Select Committee · Science, Innovation and Technology Committee

UK Science, Research and Technology Capability and Influence in Global Disease Outbreaks

Status: Closed Opened: 20 Mar 2020 Closed: 16 Nov 2022 12 recommendations 15 conclusions 1 report

The Coronavirus covid-19 outbreak is the latest in a series of disease outbreaks that have spread internationally, presenting major challenges to communities, national governments and international institutions. Scientific knowledge and advice are foundational to the prevention, management and treatment of these global outbreaks, at both an international and national level. Once the covid-19 pandemic has …

Reports

1 report
Title HC No. Published Items Response
First Report - The UK response to covid-19: use of scientif… HC 136 8 Jan 2021 27 Responded

Recommendations & Conclusions

27 items
1 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

The coronavirus pandemic marks the most significant test of the UK’s emergency advisory and decision-making...

The coronavirus pandemic marks the most significant test of the UK’s emergency advisory and decision-making structures in living memory. As such, it is important that lessons are drawn throughout and applied so that the Government and future Governments may be better placed to respond to future crises. This has been …

Government response. The Government is committed to working in a way that is open and transparent about the relevant data and scientific advice used to inform the response to the pandemic. The Government will publish scientific advice in a timely fashion subject, …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
2 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

The Cabinet Office and Government Office for Science should update SAGE guidance to set out...

The Cabinet Office and Government Office for Science should update SAGE guidance to set out the role that SAGE will play in advising the Government’s long-term management of emergency scenarios. (Paragraph 34) Activation and operation of SAGE

Government response. The responsibility for long-term management of emergencies (including prevention, contingency planning, response and recovery) sits with the accountable, policy- owning Government Departments and their respective Ministers in accordance with the principle of lead government department. The Government will continue to …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
3 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

We are satisfied that the SAGE mechanism responded to the advent of the novel coronavirus...

We are satisfied that the SAGE mechanism responded to the advent of the novel coronavirus in a timely manner and that the most up-to-date scientific research and understanding was readily available to inform the Government from the outset. Nevertheless, we note that submissions presented to us raised concerns that during …

Government response. No other papers were commissioned or tabled at those meetings. Minutes for the first two SAGE meetings about the response to Coronavirus (Covid 19), held on 22 and 28 January 2020, can be found on GOV.UK.1
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
4 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

It is disappointing that the details of SAGE’s preliminary meetings were not made public for...

It is disappointing that the details of SAGE’s preliminary meetings were not made public for over two months, leading to unnecessary concern and confusion over what advice the Government had been receiving. Indeed, were it not for our early enquiries, this confusion may have continued until the details of SAGE’s …

Government response. Through SAGE and its sub-committees, the Government has drawn on advice from a wide and diverse pool of advisers from across the scientific community. This has included securing input from; environmental scientists; public health experts; behavioural and social scientists; epidemiologists; …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
5 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

We believe the initial response in setting up SAGE was timely.

We believe the initial response in setting up SAGE was timely. We have heard from some sectors of the science community that the community was not consulted appropriately. The Government should set out in response to this Report how in future emergencies it will engage formally and informally with the …

Government response. The Government and the Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) are deeply appreciative of the significant contributions made, and hard work undertaken by the many independent scientists and experts working in support of the country’s response to the pandemic. The continuing …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
6 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

SAGE has been activated for the longest continual period since its inception, which brings to...

SAGE has been activated for the longest continual period since its inception, which brings to question how sustainably the group can maintain its current level of high activity. We acknowledge senior scientists’ comments of frequent working round the clock, and we pay tribute to their continued service to the public …

Government response. Given the extraordinary and extended nature of the Covid-19 outbreak, an exception has been made to the usual SAGE process meaning that the identities of SAGE participants were published online from early May 2020.3 Furthermore, the register of interests for …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
7 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

Whilst we welcome the eventual disclosure of SAGE participants, the fact that the delay was...

Whilst we welcome the eventual disclosure of SAGE participants, the fact that the delay was attributed to advice from the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) gives us cause for concern. As suggested by Professor Chris Whitty, the advice relates to emergencies relevant to national security rather than …

Government response. SAGE minutes published online already contain details of the Senior Civil Servants as well as special advisers present at meetings. Names of more junior observer government officials who attend the meetings are redacted. This is in line with long- 3 …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
8 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

Regarding the disclosure of Government officials observing SAGE meetings, we agree with the redaction of...

Regarding the disclosure of Government officials observing SAGE meetings, we agree with the redaction of information to protect the personal data of individuals including junior officials at the time of the emergency. In the interests of transparency, and to have a full picture of who is formulating policy advice to …

Government response. DHSC recognises the need for transparency and is committed to openness. Since July 2020, the JBC has published a range of publications including: • the Watchlist, published weekly, which gives epidemiological data on Covid- 19 for each lower-tier local authority …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
9 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

It is regrettable that full transparency was not achieved in time for the JBC’s inauguration...

It is regrettable that full transparency was not achieved in time for the JBC’s inauguration on 1 June. We welcome the disclosure of the expert advisory boards supporting the JBC. Nevertheless, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) has yet to commit to publish the outputs, including meeting papers …

Government response. GO-Science has released 684 papers (as at 30.04.2021) and the minutes from COVID-SAGE which forms the advice provided to Ministers. The current aim is to release papers about two weeks after the SAGE meeting at which the advice was considered, …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
10 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

Given the frequent reporting of the views of SAGE advisers in the media— particularly where...

Given the frequent reporting of the views of SAGE advisers in the media— particularly where these have diverged from decisions taken by the Government— and the continued public interest in the evidence base underlying decisions made, we are satisfied for the most part that the demarcation between adviser and decision- …

Government response. The Government agrees that it is important that it considers a wide range of factors in all its decision-making in relation to the pandemic. This has been its approach throughout as it has sought to slow the virus, protect the …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
11 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

Transparency in the evidence behind Government decisions enables higher quality decision-making through scrutiny, and better...

Transparency in the evidence behind Government decisions enables higher quality decision-making through scrutiny, and better understanding of the reasons for those decisions. While calls for the publication of SAGE evidence from this Committee and many others were eventually heeded, it is regrettable that a significant amount of time passed before …

Government response. The Government is keen to better understand the wider health impacts9 of the Covid- 19 pandemic as identified by the Chief Medical Officer. These health impacts may relate to mortality, in terms of excess deaths, or morbidity, in terms of …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
12 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

It has been made clear to us that policy decisions throughout the coronavirus pandemic have...

It has been made clear to us that policy decisions throughout the coronavirus pandemic have not been based solely on medical and epidemiological science, but rather have been developed with a wide range of inputs that include scientific research and opinion. Nevertheless, as indicated by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser, …

Government response. The CO will work with GO-Science to evolve SAGE guidance, in order to learn from and build on the lessons and positive developments regarding transparency over the past 12 months, in light of the response to the pandemic. In the …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
13 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

The public has shown a strong appetite for more information.

The public has shown a strong appetite for more information. The Government should attempt to quantify the four forms of health impacts identified by Professor Whitty. Further, it should consider whether it is possible to provide an analysis of—either consistently or on a sample basis—those who died with covid-19 as …

Government response. GO-Science and the GCSA are committed to ensuring science advice provided to Ministers and officials is relevant and fit-for-purpose. The nature and demands of the pandemic, including the spotlight on SAGE, has required action to be undertaken to refine and …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
14 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

As indicated by the Chief Medical Officer for England, the SAGE secretariat faced “huge pressure”...

As indicated by the Chief Medical Officer for England, the SAGE secretariat faced “huge pressure” in managing the monumental task of organising SAGE whilst adhering to the principles of transparent and scrutable scientific advice. We commend the efforts of officials in the Government Office for Science, the SAGE secretariat and …

Government response. The Government considers the understanding and mitigation of negative indirect impacts to be imperative to the recovery from Covid-19 and this is part of the C O’s remit. The CO works in partnership with other Departments, local government, Arms- length …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
15 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

We applaud the dedication with which the scientific community within the UK and globally have...

We applaud the dedication with which the scientific community within the UK and globally have directly engaged with the public, in addition to their intensive studies of the coronavirus itself. We are also grateful to those within universities and research institutes for their efforts in supporting the clear and direct …

Government response. DHSC recognises that cross-organisational working is more important than ever given the nature and impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result, various channels of data access and sharing have been strengthened or established, and both internal and public-facing central …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
16 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

We believe that a gap persists in the transparency of the advice that is given...

We believe that a gap persists in the transparency of the advice that is given to the Government, outside of the auspices of SAGE, particularly on the topic of non- medical impacts of the pandemic and related Government interventions. While this Committee is not advocating the establishment of an “economics …

Government response. Approach to test, trace and isolate The Government does not believe that its approach to test, trace and isolate should come down to a simple either/or between a national or local approach, but rather that a combined approach is best …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
17 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

Given the UK’s strengths in statistical analysis and data science, it is regrettable that poor...

Given the UK’s strengths in statistical analysis and data science, it is regrettable that poor data flows, delays in data-sharing agreements and a general lack of structuring and data integration across both the health and social care sectors have throttled timely data sharing and analysis. For example, it is unacceptable …

Government response. GCSA and CMO have, since the start of the pandemic, engaged with international counterparts on a regular basis in order to share information during what has been a rapidly evolving situation. The UK is currently on the Executive Board of …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
18 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

We are satisfied that the science advice informing the Government has drawn upon some of...

We are satisfied that the science advice informing the Government has drawn upon some of the best expertise that the UK—and indeed the world—has to offer. We acknowledge the initial dominance of modelling expertise on SAGE and believe this is a fair reflection of the lack of data at the …

Government response. The Government keeps all non–pharmaceutical interventions and social distancing rules under constant review to ensure the measures remain necessary and proportionate. For example, the Government is legally required to review the Steps regulations at least every 35 days. As set …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
19 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

The Government was too slow to increase testing capacity to the levels required to help...

The Government was too slow to increase testing capacity to the levels required to help contain the spread of the coronavirus. We have previously suggested that strategy was driven by the capacity available, rather than strategy driving the necessary increase in capacity. It was clear early in the year that …

Government response. The Government does not believe that its approach to test, trace and isolate should come down to a simple either/or between a national or local approach, but rather that a combined approach is best suited to delivering results. The NHS …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
20 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

The Government was slow to move once it realised that coronavirus testing required a rapid...

The Government was slow to move once it realised that coronavirus testing required a rapid expansion and did not engage sufficiently with the wide array of scientific expertise available within the UK—particularly within our universities and research institutes. While we appreciate the complexities of such a feat, including the need …

Government response. The Government does not believe that its approach to test, trace and isolate should come down to a simple either/or between a national or local approach, but rather that a combined approach is best suited to delivering results. The NHS …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
21 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

The Committee will report separately and more fully on the test, trace and isolate system...

The Committee will report separately and more fully on the test, trace and isolate system and the mass testing programme in due course. But in considering the role of science advice, and its influence on Government decisions, we are concerned by the continued lack of justification provided to the Committee …

Government response. The Government does not believe that its approach to test, trace and isolate should come down to a simple either/or between a national or local approach, but rather that a combined approach is best suited to delivering results. The NHS …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
22 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

The creation of NHS Test and Trace involves a budget of £22 billion for financial...

The creation of NHS Test and Trace involves a budget of £22 billion for financial year 2020–21 and the justification for most of its spending being on the central part of the system, rather than through local public health teams, has not been clearly made. Concerns have also been raised …

Government response. The Government does not believe that its approach to test, trace and isolate should come down to a simple either/or between a national or local approach, but rather that a combined approach is best suited to delivering results. The NHS …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
23 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

The Government should: explain clearly the justification for taking a relatively centralised approach to test,...

The Government should: explain clearly the justification for taking a relatively centralised approach to test, trace and isolate; set out its assessment of the impact of the system on the spread of the virus since the outset, including on health outcomes; and review the balance between the local and national …

Government response. The Government does not believe that its approach to test, trace and isolate should come down to a simple either/or between a national or local approach, but rather that a combined approach is best suited to delivering results. The NHS …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
24 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

Throughout the pandemic, the UK has relied on its own bespoke system of science advice...

Throughout the pandemic, the UK has relied on its own bespoke system of science advice and guidance on non-pharmaceutical interventions, while at the same time global-level guidance has been issued regularly by the World Health Organisation (WHO). There have also been numerous opportunities to learn from the approaches undertaken by …

Government response. The Government keeps all non–pharmaceutical interventions and social distancing rules under constant review to ensure the measures remain necessary and proportionate. For example, the Government is legally required to review the Steps regulations at least every 35 days. As set …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
25 Recommendation First Report - The UK response to covid…

Given the importance of refining interventions to mitigate both impacts on public health and economic...

Given the importance of refining interventions to mitigate both impacts on public health and economic recovery, a review of social distancing measures came quite late. While the scientific approach quite rightly waits for the evidence before making a definitive recommendation, this often necessitates delay and may not produce conclusive results. …

Government response. The Government keeps all non–pharmaceutical interventions and social distancing rules under constant review to ensure the measures remain necessary and proportionate. For example, the Government is legally required to review the Steps regulations at least every 35 days. As set …
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
26 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

The development of vaccines and therapeutics is a policy area in which it is right...

The development of vaccines and therapeutics is a policy area in which it is right that science must lead the way, so that there may be a high level of confidence that a rigorous approach has been taken towards safety and efficacy. From the beginning of the pandemic, the clear …

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
27 Conclusion First Report - The UK response to covid…

We acknowledge that a large part of the success to date into the development of...

We acknowledge that a large part of the success to date into the development of covid-19 vaccines and therapeutics can be credited to lessons learned from previous outbreaks and efforts made to prepare for future crises. As further promising vaccine candidates and treatments come to light, other aspects of the …

Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

Oral evidence sessions

27 sessions
Date Witnesses
30 Mar 2022 Professor Ann John · Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviours (SPI-B)., Sir Patrick Vallance, Government Chief Scientific Adviser · UK Government View ↗
2 Mar 2022 Dr Camilla Holten-Møller · Statens Serum Institut, Denmark, Dr Raghib Ali · MRC Epidemiology Unit, the University of Cambridge, Dr Sarah Scobie · Nuffield Trust, Ed Humpherson · UK Statistics Authority, Professor Graham Medley · Scientific Pandemic Influenza Group on Modelling (SPI-M). View ↗
14 Dec 2021 Dame Kate Bingham · UK Vaccine Taskforce, Dr Angelique Coetzee · South African Medical Association, Dr Paul Burton · Moderna, Dr Susan Hopkins · UK Health Security Agency, Professor Steven Riley · UK Health Security Agency, Professor Wei Shen Lim · JCVI COVID-19 sub-committee View ↗
26 Oct 2021 Dr Sharon Alroy-Preis · Public Health Services, Israel, Dr Thomas Waite · Department for Health and Social Care, Professor Andrew Curran · Health and Safety Executive, Professor Lucy Chappell · Department of Health and Social Care, Professor Mario Mondelli · University of Pavia, Professor Sir Andrew Pollard · Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation, Professor Sir Stephen Holgate · University of Southampton View ↗
16 Jun 2021 Dr Susan Hopkins · UK Health Security Agency, Professor Sir Andrew Pollard · Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation, Professor Wendy Barclay · Imperial College London View ↗
28 Apr 2021 Dr Mary Ramsay · UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), Dr Ruth Payne · University of Sheffield, Professor Anthony Harnden · Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation, Professor Christopher Dye · University of Oxford, Professor John Aston · University of Cambridge, Professor Ran Balicer · Clalit Research Institute, Professor Sir Munir Pirmohamed · Commission on Human Medicines View ↗
9 Mar 2021 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England · Department of Health and Social Care, Sir Patrick Vallance, Government Chief Scientific Adviser · UK Government View ↗
24 Feb 2021 Dr Philip Dormitzer · Pfizer, Madelaine McTernan · Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Nadhim Zahawi · Department for Health and Social Care, Professor Anthony Harnden · Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation, Professor Sarah Gilbert · University of Oxford, Professor Wendy Barclay · Imperial College London View ↗
17 Feb 2021 Dr James Rubin · Kings College London, Dr Johanna Hutchinson · Joint Biosecurity Centre, James Hetherington · Joint Biosecurity Centre, Professor Dame Angela McLean · HM Government, Professor Mark Woolhouse OBE · University of Edinburgh, Professor Sir John Bell · Oxford University View ↗
3 Feb 2021 Mark Hewlett · NHS Test and Trace, Steve McManus · NHS Test and Trace, The Baroness Harding of Winscombe · National Institute for Health Protection View ↗
27 Jan 2021 Dr Richard Harling MBE · Staffordshire County Council, Greg Fell · Association of Directors of Public Health View ↗
13 Jan 2021 Antonia Williams · HM Treasury, Dr Mary Ramsay · UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), Nadhim Zahawi · Department for Health and Social Care, Professor Wei Shen Lim · JCVI COVID-19 sub-committee, Sir Mene Pangalos · AstraZeneca, Tom Keith-Roach · AstraZeneca UK View ↗
3 Nov 2020 Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England · Department of Health and Social Care, Sir Patrick Vallance, Government Chief Scientific Adviser · UK Government, The Lord Patel KT · House of Lords View ↗
17 Sep 2020 Dr Susan Hopkins · UK Health Security Agency, Dr Thomas Waite · Department for Health and Social Care, Professor Carl Heneghan · University of Oxford, Professor Sylvia Richardson · Cambridge Institute of Public Health, University of Cambridge, Simon Thompson · Royal Mail, The Baroness Harding of Winscombe · National Institute for Health Protection, The Lord Bethell · Department for Health and Social Care View ↗
21 Jul 2020 Rt Hon Matt Hancock · Department for Health and Social Care, Sir Chris Wormald · Department of Health and Social Care View ↗

Correspondence

71 letters
DateDirectionTitle
23 Jun 2022 Correspondence from Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, Secretary of State for Health and So…
26 May 2022 Correspondence from the Chair to Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, Secretary of State for …
20 May 2022 Correspondence from Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, Secretary of State for Health and So…
27 Apr 2022 Correspondence from the Chair to Rt Hon Sajid Javid, Secretary of State for Hea…
17 Dec 2021 Correspondence from Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, Secretary of State for Health and So…
21 May 2021 Correspondence from Dr Mary Ramsay, Head of Immunisation, Public Health England…
12 May 2021 Correspondence from Rt Hon Matt Hancock MP, Secretary of State for Health and S…
16 Mar 2021 Correspondence from Baroness Harding to Chair regarding contact tracing in Scot…
2 Mar 2021 Correspondence from Jeane Freeman MSP, Cabinet Secretary for Health and Sport, …
12 Feb 2021 Correspondence from Baroness Harding to the Chair relating to the impact of Tes…
12 Feb 2021 Correspondence from Professor Wei Shen Lim to the Chair relating to follow up e…
5 Feb 2021 Correspondence from the Chair to Baroness Harding regarding follow up evidence
3 Feb 2021 Correspondence from the Chair to Rt Hon Matt Hancock, Secretary of State for He…
20 Jan 2021 Correspondence from Nadhim Zahawi MP, Minister for COVID-19 Vaccine Deployment,…
13 Jan 2021 Correspondence from Dr Clive Dix, Interim Chair UK Vaccine Taskforce, to the Ch…
23 Dec 2020 Correspondence from the Chair to Dr Clive Dix, Interim Chair UK Vaccine Taskfor…
10 Dec 2020 Correspondence from the Prime Minister to the Chairs of the Science & Technolog…
11 Nov 2020 Correspondence from Professor Chris Whitty, Chief Medical Officer for England, …
4 Nov 2020 Correspondence from Professor Chris Whitty to the chair, re clarification of or…
4 Nov 2020 Correspondence from the Chair to Rt Hon Alok Sharma MP relating to the Vaccine …