Daniel Morgan Independent Panel

The Panel has received advice from an independent forensic science expert it consulted, Dr Kathryn Mashiter that useful work could still be carried out on this document. It therefore recommends that the Metropolitan Police considers the operational benefits of submitting the diary for a forensic handwriting analysis in order to ascertain whether the entries were made by Daniel Morgan, as well as ESDA testing to ascertain if there is evidence of writing by someone other than Daniel Morgan.

In June 2023, the Home Office reported that the Metropolitan Police Service had conducted additional forensic analysis and communicated the results to Daniel Morgan's family (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The police service had previously stated in March 2022 that independent forensic analysis was completed, with the result giving the "Highest level of assurance the hand writing was that of Daniel Morgan" (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds no update since the Home Office's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

The Panel recommends that the Metropolitan Police consider the desirability and explore the possibility of obtaining samples of DNA from former Police Officer Z31's relatives, to compare it with the outstanding DNA recovered from the axe.

In June 2023, the Home Office reported that the Metropolitan Police Service had conducted additional forensic analysis and communicated the results to Daniel Morgan's family (Home Office response, Jun 2023). It had earlier stated in March 2022 that an independent forensic analysis was completed, finding "no evidence to support a match with any DNA obtained in this case" (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds no update since the department's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

It is recommended that the Metropolitan Police introduce systems to ensure that the management arrangements which applied during the Abelard Two Investigation can never be replicated in any future investigation, and that proper management arrangements, in compliance with the Association of Chief Police Officers' Murder Manual, exist on all occasions.

The Panel recommended that the Metropolitan Police Service prevent recurrence of Abelard Two management arrangements. In June 2023, the Home Office reported that the service had given assurances that Abelard Two arrangements would not recur under current structures and had updated its conflict of interest policy, though the department expected family liaison officers to be screened (Home Office response, Jun 2023). Earlier, in March 2022, the service accepted the recommendation and marked it complete, reporting that management structures for senior investigating officers complied with national guidance and that policies on conflicts of interest had been updated (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022; Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022). It added that a delivery plan to fully embed the changes was scheduled for implementation across 2022 and 2023 (Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

The HOLMES system is both an investigative tool and a quality assurance mechanism, but it requires significant resources if it is to be used properly. The Panel recommends that the Metropolitan Police conduct an investigation into the adequacy of resources for administering HOLMES in major crime investigations carried out by the Metropolitan Police.

The Panel asked the Metropolitan Police to assess resources for administering its major enquiry system. In June 2023, the Home Office stated that the force concluded a capacity and capability review in January 2022, which determined there was sufficient resourcing for the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES), subject to annual reviews of staffing and resources (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The service had stated in March 2022 that its review was complete, with national governance and a dedicated board established and no resourcing shortfalls identified (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

The Metropolitan Police should ensure that the role of the Family Liaison Officer is never carried out by the Senior Investigating Officer of an investigation. There is an inherent conflict between these two roles.

The Panel recommended separating Senior Investigating Officer and Family Liaison Officer roles. The Metropolitan Police Service stated in March 2022 that the recommendation was complete, having identified no dual roles in reviews of past deployments and noting that training courses would reinforce the separation (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022; Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022). The Home Office reported in June 2023 that the National Major Crime Investigation Manual, which sets guidance that the two roles are distinct, had been embedded across all police forces (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

It is recommended that the Metropolitan Police establish a process to inform police officers about the recovery options available to them when material is unlawfully disclosed.

The Panel asked the Metropolitan Police Service to guide officers on recovering unlawfully disclosed material. The Home Office reported in June 2023 that the police force had produced bespoke guidance for officers and staff regarding data breaches and recovery options (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The department noted that the College of Policing and the National Police Chiefs' Council had issued national guidance, and that the College was including recovery options in training packages for senior information risk owners (Home Office response, Jun 2023). Earlier, the police force stated in March 2022 that research establishing the legal basis for all recovery options was complete and a delivery plan agreed (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

It is recommended that the Crown Prosecution Service's additional guidance should be amended to include a requirement that the Prosecutor should consider whether the information was disclosed with a view to one or both parties securing future profit from the use of that material. Moreover, the additional guidance should also be amended to note that the advantage to the parties disclosing the document(s) may not be purely financial but, as in the case of former DCS David Cook and Michael Sullivan, could be reputational and could have improved their employability in the future.

The Home Office stated in June 2023 that the Crown Prosecution Service had updated its guidance in February 2022, setting out a list of factors to consider when assessing a suspect's overall criminality and motivation, including confirmation that advantage "need not be financial but could include other forms of anticipated personal gain" (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The record holds no update since the Home Office's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

Guidance should be issued by the Metropolitan Police to enable officers to determine whether it is appropriate, necessary and lawful to disclose investigative material to journalists. That guidance should include a requirement to record by whom, to whom and when any such evidence was disclosed, who authorised the disclosure, the reasons for the disclosure of the material, and the express conditions upon which the information is disclosed.

The Panel asked for guidance on disclosing investigative material to journalists. In March 2022, the Metropolitan Police Service stated that the recommendation was complete, having agreed guidance for its General Investigation Policy, prepared a roll-out plan, and updated recruit training (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022; Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022). In its progress report, it explained that the guidance provides methods to record contact, while potential amendments to Authorised Professional Practice (APP) remained under review with the College of Policing (Metropolitan Police Service, Mar 2022).

The Government should act on its stated intention in 2013 to require licensing measures, introduce legislation to ensure the creation and use of standards, and implement the recommendation in the 2016 review concerning the regulation of private investigators.

In June 2023, the Home Office noted positive steps taken by the private investigator sector towards raising standards through the Association of British Investigators' draft Code of Conduct, stating that it would "keep under review the need to extend regulation to introduce a new regime" (Home Office response, Jun 2023; Home Office, Jun 2023). The record holds no update since the department's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023; Home Office, Jun 2023).

Given the potential seriousness of such offences, it is recommended that the Government take an early opportunity to amend the Data Protection Act 2018 to provide for sentences of imprisonment for offenders.

In June 2023, the Home Office did not accept the recommendation, explaining that the Data Protection Act 2018 had already strengthened criminal sanctions by widening offences to include unlawful retention and making them recordable with unlimited fines, and concluding that custodial sentences would not be "a proportionate response to data protection offences at this time" (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The record holds no update since the department's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

The Panel is concerned that the policies and procedures relating to the use of informants by law enforcement agencies still allow scope for corrupt practices, and it recommends that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner takes this into consideration during inspections.

The Panel recommended that informant inspections take corruption risks into consideration. In June 2023, the Home Office stated that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office independently oversees these powers and conducts annual inspections to ensure compliance by law enforcement agencies (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The department explained that inspectors conduct interviews with handler and controller staff and scrutinise authorisation paperwork to ensure individual agencies mitigate risks (Home Office response, Jun 2023). It noted that handling risks associated with covert human intelligence sources is a key focus, though corrupt practices were not mentioned (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

The Metropolitan Police must ensure that the necessary resources are allocated to the task of tackling corrupt behaviour among its officers. Without proper resources there can be no effective fight against corruption. Since the Independent Office for Police Conduct has responsibility for investigating such matters, it must also be properly resourced to do so.

The Panel recommended allocating proper resources to tackle corrupt behaviour among police officers. In March 2022, the Metropolitan Police Service stated that its counter-corruption teams were sufficiently resourced for future needs and that discipline staffing had increased, though resourcing for the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) was not mentioned (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). In June 2023, the Home Office noted an increase in the police funding settlement for the service to ensure corruption can be fought effectively (Home Office response, Jun 2023). In June 2023, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services found that although anti-corruption structures had been reorganised, arrangements were flawed and effectiveness remained under scrutiny (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Jun 2023). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

It is recommended that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services conduct a thematic investigation of the operation of the practices and procedures introduced following the adoption of the Code of Ethics in 2014 to determine whether sufficient resources are available to ensure appropriate protection of those police officers and police staff who wish to draw alleged wrongdoing to the attention of their organisations.

The Panel recommended a thematic investigation into protections for police whistleblowers. In June 2023, the Home Office reported that HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) had inspected corruption within the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and published findings in March 2022, though whistleblower protections were not mentioned (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The department noted that Baroness Casey's review of the force in March 2023 found that the inspectorate's recommendations were repeatedly not acted upon (Home Office response, Jun 2023). It also recorded that while the force accepted all of those recommendations, it had not met all of them by the March 2023 deadline (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

All police officers and police staff should be obliged to register in confidence with the Chief Officer of their police force, at either their point of recruitment to the police force or at any point subsequent to their recruitment, their membership of any organisation, including the Freemasons, which might call their impartiality into question or give rise to the perception of a conflict of loyalties.

The Panel recommended requiring police officers and staff to register memberships, including the Freemasons. The Home Office stated in June 2023 that policing still needed to consider how to register potential conflicts of interest, noting a lack of evidence that legislation would resolve the issue while policing partners assessed conflicts as part of reviewing counter-corruption authorised professional practice (APP) (Home Office response, Jun 2023; Home Office, Jun 2023). In February 2026, Mr Justice Chamberlain noted in an Administrative Court judgment that an inter-agency working group concluded there was "no evidence base that Freemasonry is a significant factor in police corruption" (Mr Justice Chamberlain, Feb 2026).

Security clearance processes for police officers and police staff are fundamental to any anti-corruption strategy. Regular updating of the security status of each individual is essential to identify any concerns and to enable action to be taken in respect of such concerns. Notwithstanding the assurance received by the Panel from the Metropolitan Police in December 2020, the Metropolitan Police should remain vigilant at all times to ensure not only that it vets its employees in accordance with its new measures, but also that it has adequate and effective processes to establish whether its staff are currently engaged in crime.

The Panel called on the Metropolitan Police Service to regularly update staff security clearances. In June 2023, the Home Office reported that the Commissioner announced in April 2023 that all personnel had been checked against police databases, but vetting post holders to the correct standard remained ongoing, following a November 2022 inspection by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) that found vetting fell short of standards and enabled the "wrong people" to enter policing (Home Office response, Jun 2023). Earlier, in March 2022, it stated that it had increased vetting staff, established a dedicated renewals team, and reduced its backlog (Metropolitan Police Service response, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

In the interest of transparency and public accountability, all public institutions should be under a duty to cooperate fully with independent scrutiny bodies created by Government, such as the Panel.

The Panel recommended placing all public institutions under a duty to cooperate with independent scrutiny bodies. In June 2023, the Home Office stated that it introduced a statutory duty of cooperation for serving police officers in February 2020, alongside measures for former officers, but it did not mention other public institutions (Home Office response, Jun 2023). In March 2022, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services found that a non-statutory inquiry could not demand access to material and systems in the same way (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

The Panel recommends the creation of a statutory duty of candour, to be owed by all law enforcement agencies to those whom they serve, subject to protection of national security and relevant data protection legislation.

The Panel recommended creating a statutory duty of candour for all law enforcement agencies. In April 2025, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice, answered that the Government remains "fully committed to bringing legislation forward at pace", including a legal duty of candour for public servants, though national security and data protection legislation were not mentioned (Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, Apr 2025). Earlier, in a November 2023 factsheet, the Home Office and the department stated that an organisational duty of candour for chief officers would complement an existing statutory duty of cooperation for individual police officers (Home Office and Ministry of Justice, Nov 2023).

Prior to the establishment of any future non-statutory inquiries or panel, there should be an honest and full discussion between the relevant police force(s) and the sponsoring Government department, to enable a realistic, informed assessment of the nature and volume of documentation in all its forms, and of the scope and depth of the work required. Framework procedures, capable of being customised, for the disclosure of material to such panels should be available, so as to avoid excessive delays in reaching agreement for access to material. Deadlines should only be established when the relevant inquiry or panel has had the opportunity to review the programme of work it is required to do. Any such deadline should be supported with an analysis explaining how the projected deadline has been identified, and why that is a reasonable time within which the work should be completed.

In its June 2023 response presented to Parliament, the Home Office agreed that targets or deadlines set within an inquiry's terms of reference should be determined in consultation with the inquiry's chair and should have regard for the scale of the task (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The record holds no update since the Home Office's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

Arrangements must be made in future to ensure that any Panel has timely access to the material required to do its work. Organisations that promise to make 'exceptional and full disclosure' should be prepared to do so both within the letter and the spirit of such a promise.

The Panel recommended ensuring future inquiry panels receive timely access to necessary material. In June 2023, the Home Office agreed that organisations must disclose material in a timely manner and noted that police HOLMES databases had become cloud-based (Home Office response, Jun 2023). In March 2022, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services found that while the Metropolitan Police Service should not have attempted to restrict access, the panel was ultimately not refused access (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Mar 2022).

All independent panels and inquiries examining police investigations should be given full access to the associated HOLMES accounts at their secure premises when they begin their work.

The Panel recommended giving independent panels full access to police HOLMES accounts at their own premises. In June 2023, the Home Office agreed that future panels should access relevant material at their own premises where security allows, stating that cloud-based HOLMES databases permit access via corporately managed devices for cleared personnel (Home Office response, Jun 2023). In March 2022, HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services found that granting database access should never have been in doubt and that relying on hard-copy availability did not stand scrutiny (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, Mar 2022). The record holds nothing dated later than the response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

In order to avoid most of the delays and difficulties inherent in this case, and in so many other unsolved cases, there is a need for a review of the processes for archiving historic material with a view to creating a system which can produce national and local documents as required.

In June 2023, the Home Office stated that a new Code of Practice, together with guidance on archiving records in the public interest, would set guidance for preserving records and advice on managing them to prevent obsolescence (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The department noted in June 2023 that chief officers should ensure their forces have systems and processes in place to identify records meeting the criteria for permanent preservation (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

In any future Panel inquiry, arrangements should be made for the storage of sensitive material in the Panel's premises, in a similar manner to provision made for inquiries being conducted under the Inquiries Act 2005.

The Home Office stated in June 2023 that organisations disclosing material to non-statutory inquiries should do so in a timely manner, that "all efforts should be made" to ensure future panels can access material at their own premises where security requirements allow, and that police HOLMES databases had become cloud-based to support remote access on corporately managed devices (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The record holds no update since the Home Office's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).

It is recommended that, whenever a major incident remains under investigation or inquiry, documents should be retained in digitised form, subject to appropriate security measures and made available to those who subsequently and justifiably require access to them.

The Home Office stated in June 2023 that a new Code of Practice and complementary guidance on archiving records would advise police forces on managing appropriate records to prevent obsolescence and preserving those in the public interest (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The department added that chief officers should ensure their forces maintain systems and processes to identify records meeting the criteria for permanent preservation (Home Office response, Jun 2023). The record holds no update since the department's response of June 2023 (Home Office response, Jun 2023).