Amend firearms authorisation forms for risk assessment and tipping points

More broadly, and while the work at a national level is ongoing, internal guidance has been issued to all CTSFO Tac Advisors within MO19 regarding the need to tailor FA5 forms to a given operation, and to identify the use of any copy used in previous forms (chiefly the tool kit or menu of firearms tactics text) by the use of highlight or other signifier within the text. The MPS will give further, formal guidance to Firearms Commanders in light of the NPCC project’s findings, recommendations or requirements in due course. 13. As noted above in relation to multidimensional risk assessments, the MPS has already taken steps to set aside time during training days to focus trainees on the usage and completion of the FA forms. 14. Once the command logs are revised at a national level through the NPCC project, the MPS will ensure that training is provided in their use and completion. This will also provide an opportunity to tailor the revised template to address MPS specific procedures in which recommendation 4 will again be considered.

As noted above, the FA forms utilised by the MPS are derived from elements of the national command log and developed to complement the MPS operational command model and process for seeking authority to deploy armed officers. a) The requirement to complete and revise a multidimensional threat assessment throughout an armed operation, and commencing at the planning stage, is included in relevant national curriculum. The ongoing command log review being undertaken by NPCC will explicitly include the requirement to complete and record multidimensional threat assessments throughout an operation. b) The NPFTC includes an explanation and specific definitions of ‘tipping point’ and ‘threshold’. Tipping point A tipping point occurs when threat and risk assessment indicates that the risk of harm is or may be so great that it is necessary to take decisive or mitigating action. This may occur prior to the (investigative) threshold being reached and may affect the SIO strategy or evidential sufficiency. Where practicable in the circumstances, this should be discussed with the SIO. It may be possible to determine a tipping point(s) along a timeline and brief officer on the tactical plan. A tipping point may also emerge unexpectedly during an incident or operation, and require immediate action to be taken, the implementation of a contingency or a deviation from the original plan. Threshold A threshold is the point at which operational or investigative objectives are met. This may vary over the timeline where determined by new information or intelligence. When a threshold is met it may be appropriate to implement a tactical option or resolution. This may not be required immediately and will depend on the threat and risk assessment. When a threshold has been met, police action should take place at a point in time which best meets the working strategy. Evidential threshold is also a common term understood by investigators (SIO) when discussing appropriate action and considering sustained public protection. c) The FA1 form utilised by the MPS provides a mechanism by which to make an intelligence-based case and request for consideration in respect of the deployment of armed officers. The same process is embedded within the national command log template. The majority of UK police forces have an operating model that separates the serious crime investigation function from firearms command and therefore requires the information that would populate an FA1 to be documented and presented within the command log. d) The current national command log has significant capacity for recording in the operational log which allows for commanders to document and explain changes to any element of the operation or decision making. APP-AP states: ‘Commanders have a responsibility to record their decisions, actions and supporting rationale as accurately and fully as is practicable, using the NDM as the structure. This should be done contemporaneously if possible, commencing at the point at which they begin to consider any incident that may require the deployment of armed officers. The extent to which this can be achieved will depend on the circumstances and the nature of the incident or operation. Where it has not been possible to make a record contemporaneously, or soon after the event, the record should reflect this, the reason why and when it was made. Individual commanders must be prepared to account for their decisions and to explain their rationale at the time that those decisions were taken. All plans should be documented, including options rejected or progressed, together with the reasons why such conclusions were drawn and by whom’. As a consequence of the recommendation, the NPCC review of minimum national standards for command logs will explicitly reflect the requirements associated with recommendation 4 (a-d). The College will include these minimum national standards, once defined, within APP-AP.

No statement on delivery from National Police Chiefs Council has been found in the sources searched. This is separate from the response above.