Source · Prevention of Future Deaths

Charlotte Comer

Ref: 2023-0089Deceased Date: 13 Mar 2023 Coroner: David Reid Area: Worcestershire Responses identified: 1 / 1 View PDF

The Trust suffered from severe understaffing, leading to excessive care coordinator caseloads and fragmented patient care. A senior clinician unilaterally overrode a Multi-Disciplinary Team decision, highlighting a lack of robust procedural oversight.

Date 13 Mar 2023
56-day deadline 8 May 2023
Responses identified 1 of 1
Suicide (from 2015)

Coroner's concerns

AI summary
The Trust suffered from severe understaffing, leading to excessive care coordinator caseloads and fragmented patient care. A senior clinician unilaterally overrode a Multi-Disciplinary Team decision, highlighting a lack of robust procedural oversight.
View full coroner's concerns
(1) During the 2½ years in which Charlotte’s mental health care was provided by the Trust, she had total of 8 different care coordinators. Furthermore, in those 2½ years there was a 5 month period when Charlotte had no appointed care coordinator at all. The care coordinator role is particularly important for a patient with such a complex case history as Charlotte. I heard evidence that at the time of these events, the Trust had been experiencing an unprecedented level of instability, with many staff who might have been expected to fulfil care coordinator roles going off sick or even leaving the service. The witness who had conducted the Trust’s own internal investigation into these events gave evidence that one of the major reasons for this instability was that staff were unable to cope with ever-increasing workloads. The Trust’s Community Services manager for the Worcestershire Neighbourhood Teams appeared to corroborate this in his evidence, confirming that whilst national guidelines recommend a maximum of 30 patients per care coordinator, at the time of these events the Trust’s care coordinators had around 100 patients each. Whilst he was able to provide some reassurance that a recent recruitment drive has reduced individual care coordinator caseloads to around 25 patients, he was unable to explain how individual caseloads had been able to reach the levels they did at the time of these events, and was unable to give accurate figures as to current levels of staff sickness/absence. I am concerned that the Trust is unable to understand fully how the care coordinator system failed at the time of these events, and that it is therefore not in a position to guard against a repeat of these circumstances in the future.

(2) The erroneous decision to pause Charlotte’s referral to the Priory Hospital for specialist treatment for Body Dysmorphic Disorder was taken by a senior clinician acting on her own, despite a Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting having decided that the referral was appropriate. When asked about how the senior clinician could have overridden the MDT decision, the Trust’s Community Services manager for the Worcestershire Neighbourhood Teams told the inquest that he could not say whether the senior clinician was not aware of the correct decision-making procedure, or whether she was, but chose instead to ignore it. When asked whether the same issue could arise in future, he told the inquest that he himself would be in a position to prevent the senior clinician making the wrong decision, but could not guarantee that he would be made aware of the issue so as to be able to do so. I am concerned that the Trust has not properly established how the senior clinician was able to override the MDT decision, and does not have a sufficiently robust system in place to ensure that MDT decisions cannot be overridden in this way in future.

Responses

1 respondent
Herefordshire and Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust NHS / Health Body
5 May 2023 PDF
Action Taken

The Trust has implemented a new process for funding arrangements for specialist services, including weekly MDT meetings, clear documentation of decisions, and escalation procedures for disagreements. This process has been communicated to all staff. (AI summary)

View full response
Dear Mr Reid,

Re: Inquest touching the death of Charlotte Comer

Regulation 28 report to prevent future deaths - response

Thank you for forwarding on your Regulation 28 report. I have read your report with great care and note the concerns that you have raised as a result of the coronial inquiry into the death of Charlotte Comer. In your report, you highlighted the following points of concern and I will respond to these concerns together, as each concern represents a sequence of events.

Concerns

During the 2½ years in which Charlotte’s mental health care was provided by the Trust, she had a total of 8 different care coordinators. Furthermore, in those 2½ years there was a 5 month period when Charlotte had no appointed care coordinator at all. The care coordinator role is particularly important for a patient with such a complex case history as Charlotte.

The Trust fully recognises that the care coordinator system as it existed at the time failed Charlotte, and we are focused on ensuring no other patient has the experience that Charlotte very regrettably did. At the time of Charlotte’s death, the Trust had already embarked on Transformation of its community service provision in line with national developments. In October 2020, we received additional funds to test new models of integrated care as set out in the national Long Term Plan. The roll-out of the Transformation was phased across the county, and Worcester City began its process of Transformation in October 2021, after Charlotte had died. The period of uncertainty associated with the Transformation, as with any significant change, did see a turnover of staff. Coupled with the effects of the pandemic, and a growing and acknowledged national scarcity of qualified and registered healthcare staff, this unfortunately did see a period of acute staffing shortage particularly evident among those staff fulfilling care co-ordination and leadership roles.

It is worth explaining at this point that the traditional function of care co-ordination, historically core to the delivery of Community Mental Health Services, has evolved through Transformation. Central to the new

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model is an approach to personalised care and support planning embodied in the role of key worker. The key worker can be any member of the multidisciplinary team (MDT) working with a patient, but will typically be the team member with the most input into that patient’s care who is therefore best placed to provide meaningful continuity of care. This separates out a crucial continuity function from the registered professional statuses (Registered Mental Health Nurse, Occupational Therapist, Social Worker) historically associated with care coordination, with the aim of enabling a more flexible and efficient allocation of capacity across a team also including others e.g. link workers, psychologists, and ultimately intended to ensure that each patient is consistently looked after in a way best suited to their needs. It’s important to note that this does not mean that core professional roles have been dispensed with, or that the professional input to the now Neighbourhood Mental Health Teams (NMHTs) has reduced. In fact, under Transformation, the established numbers of Mental Health Practitioner (MHP) fulfilled by the professions previously listed has increased on the former number of Care Coordinators. In many cases, and where clinically indicated, MHPs will also continue to act as key workers, and after the acknowledged dip in staffing numbers, recruitment and retention for these groups of staff is improving.

At the time of and in the period running up to Charlotte’s death, though, Care Co-ordinators faced large caseloads and an emphasis on fulfilling all the needs of their patients themselves, (whereas Transformation enables a more dynamic team approach led by key worker input to ensure that patients’ needs are met by the right professionals at the right time).

I am pleased to be able to say that caseloads for MHPs and key workers are now lower than they were at the time Charlotte was under our care. C.20-25 patients per Care Coordinator is now typical, and within national guidelines. The management and leadership of the NMHTs across the county has also been significantly reinforced, so that effective oversight of team activity has been enhanced. The leadership structure for Worcestershire NMHTs consists of fourteen posts (an increase on the previous structure) and all those posts have now been substantively recruited to.

You have asked whether we have fully understood the circumstances that pertained at the time and how the resultant discontinuity of care contributed to Charlotte’s sad death. I believe Charlotte’s experience of multiple care coordinators is effectively addressed in part through the change to a key worker approach and the overall expansion of the team inherent in the Transformation. Further, though, we now have in place systems and processes to ensure that patients whose acuity is escalating can be appropriately overseen. The Worcester City “huddle” takes place twice-weekly and focuses on those in high-need groups taking into account acuity, diagnosis and other concerns or vulnerabilities such as high-risk medications. In the event that a patient does not have an allocated MHP and it is judged that their risk has escalated materially such that they require that (or other) input, then this is picked up, and other work reprioritised if necessary to facilitate this. I hope the above serves to alleviate your concerns about our ability to effectively manage patient care especially for those patients with more complex presentations.

The erroneous decision to pause Charlotte’s referral to the Priory Hospital for specialist treatment for Body Dysmorphic Disorder was taken by a senior clinician acting on her own, despite a Multi-Disciplinary Team meeting having decided that the referral was appropriate. When asked about how the senior clinician could have overridden the MDT decision, the Trust’s Community Services manager for the Worcestershire Neighbourhood Teams told the inquest that he could not say whether the senior clinician was not aware of the correct decision-making procedure, or whether she was, but chose instead to ignore it. When asked whether the same issue could arise in future, he told the inquest that he himself would be in a position to prevent the senior clinician making the wrong decision, but could not guarantee that he would be made aware of the issue so as to be able to do so.

The Trust fully accepts that a lead clinician sought to cancel Charlotte’s Priory referral in error. Evidence of this human error was reflected in the original Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and, consequently, actions have been put in place for a new process for funding arrangements.

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Any decisions regarding funding arrangements for specialist services are now established at weekly MDT meetings. Any proposed change to an application must therefore also be brought to a subsequent MDT meeting, and any clinician wishing to challenge or change the MDT decision must be present to make their case. Each decision or change, and the rationale for it, must be clearly and contemporaneously recorded in the patient’s clinical notes. This process ensures mandatory open discussion in a recorded forum (MDT) as a precondition for any change. If the MDT is unable to come to a consensus, the issue will be escalated to the Associate Director (or Deputy Associate Director in their absence) and the Associate Medical Director for a decision. The rationale for the initial decision and challenge must be presented to them, and the decision of the Associate Director and Associate Medical Director will be final. Finally, the whole is overseen by an already extant funding oversight board within the Trust which meets once a month. This process has been clearly communicated to all staff.

I hope this reassures you that the Trust has understood how a senior clinician was originally able to override the MDT decision in Charlotte’s case, and how there is now a robust system in place to ensure that such a thing cannot occur in future.

I hope that the above adequately addresses your concerns.

I do not have any submissions to make in respect of publication of this response. I shall be grateful if you could kindly send a copy of my response to those to whom you copied your Regulation 28 report.

Report sections

Circumstances of the death
In answer to the questions “when, where, how and in what circumstances did Charlotte come by her death?”, I recorded as follows: “On 18.7.21 Charlotte Comer, who lived with a number of significant mental health disorders, including Body Dysmorphic Disorder, and had a known history of attempts at suicide and self-harm, left Worcestershire Royal Hospital before doctors there could treat a substantial, recently self-inflicted wound to her upper arm. She returned initially to her parents' home, before then making her way to her own address in Worcester, where she proceeded to take a substantial overdose of Propranolol and Amlodipine medication. She was taken by ambulance back to Worcestershire Royal Hospital where, despite treatment, she succumbed to the effects of the overdose and died on the morning of 20.7.21.”

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Report details

Reference
2023-0089Deceased
Date of report
13 March 2023
Coroner
David Reid
Coroner area
Worcestershire

Responses identified

Responses identified 1 of 1
All listed responses identified

Organisations named in PFD reports are normally expected to respond within 56 days. Deadline: 8 May 2023.

Sent to

Herefordshire & Worcestershire Health and Care NHS Trust

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