Police conduct and complaints

It is an inevitable part of any complaints system that those whose complaints are not upheld will be discontented. There is none the less a perception that complaints against police officers are unlikely to succeed and that investigations are over- complex, take too long and frequently result in limited action against even officers found to have committed misconduct.

It should be clear that a police officer accused, for example, of mistreating a member of the public or of bullying colleagues or subordinates should be subject, like any other person working in the public service, to investigation and sanction if proven to have done so. Public confidence is undermined if misconduct is not appropriately punished.

The question arose during our inquiry whether the IOPC should be staffed by investigators who were not former police officers. Opinion divided on whether those who had served in the police should be excluded for potentially ‘marking their own homework’ or that of their colleagues. On the other side of the argument, ex-police officers bring the skills learned on the job and an understanding of police culture. It seems that an appropriate balance of former serving officers and investigators with other backgrounds is the right one to strike, but it may be that the IOPC should seek to widen its pool of potential candidates to include those with investigative experience from other spheres, including, for example, former military personnel.

Each complaint has unique features, and we have heard from a significant number of people whose dealings with police forces, the IOPC or its predecessor have left them unsatisfied with the investigation of their complaints or the level of sanction applied to officers found to have misconducted themselves. This includes cases of people whose family members or friends have died as a result of police operations, and who are aggrieved at the outcome of subsequent investigations that they feel do not match the severity of what happened to them. Those people do not have the advantage of high profile or a platform that leads to publicity for their cases. Their accounts may be found in the written evidence published on our website.

The sorry story of Operation Midland and subsequent inquiries into how it was conducted demonstrates why a robust complaints and conduct system is necessary if the public is to be confident that police officers behave properly and will be held to account and suitably sanctioned if they do not. Lady Brittan’s account of how she— the wife of a wrongly suspected man not herself suspected of any crime—was treated is salutary. Those investigating potential police misconduct should be ashamed of leaving any vulnerable person feeling as if they are, themselves, a suspect. The families of the now-deceased Lord Brittan and Lord Bramall, as well as the former MP Harvey Proctor, have been left feeling that no-one has been sanctioned for the mistakes identified by Sir Richard Henriques in the Operation Midland inquiry Police Conduct and Complaints 47 and its aftermath. That is a result that satisfies no-one and does nothing to improve confidence that officers will be held to account when an investigation goes quite so badly wrong. (Paragraph 34) Structure and operation of the police complaints process

It has been argued that uniting the roles of chair and director general of the IOPC aids clearer decision-making and action. We disagree. This is not normal practice and it detracts from the ability properly to scrutinise the executive action of the IOPC and to hold it to proper account. We recommend that the Government appoint an independent chair alongside the director general of the IOPC as a matter of urgency to restore the usual checks and balances.

We urge the Government to consider police complaints as part of the review of the PCC model currently under way and to make an early assessment of PCC involvement in the police complaints system.

It may be too soon to understand whether PCC involvement in the police complaints system is realising the benefits the Government hoped for, but we are concerned that the Government is not doing enough to monitor implementation of the new PCC complaint models or to encourage their uptake.

We note enhanced opportunities for PCCs to play a greater role in the local complaints process following reforms introduced in 2020. The three models present a unique opportunity for PCCs, as part of their complaint-handling responsibilities, to support proactively and systemically more effective complaints systems within their forces, although nothing in what they do should delay complaint-handling processes any further. Statutory guidance sets out that PCCs and their equivalents hold their chief constable accountable for the performance of the local complaints and disciplinary processes by scrutinising local complaints data for example to identify themes and recurring issues—and how quickly forces resolve those issues— in complaints.

We urge the Government to fund PCCs adequately to take on Models 2 or 3 as a minimum requirement in their complaint-handling roles. This will provide PCCs the opportunity to work more closely with their forces, for example, to record and systematically monitor the root causes of complaints and recurrent issues that affect their communities disproportionately and how their forces resolve those issues. This depth and consistency of monitoring is required to achieve a national understanding of where fault lines exist in the complaints systems of the 43 police forces of England and Wales so that long-standing issues may be tackled. (Paragraph 64) Police forces and the discipline system

The Government’s recent changes to the police complaints and discipline systems were intended to simplify and speed up the process. Nonetheless, the language used to explain systems to members of the public who wish to make complaints remains too complex and too technical: this contributes to public disengagement and lack of confidence in the system. (Paragraph 80) 48 Police Conduct and Complaints

The police complaints system needs to be simpler and more transparent. We welcome IOPC statutory guidance which encourages forces to use accessible language and formats to explain the system, but it is not evident that all forces are yet doing this. All key stakeholders in the policing sphere (IOPC, NPCC, forces, CoP and the CPS) should be required to publish plain language versions of the systems, available in different languages and accessible formats. These should be made available online and in print.

More than six months on from its publication, the Home Office has not yet responded to our report on Macpherson and has given no indication of when it will respond. We urge the Home Secretary to respond to that Report.

Evidence to our inquiry suggests that insufficient focus is given to the staffing and operation of some professional standards departments including their culture, transparency and ethnic diversity representation.

PSDs should be properly resourced to ensure complaint and conduct matters are handled to a high standard and in a timely manner. We repeat the recommendations made in our Macpherson report to address urgently the disparity in BME staffing in PSDs.

There is a clear absence of urgency and a culture of non-co-operation from some police forces involved in investigations. Appropriate sanctions must follow for any officer served with disciplinary proceedings, whether serving or retired. We welcome the legislation that exists to ensure delays to investigations are minimised. Specific reforms were made to the discipline system under the implementation of the 2020 reforms including the possibility for former officers to face disciplinary proceedings if allegations come to light within 12 months of their leaving the force. In addition, the IOPC has new powers to determine that disciplinary processes may be initiated against officers who have been out of service for longer than 12 months.

The available statutory and regulatory frameworks must be used by forces and the IOPC to obtain fair, transparent and appropriate sanctions against officers. (Paragraph 98) The IOPC complaints system

The example of its taking seven years to clear one police officer of misconduct is exceptional, but demonstrates why the IOPC must focus its efforts on concluding investigations as quickly as possible. Quite aside from the effect on an individual’s morale, the removal from officers under investigation from front-line duties for lengthy periods may add to strain on police resources. The IOPC must also take care that its power to reinvestigate cases already concluded locally is used sparingly and when there is a clear public interest in undertaking further inquiry.

It is unsatisfactory and unedifying to hear policing organisations blame the IOPC for delay while the IOPC suggests officers may drag their heels in cooperating with investigations. Nor is it wholly sufficient for Chief Constable Guildford to suggest Police Conduct and Complaints 49 the IOPC could resolve some of that dilemma by using its powers more vigorously; police officers should not need to be forced to cooperate with conduct investigations.

A culture needs to be created within police forces—established by and led from the top—that requires rapid, open and non-defensive response to complaints about conduct, both to deal with misconduct where it arises and to clear the names and reputations of officers who have not transgressed.

The IOPC must use its powers effectively to minimise delays to investigations at an early stage of the process. It should proactively call to account those responsible for delays or who refuse to co-operate with investigations. Police forces, individual officers and their representative organisations must also take more responsibility for rooting out bad behaviour and lifting the cloud of complaint against officers who have done their exceptionally difficult job properly.

The progress the IOPC has made in clearing 91% of its core investigations within 12 months is welcome and must be maintained. While there are risks in setting time targets for investigations (not least the incentive for those under investigation to delay co-operation if the clock is ticking), the Government should ensure that the drive towards timely investigations is continued and should consider whether stronger guidance on the expected length of inquiries may be required.

We welcome the IOPC’s work on thematic reviews, specifically its aim to identify systemic learning by taking on more independent investigations in these areas and to improve public confidence in policing and the wider system. Ultimately, the result of such thematic reviews should be manifest in increased public confidence in how the police deal with these issues. This should also support forces to improve policing practice, in, for example, how stops and searches are conducted.

We welcome the super-complaints process and are encouraged by the Home Office’s pledge to review the designated bodies that can submit super-complaints on systemic issues in policing to include a broader range of organisations, including disability organisations.

We urge the Home Office to highlight, on its super-complaints’ website, that the 16 designated bodies should collaborate with non-designated bodies as appropriate to make a complaint on matters raised by non-designated bodies. Clarity of information is essential to ensure that the process is accessible to all groups and interests.

Evidence to our inquiry suggests the IOPC could do better in defending its role in police complaint decisions which, though they may not always be amenable to forces or police associations, must be accepted and acted upon if public confidence in accountability in policing is to be improved.

The IOPC has a statutory duty to uphold confidence in the police complaints system; and we urge the IOPC to embrace this role and to proactively communicate and defend the decisions it makes. (Paragraph 142) 50 Police Conduct and Complaints

We are concerned that IOPC learning recommendations made to police forces across England and Wales to improve policies and practice in the handling of police complaints are not monitored for follow-up action. We have heard of a lack of clarity about how recommendations are monitored, and whether forces implement them. Even where the IOPC makes key recommendations, and even where there may be interaction with HMICFRS recommendations, it is unclear how they are followed up.

We recommend that the Government monitor and review bi-annually how effectively local policing bodies are holding their chief constables accountable for implementing IOPC recommendations to their forces, and report the outcomes to us.

We urge the Government to review how IOPC, HMICFRS, and Coroners’ learning recommendations are reported to the public in a more joined-up and meaningful way. We recommend that data be published centrally, in order to simplify and streamline access to this important information. (Paragraph 152)

The IOPC has made concerted efforts in its first three years to build public trust in the police complaints system by actively listening to policing bodies and communities about their concerns and by providing greater transparency in the publication of the outcome of its investigations.

It is troubling, nine years on from the Committee’s last report on this topic, that concerns are still raised about delays to investigations that detrimentally affect people’s lives, about complexity of language and processes, and about inconsistency in updating and supporting officers and complainants during investigations. (Paragraph 154) Police Conduct and Complaints 51