Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Macloud Nyeruke

Ref: 2020-0177 Date: 18 Sep 2020 Coroner: Kevin McLoughlin Area: West Yorkshire (East) Responses identified: 3 / 2 View PDF

Hospital failed to assess an agency support worker's immune status, assigning them to infectious wards without adequate PPE training, increasing infection risk to staff and patients. Nursing agencies failed to share health vulnerabilities.

Date 18 Sep 2020
56-day deadline 25 Nov 2020
Responses identified 3 of 2
Accident at Work and Health and Safety related deaths Other related deaths

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
Hospital failed to assess an agency support worker's immune status, assigning them to infectious wards without adequate PPE training, increasing infection risk to staff and patients. Nursing agencies failed to share health vulnerabilities.
View full coroner's concerns
(1) Mr Nyeruke's medical conditions were not made known to the Trust. In consequence, he had worked on wards where patients had infections involving multi-resistant organisms. Given his compromised immune state, this situation involved risk to both patients and Mr Nyeruke himself. In the absence of information concerning a particular staff member's medical condition there is an increased risk of transmission of infections either to or from the staff member. 8 (2) There is scant evidence as to whether Mr Nyeruke underwent appropriate training in respect of PPE such as masks before being permitted to work on a ward involving infectious diseases. The difficulties involved (where a support worker supplied by a nursing agency is only in the hospital for a brief period) are acknowledged. Nonetheless, the risk of an adverse transmission of infection either to, or from, the staff member necessitates stringent standards being enforced, with appropriate records preserved.

(3) Nursing agencies which supply support workers to hospitals without knowledge of their particular health vulnerabilities, or where they will be working, give rise to a risk that they may be adversely affected or may give rise to adverse effects on patients or colleagues. ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN In my opinion action should be taken to prevent future deaths and I believe your organisations have the power to take such action. YOUR RESPONSE You are under a duty to respond to this report within 56 days of the date of this report, namely by 25 November 2020. I, the Coroner, may extend the period. Your response must contain details of action taken or proposed to be taken, setting out the timetable for action. Otherwise you must explain why no action is proposed. COPIES and PUBLICATION I have sent a copy of my report to the Chief Coroner and to the following Interested Persons: (1) Ms (2) The Secretary of State for Health, Matt Hancock I am also under a duty to send the Chief Coroner a copy of your response. The Chief Coroner may publish either or both in a complete or redacted or summary form. He may send a copy of this report to any person who he believes may find it useful or of interest. You may make representations to me, the coroner, at the time of your response, about the release or the publication of your response by the Chief Coroner. SIGNED BY SENIOR co~°JER, KEVIN MCLOUGHLIN K.~~ M-._u~~l-:­ 18 September 2020 2

Responses

3 respondents
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust NHS / Health Body
19 Nov 2020 PDF
Action Planned

The Trust is providing additional 'fit testing' for PPE outside of usual provision and plans to standardise 'bank notes' on shifts in high risk areas specifying the need for fit testing, with audits to check implementation. They have also advised high risk staff to contact Reed to check the status of wards, and carry their risk assessments. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr McLoughlin

INQUEST TOUCHING THE DEATH OF MACLOUD NYERUKE (Deceased)

I refer to your correspondence of 18th September 2020, regarding the inquest touching the death of Mr Macloud Nyeruke and the Regulation 28 Report to Prevent Future Deaths in respect of this case.

I can confirm that the contents of your Regulation 28 Report have been shared with the relevant staff to enable us to provide you with a comprehensive response.

In your report you highlight that your matters of concern were as follows:

(1) Mr Nyeruke’s medical conditions were not made known to the Trust. In consequence, he had worked on wards where patients had infections involving multi-resistant organisms. Given his compromised immune state, this situation involved risk to both patients and Mr Nyeruke himself. In the absence of information concerning a particular staff member’s medical condition there is a risk of transmission of infections either to or from the staff member.

(2) There is scant evidence as to whether Mr Nyeruke underwent appropriate training in respect of PPE such as masks before being permitted to work on a ward involving infectious diseases. The difficulties involved (where a support worker supplied by a nursing agency is only in the hospital for a brief period) are acknowledged. Nonetheless, the risk of an adverse transmission of infection either to, or from, the staff member necessitates stringent standards being enforced, with appropriate records preserved.

(3) Nursing agencies which supply support workers to hospitals without knowledge of their particular health vulnerabilities, or where they will be working, give rise to a risk that they may be adversely affected or may give rise to adverse effects on patients or colleagues.

We have considered the contents of your report very carefully and our response is set out below. We have not responded to point 3 as we believe this matter rests with the Reed agency.

In response to point one, our investigations have established that all the suppliers of our bank and agency staff members are responsible for ensuring the occupational health screening of their workers is completed

The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust incorporating: Chapel Allerton Hospital, Leeds Cancer Centre, Leeds Children’s Hospital, Leeds Dental Institute, Leeds General Infirmary, Seacroft Hospital, St James’s University Hospital, Wharfedale Hospital. in line with an agreed national framework. The results of this screening are not disclosed to the organisation where the bank or agency member of staff is placed. The Trust is therefore reliant on the agency and the worker assessing the risk to the individual and other staff and patients prior to placement. It should be noted however there is no enforceable obligation on a member of staff be they bank, agency or a Trust employee to disclose information about their health. The exception to this would be where the condition poses a direct threat to the health of others, but even in these cases we are very much reliant on the member of staff’s openness despite the fact that the failure to disclose is a potential breach of Health and Safety legislation.

As a consequence, the Trust has a number of infection control measures in place aimed at mitigating the risk of cross infection. For example, there are standard precautions in place, (also known as universal precautions) which are intended to reduce the risk of transmission of blood borne and other pathogens from both recognised and unrecognised sources. They are the infection control precautions which are to be used, as a minimum, in the care of all patients. Hand hygiene is a major component of these standard precautions as is the wearing of personal protective equipment, the use of which is guided by risk assessment and the extent of contact anticipated with blood and bodily fluids, or pathogens. In addition to practices carried out by our healthcare staff when providing care, all individuals, (including patients and visitors), are required to comply with infection control practices in wards/departments.

As well as the standard infection control precautions outlined above, the Trust has a range of supporting guidelines in place to underpin the provision of safe care and treatment of patients with specific infectious diseases, including TB and Covid-19.

The Trust’s Guideline for the Management of Tuberculosis (Including Multi drug and Extensively Drug Resistant Tuberculosis) explains that there is no clear evidence on the value / efficacy of face masks in preventing the acquisition of tuberculosis infection; and there is conflicting guidance as to their appropriate use in the health care setting. However, there is some evidence that there is a decreased risk of transmission when masks are worn. The wearing of masks by patients with respiratory TB disease is to directly protect others; the wearing of masks by staff and visitors is to protect themselves - which is why the category of mask recommended differs.

The guideline recommendations that fitted FFP 3 masks are recommended for staff:

• Providing care for any suspected or confirmed respiratory TB in hospital in-patient over the age of ten when sputum smear status awaited or is positive in single room, until the patient has completed a minimum of two weeks of anti-TB treatment.

• In situations where respiratory TB is a possibility / confirmed, & exposure to large numbers of M. tuberculosis bacilli is possible, e.g. bronchoscopy, cough inducing procedures including chest physiotherapy and sputum induction; until the patient has completed a minimum of two weeks of anti-TB treatment and drug-resistant TB is not suspected.

• When entering the negative pressure room of a Multi-Drug Resistant TB patient

The guideline includes instructions on the correct wearing of a FFP 3 mask but states that the correct fit of the FFP 3 mask needs to be confirmed prior to use. This is achieved by a process called “fit testing”. All staff that care for TB patients should ensure that they have been successfully fit tested on the FFP3 masks currently available in the Trust.

The FFP3 mask must be fit tested by a competent person (HSE 2012). All areas are required to have an identified fit test trainer available to fit test staff if a suspected or confirmed TB patient is admitted. You will recall that when Mr Nyeruke attended the ward, prior to commencing work he was asked if he had been fit tested and he confirmed that he had been. It was only subsequent to becoming infected with TB that he then said he could not recall if he had been.

The TB guideline makes it clear that staff who have suppressed immunity MUST avoid contact with known or suspected cases of TB. This includes students of medicine, nursing and locum staff etc. If unsure of their status, staff should refer to the Trust’s Occupational Health Service (or other occupational health provider where relevant.). As you heard in evidence, the Trust had no knowledge of Mr Nyeruke’s immunosuppressed status.

Ultimately the Trust relies on the agency and their staff member risk assessing whether it is appropriate for them to be placed in a specific clinical area.

The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust incorporating: Chapel Allerton Hospital, Leeds Cancer Centre, Leeds Children’s Hospital, Leeds Dental Institute, Leeds General Infirmary, Seacroft Hospital, St James’s University Hospital, Wharfedale Hospital.

In response to point 2 the Trust acknowledges that there was no documentary evidence to support Mr Nyeruke’s confirmation that he had been fit tested prior to working on J20. Following receipt of your PFD report the Trust has been in discussions with Reed with a view to obtaining more robust assurance that an agency staff member has undergone Fit testing prior to working in an area where FFP 3 masks are required.

For the booking of bank and agency staff there is a computer system called Health Roster which relevant staff within the Trust can access. Reed have been adding “fit tested” as a skill to the system as and when their staff have been tested. Previously this information was not available to Trust staff to view. Reed have confirmed that they can make this skill visible so that anyone with Health Roster access on the shift can verify if the bank or agency candidate has been fit tested.

All bank and agency workers will be asked to inform Reed once they have been fit tested so that the skill can be added to their profile. This action has already commenced, and additional fit testing is being provided outside of the usual Clinical Service Unit provision.

In addition to the above, some wards are adding ‘bank notes’ to shifts that need covering specifying that the bank or agency staff member must be fit tested prior to attending the shift. Bank notes are accessible by bank and agency workers when booking the shift. We plan to standardise this approach Trust-wide so that high risk areas routinely add this to any shifts going out to bank and agency staff. To reassure ourselves that this is working we plan to audit the number of staff with the fit tested skill attached to Health Roster in the high-risk areas, including Infectious Diseases.

During our discussions we explored whether there was any way we could prevent high risk/vulnerable workers from viewing available shifts where a ‘general skill’ such as being fit tested or having IV drug competency is attached. We concluded that the system would not allow us to do this; however, all bank and agency staff assessed as being high risk or vulnerable have been advised to call Reed to check the status of a ward during Covid. All bank and agency staff classed as vulnerable or high risk have been advised to carry with them a copy of their risk assessment in case of any potential ward moves once their shift commences.

The contract with Reed ends on 31st March 2021 and the staff bank will come back under the Trust. When this happens, we will have the opportunity to introduce more robust methods of recording training and competencies within our Electronic Staff Record system as bank only staff will be Trust employees.

Thank you for bringing these matters to my attention. I do hope that this response has assured you that the Trust has given careful consideration to the matters of concern you have raised.

If I can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Reed Specialist Recruitment Ltd
4 Dec 2020 PDF
Noted

Reed Specialist Recruitment states they have complied with their contractual obligations and notified relevant authorities (EAS, CCS, CQC). They suggest the report be re-addressed to ID Medical, the direct supplier of the worker in question. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr McLoughlin,

Thank you for your letter dated 19 November 2020, the content we have noted.

As I stated in our initial reply, we take this matter very seriously and we will continue to work with the appropriate authorities to ensure a thorough review is undertaken.

In your letter, you state that “In consequence, I wished to draw Reed’s attention to the potential danger in order that the agency can review its arrangements and procedures to avoid a repeat of comparable circumstances.” Please note that Reed has acted as a Managed Agent Supplier (under the CCS Framework Agreement) to Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust (LTHT). Under this arrangement, Reed acts as a managing agent to the staff bank which includes managing the shift allocation and booking of staff through a nominated supply chain. This does include some supply by Reed direct, but mostly the booking of permanent LTHT staff, bank staff, and other agency staff.

At the point when Mr Nyeruke was first introduced to LTHT this was via ID Medical in November 2016, as prior to Reed's involvement with LTHT ID Medical had a contract direct with the Trust and not a sub-contractual arrangement via Reed. Reed then entered into a sub-contracting arrangement with ID Medical in January 2019 as part of Reed then managing the staff bank, for the supply of Mr Nyeruke. After having thoroughly investigated the matter, I can confirm that Reed has fully complied with its contractual obligations towards LTHT and received confirmation from ID Medical to confirm that Mr Nyeruke was suitably vetted and medically fit to commence the temporary assignment at LTHT. Moreover, Reed did also perform the necessary audits on ID Medical to confirm that the required health checks and training (in relation to PPE) for Mr Nyeruke were performed.

Both contractually and legislatively the responsibility on ID Medical was to carry out an occupational health assessment and training. I can confirm Reed have seen evidence of this dating back to 2012 which falls in line with when Mr Nyeruke first engaged with ID Medical. However, Reed are unable to investigate the detailed evidence beyond the health clearance such as the medical declarations made by Mr Nyeruke, and other supporting evidence that underpin the occupational health fitness to work certificate, nor can we fully scrutinise the training content that sits behind the certificates. This is a matter for the regulator and Crown Commercial Service, which is why we escalated this matter to them within 24/76 hours of receiving your initial report.

In response to the reason LTHT were not informed of any underlying issues in relation to Mr Nyeruke’s health was because Reed were not informed by the employer/supplier, ID Medical. This is further backed up from the documentation that we have audited which does not declare any issue regarding Mr Nyeruke. I cannot comment on why LTHT were not informed of any issues during the supply of Mr Nyeruke to them prior to Reed managing the supply chain as I am not privy to that information.

I can confirm that for workers supplied by Reed direct, full occupational health and training is carried out and relevant information shared with the client.

I fully appreciate the seriousness of this matter and therefore we had already taken the necessary steps to notify the Employment Agency Standards (EAS) as well as the NHS Framework Crown Commercial Service (CCS). Following your recent response, I have also personally explained the position to the Care Quality Commission (CQC) too. As Chair of the first cross-government and 3rd party organisation focusing on labour market and supply chain compliance and worker rights I am committed to ensuring the safety of non-permanent workers and identifying any weaknesses in modern supply chains. As such, I continue to talk to the EAS and CCS about this matter and how a joint, multi-agency approach could improve standards. To do this, it is important to understand the detail surrounding the occupational health assessments and training to understand what may have gone wrong. On this point we will work with the regulator in future based on any findings that come of the investigation.

My suggestion to re-address the Regulation 28 Report to ID Medical was made on the basis that Reed is unable to take any steps other that I have set out above in relation to individuals supplied by sub-contractors and that ID Medical as the employer/supplier, should be made aware of this Report in order to take additional measures (you deem fit) to protect the health and safety of temporary workers they engage.

I will share a copy of this letter with the EAS, CCS, CQC, and Leeds Teaching Hospital. I would also be very happy to engage any other bodies or organisations you see fit to work towards addressing any issues within modern supply chains.
Employment Agency Standards Other
PDF
Noted

The Employment Agency Standards (EAS) Inspectorate explains its role in enforcing regulations for employment agencies, outlining the checks and authorisations required to ensure the suitability of work-seekers, including healthcare workers. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr McLoughlin

EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES ACT 1973

Regulation 28 report to Prevent Future Deaths (following death of Mr Macloud Nyeruke)

Thank you for sending us a copy of the Regulation 28 report following the sad death of Mr Macloud Nyeruke, and the subsequent correspondence that you had with

, Director of Group Risk (Reed Specialist Recruitment Limited trading as Reed Nursing Agency) and Dr , Chief Medical Officer (Leeds Teaching Hospital NHS Trust). This sad incident had also been brought to our attention by Reed Specialist Recruitment Limited.

I should explain that the Employment Agency Standards (EAS) Inspectorate in the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the Employment Agencies Act 1973 and associated Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations 2003. This legislation requires employment agencies (that find work for persons with employers) and employment businesses (that employ workers and hire them out to act for and under the control of hirer) to abide by specified minimum standards of conduct.

The obligations of the legislation require specific checks and authorisations to be carried out by agencies or employment business where they introduce or supply work-seekers to hirers. These processes are aimed to ensure that work-seekers, including healthcare workers and professionals, that are introduced or supplied to hirers (such as NHS Trust) are suitable to work in the position that the hirer seeks to fill.

The legislation would apply to agencies and employment businesses whether they act as a direct supplier of work-seekers to a hirer, or through a recruitment supply chain. Kevin McLoughlin Senior Coroner West Yorkshire (Eastern) Coroner’s Office and Court 71 Northgate Wakefield WF1 3BS Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate, Economics and Markets Group, BEIS, Spur 1, 1Victoria Street, London, SW1H 0ET

Direct Line

Enquiries +44 (0)20 7215 5000

We will investigative this matter further in accordance with the legislative framework of the Employment Agencies Act 1973 and associated Conduct Regulations.

This will include the requirement for agencies and employment businesses to comply with the following regulations: -

• Regulation 18 – information to be obtained from hirers, including the position which the hirer seeks to fill, the type of work a work-seeker in that position would be required to do, any risks to health or safety known to the hirer and what steps the hirer has taken to prevent or control such risks; in addition the experience, training, qualifications and any authorisation which the hirer considers are necessary, or which are required by law, or by any professional body, for a work-seeker to possess in order to work in the position.

• Regulation 19 – confirmation to be obtained about a work-seeker including that the work-seeker has the experience, training, qualifications and any authorisation which the hirer considers are necessary, or which are required by law or by any professional body, to work in the position which the hirer seeks to fill.

• Regulation 20 – steps to be taken for the protection of the work-seeker and the hirer including (without prejudice to any of its duties under any enactment or rule of law in relation to health and safety at work) making all such enquiries, as are reasonably practicable, to ensure that it would not be detrimental to the interests of the work-seeker or the hirer for the work-seeker to work for the hirer in the position which the hirer seeks to fill.

• Regulation 22 – additional requirements where professional qualifications are required or where work-seekers are required to work with vulnerable persons including, oobtaining copies of any relevant qualifications or authorisations of the work-seeker; obtained two references from persons who are not relatives of the work-seeker; taken all other reasonably practicable steps to confirm that the work-seeker is suitable for the position concerned.

If you require any further information, or have any further information to pass to us, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Thank you for bringing these matters to my attention.

Report sections

Circumstances of the death
Macloud Nyeruke came to the UK from Zimbabwe in 2002. He worked in various hospitals as a support worker, having been placed by a nursing agency. His medical history included tuberculosis and a HIV infection diagnosed in 2004. On 23 November 2019 he was admitted to hospital with a fever, cough and confusion. He remained in hospital until his death on 22 February 2020. Extensive investigations revealed he had a strain of TB which was resistant to antibiotics and had developed multidrug-resistant bacteria.

Similar PFD reports

Shared signals

Related inquiry recommendations

Similar themes

Report details

Reference
2020-0177
Date of report
18 September 2020
Coroner
Kevin McLoughlin
Coroner area
West Yorkshire (East)

Responses identified

Responses identified 3 of 2
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 25 Nov 2020.

Sent to

Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust
Reed Nursing Trust

Source links