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Select Committee · Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee

The role and status of the Prime Minister’s Office

Status: Closed Opened: 23 Sep 2020 Closed: 27 Sep 2021 4 recommendations 5 conclusions 1 report

The status of the Prime Minister’s Office (“Number 10”) is opaque. The gov.uk website description says “the office helps the Prime Minister to establish and deliver the government’s overall strategy and policy priorities, and to communicate the government’s policies to Parliament, the public and international audiences.” Nominally, it is a part of the Cabinet Office, … Show more

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Reports

1 report
Title HC No. Published Items Response
First Report - The role and status of the Prime Minister’s … HC 67 9 Jun 2021 9 Responded

Recommendations & Conclusions

4 items
1 Conclusion First Report - The role and status of t… Accepted

The lack of a statutory definition of the roles of the Prime Minister or the...

The lack of a statutory definition of the roles of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet in the UK has been reflected in the evolution of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet Office. As Prime Ministers have sought to increase their strategic leadership and policy role, the … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government describes the close working relationship and shared resources between the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet Office, highlighting recent organizational changes such as a new Delivery Unit in No10 and a Government Strategic Management Office.
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6 Conclusion First Report - The role and status of t… Accepted

We have heard little evidence to support the creation of a separate Department for the...

We have heard little evidence to support the creation of a separate Department for the Prime Minister. The current Office of the Prime Minister is too small and much of its workforce too transient to be sensibly treated as a distinct department. The creation of a larger department, bringing together … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government explains the difficulty in delineating the work of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and highlights existing efforts through Outcome Delivery Plans and the Declaration of Government Reform that aim to improve planning, performance, and collective working at the centre of government.
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8 Conclusion First Report - The role and status of t… Accepted

Increasing the direct accountability of the most senior Spads in Number 10 in this way...

Increasing the direct accountability of the most senior Spads in Number 10 in this way would reflect the quasi-executive role that some have assumed. However, to do so would be to accept this quasi-executive role. The principle that “advisers advise, ministers decide” should remain the practice and Ministers, including the … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government states that the existing Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, along with the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers and Model Contract, already provide clear parameters for their roles and ensure ministerial accountability. It asserts that the current Code sufficiently clarifies what Special …
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9 Recommendation First Report - The role and status of t… Accepted

The role of Special Advisers in Number 10 has evolved to such a degree that...

The role of Special Advisers in Number 10 has evolved to such a degree that some have played a quasi-executive role. This is wrong. It undermines both ministerial accountability to Parliament and collective responsibility on the part of Cabinet. Ministers, including the Prime Minister, should remain fully accountable for the … Read more

Government response AI summary
The government asserts that the roles and accountability of Special Advisers are already clearly defined by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and the Code of Conduct, and that Ministers remain fully accountable for their actions within these existing parameters.
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Oral evidence sessions

2 sessions
Date Witnesses
10 Nov 2020 Fiona Hill CBE · Future Resilience Forum, Jonathan Powell, Polly Mackenzie, Prof Sir Geoff Mulgan CBE, Rt Hon Sir John Redwood MP View ↗
13 Oct 2020 Alex Thomas · Institute for Government, Dr Catherine Haddon, Dr Patrick Diamond View ↗

Who gave evidence

8 witnesses
WitnessOrganisationSessions
Alex Thomas · Programme Director Institute for Government 1
Dr Catherine Haddon — 1
Dr Patrick Diamond — 1
Fiona Hill CBE Future Resilience Forum 1
Jonathan Powell — 1
Polly Mackenzie — 1
Prof Sir Geoff Mulgan CBE — 1
Rt Hon Sir John Redwood MP — 1