Summer 2024 disorder

We received no evidence to dispute the characterisation of violent disorder between 30 July and 7 August 2024. Many events held during this period began as protests and remained as such. But while some instances of disorder may have originated as protests, they quickly degenerated into violence. In some cases the chosen sites of protests, such as asylum hotels, were at best controversial and at worst an incitement to violence. Police were left with no choice but to prepare for and provide a strong response. We commend the bravery and professionalism of those officers who worked for long hours in extremely difficult circumstances, many of them suffering injury and other trauma. (Conclusion, Paragraph 6) Social media mis- and disinformation

Merseyside Police were put in a very difficult position given legal restrictions on communicating the identity of the Southport suspect and the need to withhold certain information in order to protect the trial. The inconsistent advice from the CPS over the publication of information about the suspect’s religion was particularly regrettable and hampered the police response. It cannot be determined whether the disorder could have been prevented had more information been published. However, the lack of information published in the wake of the murders of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe and Alice da Silva Aguiar created a vacuum where misinformation was able to grow, further undermining public confidence. We respect the CPS’s commitment to minimising risks to successful prosecutions, but it is clear that neither the law on contempt nor existing CPS guidance for the media and police are fit for the social media age. We therefore welcome both the Law Commission’s supplementary consultation on contempt of court and the CPS’s review of media guidelines. (Conclusion, Paragraph 17)

Notwithstanding potential changes to contempt of court laws, we recommend that the CPS publish its new media protocol as soon as possible and keep this updated at least every five years or earlier if there is a significant change 33 to the media landscape. It should also work with partner organisations in the police and media to ensure there is a clear shared understanding of its interpretation and use. (Recommendation, Paragraph 17) Policing response to disorder

The levels of violence seen across the country last summer were the worst since 2011. Police officers worked tirelessly to respond to the disorder and it was only through their efforts that more serious injury and property damage was prevented. Nevertheless, in several cases it appears that police forces were unprepared for the level of violence and were initially unable to take a proactive approach to policing, leaving officers exposed to significant risk. Given the background of recent disorder, we agree with His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services that police forces should have better anticipated the risk of disorder in general. After disorder in Southport, police forces should not have taken it for granted that subsequent planned protests would remain peaceful. (Conclusion, Paragraph 25)

We recommend that the Government publishes a formal response, after the second tranche of the HMICFRS review is published, setting out how it will support police forces to implement the findings of the review, including any additional funding if required, and over what timeframe. (Recommendation, Paragraph 25)

Individual police forces did their best to monitor social media ahead of and during the disorder as a source of intelligence. It is important that forces retain local capacity to monitor social media on a business-as-usual basis. However, it is clear that the volume of social media activity, including some originating abroad, as well as the amount of activity taking place on closed platforms such as Telegram, means that in many cases more national support is required. Some of this support was available during the summer disorder but it did not go far enough. It was welcome to hear the Policing Minister suggest that new national functions for social media are being considered, and that the role of technology is being considered to increase cost-effectiveness. (Conclusion, Paragraph 31)

The new national system for policing should include enhanced capacity to monitor and respond to social media at the national level, while also supporting forces to develop the necessary capacity. (Recommendation, Paragraph 31)

While we heard of several instances of mutual aid being quickly and effectively provided, there were also some problems in its provision, and inconsistencies in the way mutual aid requests were handled. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35) 34

As part of a formal response to the HMICFRS reports the Government should set out in particular how it is supporting forces to improve the provision of mutual aid, including how changes to the national policing system will support mutual aid. (Recommendation, Paragraph 35) National policing response

We agree that despite the best efforts of policing leaders, shortcomings in national policing structures inhibited the response to the disorder and national mobilisation came too late. The disorder highlighted deficiencies that also affect business-as-usual policing, such as a lack of reliable national data. We welcome the Government’s commitment to reforming the national policing landscape, and to consulting with police leaders to define it. However, there are opportunities beyond the areas the Government has already outlined, for example in tech adoption, workforce planning and investigations. (Conclusion, Paragraph 43)

Given the importance of the Government’s ambitions on crime and policing, including halving knife crime and halving Violence Against Women and Girls, and the significant challenges facing the policing system, we encourage the Government to be ambitious in setting out its proposals for reform and not just focus on easy, short-term wins. (Recommendation, Paragraph 43) Impact on police forces

Police officers worked for long hours in extremely difficult circumstances during disorder incidents, many of them suffering injury and other trauma. Those that were re-deployed but did not face significant disorder will still have experienced fatigue and an increased workload. Police forces did their best to ameliorate the impact on officers but it is clear that the disorder has had a detrimental effect at a time when many officers were already struggling with heavy workloads, fatigue and stress. (Conclusion, Paragraph 47)

The Government should outline a comprehensive strategy forpolice officer retention alongside its recruitment efforts. (Recommendation, Paragraph 47)

The costs incurred by police forces during the course of the disorder look modest in the context of overall policing budgets, but these unexpected costs have nonetheless had a significant impact and are being disproportionately borne by certain forces. We welcome the Government’s earlier commitment to reimbursing forces through special grant funding, but we are concerned about the significant delays to releasing this money which put forces in a difficult position in planning for this financial year. 35 It would not be acceptable for Police and Crime Commissioners to have to find funding for Riot Compensation Act claims from within their existing budgets. (Conclusion, Paragraph 51)

If it has not done so already the Government should release funding to cover costs incurred during the disorder as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 51)

We commend the efforts of police forces to maintain business-as- usual policing, particularly the importance attached to maintaining neighbourhood policing. Nonetheless, the disorder and subsequent investigations have had a knock-on impact on other areas of policing, including neighbourhood policing. The Government’s focus on strengthening neighbourhood policing is welcome, as is the flexibility that the Government is allowing forces to recruit to neighbourhood teams. However, it is important that the right mix of staff, including experienced officers, are being brought into neighbourhood policing teams. The use of numerical targets for recruitment, at a time when police budgets are under pressure, risks introducing an incentive to hire cheaply. (Conclusion, Paragraph 58)

The Government should benchmark recruitment plans under the Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee to ensure that, while flexibility for forces to recruit is maintained, minimum numbers for the recruitment of police officers can be set by the Home Office if required, or more flexibility in funding provided if forces cannot meet their staffing needs through the Neighbourhood Policing Guarantee. (Recommendation, Paragraph 58) The political response

The Government’s approach to working with police forces during the disorder was clearly seen as appropriate by the police leaders involved, who welcomed the level of support and challenge they received. The assurances that the Government provided helped to ensure that the police were able to mobilise effectively nationally. However, while some level of government involvement in an emergency will always be necessary, and some level of assurance will always be required, ideally the national policing system would be sufficiently resilient to respond to emergency situations without requiring Government intervention. (Conclusion, Paragraph 63)

The Government should ensure that its policing reforms empower the national policing system to respond effectively to emergency situations, without requiring significant Government intervention. (Recommendation, Paragraph 63) 36

The joint working, supported by the Government, between the police and the criminal justice system was essential in bringing about swift justice to the perpetrators of the disorder. This helped to prevent further disorder. However, we agree with the Policing Minister that it is not right for other serious crimes to see significant delays to justice. The Government’s broader ambitions to reduce crime will require better long-term alignment between Home Office policies on crime and policing and those of the Ministry of Justice relating to the criminal justice system and the prison estate. (Conclusion, Paragraph 68)

The right to protest is fundamental in our democracy and we would take seriously any evidence that peaceful protest was being suppressed based on the political views expressed. However, we have seen no evidence that this was the case during the summer. Far from being evidence of ‘two-tier policing’, the policing response last summer was entirely appropriate given the levels of violence and criminality that were on display. It was disgraceful to see unsubstantiated commentary about ‘two-tier policing’ undermining the efforts of police officers who served bravely in the face of violence. (Conclusion, Paragraph 75) 37