SHEE-38

Discourage slab-sided vessel design and improve athwartships escape routes

Sheen Inquiry · Sheen Inquiry — Final Report · Issued 24 July 1987

Government responseNot tracked (historical inquiry)

DeliveryNo statement from the addressee found

Recommendation, verbatim from the inquiry

●Inquiry recommendation

The Court thinks that in general, the design of slab sided vessels should be discouraged. The main objections to them are:- 1. They eliminate outboard fore and aft escape routes. 2. Embarkation stations often have to be on the top deck, which is very high above the water. It is in the context of current design that the importance of being able to break side windows arises, not only if a ship is on her beam ends, but also to allow the possibility of escape in extreme circumstances when the ship is upright. Athwartships doors should be provided at recognised intervals; and thought should be given to providing access to them with the ship at significant angles of heel, say in excess of 20°. Additionally, it is a matter of some concern that passengers should be able to recognise readily escape routes and doors allowing exit athwartships from these long passenger compartments. Prominent labelling of decks, exits, lifejacket stows and muster stations is important. The Court considers that designers and the Department should give attention to these matters. Another matter of concern is the efficiency of emergency exits from accommodation below bulkhead deck. A steward, Mr. Butler, heard water running down the stairs from G deck to the lower accommodation. This must have been going over the sill from the vehicle deck which was 200 mm in height. Consideration should be given to whether such sills should be higher, say 600 mm. The HERALD had two main passenger compartments below the bulkhead deck, between frames 105-118 and between 118-132. Each of these was fitted with two means of escape in accordance with the P.S.C. Regulations 1980. However, there was a watertight door between the two passenger compartments and this was often kept open for convenience and access. If this door was open during the casualty that was not causative. Nevertheless such a door should be kept shut at sea and not used as an escape route. This is a matter which should be implemented immediately. Furthermore, there should be immediately a general safety audit of means of escape from passenger compartments below bulkhead decks in existing ships to ensure that:- (a) they comply with the relevant Passenger Ship Regulations, and (b) that the Regulations themselves are being applied properly and rigorously. A single means of escape from spaces below the bulkhead deck is dangerous. Supplementary escapes should take into account the possibility that collision damage or submergence may render them useless.

Sheen Inquiry, Sheen Inquiry — Final Report · 24 Jul 1987 Source PDF →

Government response

●No formal government response recorded

The Index has not yet recorded a verbatim government response to this recommendation.

Delivery

No statement on delivery from the addressee has been found in the sources searched. This is separate from the response above.

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