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Fifth report: No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran

Foreign Affairs Committee HC 415 Published 16 December 2020
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55

The MacGregor Review offers the single best insight into the changes which need to be...

Recommendation
The MacGregor Review offers the single best insight into the changes which need to be made within the FCDO to better equip it to deal with complex ‘consular cases’. We welcome the Government’s commitment to its recommendations but are concerned … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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65

Iran’s human rights record and selective commitment to upholding international law is a threat to...

Recommendation
Iran’s human rights record and selective commitment to upholding international law is a threat to the rules based international system generally, and a key challenge faced when aiding detained nationals specifically. The FCDO has admirably used international fora to exert … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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6
Para 25

We agree with the Foreign Secretary that the nuclear deal is imperfect, but Iran’s non-compliance...

Recommendation
We agree with the Foreign Secretary that the nuclear deal is imperfect, but Iran’s non-compliance over the last year has indicated what the nuclear proliferation implications of terminating the JCPOA without a viable replacement might be. A more satisfactory arrangement … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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9

We recommend that, in the aftermath of the Integrated Review, the Foreign Secretary makes a...

Recommendation
We recommend that, in the aftermath of the Integrated Review, the Foreign Secretary makes a statement to the House to outline specifically what a replacement to the JCPOA should seek to achieve and over what timeframe. In so doing, the … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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13
Para 50

We are satisfied that the actions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp meet the criteria...

Recommendation
We are satisfied that the actions of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp meet the criteria for proscription in the Terrorism Act 2000 and see proscription as a logical extension of the existing restrictions placed on members of the IRGC by … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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14
Para 55

The MacGregor Review offers the single best insight into the changes which need to be...

Recommendation
The MacGregor Review offers the single best insight into the changes which need to be made within the FCDO to better equip it to deal with complex ‘consular cases’. We welcome the Government’s commitment to its recommendations but are concerned … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
View Details →
17

Iran’s human rights record and selective commitment to upholding international law is a threat to...

Recommendation
Iran’s human rights record and selective commitment to upholding international law is a threat to the rules based international system generally, and a key challenge faced when aiding detained nationals specifically. The FCDO has admirably used international fora to exert … Read more
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Conclusions (28)

Observations and findings
54 Conclusion
In 2019, the FCDO commissioned a review into the department’s handling of complex consular cases. The review was conducted by Dame Judith MacGregor and focused on how the department balances the needs of the individual with the needs of the bilateral relationship, and on the process by which families are …
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56 Conclusion
In its written evidence, the FCDO made clear that the strategies employed to secure the release of detained nationals vary by case.127 The intricacies of the negotiations and representations conducted by the FCDO in the pursuit of justice for detainees are rightly withheld from public consumption, but the FCDO noted …
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57 Conclusion
The FCDO’s current approach to consular disputes is clearly not working. The Key Performance Indicator remains the unconditional and timely release of detained nationals. In this, the range of tools on offer is entirely ineffectual and requires revision. The FCDO needs to acknowledge this and use it as a basis …
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58 Conclusion
The principal part of international law concerned with hostage taking is the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which came into force in 1983. Article 1 of the convention defines the offence of hostage taking.133 Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to …
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59 Conclusion
The FCDO has rightly stated that the detention of British and dual nationals by Iran falls outside the parameters of the Convention which was clearly designed for the specific purpose of combatting individual hostage-takers, rather than state-backed actors.134 Nevertheless, witnesses understandably drew parallels between the motives of individual hostage-takers, as …
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60 Conclusion
Witnesses involved with some of the higher-profile detentions of UK and dual nationals by Iran were keen to highlight the benefits which might be gained in defining the term. Charlie Loudon from REDRESS, which has acted on behalf of Nazanin Zaghari- Ratcliffe since 2016, commented on the issue of ‘State …
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61 Conclusion
Charlie Loudon was measured in characterising other countries as more or less successful than the UK and noted that while that might appear to be an accurate assessment, “There is a lack of authoritative publicly available data on the different success rates”.140 Other witnesses were similarly sceptical that the US …
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62 Conclusion
Regardless of international comparisons, Charlie Loudon noted that “[a]vailable evidence gives a clear indication that the UK’s method has not worked so far, and that the UK needs to rethink its approach and work with other countries to better address Iranian hostage taking”.143 The sentiment was shared by Dr Vakil …
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63 Conclusion
The framework within which action over arbitrarily detained nationals can be taken is severely limited. The UK is not alone in not officially recognising the phenomenon of ‘State Hostage Taking’, but the FCDO should acknowledge that Iran’s transactional approach to diplomacy typifies a growing challenge democracies face when engaging with …
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64 Conclusion
Our predecessor Committee reported on the UK’s sanctions policy after Brexit and explored the possibility of using Magnitsky sanctions against human rights abusers.146 The Foreign Secretary announced the UK’s first round of Magnitsky-style sanctions in July 2020 against nationals of Russia, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar and North Korea.147 Iran was notable …
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66 Conclusion
The UK has been most successful at securing its objectives vis-à-vis Iran when it has committed to a long-term strategy alongside international partners. However, the UK’s relationship with Iran is bigger than Iran’s nuclear violations, malign regional activity, or human rights abuses. It is also a relationship between cultures and …
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67 Conclusion
Over the course of millennia, Persians have made significant contributions regionally and internationally to science, culture, poetry, maths and philosophy. The UK’s difficult relationship with the Islamic Republic has overshadowed its much longer relationship with Persia and the common ground values Britons share with Iranians. While it remains the right …
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68 Conclusion
Engagement with Iran should not be an end goal in and of itself. Rather, engagement should seek to encourage Iran to play a positive, constructive and predictable role as a regional power, which uses international norms, respect for human rights and the rule of law as the basis for its …
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1 Conclusion
Para 15
Disunity in addressing the nuclear issue, especially between the US and the E3, has not served the UK’s interests. Instead, it has disincentivised Iranian engagement with the West and presented an opportunity for Russia and China to pursue their respective agendas in the Middle East. In the absence of decisive …
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2 Conclusion
Para 19
A significant weakness of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 was its failure to prohibit Iran from developing ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads. In a treaty fundamentally designed to deliver non-proliferation assurances, it is entirely reasonable that the JCPOA should place a binding restriction on Iran from developing such …
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3 Conclusion
Para 21
Iran could be more forthcoming when granting access for IAEA inspections. Additionally, Iran has publicly stated it would not allow inspection of military sites, despite such visits falling within the terms of the JCPOA. These actions undermine political confidence in the nuclear deal, so additional penalties or provisions could be …
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4 Conclusion
Para 22
Annex I, Section Q, paragraph 78 of the JCPOA does not set out a definitive timetable for action in a potential period between non-compliance with the Joint Commission and the snapback of sanctions. This lack of clarity has proved contentious. Clarifying this section of the agreement would help to satisfy …
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5 Conclusion
Para 24
Given the historically covert nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, the lack of good faith it has shown in supporting the free and timely inspection efforts of the IAEA, and recent evidence indicating the military dimensions to its nuclear efforts of the early 2000s, we find it hard to envisage a …
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7 Conclusion
Para 35
We agree with the Government that its long-term goal should be to replace the JCPOA with a broader agreement which additionally addresses regional security. This must learn the lessons from last time and be held in consultation with our allies in the region, not just in Europe and the US.
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8 Conclusion
Para 36
The UK’s history in the region, and relationship with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, make it uniquely placed amongst the signatories of the JCPOA to build regional and international consensus on how to meet the challenges posed by Iran’s destabilising activity. This should form a core part …
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10 Conclusion
Para 41
BBC Persian promotes the shared interests of free people around the world. The treatment of its staff and their families by Iran is abhorrent, and the Government is right to continue to call out these abuses in international fora.
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11 Conclusion
Para 45
Iran will choose to uphold those parts of international law which suit the tenets or strategic goals of the Islamic Republic while disregarding the remainder, often at the expense of the Iranian people. The FCDO has made commendable efforts to tackle Iran’s human rights abuses and raise the plight of …
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12 Conclusion
The Iranian people are the victims of the poor choices made by the Iranian state, yet they are too often a secondary consideration. The UK’s strategy going forward should rebalance this oversight. For the UK-Iran relationship to be meaningful and mutually beneficial, the UK must invest in strengthening cultural ties, …
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15 Conclusion
Para 57
The FCDO’s current approach to consular disputes is clearly not working. The Key Performance Indicator remains the unconditional and timely release of detained nationals. In this, the range of tools on offer is entirely ineffectual and requires revision. The FCDO needs to acknowledge this and use it as a basis …
View Details →
16 Conclusion
Para 63
The framework within which action over arbitrarily detained nationals can be taken is severely limited. The UK is not alone in not officially recognising the phenomenon of ‘State Hostage Taking’, but the FCDO should acknowledge that Iran’s transactional approach to diplomacy typifies a growing challenge democracies face when engaging with …
View Details →
18 Conclusion
Para 66
The UK has been most successful at securing its objectives vis-à-vis Iran when it has committed to a long-term strategy alongside international partners. However, the UK’s relationship with Iran is bigger than Iran’s nuclear violations, malign regional activity, or human rights abuses. It is also a relationship between cultures and …
View Details →
19 Conclusion
Para 67
Over the course of millennia, Persians have made significant contributions regionally and internationally to science, culture, poetry, maths and philosophy. The UK’s difficult relationship with the Islamic Republic has overshadowed its much longer relationship with Persia and the common ground values Britons share with Iranians. While it remains the right …
View Details →
20 Conclusion
Engagement with Iran should not be an end goal in and of itself. Rather, engagement should seek to encourage Iran to play a positive, constructive and predictable role as a regional power, which uses international norms, respect for human rights and the rule of law as the basis for its …
View Details →