Source · Select Committees · Foreign Affairs Committee
Recommendation 19
19
Accepted
Paragraph: 73
Russian disinformation poses significant threat to Central Asian sovereignty and UK interests
Conclusion
Russian disinformation is a threat to both the UK and its Central Asian partners. The insidious messages spread by the Russian state have a powerful impact on how the older generation views the renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine and the nature of UK engagement in their countries. It also poses a threat to the attempts of Central Asian states to protect their sovereignty, especially in areas with high numbers of ethnic Russians such as in northern Kazakhstan. There is potential for the UK Government to support the governments and civil society in the region in combatting such disinformation.
Government response summary AI-generated
The government agrees, detailing existing FCDO initiatives like the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Directorate’s Resilience Programme and the Information Threats and Influence Directorate, and states they are actively working to extend these programmes to Central Asia to counter Russian disinformation.
Summary of the government's response below — read the verbatim text to verify.
Paragraph Reference:
73
Government Response
Accepted
HM Government · verbatim extract
Accepted
Agree 78. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept 2023 highlighted the importance of Central Asia to the Kremlin’s ambition to restore Russia as a Eurasian and global power. Russia exploits its political, security, economic and societal ties and dependencies in the region and uses the predominance of Russian language traditional media and online media platforms to exert influence. Through these means, Russia is able to promote its views and spread disinformation to oppose progress on democracy, human rights, equality and societal openness. 79. The FCDO is actively responding to this challenge through policy and programmatic approaches. In support of the HMG Integrated Review Refresh’s aim to “tackle the root causes of risks through upstream action overseas, including supporting others to build their own resilience”, the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Directorate’s Resilience Programme (ERP) is specifically aimed at supporting societal resilience to Russian interference in neighbouring countries and works with partner governments, media and civil society to achieve this. We are currently working with our Embassies and international partners in the region to extend the programme to Central Asia. 80. In 2022, the FCDO also established the Information Threats and Influence Directorate (ITID) to challenge disinformation, propaganda and information operations by state actors and to enhance our reach to key audiences globally. EECAD is working closely with ITID to prioritise and develop its activities in Europe and Central Asia on the basis of UK national security interests. This work is heavily focused on building insight into Russian, and others’, information operations, supporting international coordination and responses, providing governmental capacity building and delivering strategic communications to counter hostile states’ malign narratives. Conclusion/recommendation 20: The Government should proceed with caution when engaging with Central Asian governments on the issue of terrorism and military to military cooperation. The threat of terrorism is often used as an excuse for tightening the authoritarian grip of the state on its own people, opening the door for Chinese surveillance technology with the potential for misuse. Moreover, there is evidence that the threat of terrorism is used to encourage foreign investment in security infrastructure. We encourage the Government’s focus to be on the offer of training to Central Asian armed forces, initially in English language and in the ethical dimensions of conflicts, with the offer of training from the UK’s Islamic advisor to Central Asian militaries . Partially Agree 81. Counter Terrorism cooperation and UK Defence Engagement are two separate strands of HMG’s work in Central Asia. The UK Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) engagement in Central Asia, for those states that are constitutionally able to do so, already includes support for the development of UN Peacekeeping capabilities. Examples include our work with Kazakhstan’s Peace Operations Centre (KAZCENT); pre-deployment support for Kazakh UN Mission contingents; specialised training (also for Kyrgyz and Tajik personnel) that supports potential new missions; and a highly successful English language training programme which has trained more than 1300 students across the region over the last six years. However, since a contribution to UN Peacekeeping is not universal to all Central Asian Republics, UK MOD activity will necessarily include facilitating and encouraging wider regional security cooperation, as well as peace-building and conflict mitigation measures. UK Defence in Central Asia is already planning to continue a series of courses / symposia for regional military personnel on the Law of Armed Conflict and ethical dimensions of operations. The team will seek to involve the UK Armed Forces Islamic Religious Advisor in this event. 82. Separately, the UK has developed its counterterrorism relationships in Central Asia since 2021 to help mitigate against the risk of terrorism from Afghanistan. Any cooperation is balanced against the risks identified by the Committee - and we are working with the relevant Ministries to enhance their human rights compliance, including lobbying for partner countries to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture. Conclusion/recommendation 21.
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