Source · Select Committees · Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Eighth Report - Government transparency and accountability during Covid 19: The data underpinning decisions
Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
HC 803
Published 15 March 2021
Recommendations
22
Para 132
The Government must share all the available data with local areas in as much detail...
Recommendation
The Government must share all the available data with local areas in as much detail as possible, ideally to patient level. Data which will be key to decision making on the road map should be shared immediately, and ahead of …
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29
Para 174
The priority now must be a clear and consistent framework for making lockdown decisions as...
Recommendation
The priority now must be a clear and consistent framework for making lockdown decisions as a path back to normality is charted. The Committee, therefore, welcomes the roadmap. The Government should not make further changes to it, in terms of …
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33
Para 178
The Government must publish thresholds aligned to the roadmap in ranges or using minimum requirements,...
Recommendation
The Government must publish thresholds aligned to the roadmap in ranges or using minimum requirements, and with appropriate caveats if needed. This should be done immediately with the information available before decisions are taken to take the first steps.
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35
The Government should publish the data that underpins the restrictions that will remain in place...
Recommendation
The Government should publish the data that underpins the restrictions that will remain in place on businesses at each step of roadmap as a matter of urgency. Hyperlinks to this data must be included on pages explaining the restrictions for …
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Conclusions (31)
1
Conclusion
The Government has overseen a remarkable effort pulling together data on Covid 19 from a standing start 12 months ago. It has also made much of this data and analysis available to the public, primarily through the Covid 19 data dashboard. The Government has responded to requests for new data …
2
Conclusion
Para 33
The Government has made significant steps in the presentation of data throughout this pandemic, including through the Covid 19 dashboard. But it is still presenting some graphics which do not meet the basic standards that we would expect. The Committee welcomes UKSA and Royal Statistical Society intervention to support Departments …
3
Conclusion
Para 34
Graphics used by Government, for example slide packs and briefings, should meet Government Statistical Service good practice guidelines on data visualisation. They should always meet the accessibility regulations, which are now law.
4
Conclusion
Para 44
Statistics quoted by Ministers have not always been underpinned by published data, which goes against the UKSA Code of Practice. Publishing the underlying data is key to transparency and building trust. When the underlying data is not published, numbers may be used to make politicised points and members of the …
5
Conclusion
Para 45
When Ministers or senior officials quote statistics, the underlying data must be published. This is already an Office for Statistics Regulation expectation, and OSR should continue to inform this Committee—as it has throughout this inquiry—when it finds examples of statistics that are quoted without published data to back them up.
6
Conclusion
Para 46
Going forward, Ministerial statements published on Government websites must include hyperlinks or footnotes directing to the detailed data underpinning any numbers or statistics quoted. This should apply to all areas where data is used, not just in relation to this pandemic.
7
Conclusion
The Ministerial Code needs to be strengthened so it is clear that Ministers are required to abide by the UKSA Code of Practice in their presentation of data. The UKSA Code includes the principle of trustworthiness that builds “confidence in the people and organisations that produce statistics and data”. Abiding …
8
Conclusion
Para 53
When SAGE advisors speak publicly about the advice they have given to Government it has the potential to create confusion and undermine trust. This report calls for greater transparency, including on uncertainties, but there also needs to be clarity about what has underpinned Government decisions. SAGE is made transparent through …
9
Conclusion
Para 54
We are certainly not calling for SAGE advisors to be silenced, but for some expectations to be laid about the appropriate way to communicate considering, amongst other things, the potential for the politicisation of their commentary. Civil Servants advising Government are expected to abide by a code of conduct, and …
10
Conclusion
Para 81
Building trust between leaders and the public is essential to the response. The evidence the Committee has received, including from behavioural scientists, shows that people respond to open and honest information that is clear about the uncertainties within it. Some data has been communicated with the apparent intention of creating …
11
Conclusion
Government communication needs to focus on informing the public openly and honestly. As we move into the next stage of the pandemic, the roadmap back to lifting restrictions entirely, this becomes even more pertinent. Previous recommendations cover clarity on source information, and adherence to the UKSA Code of Practice. (Paragraph …
12
Conclusion
Para 96
Throughout this inquiry, it has been unclear which Minister and Department should be held to account for ensuring decisions are underpinned by data. Data is collected by multiple Departments and other bodies, and this Committee expects a clear point of accountability for decisions made based on data from these various …
13
Conclusion
Para 97
The Cabinet Office must clearly outline responsibilities for decision making, before the Coronavirus Act is considered for renewal after 25th March 2021. This must include Government transparency and accountability during Covid 19: The data underpinning decisions 49 clear lines of accountability at Departmental and Ministerial level, stating which Minister is …
14
Conclusion
Para 98
The Committee was very disappointed that when the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster declined to appear before the Committee on 4th February, Ministers sent in his place were poorly briefed and unable to answer the Committee’s questions. The ability of Select Committees to hold Ministers to account for decisions …
15
Conclusion
Para 99
This is not the first time that the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has tried to avoid his accountability to this Committee. He has sought to ration his appearances by refusing invitations and setting short time-limits when he does appear. It is remarkable to note that the Prime Minister …
16
Conclusion
Para 100
The Committee expects that the Rt Hon Michael Gove will respond to this report, clearly outlining his understanding of his own responsibilities, and the ways in which he should be held to account by Parliament. The Committee will put further questions to him at his next appearance in front of …
17
Conclusion
Para 101
Written correspondence from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster throughout the course of this inquiry has not answered questions posed by this Committee.
18
Conclusion
Para 102
The Government’s response to this report should state whether each recommendation is accepted or rejected and should state the next steps the Government will take or provide an explanation for those recommendations rejected. It is not sufficient for the Government to “note” a recommendation, as they have done in the …
19
Conclusion
Para 129
The message from the evidence received to this inquiry is frustratingly clear. The Government knew the response would need to be localised and there were local systems in place to manage infectious diseases already (including statutory duties on Public Health Officials) but, instead of allowing local systems to kick into …
20
Conclusion
Para 130
Vital information which might have helped local leaders to respond quickly to outbreaks simply did not move quickly enough through the system. Central Government was initially unwilling to share granular data on the spread of the virus, systems were fragmented, and new testing systems were set up outside of the …
21
Conclusion
Para 131
In May 2020, this Committee heard that local data would be key to the response, enabling local leaders to move quickly, stem small outbreaks and potentially 50 Government transparency and accountability during Covid 19: The data underpinning decisions stop a second wave in its tracks. It is impossible to know …
23
Conclusion
The Department of Health and Social Care, with support from UKSA, should undertake an urgent review of health data systems in England. The review should include consideration of the role of the Department of Health and Social Care in bringing together health data from across the different health bodies. The …
24
Conclusion
Para 143
It is deeply worrying that Ministers were unable to answer basic questions about the decision to lift the first lockdown. Proper Parliamentary scrutiny leads to better decision-making and builds trust. While this report does not comment on whether the Government made the right decision, the Committee expects Ministers to be …
25
Conclusion
Para 144
It is clear to even a casual observer that the decision to lift the first lockdown (and all subsequent lockdowns) must have also taken into consideration a range of factors, including health, economic and educational outcomes. It is, therefore, our judgement that such decisions can only be made by the …
26
Conclusion
Time has passed for Ministers to explain to this Committee why the first lockdown was lifted when it was. It is clear that Ministers are unable to answer that question, and we are sure that this will be picked up by a public inquiry of the kind this Committee recommended …
27
Conclusion
Para 146
This report is not considering the accuracy of decisions, but this Committee has serious concerns about the lack of transparency and clarity in decision-making. The Cabinet Office must outline in its response to this report the range of data and information it will use to lift current and future lockdowns.
28
Conclusion
Para 173
The framework for lockdown and tiering decisions has changed repeatedly throughout this pandemic. While the Committee does not object to the inclusion of new metrics (such as vaccines), changes in the framework to date have not always appeared to reflect new information. This has amounted to a moving of the …
30
Conclusion
Para 175
Lockdown decisions have been met with confusion because the data has been unclear. Data was not initially available for local leaders to understand the tiering decisions and there were no adequate frameworks for escalation and de-escalation in place. While this data has improved, gaps remain.
31
Conclusion
Para 176
The new roadmap must be updated to point to where data can be found under each indicator. The roadmap indicators should be added to the dashboard, with clear links through to the data at lower local authority level underpinning each one.
32
Conclusion
Para 177
The Government did not publish thresholds for tiering decisions which made it hard for local authorities and businesses to plan. This must be changed for the future. The Committee does not believe including thresholds in the roadmap will cause perverse outcomes (as James Bowler suggested in his evidence). It is, …
34
Conclusion
The hospitality and entertainment sectors have not seen sufficient data to underpin decisions relating to their industry. The evidence the Committee received was inconclusive over whether restrictions on hospitality and entertainment sectors were sensible and indeed it is not the purpose of this report to come to a judgement on …