Recommendations & Conclusions
17 items
60
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
The operation of COBR was not well-suited to the modern demands of a pandemic response. It is especially concerning that its culture of confidentiality was considered by some to be so unreliable that alternative meetings were arranged that could command greater confidentiality among participants.
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The operation of COBR was not well-suited to the modern demands of a pandemic response. It is especially concerning that its culture of confidentiality was considered by some to be so unreliable that alternative meetings were arranged that could command greater confidentiality among participants.
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Government response AI summary
The government explicitly states it does not accept the committee's conclusion that COBR's operation was not well-suited to a pandemic response and had unreliable confidentiality.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
61
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat did not have adequate resources to maintain a substantial standing capability to survey the development of potential threats, and it had a limited reach into the range of Government departments required to respond to a pandemic. The experience has been that this investment in resilience is …
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The Civil Contingencies Secretariat did not have adequate resources to maintain a substantial standing capability to survey the development of potential threats, and it had a limited reach into the range of Government departments required to respond to a pandemic. The experience has been that this investment in resilience is at risk of being trumped by the day-to-day pressures of Government.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the premise that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat had inadequate resources, stating that a range of existing capabilities, including the CCS itself, already identify and assess current and future risks effectively.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
65
Recommendation
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
A standing capability should be established in Government, or reporting to it, to scan the horizon for future threats, with adequate resource and counting on specialists with an independence from short-term political and administrative pressures.
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation, stating a dedicated standing capability is not needed as a range of existing complementary capabilities already identify and assess future risks.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
76
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
The veil of ignorance through which the UK viewed the initial weeks of the pandemic was partly self-inflicted. As we examine in depth in Chapter 4, the UK failed to turn an early lead in developing a test for covid in January 2020 into a testing operation that was adequate …
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The veil of ignorance through which the UK viewed the initial weeks of the pandemic was partly self-inflicted. As we examine in depth in Chapter 4, the UK failed to turn an early lead in developing a test for covid in January 2020 into a testing operation that was adequate for the needs of the country—depriving scientists and policymakers of crucial granular data. Our Committees heard that the UK did not take enough advantage of the learning and experience being generated in other countries, notably in East Asia.98 The approach the UK took was particular, and in some respects exceptional.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's conclusion, arguing it already has a range of complementary standing capabilities for identifying and assessing risks, including horizon scanning, the Joint Intelligence Organisation, the National Situation Centre, and the NSRA process, as well as future work by GO-Science to build …
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
147
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
Written evidence suggested that the inconsistency in Government messaging after the first wave of the pandemic was also damaging to public trust in official information.233 Analysis submitted by Leeds Beckett University showed that most members of the public did not trust information from the UK Government and that they were …
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Written evidence suggested that the inconsistency in Government messaging after the first wave of the pandemic was also damaging to public trust in official information.233 Analysis submitted by Leeds Beckett University showed that most members of the public did not trust information from the UK Government and that they were much more likely to trust information shared by the World Health Organisation.234 The perception that key Government figures, including the former assistant to the Prime Minister, had breached lockdown rules may have further undermined public trust during spring 2020. In oral 226 GOV.UK, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 10 May 2020’, accessed 17 September 2021 227 GOV.UK, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 10 May 2020’, accessed 17 September 2021 228 Gov.scot, ‘Coronavirus update: First Minister’s speech: 10 May 2020’, accessed 17 September 2021 229 Association of Anaesthetists (CLL0014) 230 Oral evidence taken before the Health and Social Care Committee on 21 July 2020, HC (2019–2021) 36, Q584 231 GOV.UK, ‘Prime Minister announces new local COVID Alert Levels: 12 October 2020’, accessed 17 September 2021 232 University College London (CLL0023) 233 For example, see: Nuffield Trust (CLL0087) 234 Leeds Beckett University (CLL0003) 56 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date evidence, Dominic Cummings acknowledged that his widely reported trip to Durham was “a complete disaster” and admitted that it “undermined public confidence in the whole thing”.235
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's implied criticism by asserting that its messaging early in the pandemic was strong and effective in achieving public compliance, without addressing the specific concerns about inconsistency after the first wave or the negative impact of certain events on public trust.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
153
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
The flattening the curve policy was implemented by introducing new restrictions only gradually and slowly, acting as if the spread of the virus were susceptible to calibrated control. Modelling at the time suggested that to suppress the spread of covid-19 too firmly would cause a resurgence when restrictions were lifted. …
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The flattening the curve policy was implemented by introducing new restrictions only gradually and slowly, acting as if the spread of the virus were susceptible to calibrated control. Modelling at the time suggested that to suppress the spread of covid-19 too firmly would cause a resurgence when restrictions were lifted. This was thought likely to result in a peak in the autumn and winter when NHS pressures were already likely to be severe. In addition, it was thought that the public would only comply with severe restrictions for a limited period, and so those restrictions should not be applied before they were most needed. This approach should have been questioned at the time for a number of reasons: 240 Oral evidence taken before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on 22 June 2021, HC (2021–22) 200, Q134 241 OECD, Obesity Update, 2017 242 GOV.UK, Disparities in the risk and outcomes of COVID-19, August 2020 58 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date • it entailed people contracting covid in large numbers with hundreds of thousands of deaths likely to result; • other countries, in Asia and in Europe, including some with experience of SARS and MERS, had chosen to implement earlier, more comprehensive strategies of non-pharmaceutical interventions, which were having success; and • suppressing the spread of the virus in the early period would have bought valuable time to consider what was the best way to manage the pandemic in the medium term.
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Government response AI summary
The government implicitly rejects the committee's criticism of the 'flattening the curve' policy, stating that its decision-making was always informed by science and evidence and that quick and decisive action was taken when needed.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
155
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
Science proceeds through challenge and disputation, and new theories are tested unflinchingly against evidence. Yet Ministers and other advisers reported that they felt it difficult to challenge the views of their official scientific advisers. Those in Government have a duty to question and probe the assumptions behind any scientific advice …
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Science proceeds through challenge and disputation, and new theories are tested unflinchingly against evidence. Yet Ministers and other advisers reported that they felt it difficult to challenge the views of their official scientific advisers. Those in Government have a duty to question and probe the assumptions behind any scientific advice given, particularly in a national emergency, but there is little evidence sufficient challenge took place. However, even when UK policy had changed to bring in a comprehensive national lockdown, the role of non-pharmaceutical interventions against covid-19 was complex, inconsistent and opaque for most of the rest of 2020.
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Government response AI summary
The government implicitly rejects the committee's conclusion about the lack of challenge to scientific advice and the inconsistency of non-pharmaceutical interventions. It asserts that NPIs were key, decision-making was evidence-based, and quick decisive action was taken.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
3
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
The operation of COBR was not well-suited to the modern demands of a pandemic response. It is especially concerning that its culture of confidentiality was considered by some to be so unreliable that alternative meetings were arranged that could command greater confidentiality among participants.
Read more
The operation of COBR was not well-suited to the modern demands of a pandemic response. It is especially concerning that its culture of confidentiality was considered by some to be so unreliable that alternative meetings were arranged that could command greater confidentiality among participants.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the committee's assessment of COBR's suitability and confidentiality, defending its role as the crisis management forum, its culture of confidentiality, and rigorous information security procedures.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
8
Recommendation
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
A standing capability should be established in Government, or reporting to it, to scan the horizon for future threats, with adequate resource and counting on specialists with an independence from short-term political and administrative pressures. (Paragraph 65) Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 125
Read more
A standing capability should be established in Government, or reporting to it, to scan the horizon for future threats, with adequate resource and counting on specialists with an independence from short-term political and administrative pressures. (Paragraph 65) Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 125
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejected the recommendation, stating that a range of complementary standing capabilities already exist within government (e.g., CCS, JIO, NSC, NSRA, GO-Science) to identify and assess future risks.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
12
Recommendation
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
The Armed Forces should have a more central and standing role in preparing for and responding to emergencies like pandemics, given the depth of capability and experience they have in planning, logistics and rapid mobilisation. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat should work with the Armed Forces to improve operational expertise in …
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The Armed Forces should have a more central and standing role in preparing for and responding to emergencies like pandemics, given the depth of capability and experience they have in planning, logistics and rapid mobilisation. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat should work with the Armed Forces to improve operational expertise in emergencies in public bodies.
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Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation, stating that existing protocols for Armed Forces support (MACA process) are fit for purpose, and highlighting the extensive support provided during the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
18
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
During the first three months of the covid pandemic, the UK followed the wrong policy in its use of non-pharmaceutical interventions. When the UK moved from the ‘contain’ to ‘delay’ stage, there was a policy of seeking to only moderate the speed of infection through the population—flattening the curve—rather than …
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During the first three months of the covid pandemic, the UK followed the wrong policy in its use of non-pharmaceutical interventions. When the UK moved from the ‘contain’ to ‘delay’ stage, there was a policy of seeking to only moderate the speed of infection through the population—flattening the curve—rather than seeking to arrest its spread. The policy was pursued until 23 March because of the official 126 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date scientific advice the Government received, not in spite of it. Questions remain about whether the containment phase was pursued aggressively enough—we believe it could have been pursued for longer. During this period Government policy did not deviate from the scientific advice it received in any material respect. The fact that the UK approach reflected a consensus between official scientific advisers and the Government indicates a degree of groupthink that was present at the time which meant we were not as open to approaches being taken elsewhere—such as earlier lockdowns, border controls and effective test and trace—as we should have been.
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Government response AI summary
The government's response implicitly rejects the committee's finding of 'wrong policy' and 'groupthink,' asserting that its decision-making was always informed by science and evidence and that it took quick, decisive action.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
19
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
The flattening the curve policy was implemented by introducing new restrictions only gradually and slowly, acting as if the spread of the virus were susceptible to calibrated control. Modelling at the time suggested that to suppress the spread of covid-19 too firmly would cause a resurgence when restrictions were lifted. …
Read more
The flattening the curve policy was implemented by introducing new restrictions only gradually and slowly, acting as if the spread of the virus were susceptible to calibrated control. Modelling at the time suggested that to suppress the spread of covid-19 too firmly would cause a resurgence when restrictions were lifted. This was thought likely to result in a peak in the autumn and winter when NHS pressures were already likely to be severe. In addition, it was thought that the public would only comply with severe restrictions for a limited period, and so those restrictions should not be applied before they were most needed. This approach should have been questioned at the time for a number of reasons: • it entailed people contracting covid in large numbers with hundreds of thousands of deaths likely to result; • other countries, in Asia and in Europe, including some with experience of SARS and MERS, had chosen to implement earlier, more comprehensive strategies of non-pharmaceutical interventions, which were having success; and • suppressing the spread of the virus in the early period would have bought valuable time to consider what was the best way to manage the pandemic in the medium term.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government implicitly rejects the committee's critique of the gradual implementation of the 'flattening the curve' policy, asserting instead that its decisions were informed by science and evidence, and it took quick and decisive action.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
60
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
The operation of COBR was not well-suited to the modern demands of a pandemic response. It is especially concerning that its culture of confidentiality was considered by some to be so unreliable that alternative meetings were arranged that could command greater confidentiality among participants.
Read more
The operation of COBR was not well-suited to the modern demands of a pandemic response. It is especially concerning that its culture of confidentiality was considered by some to be so unreliable that alternative meetings were arranged that could command greater confidentiality among participants.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government explicitly rejected the committee's assessment, disagreeing that COBR was ill-suited for pandemic response or that its confidentiality culture was unreliable. They defended COBR's role and ongoing review processes.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
61
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat did not have adequate resources to maintain a substantial standing capability to survey the development of potential threats, and it had a limited reach into the range of Government departments required to respond to a pandemic. The experience has been that this investment in resilience is …
Read more
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat did not have adequate resources to maintain a substantial standing capability to survey the development of potential threats, and it had a limited reach into the range of Government departments required to respond to a pandemic. The experience has been that this investment in resilience is at risk of being trumped by the day-to-day pressures of Government.
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the observation that the Civil Contingencies Secretariat lacked adequate resources and reach. It states that a range of existing capabilities, including near-term horizon scanning, the Joint Intelligence Organisation, and the National Situation Centre, already identify and assess risks.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
65
Recommendation
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
A standing capability should be established in Government, or reporting to it, to scan the horizon for future threats, with adequate resource and counting on specialists with an independence from short-term political and administrative pressures.
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation to establish a new standing capability for horizon scanning, stating that a range of existing complementary capabilities already address this need, including the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, the Joint Intelligence Organisation, and the National Situation Centre.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
170
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
In evidence to the Science and Technology Committee on 25 March 2020 Public Health England claimed to have formally studied, but rejected, the South Korean approach.255 Despite repeated requests by the Committee no evidence of such an evaluation has ever been produced. We must conclude that no formal evaluation took …
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In evidence to the Science and Technology Committee on 25 March 2020 Public Health England claimed to have formally studied, but rejected, the South Korean approach.255 Despite repeated requests by the Committee no evidence of such an evaluation has ever been produced. We must conclude that no formal evaluation took place which amounts to an extraordinary and negligent omission given Korea’s success in containing the pandemic which was well-publicised at the time.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially accepts the recommendation by agreeing it is important to learn from other countries and detailing how UKHSA will facilitate this. However, it explicitly rejects the committee's specific conclusion that a negligent omission occurred or that a culture of rejecting assistance was established …
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
8
Recommendation
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Rejected
A standing capability should be established in Government, or reporting to it, to scan the horizon for future threats, with adequate resource and counting on specialists with an independence from short-term political and administrative pressures. (Paragraph 65) Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 125
Read more
A standing capability should be established in Government, or reporting to it, to scan the horizon for future threats, with adequate resource and counting on specialists with an independence from short-term political and administrative pressures. (Paragraph 65) Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 125
Show less
Government response AI summary
The government rejects the recommendation, stating that a range of complementary standing capabilities already exist across various departments and organisations to identify and assess current and future risks.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care