Select Committee · Foreign Affairs Committee

The Wagner Group and beyond: proxy Private Military Companies

Status: Closed Opened: 30 Mar 2022 Closed: 26 Apr 2024 19 recommendations 20 conclusions 1 report

This inquiry will explore the challenge posed by Private Military Companies (PMCs) that some states use as proxies in conflict and to destabilise fragile countries. It will also examine how the UK Government is responding. The inquiry will focus particularly on the Wagner Group. Read the call for evidence for more details about the inquiry

Clear

Reports

1 report
Title HC No. Published Items Response
Seventh Report - Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed HC 167 26 Jul 2023 39 Responded

Recommendations & Conclusions

7 items
2 Conclusion Seventh Report - Guns for gold: the Wag… Accepted in Part

Wagner Network is opportunistic but ultimately guided by the Russian state, delivering geopolitical benefits.

The Wagner Network is highly opportunistic and not a straightforward proxy for Russia, even though the Russian state has sometimes directed, facilitated, and supported its military operations, notably in Libya and Ukraine. Even when the network has acted purely in its own economic interests, Russia is likely to have benefited …

Government response. The government partially agrees with the committee's analysis of the Wagner Network, outlining its ongoing use of sanctions to deter and disrupt malign Wagner activity, including recent designations of 13 individuals and businesses involved in Mali, CAR, and Sudan, and …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
17 Recommendation Seventh Report - Guns for gold: the Wag… Accepted in Part

Expedite and strengthen sanctions against all Wagner-linked individuals and entities, closing enforcement gaps.

We recommend that the Government move faster and harder in sanctioning Wagner- linked individuals and entities. Specifically, it should: (Paragraph 58) (a) Sanction all individuals and entities provided in Appendix 1, which the United States and European Union have already targeted but which the UK has not; (b) Consider bringing …

Government response. The government partially agrees, highlighting recent designations of 13 Wagner-linked individuals and businesses in July, some of which were not targeted by the EU or US. It explains that the UK's sanctioning ability depends on building individual cases under its …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
19 Recommendation Seventh Report - Guns for gold: the Wag… Accepted in Part

Prioritise introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals, collaborating with Turkey.

We further recommend that the Government prioritises introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals as a likely deterrent to involvement in the network, in particular working with Turkey, a popular holiday destination for Russians.

Government response. The government partially agrees that travel bans have a deterrent effect but states that UK sanctions have limited impact on travel to Turkey. They commit to continuing discussions with international partners on possible sanctions or travel bans they could adopt.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
21 Recommendation Seventh Report - Guns for gold: the Wag… Accepted in Part

Urgently assess compiled Wagner-linked names and impose sanctions if thresholds are met.

We implore the Government to urgently assess these names and impose sanctions on these individuals and entities if the necessary threshold is met.

Government response. The government partially agrees, highlighting existing sanctions against the Wagner Group and its former leader, and recent designations of 13 individuals and businesses. It notes the limitations of its sanctions regime and will consider the committee's provided analysis for further …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
24 Recommendation Seventh Report - Guns for gold: the Wag… Accepted in Part

Declassify and share intelligence on Wagner Network's destabilising effects with engaging countries.

As the Government improves its intelligence on the network, it should declassify it strategically and share it with countries that are considering engaging with the Wagner Network, to demonstrate the organisation’s destabilising effects, following the lead of the United States administration.

Government response. The government partially agrees on the potential value of declassification and sharing intelligence but notes it's not always possible due to risks. It states that it has already stepped up communication channels to expose Wagner's activities to demonstrate its destabilising …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
30 Recommendation Seventh Report - Guns for gold: the Wag… Accepted in Part

Restrict flow of arms to Wagner Network and share intelligence with host governments.

We recommend that the UK Government takes advantage of the current uncertainty and seeks to disrupt the Wagner Network. In particular, at a moment when its usual supply channels from the Russian Ministry of Defence are in doubt, the Government should do all within its power to restrict the flow …

Government response. The government agrees to disrupt the Wagner Network, stating it has increased efforts in communications, assessment, and policy coordination, and will consider further sanctions designations and continue work with partners to improve sanctions enforcement and counter illicit finance.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
37 Recommendation Seventh Report - Guns for gold: the Wag… Accepted in Part

Set out steps to strengthen international legal framework governing PMCs and accountability.

In its response, the Government should set out the steps that it will take to strengthen the international legal framework governing PMCs’ activities, drawing on the UK’s deep legal expertise. Its response should address the following aspects: (Paragraph 88) 58 Guns for gold: the Wagner Network exposed (i) how the …

Government response. The government partially accepts the recommendation, agreeing on the need for clarification on definitions and actively participating in UN discussions to develop a workable framework, though rejecting the UN Mercenaries Convention in its current form. It fully agrees on improving …
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Oral evidence sessions

3 sessions
Date Witnesses
6 Feb 2023 Ben Fender OBE · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Hazel Cameron · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, Leo Docherty · Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office View ↗
1 Nov 2022 Jason McCue · McCue Jury & Partners, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Professor Jason Blazakis · Middlebury Institute of International Studies View ↗
19 Apr 2022 Christo Grozev · Bellingcat, Dr Sean McFate · Atlantic Council, Dr Sorcha MacLeod · University of Copenhagen View ↗

Correspondence

1 letter
DateDirectionTitle
15 Mar 2023 Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) followi…