First Report - The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice

The government responded by stating that no other papers were commissioned for early SAGE meetings and that minutes are available, but did not address the committee's concern about the speed of policy decisions in response to scientific evidence.

The government's response discusses the diversity of SAGE advisors and their expertise, but does not address the recommendation to confirm whether papers were considered at the first two SAGE meetings or commit to publishing them.

The government expressed appreciation for scientific contributions and outlined support for SAGE participants and their universities, including future plans for recognition. However, it did not set out a plan for how it will formally and informally engage with the broader science community in future emergencies.

The government states it will consider revisions to SAGE guidance as part of a future review, focusing on participant identity publication and security risks, but does not specifically commit to updating guidance for adviser support in long-term emergencies or to formally recognise contributors.

The government response focuses on the Joint Biosecurity Centre's (JBC) publications, data, and the commitment to publish minutes and scope of its various boards, but it does not address the recommendation for full disclosure of SAGE attendees and observers.

The government response focuses on the transparency of SAGE publications and reasons for confidentiality, but does not commit to publishing the outputs or meeting schedules for the JBC's steering and advisory boards, as specifically requested by the committee.

The government agreed on the importance of considering a wide range of factors and committed to publishing data that has informed its decision-making, including analysis and rationale for policy choices like the tiering framework. However, it did not commit to publishing specific science advice given by the GCSA and CMO to COBR and the Prime Minister, nor to a two-month disclosure timeframe for future SAGE advice.

The government's response describes its efforts to understand the wider health impacts of Covid-19 and the methodology for reporting deaths, but it does not address the committee's specific recommendation regarding the rigour and relevance of analysis selected for public presentation to avoid public alarm.

The government's response details its efforts to communicate scientific advice during the pandemic, but does not address the recommendation to quantify health impacts or provide analysis distinguishing between those who died with or from Covid-19.

The government response details how it considers and mitigates indirect impacts of COVID-19, describes decision-making structures, and lists various metrics. However, it does not address the recommendation to update SAGE guidance specifically on managing transparency during emergencies.

The government's response focused on improvements in data access, sharing, and integration across government and devolved administrations, including the role of the JBC. This response did not address the recommendation to identify lessons learned from the communication of science or to update SAGE guidance regarding support for SAGE participants in public communication.

The government response details its approach to test, trace, and isolate, including regional engagement teams and the functions of the JBC, as well as funding for local authorities. It does not, however, set out how advice on indirect effects of COVID-19 interventions has been structured or commit to disclosing related individuals, institutions, or papers.

The government's response focused entirely on the GCSA, CMO, and SAGE participants' engagement with international counterparts and organizations to share information and learn lessons. It did not address the recommendation for DHSC to set out an action plan for addressing poor data access, data sharing agreements, data integration across UK health and social care sectors, or the role of the Joint Biosecurity Centre.

The government's response detailed its ongoing review of non-pharmaceutical interventions and social distancing rules, highlighting its collaboration with scientific advisers and consideration of international and devolved administration approaches in policy decisions. It did not directly address the committee's conclusion regarding the breadth and evolution of scientific expertise informing the government.

The government's response describes its belief in a combined national and local approach for test, trace, and isolate, and how NHS Test and Trace was designed for integrated service. However, it does not address the committee's specific criticism regarding the slowness to increase testing capacity or missed lessons.

The government's response explains its integrated national and local approach for test, trace, and isolate, and how NHS Test and Trace was designed with local engagement. However, it does not address the committee's criticism regarding the slowness to expand testing capacity or the insufficient engagement with scientific expertise.