Fifth Report: Home Office preparedness for COVID-19 (coronavirus): management of the borders

The government rejects the Committee's overall assertions regarding March 13th guidance and defends its decision-making as scientifically informed, but does not address the Committee's specific complaint about the repeated failure to provide the requested scientific advice for that decision.

The government rejects the Committee's overall assertions, stating that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were scientifically informed. However, it fails to address the Committee's specific complaint about the continued non-provision of evidence for the March 13th decision.

The government rejects the committee's assertions about the 13 March decision but fails to address the specific call for urgent clarity on who was responsible for the decision-making process and on what basis. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were science-led.

The government rejects the committee's general assertions but fails to address the specific recommendation that the Home Office should have requested and made available estimates of imported cases during March to inform ministerial decisions. They reiterate that isolation guidance was superseded and decisions were science-led.

The government states that SAGE minutes and papers are now published on www.gov.uk, but it does not address the recommendation to explain clearly why there have been delays in publishing papers within a month of relevant meetings.

The government reiterated that border health measures are for protecting public health and controlling imported cases, but did not address the committee's call for transparency regarding the evidence behind its decisions to build public support.

The government stated it agrees swift action is needed for COVID-19 risk and detailed its process for adjusting travel corridor exemptions based on Joint Biosecurity Centre assessments, but did not address the recommendation for greater sensitivity or changes in communication regarding the impact of sudden policy shifts on individuals and businesses.

The government describes the Joint Biosecurity Centre's methodology for assessing travel risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, and explains its swift action to remove/reinstate countries. However, it does not commit to publishing the specific prevalence rates or provide a detailed explanation for why Spain was initially included on the travel corridors list.

The government describes the Joint Biosecurity Centre's role and methodology for assessing travel risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, but it does not address the committee's concern about the lack of transparency regarding JBC analysis or commit to publishing prevalence rates.

The government describes the methodology used by the Joint Biosecurity Centre for assessing risks and informing decisions on travel corridors, noting a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors. However, it does not commit to publishing the specific analysis, JBC assessments of prevalence rates, or government estimates of COVID-19 in arrivals as recommended.

The government agreed on the importance of clear communication and outlined how it ensures gov.uk is the single source for policy changes, but did not address the recommendation for a single four-nations approach to border measures or publishing Joint Biosecurity Centre figures.

The government agrees on the need for swift action and explains its methodology for determining travel corridors and the decision regarding Spain, acknowledging the impact on travellers. However, it does not outline specific plans to build confidence in its decisions or ensure that people can afford to comply with quarantine requirements.

The government reiterated that border health measures are for protecting public health and controlling imported cases, but did not engage with the committee's conclusion that some form of border quarantine mechanism would likely be required for the foreseeable future.