Daniel Morgan Independent Panel

The Panel has received advice from an independent forensic science expert it consulted, Dr Kathryn Mashiter that useful work could still be carried out on this document. It therefore recommends that the Metropolitan Police considers the operational benefits of submitting the diary for a forensic handwriting analysis in order to ascertain whether the entries were made by Daniel Morgan, as well as ESDA testing to ascertain if there is evidence of writing by someone other than Daniel Morgan.

In June 2023, the Home Office reported that the Metropolitan Police Service had conducted additional forensic analysis and communicated the results to Daniel Morgan's family (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The police service had previously stated in March 2022 that independent forensic analysis was completed, with the result giving the "Highest level of assurance the hand writing was that of Daniel Morgan" (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds no update since the Home Office's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

The Panel recommends that the Metropolitan Police consider the desirability and explore the possibility of obtaining samples of DNA from former Police Officer Z31's relatives, to compare it with the outstanding DNA recovered from the axe.

In June 2023, the Home Office reported that the Metropolitan Police Service had conducted additional forensic analysis and communicated the results to Daniel Morgan's family (Home Office response, Jun 2023). It had earlier stated in March 2022 that an independent forensic analysis was completed, finding "no evidence to support a match with any DNA obtained in this case" (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds no update since the department's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

It is recommended that the Metropolitan Police introduce systems to ensure that the management arrangements which applied during the Abelard Two Investigation can never be replicated in any future investigation, and that proper management arrangements, in compliance with the Association of Chief Police Officers' Murder Manual, exist on all occasions.

The Panel recommended that the Metropolitan Police Service prevent recurrence of Abelard Two management arrangements. In June 2023, the Home Office reported that the service had given assurances that Abelard Two arrangements would not recur under current structures and had updated its conflict of interest policy, though the department expected family liaison officers to be screened (Home Office response, Jun 2023). Earlier, in March 2022, the service accepted the recommendation and marked it complete, reporting that management structures for senior investigating officers complied with national guidance and that policies on conflicts of interest had been updated (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022; Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022). It added that a delivery plan to fully embed the changes was scheduled for implementation across 2022 and 2023 (Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

The HOLMES system is both an investigative tool and a quality assurance mechanism, but it requires significant resources if it is to be used properly. The Panel recommends that the Metropolitan Police conduct an investigation into the adequacy of resources for administering HOLMES in major crime investigations carried out by the Metropolitan Police.

The Panel asked the Metropolitan Police to assess resources for administering its major enquiry system. In June 2023, the Home Office stated that the force concluded a capacity and capability review in January 2022, which determined there was sufficient resourcing for the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES), subject to annual reviews of staffing and resources (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The service had stated in March 2022 that its review was complete, with national governance and a dedicated board established and no resourcing shortfalls identified (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

The Metropolitan Police should ensure that the role of the Family Liaison Officer is never carried out by the Senior Investigating Officer of an investigation. There is an inherent conflict between these two roles.

The Panel recommended separating Senior Investigating Officer and Family Liaison Officer roles. The Metropolitan Police Service stated in March 2022 that the recommendation was complete, having identified no dual roles in reviews of past deployments and noting that training courses would reinforce the separation (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022; Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022). The Home Office reported in June 2023 that the National Major Crime Investigation Manual, which sets guidance that the two roles are distinct, had been embedded across all police forces (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

It is recommended that the Metropolitan Police establish a process to inform police officers about the recovery options available to them when material is unlawfully disclosed.

The Panel asked the Metropolitan Police Service to guide officers on recovering unlawfully disclosed material. The Home Office reported in June 2023 that the police force had produced bespoke guidance for officers and staff regarding data breaches and recovery options (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The department noted that the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs' Council had issued national guidance, and that the College was including recovery options in training packages for senior information risk owners (Home Office response, Jun 2023). Earlier, the police force stated in March 2022 that research establishing the legal basis for all recovery options was complete and a delivery plan agreed (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

Guidance should be issued by the Metropolitan Police to enable officers to determine whether it is appropriate, necessary and lawful to disclose investigative material to journalists. That guidance should include a requirement to record by whom, to whom and when any such evidence was disclosed, who authorised the disclosure, the reasons for the disclosure of the material, and the express conditions upon which the information is disclosed.

The Panel asked for guidance on disclosing investigative material to journalists. In March 2022, the Metropolitan Police Service stated that the recommendation was complete, having agreed guidance for its General Investigation Policy, prepared a roll-out plan, and updated recruit training (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022; Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022). In its progress report, it explained that the guidance provides methods to record contact, while potential amendments to Authorised Professional Practice (APP) remained under review with the College of Policing (Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022).

The Metropolitan Police must ensure that the necessary resources are allocated to the task of tackling corrupt behaviour among its officers. Without proper resources there can be no effective fight against corruption. Since the Independent Office for Police Conduct has responsibility for investigating such matters, it must also be properly resourced to do so.

The Panel recommended allocating proper resources to tackle corrupt behaviour among police officers. In March 2022, the Metropolitan Police Service stated that its counter-corruption teams were sufficiently resourced for future needs and that discipline staffing had increased, though resourcing for the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) was not mentioned (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). In June 2023, the Home Office noted an increase in the police funding settlement for the service to ensure corruption can be fought effectively (Home Office response, Jun 2023). In June 2023, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services found that although anti-corruption structures had been reorganised, arrangements were flawed and effectiveness remained under scrutiny (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Jun 2023). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

Security clearance processes for police officers and police staff are fundamental to any anti-corruption strategy. Regular updating of the security status of each individual is essential to identify any concerns and to enable action to be taken in respect of such concerns. Notwithstanding the assurance received by the Panel from the Metropolitan Police in December 2020, the Metropolitan Police should remain vigilant at all times to ensure not only that it vets its employees in accordance with its new measures, but also that it has adequate and effective processes to establish whether its staff are currently engaged in crime.

The Panel called on the Metropolitan Police Service to regularly update staff security clearances. In June 2023, the Home Office reported that the Commissioner announced in April 2023 that all personnel had been checked against police databases, but vetting post holders to the correct standard remained ongoing, following a November 2022 inspection by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) that found vetting fell short of standards and enabled the "wrong people" to enter policing (Home Office response, Jun 2023). Earlier, in March 2022, it stated that it had increased vetting staff, established a dedicated renewals team, and reduced its backlog (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

Prior to the establishment of any future non-statutory inquiries or panel, there should be an honest and full discussion between the relevant police force(s) and the sponsoring Government department, to enable a realistic, informed assessment of the nature and volume of documentation in all its forms, and of the scope and depth of the work required. Framework procedures, capable of being customised, for the disclosure of material to such panels should be available, so as to avoid excessive delays in reaching agreement for access to material. Deadlines should only be established when the relevant inquiry or panel has had the opportunity to review the programme of work it is required to do. Any such deadline should be supported with an analysis explaining how the projected deadline has been identified, and why that is a reasonable time within which the work should be completed.

In its June 2023 response presented to Parliament, the Home Office agreed that targets or deadlines set within an inquiry's terms of reference should be determined in consultation with the inquiry's chair and should have regard for the scale of the task (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The record holds no update since the Home Office's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

Arrangements must be made in future to ensure that any Panel has timely access to the material required to do its work. Organisations that promise to make 'exceptional and full disclosure' should be prepared to do so both within the letter and the spirit of such a promise.

The Panel recommended ensuring future inquiry panels receive timely access to necessary material. In June 2023, the Home Office agreed that organisations must disclose material in a timely manner and noted that police HOLMES databases had become cloud-based (Home Office response, Jun 2023). In March 2022, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services found that while the Metropolitan Police Service should not have attempted to restrict access, the panel was ultimately not refused access (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Mar 2022).

All independent panels and inquiries examining police investigations should be given full access to the associated HOLMES accounts at their secure premises when they begin their work.

The Panel recommended giving independent panels full access to police HOLMES accounts at their own premises. In June 2023, the Home Office agreed that future panels should access relevant material at their own premises where security allows, stating that cloud-based HOLMES databases permit access via corporately managed devices for cleared personnel (Home Office response, Jun 2023). In March 2022, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services found that granting database access should never have been in doubt and that relying on hard-copy availability did not stand scrutiny (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

In any future Panel inquiry, arrangements should be made for the storage of sensitive material in the Panel's premises, in a similar manner to provision made for inquiries being conducted under the Inquiries Act 2005.

The Home Office stated in June 2023 that organisations disclosing material to non-statutory inquiries should do so in a timely manner, that "all efforts should be made" to ensure future panels can access material at their own premises where security requirements allow, and that police HOLMES databases had become cloud-based to support remote access on corporately managed devices (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The record holds no update since the Home Office's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).