Tenth Report - Countries at crossroads: UK engagement in Central Asia

There is a genuine interest in Central Asian capitals in greater cooperation between the five countries. Such cooperation plays an important part in defending their independence from large and assertive neighbours such as China and Russia. It can help build on their shared history and cultural proximity to reduce the risk of conflict, not least over dwindling shared resources. The UK is well placed to support this ambition, due to its good standing in Central Asian capitals, highly experienced diplomatic service and convening power at the UN. Consequently, we recommend that: a) a Central Asia 5+UK meeting is held in 2024, with the potential for follow-ups, to better understand how the UK can support regional cooperation. A single issue, such as renewable energy, should be identified for this meeting and result in concrete objectives for action. b) an offer is made by the FCDO of high-quality capacity building for the diplomatic corps of Central Asian countries through a Diplomatic Academy, enhancing the skills required for greater regional and international cooperation, as recommended for other Asian countries in our 2023 report on the Government’s tilt to the Indo- Pacific.

All five Central Asian states are rightly proud of their distinct cultural heritages and histories. Each has unique assets and strengths and fiercely defends its sovereignty. It is important that the UK Government both respects and encourages the independence of the Central Asian countries from their dominating neighbours. The Government should develop tailored approaches to engagement for each one. However, it is also important that the Government remains realistic about the extent to which countries are able to decouple from Russia at the current time and the varying levels of interest in doing so.

If the aspirations of Global Britain are to be realised the Government must live up to them across the breadth of its international relationships. We welcome the ambition of the FCDO’s Europe and Central Asia directorate and the intention to make the most of opportunities open to the UK. However, while missions in Central Asian capitals continue to punch above their weight, achieving diplomatic successes, they have been let down by a lack of commitment from ministers. High- level ministerial engagement with Central Asian governments has been persistently inadequate and is interpreted by our partners as demonstrating a lack of seriousness from Government. We recommend more high-level engagement at Secretary of State and head of Government level over the coming three years with all five countries, including bilateral ministerial visits in both directions to each of them.

We agree that Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine and Moscow’s scramble to secure willing partners is a key concern of the UK and must influence foreign policy toward Central Asia. However, the UK’s engagement with Central Asian countries and the relationships invested in must not succumb, once again, to an Countries at crossroads: UK engagement in Central Asia 55 approach dependent on a single issue such as Afghanistan, Russia or trade. There is now an opportunity to build an enduring relationship with the people of Central Asia. (Paragraph 24) Illicit finance

Illicit finance is an integral component of autocratic rule in Central Asian countries. The UK is a key node for Central Asian capital flight and a leading enabler of its corrupt elites. While the UK is careful not to interfere with the internal affairs of Central Asian countries by challenging the legitimacy of their autocratic regimes, the continuance of an underenforced financial crime prosecution system in the UK constitutes an undeclared interference in the form of facilitation of kleptocratic autocracies.

While there has been progress in developing laws and regulations to curb money laundering in the UK in recent years, enforcement has been inadequate, not least because of a lack of enforcement capacity. State agencies have been under-resourced in comparison with the wealthy individuals they are investigating. We reiterate the recommendation in our 2022 report, ‘The cost of complacency: illicit finance and the war in Ukraine’, that the Government increase resources available to law enforcement authorities, including the National Crime Agency and the Serious Fraud Office, to ensure that they have the capacity to conduct effective actions against those engaged in illicit finance.

We recommend that the Government: a) Offers assistance to each of the Central Asian countries in building their domestic capacity to tackle corruption and money laundering as a contribution to their economic development. b) Encourages the National Crime Agency to send agents to liaise with Central Asian governments in developing cooperation on Unexplained Wealth Orders (UWO) and on bringing back stolen public assets from the UK. c) Ensures that Oversees Territory governments comply with the extended deadline of implementing public registers of beneficial ownership with full and free access to company data, not limited to single entries. There should be no further deadline extensions. d) Imposes Global Anti-Corruption sanctions designations on those whose origins of wealth can be tied to assets they have illegally seized and apply the Global Forum on Asset Recovery’s Principles for Disposition and Transfer of Confiscated Stolen Assets in Corruption Cases (the GFAR Principles). e) Ensures the Transatlantic Taskforce to tackle kleptocracy and Russian sanctions evasion, established in 2022, provides a special focus on sanctions evasion in Central Asia, by ensuring that the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation updates Parliament with a special report on the action taken.

Sanctions evasion by Russia via Central Asian states is a real and significant threat to the international measures against Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine. 56 Countries at crossroads: UK engagement in Central Asia The kleptocratic nature of Central Asian governments and the currently intractable economic ties between Russian and Central Asian economies makes addressing this issue complex. We encourage the Government to lead by example in terms of closing off opportunities for entities involved in sanctions evasion to use the City of London and UK services. We also encourage the Government to simultaneously work with Central Asian economies to reduce the dependence of their economies on that of Russia in the medium- to long-term. (Paragraph 40) Human rights and the environment

Ensuring that the Qosh Tepa canal project does not lead to an environmental and political crisis for countries accessing the waters of the Amu Darya should be a key priority of the UK’s engagement with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

The vulnerability of all five Central Asian countries to climate change is real and severe. Without rapid and concerted action, the consequences of food and water insecurity pose threats to regional and global resilience. It is in our mutual interest to shoulder this burden together. However, due to the uncertainties of future water resources in the region and the risks relating to water availability for hydropower, we suggest that the UK Government encourages focus on wind, solar and energy delivery infrastructure. We recommend that the Government prepares a detailed and fully costed action plan within the next year, drawing on the deep preparatory roadmaps and costings already tabled in the World Bank’s Country Climate and Development Reports when available, for how and where it will engage on climate adaption and mitigation in Central Asian countries, including methane reduction in Turkmenistan. This should include facilitating regional cooperation on water use, a package for collaboration on renewable energy, continued support of conservation projects and details of how the UK will use its convening power to ensure Central Asian states are at the front and centre of international dialogue on these issues.

The relationship between Central Asian governments and their own Uyghur populations is sometimes complex. The persecution of the Muslims in Xinjiang continues with little obvious objection from Central Asian governments. In some cases, Central Asian Governments have failed to provide asylum to Chinese Uyghurs.

The crackdown on human rights defenders as well as the repression of Pamiri culture and Ismaili religion in Gorno-Badakshan in Tajikistan is a particularly concerning example of human rights abuses by the Tajik Government. We recommend that the Government supports the call of the UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues for an impartial and transparent investigation according to international standards and takes steps to prevent tensions and escalation of violence in Gorno-Badakshan. It should raise this situation formally with the Tajik Government bi-laterally and press them to implement recommendations to be made in the Universal Periodic Review follow-up report due in March 2024. We further recommend that the FCDO add Tajikistan to the list of priority countries included in its annual report on human rights. The Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan should be also considered for inclusion. (Paragraph 51) Countries at crossroads: UK engagement in Central Asia 57

We recommend, once more, that the Government implements the recommendations made in the Committee’s report Never Again: The UK’s Responsibility to Act on Atrocities in Xinjiang and Beyond, to focus on supply chains that might be facilitating forced labour in the cotton fields of Turkmenistan. Lessons should be learnt and applied from initiatives that have brought about reforms on cotton picking in Uzbekistan.

Civil society organisations act as a bastion against totalitarianism and a counter to foreign disinformation. We welcome the UK Government’s support of civil society organisations in Central Asia. However, this support needs to be fit for purpose and accessible to those organisations that need it most. We recommend that the reporting requirements for civil society organisations receiving funds from the UK Government are amended so as to provide for an appropriate level of accountability needed and allow the maximum agency in their operations.

The situation for human rights, and the environment for human rights defenders, may be different in different Central Asian countries, but there is evidence of a negative trajectory in all of them. This is a situation which cannot be ignored in the UK’s bilateral relationships. We have not seen evidence to support the rhetoric that agreed universal human rights are at times at odds with cultural heritage. We welcome the work we saw in various Central Asian countries in which the FCDO is engaging effectively on important human rights issues. However, there is still much work to be done to bring consistency to the UK’s messaging on human rights in the region. We recommend that countries included in the Developing Countries Trading Scheme be rigorously assessed against qualifying criteria and that incentives be provided to adhere to them—wishful thinking and vague reference to convention bodies is not enough. The Government should be fully prepared to suspend trading arrangements with countries that fail to meet the conditions and clearly communicate thresholds for this action. Industries closely connected to particular human rights abuses should receive specific attention. UK ambassadors should be key sources of information in this scrutiny. We recommend this action is coordinated with the EU and US. (Paragraph 57) Young people, education and soft power

Education provides one of the most promising opportunities for the UK to be a force for good and to build soft influence in Central Asian countries—contributing to a generation of educated young people who know English and have had exposure to the UK. It is a strategy with potential long-term results but requires concerted and deliberate short- and medium-term action. If the Government is serious about its aspirations to take advantage of interest in the English language, it needs to ensure that it has fully committed and resourced partners through which to achieve them. Currently the ambitions here, and for the further promotion of the English language, rely heavily on funds available to the British Council and the choices it makes in spending them. To improve the effectiveness of its support on language and education, we recommend that the Government: a) Support the establishment of permanent offices for the British Council in Dushanbe and Bishkek—as recommended in the Committee’s 1999 report. The British 58 Countries at crossroads: UK engagement in Central Asia Council must be adequately resourced to take advantage of the opportunities presented to it in a part of the world transitioning from Russian to English as its second language of choice b) Galvanise its support of the creative sector in Central Asian countries by sending a high-level ministerial delegation to the World Conference on Creative Economy in Uzbekistan in 2024. c) Expand the numbers of Chevening scholars from Central Asian countries initially to 40 per year by 2025, and better support the visa application process for students. d) Enhance engagement with the Uzbek Government, and other governments where invited, on education reform.

The Migrant Workers Scheme is highly effective, with benefits for the UK, the workers themselves and the societies they are returning to. We see huge potential for this to be expanded for agricultural workers and other trades. We recommend that the Government reviews its ability to issue visas and provide more options, including application centres closer to the populations that require them. In order to enhance the benefits of the programme we suggest that the Government considers an additional element to provide vocational training as well as cultural experiences for those workers visiting the UK. (Paragraph 67) Security, drugs and violent extremism

The autocratic nature of the governments in the region and the lack of civil society engagement in most countries represents the foremost threat to peace and stability in the region. As recommended elsewhere, the UK Government should continue to prioritise the promotion of meaningful civil society activity and the meeting of human rights obligations as cross-cutting themes in its engagement with the five Central Asian states.

Russian disinformation is a threat to both the UK and its Central Asian partners. The insidious messages spread by the Russian state have a powerful impact on how the older generation views the renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine and the nature of UK engagement in their countries. It also poses a threat to the attempts of Central Asian states to protect their sovereignty, especially in areas with high numbers of ethnic Russians such as in northern Kazakhstan. There is potential for the UK Government to support the governments and civil society in the region in combatting such disinformation.

The Government should proceed with caution when engaging with Central Asian governments on the issue of terrorism and military to military cooperation. The threat of terrorism is often used as an excuse for tightening the authoritarian grip of the state on its own people, opening the door for Chinese surveillance technology with the potential for misuse. Moreover, there is evidence that the threat of terrorism is used to encourage foreign investment in security infrastructure. We encourage the Government’s focus to be on the offer of training to Central Asian armed forces, initially in English language and in the ethical dimensions of conflicts, with the offer of training from the UK’s Islamic advisor to Central Asian militaries. (Paragraph 76) Countries at crossroads: UK engagement in Central Asia 59

Drugs trafficking is a complex issue with close links between the trade and ruling elites as well as organised crime. There are also linkages to funds originating from the drugs trade being channelled through the City of London. The UK cannot shirk its responsibilities: it is not only the source of demand for narcotics but is also complicit in the washing of the illicit gains of the trade. (Paragraph 78) Trade and investment

There are opportunities for increased trade and investment for UK companies in Central Asian states. Policies on investment should be clearer and calibrated to its efforts to curb corruption in-country and in the City of London, its ministerial engagement programme, its ethical principles and work to ensure the resilience of critical supply chains. Ministers should be alive to the opportunity to improve standards of corporate governance through encouraging listing of firms on the London Stock Exchange. We recommend that the Government produces a strategy for its approach to trade and investment in Central Asia. This strategy should be clearly communicated to the business community in the UK and relevant interlocutors in the region. We encourage the involvement of Central Asian civil society in any resulting arrangements to help ensure ethical standards are maintained.

The investment environment in Central Asian states is still far from attractive to many would-be investors. There is much more the UK Government could do to improve the situation. We recommend that capacity building for civil servants and practical assistance in policy and legislation formulation be a central offer made by the UK to Central Asian states. This should be calibrated to complement UK initiatives to support reforms to regional trading infrastructure and policies. (Paragraph 85)

Engagement with Central Asian countries comes with significant potential for mutual benefit. Whether it be in terms of cultural exchange, migrant labour, investment in tech, creative industries, education or critical minerals, the countries of this region have hospitable cultures ready to embrace a closer relationship with the UK. Now is the time to take this opportunity. We can see that the relevant directorate in the FCDO has the ambition for greater engagement but question the extent to which the Government as a whole is ready to enable it.

Governments in the respective Central Asian states are forthright diplomatic actors, fully aware of the importance and potential of their nations and the region in the geopolitical manoeuvrings of this decade. The UK is well positioned to be a reliable long-term partner and critical friend. It can afford to be more assertive and courageous in its engagement with these governments.

It is important that UK engagement in Central Asia is responsive to what the citizens of the various states want and need. Change in any political sphere in Central Asia is unlikely to take place rapidly, and UK influence is more likely to be successful if it is based on a stable relationship of mutual respect, trust and understanding. Relatively inexpensive programmes (such as in education, English language and creative industries) can make a big difference in terms of creating good will amongst 60 Countries at crossroads: UK engagement in Central Asia populations and governments in Central Asian countries. We recommend that the UK Government’s strategy governing engagement with countries in the region be characterised by clear long-term goals with corresponding, fully funded, short- and medium-term actions. We suggest that the Government articulates and implements distinct and consistent principles to govern agreements and cooperation, choosing no- regret investments which can be adjusted in light of any changing political situations on the ground.

The UK Government needs to be clear-eyed and discerning in its engagement with Central Asian governments, all of which fully understand that there is international competition for their cooperation. There are likely to be many issues which the UK will not be able to cooperate on given the nature of governance and human rights records in those countries. We understand that in some cases governments may undertake significant public relations work to portray progress on human rights and corruption, for example, whilst the reality is the opposite. The UK Government should not be satisfied with unsubstantiated assurances that conditions have been met and instead be prepared to robustly enforce adherence to mutually agreed commitments.

Progress on human rights will depend on creative approaches to dialogue that respect the sovereignty and heritage of these countries yet empower them to meet their obligations to internationally-agreed rights. The UK Government should ensure that clear objectives relating to human rights are consistently embedded across its programme of engagement. (Paragraph 90) Countries at crossroads: UK engagement in Central Asia 61