Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons learned to date

The government explicitly states it does not accept the committee's conclusion that COBR's operation was not well-suited to a pandemic response and had unreliable confidentiality.

The government rejects the premise that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat had inadequate resources, stating that a range of existing capabilities, including the CCS itself, already identify and assess current and future risks effectively.

The government rejects the recommendation, stating a dedicated standing capability is not needed as a range of existing complementary capabilities already identify and assess future risks.

The government rejects the committee's conclusion, arguing it already has a range of complementary standing capabilities for identifying and assessing risks, including horizon scanning, the Joint Intelligence Organisation, the National Situation Centre, and the NSRA process, as well as future work by GO-Science to build futures capability.

The government rejects the committee's implied criticism by asserting that its messaging early in the pandemic was strong and effective in achieving public compliance, without addressing the specific concerns about inconsistency after the first wave or the negative impact of certain events on public trust.

The government implicitly rejects the committee's criticism of the 'flattening the curve' policy, stating that its decision-making was always informed by science and evidence and that quick and decisive action was taken when needed.

The government implicitly rejects the committee's conclusion about the lack of challenge to scientific advice and the inconsistency of non-pharmaceutical interventions. It asserts that NPIs were key, decision-making was evidence-based, and quick decisive action was taken.

The government rejects the committee's assessment of COBR's suitability and confidentiality, defending its role as the crisis management forum, its culture of confidentiality, and rigorous information security procedures.

The government rejected the recommendation, stating that a range of complementary standing capabilities already exist within government (e.g., CCS, JIO, NSC, NSRA, GO-Science) to identify and assess future risks.

The government rejects the recommendation, stating that existing protocols for Armed Forces support (MACA process) are fit for purpose, and highlighting the extensive support provided during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The government's response implicitly rejects the committee's finding of 'wrong policy' and 'groupthink,' asserting that its decision-making was always informed by science and evidence and that it took quick, decisive action.

The government implicitly rejects the committee's critique of the gradual implementation of the 'flattening the curve' policy, asserting instead that its decisions were informed by science and evidence, and it took quick and decisive action.