Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Francesca Whyatt

Ref: 2017-0248 Date: 21 Aug 2017 Coroner: Karon Monaghan Area: London Inner (West) Responses identified: 1 / 4 View PDF

Key safety gaps include no risk assessment for ward configuration, inadequate guidance on agency staff observation competency, and the failure to automatically treat ligature incidents as Serious Untoward Incidents (SUIs), despite the rapid risk of death.

Date 21 Aug 2017
56-day deadline 16 Oct 2017
Responses identified 1 of 4
Hospital Death (Clinical Procedures and medical management) related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
Key safety gaps include no risk assessment for ward configuration, inadequate guidance on agency staff observation competency, and the failure to automatically treat ligature incidents as Serious Untoward Incidents (SUIs), despite the rapid risk of death.
View full coroner's concerns
(1) There has been no risk assessment of the configuration of the East Wing ward over four floors.

(2) There is no written or other formal guidance on the frequency with which ad-hoc agency staff should complete the observation competency checklist.

(3) Ligature incidents are not automatically treated as SUIs (though the evidence suggests that death can occur within seconds of a ligature being applied).

(4) There is no clear guidance or criteria on the circumstances in which a ligature incident/s (or other self-harming incident/s) should be treated as an SUI such as to trigger an SUI investigation.

Responses

1 respondent
Priory Hospital Private Sector
PDF
Action Taken

The Priory Hospital Roehampton details environmental and health and safety risk assessments undertaken and coordinated with Policy H43 Observation and Engagement throughout the ward. The Incident Management; Reporting and Investigation Policy (OP4) has been updated to include a requirement that serious self-harm incidents will require an SBAR notification to be made and further investigation will be commissioned. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Ms Monaghan; ReMs Francesca Whyatt (deceased) dated Monday 21 the Regulation 28 Report to Prevercthincturre Deettf ctevs Fancesca Iwrite to you in response to to the Inquest Touching the August t2017 that YoU issued irnaseopon are set out below; Agyatt ?he matters of concern and responses over four of the East Wing ward no risk assessment of the configuration There has been floors: that patients are unable to would respectfully ask vou to please note without being escorted; As preliminary issue, ebeewhole of the basement (Floor U patients with mental access the rooms on Floor or that many units in the UK for and Fcceher; Jewould wish to make the gereral will inform the main risk assessment risk are multi-level and that layout In addition, to support clinical health issues the clinical risk assessment fora health and safety risk assessments management tool i.e; environmental and assessments, there will be more which are summarised below. and management ward patients have a current clinical rishtsssesspeans_ on day-to-day Clinical Risk_assessnents: All aeuitements of these assessmeahs ar/plansexperierced ward place. In order to meet the with oversight from an plan in core staff team in place that the group are basis the ward has Systems in place to ensure team: All baanager and hospital teanageetentbervationts undertaken by fully trained It subject to co-ordinated erafetaccodenctionth Policr H43 Observatioduandhergpgeengroughoord observations are undertaken in_ patients are in individual therapy in the also be noted that during the the ots te ward (or other areas of the Hospital) areas and will therefore occupy presence of staff. an ongoing basis, there to the opening of a service and on blind audits: Environmental risk_assessmentsspior which wili include ligature and Quality Walk will be an environmental riskrassefeasentwicei Additionally thereateet eckStarusafety and Thesee audits wilil be refreshed at least these include reference to; and risk being completed by senior nursing staff_ obstruction; areas that present a Rounds to corridors being kept free of available: The documents make reference emergency equipment being effectively and 12th point ward patient: general patient regular are staff should occupied day, particular spot point year. patient are completed managed

THE PRIOY HOSPITAL reviewed by the relevant hospital director and are also subject to review by the ROEHAMPTON divisional quality team: Health_and_safety_risk_assessments: these will include the Potential Violence Risk Assessment has recently been updated and scrutinised by our Director of Risk and Safetvwho has found (heichsessmere t beeeccuratetanarsitable). SThe assessment document is completed prior to ay the ward opening and also in: response to any serious incident of violence and aggression or new in patient profile: The assessment assists staff in identifying any actions that sieedficantechakee t0 DatierthPredilecinghehestieetifood o violent incident: Additional health and need to and audits that assist in ensuring and staff safety include fire risk safety risk assessments assessments, infection control and anti-barricade door audits. There is no written or other formal guidance on the frequency with which ad-hoc agency staff should complete the observation competency checklist We would wish to make the general point that ward staff will have access to agency training recordon ar ongoing basis to enable a check to be made of when the observation competencvtfor partic laramember of staff was Iast completed, However, we can see the benefits of this practice codified in our existing Policy H43 Observation and Engagement and the following being requirement has now been added: 'Where bank or agency member of staff has a break in service of over one month then H Form: 99 Observation Competency Checklist must be completed again' This additional requirement will be communicated to divisional during week commencing Monday 16 October 2017 via the weekly divisional newsletter and as part of the ongoing observation and engagement staff training webinars that are delivered on monthly basis_ Ligature incidents are not automatically treated as SUIs (though the evidence suggests that death can occur within seconds of a ligature being applied) We wish to make the general that self-harm incidents both generally and those ligature will vary in their nature and degree and it would not be appropriate for all iigvolyieg incideats to be treated as SUIs. It will depend on the patient and the particular ligature in each case: Accordingly, it is for the staff who deal with the incident on the ward to cirkenstadetermireatroncaise partictdargthe twarar manager, as to how such an incident should be make graded: However; all ligature incidents will be recorded on our e-compliance system within 48 hourst ofethe incident and all e-compliance incident reports are reviewed by the hospital management team within 72 hours of the incident report being made: will check the accuracy of the report and the incident grading; Where necessary the incident grade will be amended; Incident reports are ialso reviewed on daily basis by the central risk and audit team and where appropriate; there wiltbe follow-ups with the Hospital to check on how the incident is managed and what changes to patient's risk assessment are needed. More serious ligature incidents resulting in medical intervention will be the subject of tedetailed incident report (called an SBAR) which will be sent to the central risk and audit teameand eeridlated toehe senior levels of management for review with an SUI report being commissionedin circumstances: Again; though this happens in practice, we can see the benefits of this appropriate patient staff staff point would they being

THE PRIORY HosPITAL being expressly set out in our Incident Management; Reporting and Investigation ROEHAMPTON Policy (OP4) and the following requirement has been added to the policy: "Serious self-harm incidents involving ligature or self-mutilation of such severity that the service user was at risk of death andjor life changing injuries and which necessitated medical treatment" will require an SBAR notification to be made and further investigation be commissioned to enable an understanding of the actual incident and identification of any improvements that need to be made to assist in preventing a repeat of similar incidents in the future. This requirement will be communicated to divisional staff during week commencing Monday 16 October 2017 via the weekly divisional newsletter There is no clear guidance or criteria on the circumstances in which ligature incident/incident/s or other self harming incident/s) should be treated as an SUI such as to trigger an SUI investigation: As with point 3 above, we have identified that any self-harm incident which requires medical attendance and medical intervention will be recorded as serious incident and will require escalation with serious incident investigation being commissioned by the divisional management team in appropriate circumstances: The report arising from that investigation will be shared and any lessons learnt and improvements will be rolled-out across the division as required. I do hope that these actions will provide you with the reassurance that you require: If I can be of further assistance then please do not hesitate to contact me;

Report sections

Investigation and inquest
On 30th September 2013 an investigation was commenced into the death of Francesca Whyatt (date of birth 18th September 1992) and concluded at the end of the Inquest on 4th August 2017.

The Jury came to a narrative conclusion. Their conclusion included findings that: (1) The protocols, procedures and risk assessments were not updated to reflect the challenges and changes to the Emerald Ward. The layout of the ward over four floors and the system of fob and key doors made the policy unworkable with the level of staff provided. (2) The zonal observation policy failed and staff were unaware of how it operated. (3) Prohibited items of ligature were not strictly monitored or controlled. (4) On the day of the incident there was a complete lack of leadership, there were very few experienced staff on duty, several were new or with only days of experience on the ward. (5) The training and induction of staff was generic and not fully suited to the particular requirements at the Emerald Ward. The reliance on agency staff added to the risk and detracted from the continuity and effectiveness of the therapy of the ward. More could have been done earlier to recruit permanent staff. (6) Francesca Whyatt’s death was contributed to by neglect in that she was permitted to wear tights. (7) Francesca Whyatt’s death was contributed to by neglect in that she was able to ascend from the garden to the first floor unrestricted by a locked door and/or staff intervention. (8) Francesca Whyatt’s death was contributed to by neglect in that there were no zonal or intermittent observations undertaken between the period 4.05 p.m. – 4.20p.m..
Circumstances of the death
Francesca Whyatt was admitted to the Priory Hospital, Roehampton on 20th March 2013 under section 3, Mental health Act 1983, to its specialist Personality Disorder Unit, East Wing (thereafter known as “Emerald Ward”). The unit provided NHS commissioned services to patients requiring specialist care from all over England and Wales. Many of the patients in the Emerald Ward were at high risk of serious self-harm and all required complex and expert care.

Emerald Ward was arranged over four floors (basement, ground, first and second), each separated by a single staircase.

Observations of patients were primarily carried out “zonally” so that a member of staff was allocated to each floor to observe patients, save that in the case of the first and second floor, a single member of staff was allocated to undertake observations on both floors. In addition, patients were sometimes subject to closer observations (intermittent, 1:1, 2:1) where heightened risk was identified.

The doors between the basement, ground and first floor were expected to be locked at all times with access granted to patients by a member of staff using a “fob” key. There was no locked door between the first and second floors.

Francesca Whyatt was at known risk from ligatures. A risk assessment (“risk management self-harm plan”) was prepared shortly after her admission to the Emerald Ward indicating that she should not have tights or belts. This was because it was understood that she was more likely to self-harm with these items.

On 16th April and 17th June 2013, Francesca Whyatt gained access to tights and fashioned ligatures out of them and tied them around her neck.

On 6th August 2013 Francesca Whyatt used a belt cord from a dressing gown to which she had been provided access, and tied it tightly around her neck. She was discovered cyanosed and with a nosebleed. This was recognized to be a “near - miss”. This incident at least should have been treated as a serious untoward incident (SUI) and as such a formal SUI investigation should have been undertaken. The Incident Form that was used to report the incident described the level of harm as “low” and no investigation took place.

On 25th September 2013 at a time between 4.05 p.m. and 4.20p.m., Francesca Whyatt was able to ascend from the basement to the top floor, through doors which were unlocked though expected to be locked, without being observed. She was then found unconscious in a lounge on the top floor of the Emerald Ward with a pair of tights around her neck secured tightly as a ligature. Attempts were made to resuscitate her at the scene. She was then taken to Kingston Hospital where she died on 28th September 2013.

The medical cause of Fancesca Whyatt’s death was: 1a. Irreversible cerebral anoxia 2b. Upper airway obstruction

Emerald Ward closed in June/July 2014.

East Wing is now a 12 - bedded female acute mental health ward with the majority of patients diagnosed with psychosis and some are at high risk of self-harm. The NHS funds the care and treatment of the majority of the patients on East Wing through commissioning arrangements.

East Wing remains a single ward arranged over four floors, with one floor now inaccessible to patients without supervision. There are no locked doors impeding access to and up the staircases between floors. There has been no risk assessment of the configuration of the ward over four floors.

Agency staff are still used (though in much fewer numbers). They must complete an observation competency checklist when they commence work on the ward. There is no written or other formal guidance on the frequency with which ad-hoc agency staff must complete the checklist.

Ligature incidents are not automatically treated as SUIs. There is no clear guidance or criteria on the circumstances in which a ligature incident/s (or other self-harming incident/s) should be treated as an SUI such as to trigger an SUI investigation.
Action should be taken
It for each of the individuals or agencies to whom this report is addressed to identify any specific and appropriate action that should be taken on their or their organisation’s behalf in relation to the concerns listed above.
Copies sent to
Priory Hospital, RoehamptonHealth and Safety ExecutiveMetropolitan Police Service

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Report details

Reference
2017-0248
Date of report
21 August 2017
Coroner
Karon Monaghan
Coroner area
London Inner (West)

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 4
3 responses not yet linked

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 16 Oct 2017.

Sent to

MENTAL HEALTH NATIONAL PROGRAMMES OF CARE BOARD, NATIONAL HEA
Care Quality Commission
NHS
Priory Hospital Roehampton

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