Source · Prevention of Future Deaths
Ajvir Sandhu
Ref: 2016-0436-wp25562
Date: 8 Dec 2016
Coroner: Michael Oakley
Area: North Yorkshire (East)
Responses identified: 0 / 1
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Safety concerns include the lack of mandatory parachutes with static lines in certain aircraft and insufficient mandatory spin recovery training on specific light aircraft types for pilots.
Date
8 Dec 2016
56-day deadline
2 Feb 2017
Responses identified
0 of 1
Coroner's concerns
Safety concerns include the lack of mandatory parachutes with static lines in certain aircraft and insufficient mandatory spin recovery training on specific light aircraft types for pilots.
View full coroner's concerns
1. The two lead investigators from the AAIB stated that neither occupant was wearing a parachute and that parachutes were not supplied but had they done so and abandoned the aircraft at a safe height that would have offered both of them the possibility of survival. The AAIB referred me to leaflet number 90 issued by the CAA relating to static line parachutes and I would advise that further consideration should be given to whether those leaflets should be revised and/or that regulations are introduced making mandatory the provision of parachutes with static lines for aircraft of this nature.
2 That there should be a review taking place of whether regulations should be introduced to make spin recovery training mandatory on specific types of light aircraft before a person can fly that light aircraft and carry out aerobatics.
3. Evidence was given from the AAIB that whilst it was clear that Mr Sandhu had had spin recovery training within the Royal Air Force that spin recovery training had taken place on two different aircraft and not the Slingsby Firefly. Concern has been expressed within the Inquest that in an aircraft well understood to have areas requiring specific handling techniques it should be established that the persons who fly them are trained and proficient in those areas and have the ability to recover the aircraft from an uncontrolled condition.
2 That there should be a review taking place of whether regulations should be introduced to make spin recovery training mandatory on specific types of light aircraft before a person can fly that light aircraft and carry out aerobatics.
3. Evidence was given from the AAIB that whilst it was clear that Mr Sandhu had had spin recovery training within the Royal Air Force that spin recovery training had taken place on two different aircraft and not the Slingsby Firefly. Concern has been expressed within the Inquest that in an aircraft well understood to have areas requiring specific handling techniques it should be established that the persons who fly them are trained and proficient in those areas and have the ability to recover the aircraft from an uncontrolled condition.
Report sections
Investigation and inquest
On the 4th May 2016 I commenced an investigation in to the deaths of Ajvir Singh Sandhu aged 25 and Cameron James Forster aged 21. The investigation was concluded at the end of the Inquest on the 5 December 2016. The conclusion of the inquest in the case of both persons was accidental.
Circumstances of the death
Both the deceased persons were Flying Officers training with the Royal Air Force at RAF Linton Upon Ouse. On the 30 April 2016 whilst off duty the first deceased Mr Sandhu hired a Slingsby T67 Firefly aeroplane from Full Sutton Flying Centre at York. Mr Sandhu had previously hired the same plane back in January. Both Mr Sandhu and Mr Forster then flew out of Full Sutton Flying Centre and whilst performing aerobatics and getting the aircraft into a spin above Castle Howard near to Whitwell Hill Malton the light aircraft which they were flying crashed into a field and both occupants were killed.
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, and to of the AAIB
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Report details
- Reference
- 2016-0436-wp25562
- Date of report
- 8 December 2016
- Coroner
- Michael Oakley
- Coroner area
- North Yorkshire (East)
Responses identified
Responses identified
0 of 1
1 response not yet linked
Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 2 Feb 2017.
Sent to
- Department for Transport