The UK and Iran

In 2019, the FCDO commissioned a review into the department’s handling of complex consular cases. The review was conducted by Dame Judith MacGregor and focused on how the department balances the needs of the individual with the needs of the bilateral relationship, and on the process by which families are informed of actions taken while sensitive details are protected.124 The review makes several important recommendations, including the establishment of a task force approach to properly handle the most sensitive cases and determine the parameters of Ministerial involvement.125 Despite being completed in June 2019, the review was not made public until it was deposited in the House of Commons Library in November. In his covering letter, Nigel Adams, the Minister of State for Asia, endorsed the review’s key findings and recommendations and noted that implementation was in progress.126

The MacGregor Review offers the single best insight into the changes which need to be made within the FCDO to better equip it to deal with complex ‘consular cases’. We welcome the Government’s commitment to its recommendations but are concerned that this undertaking comes over a year since the review was finalised. We recommend that the FCDO continues to implement the recommendations of the MacGregor Review and provides the Committee with annual updates on its progress. Strategy to secure release of detainees

In its written evidence, the FCDO made clear that the strategies employed to secure the release of detained nationals vary by case.127 The intricacies of the negotiations and representations conducted by the FCDO in the pursuit of justice for detainees are rightly withheld from public consumption, but the FCDO noted that it makes requests for consular access to detained nationals where it is not automatically provided, such as with dual nationals.128 Another tactic has been to accord the detainee diplomatic protection, 122 Q22 [Charlie Loudon] 123 Q22 [Charlie Loudon] 124 Correspondence from the Minister of State for Asia, 19 November 2020 125 Review of Complex Consular Cases, House of Commons Library 126 Correspondence from the Minister of State for Asia, 19 November 2020 127 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UKI0031), para 18 128 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UKI0031), para 18 22 No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran although this has been dismissed by Iran when used for dual nationals.129130 Tulip Siddiq MP noted that despite the FCDO’s efforts to negotiate the release of Nazanin Zaghari- Ratcliffe, no real progress was made until covid-19 enabled her to be released on furlough.131 The limited range of options available was highlighted in October 2019 by Dr Andrew Murrison, the then Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, who stated: […] it is a sad fact that the tools in our toolbox are limited. What we can do is continue to make it clear to our interlocutors that this is not acceptable, right or proper, and that if Iran wants to restore its reputation, the early release of Nazanin and other dual nationals will go a very long way.132

The FCDO’s current approach to consular disputes is clearly not working. The Key Performance Indicator remains the unconditional and timely release of detained nationals. In this, the range of tools on offer is entirely ineffectual and requires revision. The FCDO needs to acknowledge this and use it as a basis for working with allies to develop an effective strategy which will adequately safeguard British citizens. ‘Hostages’, not ‘consular cases’

The principal part of international law concerned with hostage taking is the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which came into force in 1983. Article 1 of the convention defines the offence of hostage taking.133 Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the “hostage”) in order to compel a third party, namely a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or judicial person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking hostages (“hostage-taking”) within the means of this Convention.

The FCDO has rightly stated that the detention of British and dual nationals by Iran falls outside the parameters of the Convention which was clearly designed for the specific purpose of combatting individual hostage-takers, rather than state-backed actors.134 Nevertheless, witnesses understandably drew parallels between the motives of individual hostage-takers, as defined by the Convention, and those which have been expressed by members of the Iranian executive. Janet Daby MP argued that the case of Anoosheh Ashoori seemed commensurate with Iran’s strategy of “hostage diplomacy”135 and Tulip Siddiq MP additionally noted that Mrs Zaghari-Ratcliffe has repeatedly been told that her unlawful detention since 2016 is linked to the UK’s historic International Military Services (IMS) debt owed to Iran.136 Indeed, Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s husband has referred to her as a hostage, as has her legal team.137 The FCDO has been conspicuous in its reluctance 129 Foreign Secretary affords Nazanin Zaghari Ratcliffe diplomatic protection, FCO, 7 March 2019 130 Iran rejects UK claim of diplomatic status for Zaghari-Ratcliffe, The Guardian, Patrick Wintour, 8 March 2019 131 Tulip Siddiq MP (UKI0032), para 25 132 HC Deb, 7 October 2019, col 1570 133 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, United Nations, accessed 8 September 2020 134 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UKI0031), para 18 135 Janet Daby MP (UKI0030), para 5.1 136 Tulip Siddiq MP (UKI0032), paras 12–13 137 Q18 [Charlie Loudon]; Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe ‘held hostage’ by Iran, says husband, The Guardian, Patrick Wintour, 9 September 2020 No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran 23 to refer to Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe as a hostage, and a spokesperson for the then Prime Minister Theresa May stated in 2017 that the IMS debt was not being linked with efforts to secure Zaghari-Ratcliffe’s release.138

Witnesses involved with some of the higher-profile detentions of UK and dual nationals by Iran were keen to highlight the benefits which might be gained in defining the term. Charlie Loudon from REDRESS, which has acted on behalf of Nazanin Zaghari- Ratcliffe since 2016, commented on the issue of ‘State Hostage Taking’: The US has been successful in securing releases despite having a particularly poor relationship with Iran. The US has a stronger legal framework, having recently enacted the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage- Taking Accountability Act, which empowers the federal government to challenge hostage taking of its nationals. The US also has more targeted leadership structures to tackle this issue, including a Special Presidential Envoy on Hostage Affairs and a Hostage Fusion Cell for coordinating across government sectors. The UK does not currently have such structures. The US government has also been willing to use the term ‘hostage taking’. This is in contrast to the UK, which strictly refers to and treats state held hostages as regular ‘consular cases.’139

Charlie Loudon was measured in characterising other countries as more or less successful than the UK and noted that while that might appear to be an accurate assessment, “There is a lack of authoritative publicly available data on the different success rates”.140 Other witnesses were similarly sceptical that the US or Australia should be unequivocally characterised as ‘more successful’ than the UK. Dr Vakil noted that the US had been successful at negotiating the release of US nationals, but not dual nationals, and that Australia still had unresolved cases.141 Dr Van Engeland similarly emphasised that “there are still Australian, US and French citizens detained” but nonetheless described it as “striking” that the UK had recently seen several of its citizens and dual nationals detained.142

Regardless of international comparisons, Charlie Loudon noted that “[a]vailable evidence gives a clear indication that the UK’s method has not worked so far, and that the UK needs to rethink its approach and work with other countries to better address Iranian hostage taking”.143 The sentiment was shared by Dr Vakil who stated that the UK “should be more proactive and find opportunities to negotiate with Iran specifically delinking the issue of dual nationals from other security challenges”.144 As a specific remedy, Tulip Siddiq MP suggested that These problems are all the more likely at a time when authoritarianism is on the rise around the world and international law is increasingly being 138 Britain denies £400 million debt to Iran linked to bid to free jailed aid worker, Reuters, Guy Faulconbridge, Paul Sandle, 16 November 2017 139 Q23 [Charlie Loudon] 140 Q23 [Charlie Loudon] 141 Q23 [Dr Sanam Vakil] 142 Q23 [Dr Anicée Van Engeland] 143 Q23 [Charlie Loudon] 144 Q23 [Dr Sanam Vakil] 24 No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran challenged […] HMG should be using its role on the world stage to forcefully call-out state hostage-taking and push for international agreements to curtail it.145

The framework within which action over arbitrarily detained nationals can be taken is severely limited. The UK is not alone in not officially recognising the phenomenon of ‘State Hostage Taking’, but the FCDO should acknowledge that Iran’s transactional approach to diplomacy typifies a growing challenge democracies face when engaging with some autocracies. Calling ‘State Hostage Taking’ out for what it is and taking the lead in shaping a united international response would help yield additional tools to counter this behaviour. The FCDO should use the UK’s position at the UN to establish an ad hoc Committee to draft a complementary stand-alone addition to the 1979 Hostages Convention which defines ‘State Hostage Taking’ and prohibits its practice. Human rights sanctions

Our predecessor Committee reported on the UK’s sanctions policy after Brexit and explored the possibility of using Magnitsky sanctions against human rights abusers.146 The Foreign Secretary announced the UK’s first round of Magnitsky-style sanctions in July 2020 against nationals of Russia, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar and North Korea.147 Iran was notable by its absence, particularly as the international community is aware of many individuals within Iran known to have committed human rights abuses.148 Behnam Ben Taleblu told us that Global Magnitsky sanctions can and should be used to punish those engaged in human rights violations or gross acts of government corruption. […] The exact scale and scope of the penalty can be highlighted when being issued, and should remain in place until the behavior–in this case the detention of UK nationals–ceases by the relevant authority.149 The assessment was shared by Charlie Loudon who noted that “Magnitsky sanctions are well-suited to supporting behavioural change”.150 However, Dr Van Engeland took the opposite view, noting that sanctions could increase scrutiny on human rights but would be resented by already heavily sanctioned Iranians who would not draw an obvious link between sanctions and detained British and dual nationals.151 The Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, James Cleverly MP, noted in correspondence to us in August that the FCDO would “continue to designate under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations” and stressed the importance of ensuring “that all designations are underlined by a robust evidence case, ensuring that legal tests and policy objectives are met” but would not be drawn further.152 145 Tulip Siddiq MP (UKI0032), para 65 146 Foreign Affairs Committee, Seventeenth Report of Session 2017–19, Fragmented and incoherent: the UK’s sanctions policy, HC 1703, paras 11–19 147 UK announces first sanctions under new global human rights regime, FCO, 6 July 2020 148 Report to Congress List of Persons W

Iran’s human rights record and selective commitment to upholding international law is a threat to the rules based international system generally, and a key challenge faced when aiding detained nationals specifically. The FCDO has admirably used international fora to exert pressure on Iran and to encourage a behaviour change, but a country which does not respect international norms will never be embarrassed into compliance. The time has come for a more robust approach. For its next round of Magnitsky-style sanctions, we recommend that the FCDO prioritises building watertight cases against human rights abusers based in Iran or acting for it abroad, including those involved in the arbitrary detention of UK and dual nationals. 26 No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran 4 Conclusions

The UK has been most successful at securing its objectives vis-à-vis Iran when it has committed to a long-term strategy alongside international partners. However, the UK’s relationship with Iran is bigger than Iran’s nuclear violations, malign regional activity, or human rights abuses. It is also a relationship between cultures and peoples and the story of their shared interests. Consequently, the FCDO should be prepared to accept that the UK’s existing relationships with the E3 and US, while important, cannot offer the fullest structure for diplomacy. The FCDO needs a renewed focus on understanding the motivations behind the actions of the Iranian State, and a clear effort needs to be made to differentiate between the Iranian State and the Iranian people.

Over the course of millennia, Persians have made significant contributions regionally and internationally to science, culture, poetry, maths and philosophy. The UK’s difficult relationship with the Islamic Republic has overshadowed its much longer relationship with Persia and the common ground values Britons share with Iranians. While it remains the right of the Iranian people to determine how they are governed, it equally remains the responsibility of the UK to call the Iranian State out for its human rights abuses where it falls short of international expectations.

Engagement with Iran should not be an end goal in and of itself. Rather, engagement should seek to encourage Iran to play a positive, constructive and predictable role as a regional power, which uses international norms, respect for human rights and the rule of law as the basis for its actions. At its heart, a strategy must send a clear message: that Iran’s destabilising activities are unacceptable because they adversely impact the region and its peoples, but that when the time comes, the door is open to diplomacy. No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran 27 Conclusions and recommendations Future of the Nuclear Deal

Disunity in addressing the nuclear issue, especially between the US and the E3, has not served the UK’s interests. Instead, it has disincentivised Iranian engagement with the West and presented an opportunity for Russia and China to pursue their respective agendas in the Middle East. In the absence of decisive leadership and multilateral cooperation going forward, there is a risk that Iran will turn further to Russia and China for the economic relief they can each offer at a knock-down political price.

A significant weakness of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 was its failure to prohibit Iran from developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. In a treaty fundamentally designed to deliver non-proliferation assurances, it is entirely reasonable that the JCPOA should place a binding restriction on Iran from developing such missiles.

Iran could be more forthcoming when granting access for IAEA inspections. Additionally, Iran has publicly stated it would not allow inspection of military sites, despite such visits falling within the terms of the JCPOA. These actions undermine political confidence in the nuclear deal, so additional penalties or provisions could be introduced to encourage a behaviour change.

Annex I, Section Q, paragraph 78 of the JCPOA does not set out a definitive timetable for action in a potential period between non-compliance with the Joint Commission and the snapback of sanctions. This lack of clarity has proved contentious. Clarifying this section of the agreement would help to satisfy all parties that impediments to the IAEA’s access can be addressed within defined and reasonable parameter and could also serve as a useful confidence building measure.

Given the historically covert nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, the lack of good faith it has shown in supporting the free and timely inspection efforts of the IAEA, and recent evidence indicating the military dimensions to its nuclear efforts of the early 2000s, we find it hard to envisage a time when an Iranian nuclear programme will have widespread support in the region.

We agree with the Foreign Secretary that the nuclear deal is imperfect, but Iran’s non-compliance over the last year has indicated what the nuclear proliferation implications of terminating the JCPOA without a viable replacement might be. A more satisfactory arrangement for all signatories is within reach but is not guaranteed. We recommend that the Government takes the lead amongst the E3 in discussions in the New Year with the incoming US Administration on the future of the JCPOA. It should aim to bring all parties back into full compliance and address the concerns of Gulf allies initially overlooked by the JCPOA, specifically; i) Ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads; ii) Sunset clauses; 28 No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran iii) Timely and public compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency inspection requests; and iv) International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of undeclared nuclear sites and material. The Government should be prepared to work with European and American partners to invoke the snapback of sanctions if full compliance is not achieved.

We agree with the Government that its long-term goal should be to replace the JCPOA with a broader agreement which additionally addresses regional security. This must learn the lessons from last time and be held in consultation with our allies in the region, not just in Europe and the US.

The UK’s history in the region, and relationship with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, make it uniquely placed amongst the signatories of the JCPOA to build regional and international consensus on how to meet the challenges posed by Iran’s destabilising activity. This should form a core part of any strategy going forward to improve upon the JCPOA.

We recommend that, in the aftermath of the Integrated Review, the Foreign Secretary makes a statement to the House to outline specifically what a replacement to the JCPOA should seek to achieve and over what timeframe. In so doing, the Foreign Secretary should address i) exactly what the UK wants to achieve from broader engagement with Iran, ii) which allies can facilitate and complement those discussions, and iii) how such an agreement will fit within the framework of the UK’s long-term strategic goals. (Paragraph 37) Human Rights

BBC Persian promotes the shared interests of free people around the world. The treatment of its staff and their families by Iran is abhorrent, and the Government is right to continue to call out these abuses in international fora.

Iran will choose to uphold those parts of international law which suit the tenets or strategic goals of the Islamic Republic while disregarding the remainder, often at the expense of the Iranian people. The FCDO has made commendable efforts to tackle Iran’s human rights abuses and raise the plight of victims of Iranian oppression through international fora. These efforts should be complemented through direct diplomacy with President Rouhani to encourage him to place human rights prominently on his domestic agenda. In particular, the freedom of BBC Persian staff to provide free quality journalism is of vital importance to Persian speakers throughout the region and should be prioritised.

The Iranian people are the victims of the poor choices made by the Iranian state, yet they are too often a secondary consideration. The UK’s strategy going forward should rebalance this oversight. For the UK-Iran relationship to be meaningful and mutually beneficial, the UK must invest in strengthening cultural ties, fostering exchanges, and building upon common values shared with the Iranian people. (Paragraph 46) No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran 29

We are satisfied that the actions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp meet the criteria for proscription in the Terrorism Act 2000 and see proscription as a logical extension of the existing restrictions placed on members of the IRGC by the EU’s sanctions regime. The IRGC’s philosophy and malign actions within Iran and across the region run counter to the interests of the UK and those of the Iranian people. We recommend that the Foreign Secretary works with the Home Secretary to assess the available information on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with a view to laying an order before Parliament to proscribe the IRGC in its entirety.

The MacGregor Review offers the single best insight into the changes which need to be made within the FCDO to better equip it to deal with complex ‘consular cases’. We welcome the Government’s commitment to its recommendations but are concerned that this undertaking comes over a year since the review was finalised. We recommend that the FCDO continues to implement the recommendations of the MacGregor Review and provides the Committee with annual updates on its progress.

The FCDO’s current approach to consular disputes is clearly not working. The Key Performance Indicator remains the unconditional and timely release of detained nationals. In this, the range of tools on offer is entirely ineffectual and requires revision. The FCDO needs to acknowledge this and use it as a basis for working with allies to develop an effective strategy which will adequately safeguard British citizens.

The framework within which action over arbitrarily detained nationals can be taken is severely limited. The UK is not alone in not officially recognising the phenomenon of ‘State Hostage Taking’, but the FCDO should acknowledge that Iran’s transactional approach to diplomacy typifies a growing challenge democracies face when engaging with some autocracies. Calling ‘State Hostage Taking’ out for what it is and taking the lead in shaping a united international response would help yield additional tools to counter this behaviour. The FCDO should use the UK’s position at the UN to establish an ad hoc Committee to draft a complementary stand-alone addition to the 1979 Hostages Convention which defines ‘State Hostage Taking’ and prohibits its practice.

Iran’s human rights record and selective commitment to upholding international law is a threat to the rules based international system generally, and a key challenge faced when aiding detained nationals specifically. The FCDO has admirably used international fora to exert pressure on Iran and to encourage a behaviour change, but a country which does not respect international norms will never be embarrassed into compliance. The time has come for a more robust approach. For its next round of Magnitsky-style sanctions, we recommend that the FCDO prioritises building watertight cases against human rights abusers based in Iran or acting for it abroad, including those involved in the arbitrary detention of UK and dual nationals. (Paragraph 65) 30 No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran Conclusions

The UK has been most successful at securing its objectives vis-à-vis Iran when it has committed to a long-term strategy alongside international partners. However, the UK’s relationship with Iran is bigger than Iran’s nuclear violations, malign regional activity, or human rights abuses. It is also a relationship between cultures and peoples and the story of their shared interests. Consequently, the FCDO should be prepared to accept that the UK’s existing relationships with the E3 and US, while important, cannot offer the fullest structure for diplomacy. The FCDO needs a renewed focus on understanding the motivations behind the actions of the Iranian State, and a clear effort needs to be made to differentiate between the Iranian State and the Iranian people.

Over the course of millennia, Persians have made significant contributions regionally and internationally to science, culture, poetry, maths and philosophy. The UK’s difficult relationship with the Islamic Republic has overshadowed its much longer relationship with Persia and the common ground values Britons share with Iranians. While it remains the right of the Iranian people to determine how they are governed, it equally remains the responsibility of the UK to call the Iranian State out for its human rights abuses where it falls short of international expectations.

Engagement with Iran should not be an end goal in and of itself. Rather, engagement should seek to encourage Iran to play a positive, constructive and predictable role as a regional power, which uses international norms, respect for human rights and the rule of law as the basis for its actions. At its heart, a strategy must send a clear message: that Iran’s destabilising activities are unacceptable because they adversely impact the region and its peoples, but that when the time comes, the door is open to diplomacy. (Paragraph 68) No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran 31