The Government should introduce its proposed legislation on the criminal law of bribery as soon as possible in order to remove any uncertainty regarding the scope of the statutory offence of bribery and to make clear that members of both Houses of Parliament, acting in their capacity as members, and those who bribe a member of either House of Parliament fall within its scope.
Where a complaint is made to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards alleging criminal conduct by an MP and the complaint is neither malicious nor frivolous, then the Parliamentary Commissioner should report to the Committee on Standards and Privileges with a recommendation that the matter be referred to the police for further investigation.
`Trial' procedure in serious, contested cases 1. Where (a) the Parliamentary Commissioner finds a prima facie case against an accused MP, the alleged facts of which, if true, would amount to serious misconduct, but (b) the alleged facts are disputed by the accused MP, the Parliamentary Commissioner should report to the Committee on Standards and Privileges with a recommendation that the case be referred to a disciplinary tribunal consisting of a legal chairman sitting with either two or four MPs who should be of substantial seniority. 2. Before making a decision about whether to accept the Parliamentary Commissioner's recommendation, the Committee on Standards and Privileges should allow the accused MP an opportunity to make representations in respect of that decision. 3. If the Parliamentary Commissioner's recommendation is accepted, the accused MP should be provided with financial assistance to enable him or her to fund legal representation at the hearings of the tribunal. 4. The tribunal should be governed by procedures which satisfy the ``minimum standards of fairness'', as defined by the Nicholls Committee. 5. The tribunal should both act as fact-finder and decide whether, on the basis of the facts found, the charges against the accused MP are proved. 6. The tribunal should report its conclusions to the Committee on Standards and Privileges and, assuming no appeal is being lodged, the Committee should consider what penalty (if any) should be recommended to the House of Commons. 1 Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life
Appeal procedure in serious, contested cases 1. An accused MP who receives an adverse ruling from the first instance tribunal should have a right of appeal and should be entitled to financial assistance to pursue that appeal. 2. The appeal should be heard by an ad hoc appellate tribunal, possibly a retired senior appellate judge sitting alone. 3. If the appeal is dismissed, the Committee should report the result of the appeal to the House of Commons along with any recommendation as to penalty.
`Trial' and appeal procedure in other contested cases 1. In cases which, in the opinion of the Parliamentary Commissioner, do not warrant a referral to the full tribunal, the Parliamentary Commissioner should make a recommendation to the Committee on Standards and Privileges accordingly. The Committee should decide whether to uphold the recommendation of the Commissioner on the basis of the Commissioner's report and of the representations (if any) by the accused MP. 2. In those cases that remain with the Parliamentary Commissioner, the Commissioner should investigate the complaint and, on the basis of the facts found, decide whether the complaint should be upheld or dismissed. The Commissioner's decision should be reported to the Standards and Privileges Committee which should, in turn, decide whether or not to adopt the Commissioner's report and what penalty (if any) should be recommended to the House. 3. In cases where an accused MP disputes the Commissioner's findings or conclusions, that MP should be able to appeal against the Commissioner's decision, such an appeal to be heard either by the Committee itself or by such ad hoc appellate body as it decides to appoint.
Disciplinary procedure in non-contested cases In non-contested cases, whether serious or minor, the Parliamentary Commissioner should, in accordance with present practice, report the (undisputed) facts and conclusions based on those facts to the Committee on Standards and Privileges which, if it endorses the report, should recommend to the House of Commons what penalty (if any) should be imposed.
The disciplinary proceedings of the House of Commons should be held in public but should not be broadcast. This recommendation as to hearings in public does not extend to the private deliberations of the Standards and Privileges Committee or of any disciplinary or appellate tribunal (which should remain private).
The House of Commons should take measures in relation to the Committee on Standards and Privileges, with a view: (a) to ensuring that a substantial proportion of its members are senior MPs, and (b) to exempting the Committee from the convention that its chairman should be drawn from the Government benches.
The guidelines relating to the ban on paid advocacy, set out in the Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of Members, should be amended so as to make it possible for an MP who has a personal interest to initiate proceedings which relate in a general way (and not exclusively) to that interest, subject to the following safeguards:. the MP is prohibited from engaging in `paid advocacy' on behalf of that interest;. he or she is required to register and declare the interest in accordance with the guidelines;. he or she must identify his or her interest on the Order Paper (or Notice Paper) by way of an agreed symbol when initiating a debate. Chapter 4: Ministers
Paragraph 123 of the Ministerial Code should be amended to make it clear that a Minister, having had the advice of his or her Permanent Secretary on potential conflicts of interests, must take full responsibility for any subsequent decision.
The final three sentences in section 1 of the Ministerial Code should be redrafted to clarify the role of the Prime Minister. It will be for the Prime Minister to determine the precise wording but we suggest the following text: It will be for individual Ministers to judge how best to act in order to uphold the highest standards. They are responsible for justifying their conduct to Parliament and retaining its confidence. The Prime Minister remains the ultimate judge of the requirements of the Code and the appropriate consequences of breaches of it.
The presentation of section 1 of the Ministerial Code should be improved to reflect its importance as a statement of the ethical principles governing ministerial conduct. In particular the final three sentences, redrafted as suggested above, should be clearly distinguished from the preceding text. Chapter 5: Civil Servants
Permanent heads of department and heads of profession, in conjunction with the Centre for Management and Policy Studies, should ensure that there are training and induction opportunities for those appointed on secondments or on short-term contracts to middle management or senior Civil Service levels at which ethical issues within the public sector are examined.
The arrangements for validating the performance of permanent heads of department and agencies against their personal objectives need to be subject to further scrutiny but should be structured to allow for some element of independent validation so as not to undermine political impartiality.
A timetable for the implementation of the Government's commitment to a Civil Service Act should be produced as soon as possible. In particular a target date should be set for the process of consultation on the scope of such an Act. 3 Sixth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life Chapter 6: Special Advisers
The Ministerial Code should be amended to reflect the fact that in certain circumstances more than two special advisers per Cabinet Minister may be appointed. The Prime Minister may wish to set out in the Code the criteria which should be applied if the limit is to be exceeded.
The proposed Civil Service Act should contain a provision limiting the total number of special advisers that can be appointed within Government. Any increase beyond that figure should be made subject to affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament.
Pending the enactment of the Civil Service Act, the Government should put before both Houses of Parliament for debate a limit on the total number of special advisers that can be appointed within Government.
Any increase in the number of special advisers with executive powers should be subject to the same process of Parliamentary scrutiny as set out in recommendations R19 and R20 above for the overall number of special advisers.
There should be a separate code of conduct for special advisers. The special advisers' code should: (a) consolidate appropriate elements of the Civil Service Code, the Model Contract and paragraph 56 of the Ministerial Code, which sets out the duty to uphold the political impartiality of the Civil Service and other obligations; (b) include a section on the direct media contacts of special advisers, making clear the nature of the role that they play in relation to the work of Civil Service information staff and in particular the role of the departmental head of information, as set out in the Guidance on the Work of the Government Information Service published in July 1997; (c) be enforced by permanent heads of department.
The Government should include in the contracts of employment of all future special advisers a clause requiring the special adviser to abide by the terms of the special advisers' code, and the Model Contract and the Civil Service Code should not apply to them. The Government should also ensure that existing special advisers abide by the terms of the special advisers' code.
There should be no statutory or compulsory system for the regulation of lobbyists. The current strengthening of self-regulation by lobbyists is to be welcomed.
For Ministers, the basic facts about official meetings with external interests (which should include the date and time, the people involved and the general subject under discussion) should be recorded in their office diaries, which should be retained. The Ministerial Code should be supplemented accordingly. and Observations
For civil servants including special advisers, the current guidance on lobbying should be strengthened, to ensure that a record is kept of the basic facts (which should include the date and time, the people involved and the general subject under discussion) of any contact with external interests in which those interests attempt to influence policy and decisions.
The Cabinet Office should issue guidance on consultation, which would have as its objective a uniformly high and transparent standard of consultation on policy issues and decisions. This might be in the form of a Consultation Code, which would seek to ensure that departments meet the principles set out in the current Cabinet Office document on Best Practice in Written Consultation.
The Register of All-Party Parliamentary and Associate Parliamentary Groups should be placed on the internet. The question of the ease of public access to information about All-Party Groups should be kept under review by both Houses.
The Cabinet Office should produce a set of principles (based on the current Cabinet Office guidelines but reflecting recommendations R33, R34, R35 and R36) to be followed by all departments that wish to attract private or voluntary sector sponsorship. Each of these departments should incorporate these principles in a more detailed practical document, appropriate to its own requirements.
The Cabinet Office sponsorship principles should include a requirement that departments must satisfy themselves, before they begin to seek sponsorship, that any sponsorship is likely to produce significant net benefit for the department, at no detriment to the public interest. Departments should in particular examine rigorously whether: (a) particular activities should be excluded from sponsorship, and (b) particular types of company could be held to be unsuitable for consideration as sponsors on the grounds of potential conflicts of interest or inappropriate association.
Each department which seeks sponsorship should identify an official, who would be responsible for ensuring that the relevant guidance on sponsorship is known and observed throughout that department. The official should liaise with other such officials across government departments to ensure high standards of propriety in relations with sponsors.
There should be disclosure in departmental annual reports, and to the public on request, of the details, including the value received, of sponsorship of government activities by the private and voluntary sectors. For sponsorship valued at less than £5,000, the individual amounts need not be disclosed.
In recording the value of sponsorship, the figure to be recorded should be the value of the sponsorship to the government department. Guidance on the correct way to record `in-kind' sponsorship in such disclosures should be appended to the principles set out by the Cabinet Office.
The Secretary of State for Health should review the procedure governing reappointments to NHS bodies with a view: (a) to re-introducing a system under which those seeking reappointment for the first time, who have been assessed as performing satisfactorily in their posts, can be reappointed without being compared to an external candidate; (b) to ensuring that those seeking reappointment are kept fully informed about the progress of the reappointment process at all stages; and (c) to ensuring that the reappointment process is undertaken at the appropriate stage and a decision on reappointment is made reasonably in advance (say, two months) of the end of the post-holder's term of office.
The Secretary of State for Health should reconsider, with the advice of the Public Appointments Commissioner and following the Commissioner's scrutiny of the NHS appointments system (see O3 below), the appointments procedure in relation to NHS trusts and authorities with a view to setting up, if practicable, a less centralised appointments system than the present register system, subject to the need to maintain standards of performance and delivery across the NHS system. O3. We support the announcement of the Commissioner for Public Appointments that she intends undertaking a scrutiny of the appointment procedure used for NHS appointments and look forward to the report of her findings. O4. We welcome the work of the Commissioner for Public Appointments on developing measures to improve the balance of representation on the boards of public bodies and look forward to the report of her conclusions. As part of the objectives of her work, we invite her to consider. how to improve the range of candidates from which public appointees are drawn, and. how the concept of `merit' can be reconciled with the need for a balanced and appropriately qualified representation.