Source · Scotland · Fatal Accident Inquiry
Harry McKenzie
Scotland · FAI
Reference: FFR-B61-09
Published: 30 Dec 2008
Sheriff: Sheriff K.A. Veal
Sheriffdom: Tayside, Central and Fife
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Court recommendations
Identified
Responses identified
0
8-week deadline
24 Feb 2009
Section 28 status
Response pending
Recommendations
(Fifty eight) A reasonable precaution, whereby the death of Mr. McKenzie might have been avoided, would have been the wearing of the seatbelt by himself, as the driver of the lorry concerned. To comply with this precaution would only require the driver of the lorry to use the seatbelt already fitted within the lorry. Accordingly, notwithstanding current practice, HGV Drivers - such as Mr. McKenzie - should wear seatbelts at all times.
(Sixty) The ongoing use of AIB’s on Crash Cushion Vehicles requires that all operatives driving and having responsibility for such vehicles should be properly trained and required to take refresher courses at periodic intervals to ensure that they are kept up-to-date with the operation of these vehicles and attached AIB’s. Such operatives should, on a daily basis, examine the vehicle for which they will have responsibility that day prior to any operation involving that vehicle commencing. A log-book should be kept by the employers, and initialled each day by operatives to record that the daily check has in fact been made. Drivers ought also to be made aware of the normal operation of the system, and be required to report forthwith any deviations from the norm, so that immediate remedial action may be taken. In particular, the daily inspections should include • a check that the warning and telltale lights in the Cab Box are responding correctly, • a visual inspection of the Down Limit Switch on the Crash Cushion, (to detect any corrosion and that the arm and wheel thereon move smoothly, and then dry and treat with dampness inhibitor or replace as required). (Sixty one) In-depth periodic checks should be carried out on the whole system of operation of AIB’s and related equipment to identify faults. Such periodic checks, the frequency of which should be determined by recommendation from the Health and Safety Inspectorate, should be carried out at the depot where the vehicle is “based”, and by appropriately qualified engineers. A written record should be kept of such inspections. (Sixty two) All users and operators of Crash Cushion vehicles with AIB components should be informed - in writing and at regular intervals after the commencement of their operation of such vehicles with AIBs - of correct installation, maintenance and periodic test procedures, with particular reference to the procedures related to the Down Limit Switch, the correct connection to the electrical supply, and related functions matters, as recommended by the manufacturers and VOSA. (Sixty three) The manufacturers and the Regulator, (VOSA), ought to explore means whereby Voltage Transient Pulses can be prevented from interfering with the electrical circuits of the Automatic Impact Braking System. In particular, the introduction of decoupling capacitators and MOV’s - with a view to protecting the C300 and ACU components from spurious triggering - should be actively considered. (Sixty four) Consideration ought also to be given to ensuring that that water does not enter the Down Limit Switch, and that any corrosion of equipment within the Down Load switch is readily identified, with immediate restorative action being taken. (Sixty five) Consideration ought also, as a matter of high priority, to be given to immediately alerting the driver of the Crash Cushion Vehicle on all occasions that the AIB is in the “Armed” state. In this connection, drivers of vehicles with AIB systems should ensure that the AIB system is turned off at all times when the crash cushion is not deployed, (Sixty six) As set out supra, the AIB has an important safety related function. Thus, it would be reasonable - in light of what happened in this accident - that a full analysis of its failure modes be undertaken by the manufacturer, in association with the Regulator and the Health and Safety Executive. Such analysis should be very comprehensive, and would incorporate inter alia a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, and a probability of brake operation analysis. (Sixty seven) Installers of AIB systems on vehicles should : - • not modify in any way the AIB system as supplied by the manufacturers. • ensure that the power supply for the AIB system is taken from the ignition supply, and • otherwise avoid running the power cables for the AIB system parallel to other power cables.
(Sixty) The ongoing use of AIB’s on Crash Cushion Vehicles requires that all operatives driving and having responsibility for such vehicles should be properly trained and required to take refresher courses at periodic intervals to ensure that they are kept up-to-date with the operation of these vehicles and attached AIB’s. Such operatives should, on a daily basis, examine the vehicle for which they will have responsibility that day prior to any operation involving that vehicle commencing. A log-book should be kept by the employers, and initialled each day by operatives to record that the daily check has in fact been made. Drivers ought also to be made aware of the normal operation of the system, and be required to report forthwith any deviations from the norm, so that immediate remedial action may be taken. In particular, the daily inspections should include • a check that the warning and telltale lights in the Cab Box are responding correctly, • a visual inspection of the Down Limit Switch on the Crash Cushion, (to detect any corrosion and that the arm and wheel thereon move smoothly, and then dry and treat with dampness inhibitor or replace as required). (Sixty one) In-depth periodic checks should be carried out on the whole system of operation of AIB’s and related equipment to identify faults. Such periodic checks, the frequency of which should be determined by recommendation from the Health and Safety Inspectorate, should be carried out at the depot where the vehicle is “based”, and by appropriately qualified engineers. A written record should be kept of such inspections. (Sixty two) All users and operators of Crash Cushion vehicles with AIB components should be informed - in writing and at regular intervals after the commencement of their operation of such vehicles with AIBs - of correct installation, maintenance and periodic test procedures, with particular reference to the procedures related to the Down Limit Switch, the correct connection to the electrical supply, and related functions matters, as recommended by the manufacturers and VOSA. (Sixty three) The manufacturers and the Regulator, (VOSA), ought to explore means whereby Voltage Transient Pulses can be prevented from interfering with the electrical circuits of the Automatic Impact Braking System. In particular, the introduction of decoupling capacitators and MOV’s - with a view to protecting the C300 and ACU components from spurious triggering - should be actively considered. (Sixty four) Consideration ought also to be given to ensuring that that water does not enter the Down Limit Switch, and that any corrosion of equipment within the Down Load switch is readily identified, with immediate restorative action being taken. (Sixty five) Consideration ought also, as a matter of high priority, to be given to immediately alerting the driver of the Crash Cushion Vehicle on all occasions that the AIB is in the “Armed” state. In this connection, drivers of vehicles with AIB systems should ensure that the AIB system is turned off at all times when the crash cushion is not deployed, (Sixty six) As set out supra, the AIB has an important safety related function. Thus, it would be reasonable - in light of what happened in this accident - that a full analysis of its failure modes be undertaken by the manufacturer, in association with the Regulator and the Health and Safety Executive. Such analysis should be very comprehensive, and would incorporate inter alia a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, and a probability of brake operation analysis. (Sixty seven) Installers of AIB systems on vehicles should : - • not modify in any way the AIB system as supplied by the manufacturers. • ensure that the power supply for the AIB system is taken from the ignition supply, and • otherwise avoid running the power cables for the AIB system parallel to other power cables.
Under section 28 of the 2016 Act, each recipient of a recommendation must respond within 8 weeks.
The window from publication ran to 24 February 2009.
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Section 28 responses
Response pendingNo response has been identified on the case landing page yet. The 8-week window has closed without a published response or non-response notice.
Determination details
- Reference
- FFR-B61-09
- Published
- 30 December 2008
- Sheriff
- Sheriff K.A. Veal
- Sheriffdom
- Tayside, Central and Fife
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About FAIs
Fatal Accident Inquiries are held under the
2016 Act
before a sheriff. They are mandatory for deaths in custody and at work.
The sheriff may make recommendations under s.26(1)(b); recipients must respond within 8 weeks under
s.28. See the methodology page for detail.