Recommendations & Conclusions
47 items
75
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Much of the impact of covid-19 during the first wave was determined by decisions made during the early weeks of the pandemic, between January and late March 2020. The seriousness of the threat to the UK was recognised in January when the Government’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies—SAGE—was convened and …
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Much of the impact of covid-19 during the first wave was determined by decisions made during the early weeks of the pandemic, between January and late March 2020. The seriousness of the threat to the UK was recognised in January when the Government’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies—SAGE—was convened and met on 22 January 2020.97 It is important to record that all decisions taken during those initial weeks were taken in a fog of uncertainty. The UK did not know to what extent covid-19 had entered the country, how many people it was affecting, how quickly it would spread, and what would be the consequences in terms of illness and death. What the UK did know was bleak: from the experience of China and Italy, it was clear that covid-19 was a highly infectious virus, with profound consequences for health, and for which there was no cure nor effective treatments. This meant that the only tools available to affect the spread of the pandemic were isolating people who had contracted the virus and their contacts, and, more generally restricting contacts between people, collectively known as non-pharmaceutical interventions, or NPIs.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of positive learning and engagement with other countries. They describe ongoing efforts by the Cabinet Office to review and improve the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) methodology, considering ways to increase external expert accessibility and diversify challenge during the process.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
95
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
By contrast, other countries implemented more rigorous border controls which were more effective at suppressing the virus and preventing the need for long and repeated lockdowns. However, even though it is not straightforward to make direct comparisons between countries, and it is yet to be seen how countries like New …
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By contrast, other countries implemented more rigorous border controls which were more effective at suppressing the virus and preventing the need for long and repeated lockdowns. However, even though it is not straightforward to make direct comparisons between countries, and it is yet to be seen how countries like New Zealand will fare when their borders are opened, it is reasonable to say that a more precautionary approach would have been beneficial at the start of the pandemic. Reasons for the delay in full lockdown
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of positive learning and international engagement for future emergencies. They detail ongoing work to review the NSRA methodology and increase external expert challenge, and commit to international frameworks for disaster risk reduction.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
100
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Several witnesses to our inquiry, reflecting on the early weeks of the pandemic, were rueful that they did not sufficiently question and challenge the advice they were being given. We heard that challenging an established scientific consensus was difficult. Dominic Cummings told us: It was clear through all the meetings …
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Several witnesses to our inquiry, reflecting on the early weeks of the pandemic, were rueful that they did not sufficiently question and challenge the advice they were being given. We heard that challenging an established scientific consensus was difficult. Dominic Cummings told us: It was clear through all the meetings with PHE and everybody that everything was going wrong; everything we pushed, everything we probed—everything was wrong, bad, terrible. But I was incredibly frightened—I guess is the word—about the consequences of me kind of pulling a massive emergency string and saying, “The official plan is wrong, and it is going to kill everyone, and you’ve got to change path,” because what if I’m wrong? What if I persuade him [the Prime Minister] to change tack and that is a disaster? Everyone is telling me that if we go down this alternative path, it is going to be five times worse in the winter, and what if that is the consequence?147
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of greater questioning and challenge in policy development, stating ministers and SAGE should facilitate robust external and structured challenge to scientific advice.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
102
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
We accept that it is difficult to challenge a widely held scientific consensus. But accountability in a democracy depends on elected decision-makers taking advice, but examining, questioning and challenging it before making their own decisions. We find it surprising that the fatalistic assumptions behind the initial scientific advice were not …
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We accept that it is difficult to challenge a widely held scientific consensus. But accountability in a democracy depends on elected decision-makers taking advice, but examining, questioning and challenging it before making their own decisions. We find it surprising that the fatalistic assumptions behind the initial scientific advice were not challenged until it became clear the NHS could be overwhelmed, particularly given alternative strategies were being pursued visibly and successfully in East Asian countries. We heard that ‘red teaming’ and structured challenge was used within the national security community, which may also be of benefit to the scientific community.154 Kate Bingham also pointed out that the Government may have benefited from more scientists within the Civil Service155 We acknowledge that the then Secretary of State told us that he had challenged scientific advice regarding asymptomatic transmission.156 However, this came after the key moments in mid-March when challenge was needed most, and after the WHO had warned of asymptomatic transmission. The influence of modelling during the pandemic
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need for greater questioning and challenge in future policy development, stating ministers and SAGE should facilitate robust external and structured challenge to scientific advice from a wider range of disciplines.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
103
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
In his evidence to the Science and Technology Committee during the early weeks of the pandemic, on 25 March, the Editor of the Lancet expressed concern that mathematical modelling was playing too influential a role in UK scientific advice.157 The prominence of modelling and projections was, and still remains, an …
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In his evidence to the Science and Technology Committee during the early weeks of the pandemic, on 25 March, the Editor of the Lancet expressed concern that mathematical modelling was playing too influential a role in UK scientific advice.157 The prominence of modelling and projections was, and still remains, an important part of the UK’s response to covid-19. Models can be useful and informative to policymakers, but they come with limitations. As Professor Neil Ferguson told the Science and Technology Committee in June 2020, “Models can only be as reliable as the data that is feeding into them.”158 However, we know that—especially in the early stages of the pandemic—there was an acute shortage of good data.159 There was also a limited understanding of the virus early in the pandemic. Key questions, such as the length of immunity conferred by infection, were unknown and hampered accurate modelling.160
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges that future policy development should include greater questioning and challenge, with ministers and SAGE facilitating robust external scrutiny of scientific advice.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
105
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Sir John also highlighted concerns about how different academic disciplines did not collaborate sufficiently on models.164 Professor James Poterba, Mitsui Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, explained to the Science and Technology Committee that the consequence of this was that some costs were not factored into models earlier in …
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Sir John also highlighted concerns about how different academic disciplines did not collaborate sufficiently on models.164 Professor James Poterba, Mitsui Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, explained to the Science and Technology Committee that the consequence of this was that some costs were not factored into models earlier in the pandemic: Many in epidemiology and in the health services area have realised that the economic cost of some of the policies their models suggested were very important to understand, and consequently they have become very concerned about building some more economics into those models in various ways.165 161 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 5 June 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Qq764– 765 162 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 5 June 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q774 163 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 5 June 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q768 164 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 5 June 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q767 165 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 5 June 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q770 44 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date
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Government response AI summary
The government stated that future policy development should involve greater questioning and challenge, with Ministers confidently probing scientific advice and SAGE facilitating strong external challenge from diverse disciplines, but did not specifically detail how interdisciplinary collaboration in modelling, particularly regarding economic costs, would be ensured.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
137
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Due to the much higher transmissibility of the Alpha variant, in the absence of a test, trace and isolate system capable of arresting the spread of the virus, a circuit-breaker in September and an earlier, more stringent lockdown, would likely have reduced deaths. Had more stringent social distancing measures been …
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Due to the much higher transmissibility of the Alpha variant, in the absence of a test, trace and isolate system capable of arresting the spread of the virus, a circuit-breaker in September and an earlier, more stringent lockdown, would likely have reduced deaths. Had more stringent social distancing measures been adopted during the autumn they could have reduced the seeding of the Alpha variant across the country, slowed its spread and therefore have saved lives. However, this is something we know now, but was not knowable at the time lockdown decisions were taken during the autumn: the existence of the Alpha variant was known only in December 2020.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of positive learning and international engagement for future emergencies, outlining efforts to review the NSRA methodology and enhance external expert challenge and international practice.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
157
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Government public health communications are key to the public’s understanding of and compliance with non-pharmaceutical interventions. Initial messaging from the Government early in the pandemic was strong, effective and undoubtedly contributed to the success of the first lockdown. After the gradual lifting of the first lockdown Coronavirus: lessons learned to …
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Government public health communications are key to the public’s understanding of and compliance with non-pharmaceutical interventions. Initial messaging from the Government early in the pandemic was strong, effective and undoubtedly contributed to the success of the first lockdown. After the gradual lifting of the first lockdown Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 59 from May 2020, Government guidance became increasingly complex and harder to understand, with restrictions varying in different parts of the country. Government communications did not always reflect this nuance, leading to perceived inconsistency and divergent strategies across the four nations of the UK. Recommendations and lessons learned
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of public health communications and agrees that early messaging was strong and effective, but does not address the committee's conclusion that later guidance became increasingly complex and inconsistent.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
163
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
While, as we will illustrate in Chapter 7, the UK’s vaccination programme has been a national success, the record during the pandemic of the test, trace and isolate programme is more mixed. The slow, uncertain, and often chaotic performance of the test, trace and isolate system during the first phases …
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While, as we will illustrate in Chapter 7, the UK’s vaccination programme has been a national success, the record during the pandemic of the test, trace and isolate programme is more mixed. The slow, uncertain, and often chaotic performance of the test, trace and isolate system during the first phases of the pandemic was a drag anchor on the UK’s response to the pandemic. Partly because NHS Test and Trace was only established when daily infections had risen to 2,000, it ultimately failed in its objective to prevent future lockdowns despite vast quantities of taxpayers’ money being directed to it.243 In contrast to the approach to vaccines, which we discuss in greater detail in Chapter 7, NHS Test and Trace had to build a new organisation and respond to changing circumstances while it was operating rather than being able to anticipate these in advance of the system being in operation. In this Chapter, when we refer to NHS Test and Trace we refer to the new organisation set up by the Department of Health and Social Care, initially led by Baroness Harding, in partnership with several public and private organisations.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the test, trace, and isolate legacy by outlining plans to ensure a resilient infrastructure, work closely with local authorities for future tracing, and maintain UKHSA's local relationships.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
164
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
This Chapter looks at a number of different facets of the test, trace and isolate system— though they are illustrative rather than exhaustive. While it describes an unsatisfactory history, there are signs that the UK has now arrived at a more dependable outcome: the UK now has, in principle, the …
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This Chapter looks at a number of different facets of the test, trace and isolate system— though they are illustrative rather than exhaustive. While it describes an unsatisfactory history, there are signs that the UK has now arrived at a more dependable outcome: the UK now has, in principle, the ability to test more than 800,000 people a day, and in the week commencing 23 August 2021 there were more than 5.6 million tests carried out in England, more than any EU/EEA country.244 But there are many lessons to be learned on the way and this notional capacity has yet to be fully tested in action.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the observation by outlining its ‘Living with COVID-19’ strategy to build on the legacy of test, trace, and isolate, ensuring resilient infrastructure, working with local authorities for future contact tracing, and UKHSA maintaining local relationships.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
165
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
In this Chapter we consider in particular: • the initial testing capacity available; • the decision to abandon testing in the community; • the 100,000 tests a day target introduced by the then Secretary of State; • the centralisation of testing laboratories; • the shortage of testing capacity in Autumn …
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In this Chapter we consider in particular: • the initial testing capacity available; • the decision to abandon testing in the community; • the 100,000 tests a day target introduced by the then Secretary of State; • the centralisation of testing laboratories; • the shortage of testing capacity in Autumn 2020; • the organisation of contact tracing; and • the management of “NHS” Test and Trace. Limited testing capacity
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the committee's observation by outlining its strategy to build on the test, trace, and isolate legacy, ensuring resilient infrastructure, and working with local authorities for future contact tracing, with UKHSA maintaining local relationships.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
168
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Professor Martin explained to us that early in the pandemic there were “very severe constraints in equipment and consumables” which acted as a drag on testing capacity: Bear in mind that those were all new tests coming on stream at the beginning of the pandemic. Effectively, there was not enough …
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Professor Martin explained to us that early in the pandemic there were “very severe constraints in equipment and consumables” which acted as a drag on testing capacity: Bear in mind that those were all new tests coming on stream at the beginning of the pandemic. Effectively, there was not enough to go round. It was global; it was not just the UK. There was a global shortage of the consumables. […] There are big international suppliers that have capped the UK supply of consumables251
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need for a resilient and scalable infrastructure for test, trace, and isolate, committing to build on existing responses and work with local authorities and UKHSA for future public health emergencies, but does not specifically address the previous constraints in equipment and …
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
200
Recommendation
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
The failure of the test and trace system to rise to meet even the most predictable of demands in Autumn 2020, especially given many weeks to prepare, suggests that lessons that were learnable during the pandemic were not applied. An urgent priority for the Government must be to satisfy itself …
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The failure of the test and trace system to rise to meet even the most predictable of demands in Autumn 2020, especially given many weeks to prepare, suggests that lessons that were learnable during the pandemic were not applied. An urgent priority for the Government must be to satisfy itself that there is now a dependable organisation for covid testing that can both anticipate and meet future demands. The role of Test and Trace in autumn lockdowns
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Government response AI summary
The government states it will build on the pandemic response legacy and ensure resilient, scalable infrastructure, working with local authorities and UKHSA to protect against future health threats, as outlined in the ‘Living with COVID-19’ strategy.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
2
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Previous exercises to test the national response capability, namely Exercises Cygnus and Winter Willow, did not squarely address a disease with the characteristics of covid-19. Nevertheless, some useful lessons were learned and applied, such as the drafting of legislative measures that might be needed.
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Previous exercises to test the national response capability, namely Exercises Cygnus and Winter Willow, did not squarely address a disease with the characteristics of covid-19. Nevertheless, some useful lessons were learned and applied, such as the drafting of legislative measures that might be needed.
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Government response AI summary
The government recognises that previous exercises did not fully address a disease with COVID-19 characteristics and agrees that lessons, such as legislative drafting, can be learned for future outbreaks.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
5
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Protocols to share data between public bodies involved in the response were too slow to establish and to become functional. This was especially true in the data flows from national to local government.
Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's finding that data sharing protocols were too slow to establish and become functional, particularly between national and local government.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
6
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
The NHS responded quickly and strongly to the demands of the pandemic, but compared to other health systems it “runs hot”—with little spare capacity built in to cope with sudden and unexpected surges of demand such as in a pandemic.
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the demands placed on the NHS during the pandemic and states that this experience should lead to a more explicit and monitored surge capacity being integrated into the NHS's long-term organization and funding.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
20
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
There are several possible explanations for what was a significant error in policy and advice early in the pandemic. These include: • the lack of adequate data on the spread of covid-19, as a result of the inadequacy of the UK testing operation; • overreliance on specific mathematical models when …
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There are several possible explanations for what was a significant error in policy and advice early in the pandemic. These include: • the lack of adequate data on the spread of covid-19, as a result of the inadequacy of the UK testing operation; • overreliance on specific mathematical models when there were too many uncertainties; • assumptions about public compliance with rules that turned out to have underestimated the willingness to conform even for long periods; • the composition of SAGE suffered from a lack of representation from outside the United Kingdom; and • a preference for a particular UK approach may have been favoured above advice based on emulation of what was being pursued elsewhere. (Paragraph 154) Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 127
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Government response AI summary
The government partially accepted the implicit recommendation, acknowledging the importance of learning from other countries and engaging with diverse experts. They highlighted existing international collaborations and stated the Cabinet Office is considering ways to increase external expert challenge within the National Risk Assessment process.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
31
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
The resulting requirement to abandon testing people in the community during the critical early period of the pandemic cost many lives for a number of reasons including because: a) many asymptomatic carriers were not tested and therefore identified and asked to isolate; b) many older people were admitted to care …
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The resulting requirement to abandon testing people in the community during the critical early period of the pandemic cost many lives for a number of reasons including because: a) many asymptomatic carriers were not tested and therefore identified and asked to isolate; b) many older people were admitted to care homes either from the community or hospitals in ignorance of their covid status or that of staff working in care homes; c) low levels of testing meant that the UK lost visibility of where the disease was spreading, among which groups and how quickly. For a crucial period our only insight into the spread of covid was by counting people so sick that they had to be admitted to hospital; and (Paragraph 234.c)) d) the receipt of a positive test result would have been likely to improve compliance with an isolation request.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the need for positive learning and engagement with other countries and disciplines for future emergencies. They outline ongoing work to review the NSRA methodology to enhance external expert challenge and diversity during risk assessment processes, and commit to international frameworks for disaster …
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
44
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Social care had a less prominent voice in Government during the early stages of the pandemic than did the NHS.
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the impact of the pandemic on the social care sector and outlines the 'Build Back Better' plan, detailing reforms, a sustainable funding model, and proposals to bring health and social care sectors closer together to strengthen services.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
45
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
The discharge of elderly people from NHS hospitals into care homes without having been tested at the beginning of the pandemic—while understandable as the NHS prepared to accept a surge of covid patients—had the unintended consequence of contributing to the spread of infection in care homes. The seeding of infections …
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The discharge of elderly people from NHS hospitals into care homes without having been tested at the beginning of the pandemic—while understandable as the NHS prepared to accept a surge of covid patients—had the unintended consequence of contributing to the spread of infection in care homes. The seeding of infections also happened as a result of staff entering care homes, and the failure to recognise this risk early is a symptom of the inadequate initial focus on social care. The lack of available testing at the time meant that the extent of spread by each route of transmission cannot be fully known and has not been conclusively determined by the report commissioned from PHE by the Government.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the pandemic's impact on social care and references its existing 'Build Back Better' plan for reform, sustainable funding, and closer integration of health and social care sectors.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
53
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
During the initial phase of the pandemic Black, Asian and minority ethnic people experienced significantly higher levels of severe illness and death from covid than was typical the population as a whole. Research conducted so far suggests that the drivers of these elevated levels of impact among Black, Asian and …
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During the initial phase of the pandemic Black, Asian and minority ethnic people experienced significantly higher levels of severe illness and death from covid than was typical the population as a whole. Research conducted so far suggests that the drivers of these elevated levels of impact among Black, Asian and minority ethnic people arise from greater likelihood of jobs that come with higher exposure to covid infection; more challenging social and economic circumstances; more densely occupied housing; and comorbidities from different health conditions. These are classic features of inequality in society and in the economy. (Paragraph 331) 132 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date
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Government response AI summary
The government accepts the committee's conclusion that Black, Asian and minority ethnic people experienced significantly higher levels of severe illness and death from COVID-19 due to features of inequality.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
54
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Staff from Black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds are crucial to the NHS and care sectors. The covid-19 pandemic has brought the experiences of these staff into sharp focus. It is telling that the first ten NHS staff to die from covid-19 were from Black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds, …
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Staff from Black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds are crucial to the NHS and care sectors. The covid-19 pandemic has brought the experiences of these staff into sharp focus. It is telling that the first ten NHS staff to die from covid-19 were from Black, Asian and minority ethnic backgrounds, and evidence has since confirmed that the impact of covid-19 on this section of the workforce has been significant. While the NHS has made progress in recent years, the experience of people from BAME groups during the pandemic has made it clear that inequalities persist.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledged the conclusion that inequalities persist for BAME staff in the NHS and care sectors, but did not commit to any specific actions in response.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
55
Conclusion
Sixth Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
People with learning disabilities have experienced significantly higher death rates from covid-19 than the country as a whole. Deaths have been especially high among younger adults with learning disabilities. Initial research suggests that people with learning disabilities entered the pandemic from a position of heightened vulnerability because of existing comorbidities. …
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People with learning disabilities have experienced significantly higher death rates from covid-19 than the country as a whole. Deaths have been especially high among younger adults with learning disabilities. Initial research suggests that people with learning disabilities entered the pandemic from a position of heightened vulnerability because of existing comorbidities. This was compounded by particular barriers to accessing NHS treatment during the pandemic arising from restrictions on non- covid care and limits on the ability of carers and advocates to attend hospital with people with learning disabilities.
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Government response AI summary
The government states it accepts the committee's conclusion, thereby acknowledging the finding that people with learning disabilities experienced significantly higher COVID-19 death rates and faced particular barriers to accessing NHS treatment during the pandemic.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
75
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Much of the impact of covid-19 during the first wave was determined by decisions made during the early weeks of the pandemic, between January and late March 2020. The seriousness of the threat to the UK was recognised in January when the Government’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies—SAGE—was convened and …
Read more
Much of the impact of covid-19 during the first wave was determined by decisions made during the early weeks of the pandemic, between January and late March 2020. The seriousness of the threat to the UK was recognised in January when the Government’s Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies—SAGE—was convened and met on 22 January 2020.97 It is important to record that all decisions taken during those initial weeks were taken in a fog of uncertainty. The UK did not know to what extent covid-19 had entered the country, how many people it was affecting, how quickly it would spread, and what would be the consequences in terms of illness and death. What the UK did know was bleak: from the experience of China and Italy, it was clear that covid-19 was a highly infectious virus, with profound consequences for health, and for which there was no cure nor effective treatments. This meant that the only tools available to affect the spread of the pandemic were isolating people who had contracted the virus and their contacts, and, more generally restricting contacts between people, collectively known as non-pharmaceutical interventions, or NPIs.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the uncertainty of early crisis situations, stating that scientific advice may be uncertain and rapid, precautionary action may be appropriate.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
99
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
We accept that it is difficult for Ministers to go against a scientific consensus among the body set up to provide scientific advice during a national emergency. We also understand the reluctance to introduce measures with significant negative economic impact. But the 141 Imperial College London, ‘COVID-19 transmission chains in …
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We accept that it is difficult for Ministers to go against a scientific consensus among the body set up to provide scientific advice during a national emergency. We also understand the reluctance to introduce measures with significant negative economic impact. But the 141 Imperial College London, ‘COVID-19 transmission chains in the UK traced back to Spain, France and Italy’, accessed 17 September 2021 142 Rt Hon Greg Clark MP, Chair, Science and Technology Committee (Qq75–76); Correspondence from the Chair to Sir Patrick Vallance, Chief Scientific Adviser, relating to SAGE Membership, 30 March 2020; and correspondence from Sir Patrick Vallance, Chief Scientific Adviser, relating to transparency of scientific evidence: social distancing, 28 May 2020 143 Science and Technology Committee, First Report of Session 2019–21, The UK response to covid-19: use of scientific advice, HC 136, paragraphs 55 and 71–72 144 GOV.UK, ‘List of participants of SAGE and related sub-groups’, accessed 17 August 2021 145 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 25 March 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q81 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 41 early weeks of the pandemic expose deficiencies in both scientific advice and Government action. In the early days of an emergency, formulating the best scientific advice is challenging: there are, for example, inevitable lags in acquiring and analysing data. Other countries took early decisions that were more seen as those of Government leaders rather than from established scientific evidence146 and it is possible that this provided a greater licence to take decisions more quickly, and on a more precautionary basis than happened in the UK—contributing to better overall outcomes. Was there sufficient challenge to scientific advice during the first weeks?
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the report and agrees that lessons should be learned from the COVID-19 experience to inform preparedness for future crises, without committing to specific new actions regarding scientific advice challenge.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
104
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Evidence to the Science and Technology Committee from other academic disciplines included scepticism of the weight being placed on mathematical models during the pandemic. For example Professor Sir John Kay, Economist and Fellow in Economics, St 152 Correspondence from Rt Hon Greg Clark and Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt to Matt …
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Evidence to the Science and Technology Committee from other academic disciplines included scepticism of the weight being placed on mathematical models during the pandemic. For example Professor Sir John Kay, Economist and Fellow in Economics, St 152 Correspondence from Rt Hon Greg Clark and Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt to Matt Hancock, 22 June 2021 153 After the Report was agreed by the Committees a response from Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, was received. 154 Q743 155 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 4 November 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q282 156 Q1300 157 See, for example: oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 25 March 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q40 and Q42. 158 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 10 June 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q889 159 For example, see: SAGE 14, 10 March 2020, paragraph 36 160 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 10 June 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q841 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 43 John’s College, University of Oxford, told the Science and Technology Committee in June 2020 that models did not necessarily respond well to change and should not be used to make predictions: economic models tend to work pretty well as long as nothing much changes, which does not help them to be a great deal of use. What really matters from this point of view is understanding the nature of the underlying change. […] In my view, the use of economic models and other models is not so much to make predictions as to give people better insights into what is going on, and that is the way in which models ought to be used.161 Professor Carol Propper, Professor of Economics, Imperial College London and President of the Royal Economic Society, illustrated that assumptions in models had not always borne out and there was a need for up-to-date data: To give one more example of the need for that data, when we shut down hospitals
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Government response AI summary
The government's response outlines an aspirational approach for the future, stating that policy development should feature greater questioning and challenge, and that ministers should be more robust in challenging advice.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
108
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Another potential reason for the late lockdown was the behavioural advice that was being tendered to the Government. Behavioural advice is tendered to the Government through SAGE’s sub-group, the Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviours (SPI- B).168 SPI-B’s first publicly known input into SAGE was on 25 February 2020 on …
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Another potential reason for the late lockdown was the behavioural advice that was being tendered to the Government. Behavioural advice is tendered to the Government through SAGE’s sub-group, the Scientific Pandemic Insights Group on Behaviours (SPI- B).168 SPI-B’s first publicly known input into SAGE was on 25 February 2020 on the risk of public disorder.169
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Government response AI summary
The government's response outlines an aspirational approach for the future, stating that policy development should feature greater questioning and challenge, and that ministers should be more robust in challenging advice.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
113
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Acknowledged
It is a characteristic of the best UK scientific institutions, and the people that work in them, that much of their research involves extensive international collaboration. However, for a virus that has affected every country in the world and which was experienced first by other countries, it is also right …
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It is a characteristic of the best UK scientific institutions, and the people that work in them, that much of their research involves extensive international collaboration. However, for a virus that has affected every country in the world and which was experienced first by other countries, it is also right to consider whether our scientific advisory bodies are sufficiently international. This question arises not only in the context of the early decisions on lockdown but, as we will see in Chapter 4, Public Health England’s failure to evidence any formal evaluation of the test and trace policies of countries which had experienced covid before the UK.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially accepts 'this recommendation' (despite it being a conclusion), agreeing on the importance of learning from other countries and stating it will do so flexibly. It also outlines efforts to review and improve the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA) methodology and increase expert …
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
139
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Several public health experts stressed to us that an effective messaging and communications strategy was a crucial part of the response to a pandemic. In July 2020, Sir Paul Nurse argued in evidence to the Health and Social Care Committee that “communication, messaging and keeping trust” should be one of …
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Several public health experts stressed to us that an effective messaging and communications strategy was a crucial part of the response to a pandemic. In July 2020, Sir Paul Nurse argued in evidence to the Health and Social Care Committee that “communication, messaging and keeping trust” should be one of the core focuses of the Government’s strategy.218 This was echoed by Sir Jeremy Farrar, who explicitly linked consistent messaging to public compliance with other NPIs: 211 NERVTAG is an expert committee of the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), which advises the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) and, through the CMO, Ministers, DHSC and other Government departments. 212 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 23 December 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q1612 213 GOV.UK, ‘Prime Minister’s statement on coronavirus (COVID-19): 19 December 2020’, and HC Deb, 6 January 2021, cols 734–736 [Commons Chamber] 214 GOV.UK, ‘Cases in the UK: Coronavirus in the UK—cases by date reported’, accessed 17 August 2021 215 GOV.UK, ‘Deaths in the UK: Coronavirus in the UK—Deaths within 28 days of positive test by date reported’, accessed 17 August 2021 216 Ourworldindata, SARS-CoV-2 variants in analyzed sequences, United Kingdom, accessed 2 September 2021 217 According to the Office for National Statistics, the second wave was estimated to be between 7 September 2020 to 24 April 2021. 218 Oral evidence taken before the Health and Social Care Committee on 21 July 2020, HC (2019–2021) 36, Q589 54 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date Consistent messaging and trust in the messaging is absolutely vital. If you are asking anybody—the community or the public—to do things that they would not normally do, they have to trust the message and the messenger, and that has to be consistent over time.219
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of public health communications for compliance, asserting that its messaging early in the pandemic was strong and effective in contributing to public understanding and adherence.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
140
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
At the outset of the pandemic, the Prime Minister’s “stay at home” order was accompanied by a public messaging campaign that clearly instructed the public to “stay home, protect the NHS, save lives”. This message was driven by regular televised press conferences from Number 10 Downing Street, during which Ministers …
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At the outset of the pandemic, the Prime Minister’s “stay at home” order was accompanied by a public messaging campaign that clearly instructed the public to “stay home, protect the NHS, save lives”. This message was driven by regular televised press conferences from Number 10 Downing Street, during which Ministers sought to emphasise that the response was “built upon the bedrock of the best possible scientific and medical advice”.220 Professor Whitty credited this initial messaging as “absolutely essential in people understanding what needed to happen, and then doing it.”221 The message was clear in both the instruction it was giving the public, as well as plainly explaining why they were being asked to change their behaviour.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the committee's observation, agreeing that early government messaging was strong, effective, and crucial for public understanding and compliance with pandemic measures.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
141
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Much of the evidence to our inquiry has acknowledged that this “Stay at Home” slogan was successful in fostering sufficient levels of awareness and understanding among the public. For example, during this period there was a marked fall in the number of people travelling on the roads and using recreational …
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Much of the evidence to our inquiry has acknowledged that this “Stay at Home” slogan was successful in fostering sufficient levels of awareness and understanding among the public. For example, during this period there was a marked fall in the number of people travelling on the roads and using recreational areas. Written evidence from the Nuffield Trust attributed this apparent success to the “simplicity and ease of recall” of the message.222 According to Professor Devi Sridhar, Chair of Global Public Health at the University of Edinburgh, the public are more likely to comply with instructions that are clear and easy to understand: You have to take the public with you. The public will comply, not because they are forced to, or because there is military on the streets, but because they want to. People generally want to follow the rules if they understand them.223
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the report's point about the importance of public health communications and affirms its early pandemic messaging was strong, effective, and contributed to public compliance.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
142
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Evidence from University College London (UCL) showed that during the first lockdown, the simplicity and clarity of public health messaging did indeed translate into high levels of compliance with the stay at home order. According to UCL, during this period “levels of understanding were reported by individuals to be very …
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Evidence from University College London (UCL) showed that during the first lockdown, the simplicity and clarity of public health messaging did indeed translate into high levels of compliance with the stay at home order. According to UCL, during this period “levels of understanding were reported by individuals to be very high” and simultaneously “over 70% of [70,000] survey respondents reported ‘complete compliance’ with guidelines”.224
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the report's finding, agreeing that early messaging was strong and effective, contributing to public understanding and compliance.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
144
Conclusion
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Acknowledged
On 10 May 2020, the Government announced that society would begin to reopen in England through a staged series of lockdown easing measures.226 From this point, there were divergent approaches to messaging across the four nations of the UK. To reflect the gradual lifting of strict lockdown measures in England, …
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On 10 May 2020, the Government announced that society would begin to reopen in England through a staged series of lockdown easing measures.226 From this point, there were divergent approaches to messaging across the four nations of the UK. To reflect the gradual lifting of strict lockdown measures in England, the Government changed its slogan from “stay home, protect the NHS, save lives” to “stay alert, control the virus and save lives”.227 In contrast, during a press conference on the same day, the First Minister of Scotland emphasised that “we remain in lockdown for now and my ask of you remains to Stay at Home”.228
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the importance of public health communications and states that its early pandemic messaging was strong and effective.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
152
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
During the first three months of the covid pandemic, the UK followed the wrong policy in its use of non-pharmaceutical interventions. When the UK moved from the ‘contain’ to ‘delay’ stage, there was a policy of seeking to only moderate the speed of infection through the population—flattening the curve—rather than …
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During the first three months of the covid pandemic, the UK followed the wrong policy in its use of non-pharmaceutical interventions. When the UK moved from the ‘contain’ to ‘delay’ stage, there was a policy of seeking to only moderate the speed of infection through the population—flattening the curve—rather than seeking to arrest its spread. The policy was pursued until 23 March because of the official scientific advice the Government received, not in spite of it. Questions remain about whether the containment phase was pursued aggressively enough—we believe it could have been pursued for longer. During this period Government policy did not deviate from the scientific advice it received in any material respect. The fact that the UK approach reflected a consensus between official scientific advisers and the Government indicates a degree of groupthink that was present at the time which meant we were not as open to approaches being taken elsewhere—such as earlier lockdowns, border controls and effective test and trace—as we should have been.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges that scientific advice may be uncertain in early crises, suggesting a precautionary approach might be appropriate, but does not specifically address the committee's criticism of past policy or groupthink.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
158
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
In the early days of a crisis, scientific advice may be necessarily uncertain: data may be unavailable, knowledge limited and time may be required for analysis to be conducted. In these circumstances it may be appropriate to act quickly, on a precautionary basis, rather than wait for more scientific certainty.
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In the early days of a crisis, scientific advice may be necessarily uncertain: data may be unavailable, knowledge limited and time may be required for analysis to be conducted. In these circumstances it may be appropriate to act quickly, on a precautionary basis, rather than wait for more scientific certainty.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the conclusion verbatim, agreeing that in early crisis situations with scientific uncertainty, it may be appropriate to act quickly on a precautionary basis rather than waiting for more scientific certainty.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
163
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
While, as we will illustrate in Chapter 7, the UK’s vaccination programme has been a national success, the record during the pandemic of the test, trace and isolate programme is more mixed. The slow, uncertain, and often chaotic performance of the test, trace and isolate system during the first phases …
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While, as we will illustrate in Chapter 7, the UK’s vaccination programme has been a national success, the record during the pandemic of the test, trace and isolate programme is more mixed. The slow, uncertain, and often chaotic performance of the test, trace and isolate system during the first phases of the pandemic was a drag anchor on the UK’s response to the pandemic. Partly because NHS Test and Trace was only established when daily infections had risen to 2,000, it ultimately failed in its objective to prevent future lockdowns despite vast quantities of taxpayers’ money being directed to it.243 In contrast to the approach to vaccines, which we discuss in greater detail in Chapter 7, NHS Test and Trace had to build a new organisation and respond to changing circumstances while it was operating rather than being able to anticipate these in advance of the system being in operation. In this Chapter, when we refer to NHS Test and Trace we refer to the new organisation set up by the Department of Health and Social Care, initially led by Baroness Harding, in partnership with several public and private organisations.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the mixed record of test, trace and isolate, committing to building a resilient and scalable infrastructure for future public health threats by working closely with local authorities and maintaining UKHSA relationships.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
164
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
This Chapter looks at a number of different facets of the test, trace and isolate system— though they are illustrative rather than exhaustive. While it describes an unsatisfactory history, there are signs that the UK has now arrived at a more dependable outcome: the UK now has, in principle, the …
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This Chapter looks at a number of different facets of the test, trace and isolate system— though they are illustrative rather than exhaustive. While it describes an unsatisfactory history, there are signs that the UK has now arrived at a more dependable outcome: the UK now has, in principle, the ability to test more than 800,000 people a day, and in the week commencing 23 August 2021 there were more than 5.6 million tests carried out in England, more than any EU/EEA country.244 But there are many lessons to be learned on the way and this notional capacity has yet to be fully tested in action.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the lessons learned, stating it will build a resilient test, trace, and isolate infrastructure, work with local authorities, and ensure UKHSA maintains local tracing relationships to protect against future health threats.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
165
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
In this Chapter we consider in particular: • the initial testing capacity available; • the decision to abandon testing in the community; • the 100,000 tests a day target introduced by the then Secretary of State; • the centralisation of testing laboratories; • the shortage of testing capacity in Autumn …
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In this Chapter we consider in particular: • the initial testing capacity available; • the decision to abandon testing in the community; • the 100,000 tests a day target introduced by the then Secretary of State; • the centralisation of testing laboratories; • the shortage of testing capacity in Autumn 2020; • the organisation of contact tracing; and • the management of “NHS” Test and Trace. Limited testing capacity
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Government response AI summary
The government states it will build on the legacy of the pandemic's test, trace, and isolate response, ensuring resilient infrastructure and continued collaboration with local authorities through UKHSA for future public health threats.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
166
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
During the early days of the pandemic, the Government believed—and told the public—that testing for covid-19 was a field in which the UK had a leading position. This assessment was shared, and possibly arose out of, the views of scientific advisers. The minutes of the very first SAGE meeting on …
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During the early days of the pandemic, the Government believed—and told the public—that testing for covid-19 was a field in which the UK had a leading position. This assessment was shared, and possibly arose out of, the views of scientific advisers. The minutes of the very first SAGE meeting on covid-19 on 22 January 2020 stated: 243 On 2 April 2020, when the Government announced its new 5-pillar testing strategy, 4,522 Covid-19 cases were recorded. 244 GOV.UK, ‘Coronavirus in the UK: Testing’; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, ‘Data on testing for COVID-19 by week and country’. Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 61 The UK currently has good centralised diagnostic capacity for WN-CoV [covid-19]–and is days away from a specific test, which is scalable across the UK in weeks.245 The following day, on 23 January 2020, the then Secretary of State for Health and Social Care told the House that the UK is “one of the first countries to have developed a world-leading test for the new coronavirus.”246 When the Prime Minister claimed to have “growing confidence that we will have a test, track and trace operation that will be world-beating,” it may be that this early lead was what he had in mind.247 However, it rapidly became apparent that the scientific expertise in identifying the virus and the ability to deploy that operationally were very different. Public Health England was initially responsible for managing covid-19 testing as well as the scientific development of a test for covid-19, but it is in the former that its deficiencies were exposed.
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the test, trace, and isolate legacy by outlining plans to build a resilient and scalable infrastructure, work with local authorities, and maintain UKHSA's relationships for future public health emergencies.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
169
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
However, throughout the pandemic, our Committees have taken a great interest in what might be learned and applied from how other countries tackled the virus. In March 2020, the World Health Organisation recommended that nations “plan for surge capacity by establishing decentralized testing capacity in sub-national laboratories”.252 Dr Seon Kui …
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However, throughout the pandemic, our Committees have taken a great interest in what might be learned and applied from how other countries tackled the virus. In March 2020, the World Health Organisation recommended that nations “plan for surge capacity by establishing decentralized testing capacity in sub-national laboratories”.252 Dr Seon Kui Erica Lee, of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, told the Science and Technology Committee in April 2020 that testing capacity in the Republic of Korea had expanded rapidly because of lessons learned from the 2015 MERS outbreak.253 Dr 245 GOV.UK, SAGE 1, 22 January 2020 246 HC oral statement, 23 January 2020, Vol 670 [Commons Chamber] 247 HC oral questions, 20 May 2020, Vol 676 [Commons Chamber] 248 GOV.UK, SAGE 2, 28 January 2020 249 See, for example: oral evidence taken before the Health and Social Care Committee on 19 May 2020, HC (2019– 21) 36 and oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 16 April 2020, HC (2019–21) 136 250 Department of Health and Social Care, via Twitter, 11 March 2020 251 Q343 252 World Health Organisation, ‘Laboratory testing strategy recommendations for COVID-19: interim guidance: 23 March 2020’, accessed 17 September 2021 253 Oral evidence taken before the Science and Technology Committee on 8 April 2020, HC (2019–21) 136, Q145 62 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date Max Roser also explained to us that “by mid-March [2020], Germany was testing 50,000 people per day”, whilst the UK was “very late” and reached the same capacity one and a half months later.254
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Government response AI summary
The government's response, phrased as a directive, states that Public Health England and its successors, Ministers, and advisers should be more willing to study and emulate international practices with urgency and agility during crises.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
184
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Given the painfully slow increase in the availability of testing before April 2020, we consider that the impact of the Secretary of State’s target to have been an appropriate one to galvanise the rapid change the system needed. However, as such a personal and unilateral approach was needed—and appears not …
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Given the painfully slow increase in the availability of testing before April 2020, we consider that the impact of the Secretary of State’s target to have been an appropriate one to galvanise the rapid change the system needed. However, as such a personal and unilateral approach was needed—and appears not to have been supported by other parts of Government—it is concerning to contemplate what would have happened without this unorthodox initiative.
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Government response AI summary
The government partially accepts the recommendation, generally agreeing on the importance of learning from other countries and disciplines, and describes ongoing efforts to review and improve the methodology of the National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA).
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
43
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
The covid-19 pandemic has put massive strain on a social care sector already under huge pressure, which has a particular focus on caring for elderly people who have been at the greatest risk of death from covid.
Government response AI summary
The government recognises the pandemic's impact on the social care sector, referencing the 'Build Back Better' plan from September 2021 for reform, funding, and closer integration of health and social care.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
44
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Social care had a less prominent voice in Government during the early stages of the pandemic than did the NHS.
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the impact of the pandemic on social care and references the 'Build Back Better' plan for health and social care reform, which aims to strengthen adult social care and foster closer ties between sectors.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
45
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
The discharge of elderly people from NHS hospitals into care homes without having been tested at the beginning of the pandemic—while understandable as the NHS prepared to accept a surge of covid patients—had the unintended consequence of contributing to the spread of infection in care homes. The seeding of infections …
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The discharge of elderly people from NHS hospitals into care homes without having been tested at the beginning of the pandemic—while understandable as the NHS prepared to accept a surge of covid patients—had the unintended consequence of contributing to the spread of infection in care homes. The seeding of infections also happened as a result of staff entering care homes, and the failure to recognise this risk early is a symptom of the inadequate initial focus on social care. The lack of available testing at the time meant that the extent of spread by each route of transmission cannot be fully known and has not been conclusively determined by the report commissioned from PHE by the Government.
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Government response AI summary
The government recognises the pandemic's impact on social care, referencing the 'Build Back Better' plan from September 2021 for reform, sustainable funding, and closer integration of health and social care.
Read full response →
Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
46
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
Staff shortages, the lack of testing, difficulties in obtaining PPE and the design of care settings to enable communal living hampered isolation and infection control and the ability to keep covid at bay. Social care staff in care homes and providing domiciliary care worked under strenuous conditions, at risk to …
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Staff shortages, the lack of testing, difficulties in obtaining PPE and the design of care settings to enable communal living hampered isolation and infection control and the ability to keep covid at bay. Social care staff in care homes and providing domiciliary care worked under strenuous conditions, at risk to themselves, to provide care to people. (Paragraph 291) Coronavirus: lessons learned to date 131
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Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the impact of the pandemic on the social care sector, pointing to the 'Build Back Better' plan as its response to strengthen services through reform, a sustainable funding model, and closer integration with health.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
52
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
The impact of covid-19 has been uneven across the population, with some sections of society suffering significantly higher illness and deaths than the nation as a whole.
Government response AI summary
The government acknowledges the uneven impact of COVID-19, particularly on ethnic minority groups, highlighting actions already taken and proposals made in the 'Levelling Up the United Kingdom' white paper.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care
53
Conclusion
Third Report - Coronavirus: lessons lea…
Acknowledged
During the initial phase of the pandemic Black, Asian and minority ethnic people experienced significantly higher levels of severe illness and death from covid than was typical the population as a whole. Research conducted so far suggests that the drivers of these elevated levels of impact among Black, Asian and …
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During the initial phase of the pandemic Black, Asian and minority ethnic people experienced significantly higher levels of severe illness and death from covid than was typical the population as a whole. Research conducted so far suggests that the drivers of these elevated levels of impact among Black, Asian and minority ethnic people arise from greater likelihood of jobs that come with higher exposure to covid infection; more challenging social and economic circumstances; more densely occupied housing; and comorbidities from different health conditions. These are classic features of inequality in society and in the economy. (Paragraph 331) 132 Coronavirus: lessons learned to date
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Government response AI summary
The government recognises the disproportionate impact on ethnic minority groups, stating it has taken action to support them and that socio-economic factors are addressed in the 'Levelling Up the United Kingdom' white paper.
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Department for Science, Innovation and Technology
Department of Health and Social Care