous example of where this planning has been lacking, leading to losses of capability, poor value for money—and a network that is still only 39 per cent electrified. (Conclusion, Paragraph 37) 49
4
Steady rail investment pipelines foster jobs, skills development, and innovation across the industry. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
A steady pipeline would support jobs at all levels of the supply chain, facilitate workforce planning, help industry address skills shortages and foster innovation. Success stories from Scotland, where there has been greater certainty of future workload, show the relationship between steady investment and industry’s ability to invest in its people and provide high- quality employment. (Conclusion, Paragraph 38)
5
Publish a clear rail investment pipeline highlighting opportunities for private and public funders. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
Injection of private sector investment into rail assets, including track and other infrastructure, has been hindered by the lack of a clear, credible pipeline of projects and a failure by Government to identify where such investment would be welcomed and could best contribute. There is also a need for a better framework to allow regional and mayoral authorities to identify opportunities where alignment of funding, priorities and business case processes is expected to be achievable. A rail investment pipeline should clearly highlight opportunities and mechanisms for private and public sector funders alike to invest in. (Conclusion, Paragraph 39) How well do existing tools work?
6
Control Period funding mechanism provides certainty but experiences uneven spending and contracting delays. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
The five-year funding settlement provided through the Control Period process, which is set to be continued through Funding Period Reviews, gives a reasonable degree of certainty and visibility of spend on operations, maintenance and renewals. Nonetheless, the mechanism could be improved. Spending profiles for particular categories of work can be uneven and delays to contracting at the start of a new Control Period can cause damaging uncertainty. It is apparent that industry experienced significant disruption to volumes of work and continuity of contracting at the beginning of Control Period 7. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)
7
Commission independent review of Control Period 7 and spend volatility to improve future funding. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
We recommend that the Government commission an independent review of the beginning of Control Period 7 in comparison to the beginning of previous Control Periods. The review should also survey the volatility of spend within Control Periods, identify whether this is systemic, and consider whether they could be better managed to smooth the flow of work. It should seek early lessons from the new partnership model being pursued in the Southern region, and consider whether more certainty could be provided on a five-year rolling basis. This review should be published in advance of the establishment of Great British Railways, so that the new organisation is able to act on key findings from the outset. (Recommendation, Paragraph 59)
8
Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline undermined by lack of updates and immature projects. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
The Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline (RNEP) was a sound idea, undermined by a chronic lack of updates and by poor decisions to add immature or unfunded projects to the list. If these weaknesses were 50 addressed, it could form the basis of mature, informed communication with the rail sector and industry about enhancement projects. (Conclusion, Paragraph 66)
9
Revamp and annually republish the Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline, reflecting all government decisions. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline should be revamped and updated, taking account of all the decisions made by the Government on enhancements since July 2024. It should then be revised and re-published at least annually. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67)
10
Delay and withdrawal of immature rail schemes erodes industry and community confidence. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
The delay or withdrawal of immature schemes is disruptive for industry and disappointing for communities who expected to benefit from new or upgraded facilities and services. It erodes confidence in the ability of the system to prioritise the right projects, identify what is viable, match it to supply chain capability, and secure the necessary funding. (Conclusion, Paragraph 68)
11
Require the RNEP to clearly set out committed funding and provide 5-year rolling certainty. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
The RNEP should set out clearly how much funding has been committed, from what sources, and for the purpose of reaching which milestones. It should provide certainty at least five years into the future on a rolling basis, with an indicative pipeline of up to 15 years beyond that. (Recommendation, Paragraph 69)
12
Require a high viability bar for RNEP projects and regular review by key bodies. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
The RNEP should not become an unfunded wishlist: there must be a high bar of viability for projects to be included, and a commensurately high bar for any subsequent decision to remove them from the pipeline. The inclusion and status of projects should be regularly reviewed by the Secretary of State, the Office of Rail and Road and, when established, Great British Railways and the Passenger Watchdog. (Recommendation, Paragraph 71)
13
Implement ORR's review findings and identify RNEP projects suitable for private sector investment. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
The RNEP should also be a tool for promoting rail infrastructure investment from sources other than central government. We urge the Government to implement the findings of the Office of Rail and Road’s review of the Rail Network Investment Framework, and in the next iteration of the RNEP, identify projects where private sector investment would be welcome, or could be decisive. (Recommendation, Paragraph 71)
14
Identify regional schemes in the RNEP and include all devolved authority enhancement projects. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
The RNEP should also identify those schemes which are most appropriate for funding and delivery at a regional level, such as those where alignment with national objectives is not sufficient to warrant full central government funding but which would be viable with local contributions. Confirmed enhancements projects being delivered or partially delivered by devolved authorities should be included in the RNEP for full industry visibility. (Recommendation, Paragraph 72)
15
Promptly reflect outcomes of Spending Reviews and government announcements in RNEP updates. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
The 2025 Spending Review has provided welcome clarity on what inherited enhancements the Department is proceeding with and those which it has decided to pause. Such announcements do not, however, provide 51 information in the format or detail necessary to populate a pipeline which can be traced clearly over time and which provides consistency of information to the rail sector. The outcomes of Spending Reviews, fiscal events and other Government announcements, insofar as they affect railway enhancements, should be reflected promptly in updates of the RNEP. (Recommendation, Paragraph 76)
16
Clarify relationship between UK Infrastructure Pipeline and RNEP for consistent industry information. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
While we recognise the fledging status of the UK Infrastructure Pipeline, we are unconvinced of its current usefulness to stakeholders in the rail industry because of its lack of detail at the necessary scale. We ask the Department for Transport to set out how the UK Infrastructure Pipeline will relate to the RNEP, the purpose of each, and where industry should look for the latest and most detailed information. Wherever there are overlapping sources of information, care is needed to ensure that these are congruent, complementary and up to date. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80)
17
Absence of long-term rolling stock strategy created damaging boom-and-bust investment cycles. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
The pattern of boom and bust has been especially apparent in rolling stock investment. There is widespread agreement, including from the Government, that the absence of a long-term rolling stock strategy, aligned to a similar strategy for infrastructure, has resulted in damaging missed opportunities and fluctuations in orders over many years. (Conclusion, Paragraph 90)
18
Publish an urgent rolling stock strategy, aligned with pipelines and developed with industry. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
We welcome the Government’s commitment to publishing a rolling stock strategy in 2026: this work is urgent. The strategy must be clearly aligned with the pipeline of both major projects and enhancements, so that decisions about track and about the trains that will run on it can be taken in a timely, coordinated way. It should provide near-term certainty as well as a basis for industry to undertake medium and long-term planning, and it must be drawn up in collaboration with industry with the explicit intention of avoiding unnecessary peaks and troughs in procurement. (Recommendation, Paragraph 91)
19
Define standard train families for the national network to limit rolling stock proliferation. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Department should set out in the Long Term Rail Strategy a clear policy statement on its intention to limit the proliferation of rolling stock types. Within two years, the Department and Great British Railways should define a small number of standard train families for use across the national network, to achieve better value for money and an improved experience for passengers, including through more widespread level boarding. These should be deployed and refreshed over successive procurement cycles. (Recommendation, Paragraph 92) 52 Insulating the pipeline from instability
20
Lack of consistent strategic vision prevents stable railway investment pipelines. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
A consistent strategic vision of what the railway is for and how it will contribute to the wider priorities of Government is fundamental to achieving stable investment pipelines. Successive governments have failed to articulate what they want the railway network to achieve as a core national asset and, therefore, how it will invest in the network to meet those objectives. (Conclusion, Paragraph 108)
21
Consistent strategic vision, not decades-long pipeline, is needed for railway investment planning. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
We found little appetite during our inquiry for a detailed, confirmed pipeline of railway projects lasting decades into the future; this would be unrealistic. What is needed instead is a consistent strategic vision that predictably informs shorter-term planning, and which provides a reliable guide to strategic investment decisions for both Government and industry. (Conclusion, Paragraph 109)
22
Establish a Long Term Rail Strategy to provide certainty for investment priorities. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
We welcome the provision made in the Railways Bill for a Long Term Rail Strategy: it is long past time that such a vision is set out for the railways. The Strategy must provide a basis for consensus and certainty about long- term investment priorities. If it puts in place stable scaffolding for practical plans and pipelines, the LTRS has the potential to insulate those plans from unnecessary changes of direction or delay, to convey confidence to industry and to bring improvements to the network forward more efficiently. (Recommendation, Paragraph 110)
23
Set out clear objectives, commitments, and assessment criteria within the Long Term Rail Strategy. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
In order to achieve this: • the Strategy should set out firm objectives on matters of long- term infrastructure policy including electrification, rolling stock, accessibility and capacity; • the Strategy should be the means for setting out commitments to the largest infrastructure programmes on the railway—those at the level of HS2 or Northern Powerhouse Rail which take more than a decade— with a clear articulation of how these programmes will achieve the Government’s strategic objectives; • the Rail Network Enhancements Pipeline must be informed by the Long Term Rail Strategy, with schemes at all stages of development clearly matched to its strategic objectives; • the new rolling stock strategy must also be transparently and closely aligned to the strategic objectives set out in the LTRS; and 53 • the Strategy should set out how and by what criteria proposed infrastructure projects and enhancements will be assessed, including their potential to deliver the Government’s strategic aims for the railway. (Recommendation, Paragraph 111)
24
Government acknowledges rail industry fragmentation and commits to Great British Railways for integration. Conclusion · addressed to Department for Transport Conclusion (the committee's words)
We welcome the Government’s recognition that industry fragmentation has contributed to siloed decision-making and misaligned incentives between stakeholders, and its commitment to establishing a whole- system organisation, Great British Railways, to tackle this. We look forward to holding GBR and Ministers accountable for delivering on the promise of better and more integrated investment decisions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 117)
25
Commit successive governments to long-term consensus on rail investment priorities and consistent delivery. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
The advent of Great British Railways provides a golden opportunity for decision-makers on the railway to approach investment planning differently. Successive governments must be prepared to commit to reaching a long-term consensus on which investments should be prioritised, and to following through on those decisions. While we accept the legitimacy of different political choices about how to allocate public resources, chopping and changing decisions on infrastructure investment is almost always an irresponsible use of those resources in the long term. It will require self-restraint from the politicians who oversee GBR long into the future to resist tinkering with pipelines to satisfy short-term goals, and to recognise the value of consistent investment over the long term. (Conclusion, Paragraph 118)
26
Require Secretary of State to lay the Long Term Rail Strategy before Parliament, including changes. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
The Long Term Rail Strategy guiding Great British Railways needs to have a timescale of at least 30 years to provide the necessary vision for underpinning shorter-term decisions on specific projects and funding. It also needs to be protected from unnecessary or radical changes of direction that would undermine its value. Significant amendments to the LTRS should require formal consultation with industry and with Parliament. We recommend that the Secretary of State be required to lay the Strategy before Parliament, and that, where the Secretary of State makes substantive changes, it be required to be laid again in its amended form. (Recommendation, Paragraph 119)
27
Clarify Great British Railways' autonomy in enhancements planning and ministerial oversight to prevent micromanagement. Recommendation · addressed to Department for Transport Recommendation (the committee's words)
We want Great British Railways to reach its potential for making unified decisions over track and train informed by expertise in railway systems. We expect political leaders to set its strategic direction and hold it accountable for delivery, but micromanagement would work against the best interests of passengers and industry. The Department must be clear about the level of autonomy it expects GBR to exercise in enhancements planning, and how ministerial oversight will be exercised in a way that does not jeopardise the investment pipeline. (Recommendation, Paragraph 120) 54