Parliamentary activity

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

Estates Safety Fund schemes were selected by the National Health Service working with trusts and integrated care boards to prioritise the most urgent operational and safety risks, including ventilation requirements, and the schemes that will make the greatest difference to patients and staff.

No data is held on the proportion of the funding that will be directed towards the use of high-efficiency particulate air filters.

Answering body: Cabinet Office

The Government is fully committed to supporting the work of the Covid-19 Inquiry and to learning lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic to ensure the UK is better prepared for a future pandemic.

The Inquiry published its report on Module 5 (Procurement) in July. The Government will consider its findings and recommendations in detail and respond in due course.

Answering body: Cabinet Office

The title and purposes of the specified events booked through Calder Conferences Limited are as follows:

(i) The Old Ship Hotel on 29 May 2025: “Covid 19 Inquiry - Listening Event”. This was part of the Covid-19 Inquiry’s public listening initiatives which enabled bereaved individuals to share their personal experiences and impacts of the pandemic, to be used as evidence for the Inquiry's investigations.

(ii) Westminster Chapel on 9 July 2025: “Infected Blood Inquiry Hearings.” The venue was required to conduct hearings for the Infected Blood Inquiry.

(iii) Leonardo Royal Hotel London Tower Bridge:

11 and 13 December 2024: Details regarding the specific purpose for these two bookings are not held centrally, as they occurred prior to the implementation of the updated guidance on external venue bookings which was issued on 4 April 2025.

16 July 2025: “Government Property Agency All-Staff Conference”.

Answering body: Cabinet Office

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry operates independently from the Government. Therefore, Ministerial approval was not required for this contract.

The contract was procured and awarded in line with procurement rules, as well as Cabinet Office Commercial policies and procedures.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

As set out by the Prime Minister in his Written Ministerial Statement of 16 April responding to the publication of Module 4 of the COVID-19 Inquiry, the Government is carefully considering the findings of the inquiry, including the recommendations on reform of the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme (VDPS), and will respond within six months of publication.

The Government is actively considering the recommendations of the inquiry on reform of the VDPS.

Answering body: Department for Education

The government does not intend to introduce legislation to make Child’s Rights Impact Assessments a statutory requirement at this time.

The department is working closely with Cabinet Office and other government departments to strengthen the consideration of children and young people’s interests within overall risk planning, including in relation to pandemics and other emergencies.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

A pandemic would most likely be caused by a virus, though it could also be by bacteria or fungi. The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy acknowledges that no two pandemics are identical, and that a future pandemic could spread through one or more routes of transmission.

One of the principles set out in the strategy is that preparedness will be for all five main routes of disease transmission, while another is holding flexible plans underpinned by a broad range of “capabilities”, such as equipment, skilled people, and infrastructure, that can adapt to protecting the population from different pathogens. Some of the capabilities we will develop through the actions of the strategy can be used for all routes of transmission and others are specific to particular routes.

The strategy is explicitly designed to cover the capabilities needed to respond to all types of pandemic, regardless of origin or transmission route.

The Pandemic Preparedness Strategy does contain commitments that will support prevention, identification, and mitigation of hospital-acquired infections in a pandemic. These include commitments for personal protective equipment (PPE) for the health and care workforce, improving the National Health Service’s baseline capabilities to manage infections, developing plans to minimise the cross-contamination across services, and using existing programmes to build NHS infection prevention and control (IPC) capabilities in our estate. More widely, the strategy commits to revise and update existing surge plans, including considering the potential impact and mitigations for hospital-acquired transmission.

Pandemic is where an infectious disease spreads across whole countries, international boundaries, or continents at the same time, usually driven by a novel pathogen. The recent World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement defines a “pandemic emergency” as a public health emergency of international concern, that is caused by a communicable disease and:

has, or is at high risk of having, wide geographical spread to and within multiple states;

is exceeding, or is at high risk of exceeding, the capacity of health systems to respond in those states;

is causing, or is at high risk of causing, substantial social and/or economic disruption, including disruption to international traffic and trade; and

requires rapid, equitable, and enhanced coordinated international action, with whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The strategy was written in 2025 and early 2026, incorporating early learnings from Exercise Pegasus and being informed by lessons learned from COVID-19 and drawing from the UK Covid-19 Inquiry findings.

The strategy includes a key principle to ensure that decision-making will be informed by data analysis, scientific, public health and clinical evidence, and expert advice. That extends beyond the use of source data, to modelling and interpretation of the available evidence. Many commitments in the strategy will be informed by modelling, for example on enhancing PPE or access to clinical countermeasures.

The strategy sets out the substantial developments across data, analysis, and evidence that have already been made in response to lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic. It includes commitments to review the data, analysis, and modelling capabilities needed across health and other areas to support decision-making, including for example to inform decisions on public health social measures and to evaluate their impacts, and to continue to ensure capabilities can be rapidly scaled up during a pandemic.

The strategy document was written by Department of Health and Social Care officials working closely with the UK Health Security Agency, NHS England, the Cabinet Office, other Government departments, and the devolved administrations. It is not the product of artificial intelligence.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

The Inquiry published its report relating to the development of COVID-19 vaccines and the implementation of the vaccine deployment programme on 16 April 2026. The Government will consider the findings and recommendations in detail and will respond within six months of publication, by 16 October 2026. The Government remains committed to learning the lessons needed from the COVID-19 Inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future.

Answering body: Treasury

This government is committed to learning lessons from the Covid-19 schemes. Formal evaluations of the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) have been published. HM Treasury has participated in Module 9 hearings of the Covid-19 Inquiry, which examined the economic response to the pandemic.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

Our deepest sympathies are with those who have experienced harm following vaccination, as well as their families.

The Government recognises that concerns have been raised in relation to the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme (VDPS), including during Module 4 of the COVID-19 inquiry. Following the publication of the COVID-19 Inquiry’s Module 4 report on vaccines and therapeutics on 16 April 2026, the Government will carefully consider its recommendations, including on the reform of the VDPS, and will respond formally in due course.

Answering body: Women and Equalities

This Government is committed to ensuring that everyone, no matter their background, can thrive. Therefore, as set out in our response to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 2 report, we agree with the recommendation that commencement of the socio-economic duty could drive the routine consideration of the impact decisions might have on those most at risk in an emergency.

The Government is giving careful consideration to responses to the equality law call for evidence as we consider next steps. We will publish a summary of responses and a Government response in due course on: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/equality-law-call-for-evidence.

The socio-economic duty will require specified public bodies to actively consider how their strategic decisions might help to reduce the inequalities of outcome associated with socio-economic disadvantage.

We are now taking forward work to make sure that commencement of the duty in England is as effective as possible.

Answering body: Cabinet Office

This Government is committed to ensuring that everyone, no matter their background, can thrive. Therefore, as set out in our response to the UK Covid-19 Inquiry’s Module 2 report, we agree with the recommendation that commencement of the socio-economic duty could drive the routine consideration of the impact decisions might have on those most at risk in an emergency.

The Government is giving careful consideration to responses to the equality law call for evidence as we consider next steps. We will publish a summary of responses and a Government response in due course on: https://www.gov.uk/government/calls-for-evidence/equality-law-call-for-evidence.

The socio-economic duty will require specified public bodies to actively consider how their strategic decisions might help to reduce the inequalities of outcome associated with socio-economic disadvantage.

We are now taking forward work to make sure that commencement of the duty in England is as effective as possible.

Answering body: Cabinet Office

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry publishes a quarterly financial report of its costs. The latest publication for Q3 2025/26 shows that the total cost from when the Inquiry was established on 28 June 2022 to 31 December 2025 was £204m.

Since the financial year 2023/24, the Government has published data on costs incurred by key government departments in responding to the Inquiry. These costs to 30 September 2025 total £111m and are in addition to the Inquiry’s own costs above. A further update to the data will be published in due course.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

The Government recognises that the pandemic had a profound and lasting impact across society, and its effects were felt particularly acutely within the health and social care system. We are deeply grateful to everyone across health and social care in the four nations who contributed to the country's response.

The Government is committed to learning the lessons of the COVID-19 Inquiry and we are investing in and reforming the health service to ensure it is fit for the future and available for people when they need it. We will consider the inquiry’s findings and recommendations carefully and respond in full in due course.

The health and wellbeing of all National Health Service staff is a top priority, and we want to ensure that there is better support for staff in the future.

NHS England offers a range of health and wellbeing resources, as well as the National Staff Mental Health Treatment Service to provide support for those with more complex mental health needs.

The 10-Year Health Plan announced the introduction of Staff Treatment Hubs that will focus on mental health and musculoskeletal issues, the two main reasons for sickness absence in the NHS. In addition, a series of staff standards for modern employment will be launched in April 2026. These will tackle the issues that really matter to staff such as support to work healthily and flexibly, and tackling violence, racism, and sexual harassment in the workplace.

Answering body: Cabinet Office

The UK National Security Strategy is clear that we need to increase our preparations for potential threats, from future pandemics to energy and supply chain disruption.

The UK's alliances and partnerships are critical to our safety and our collective security is a source of significant strength. But it must be delivered in the right way, mitigating against areas of over-dependence and moving instead towards interdependence.

We are embedding lessons from COVID-19, including those of the COVID-19 Inquiry. The largest ever national pandemic response exercise was conducted last year, testing coordination efforts across all regions and nations of the UK and we published the new Pandemic Preparedness Strategy in March 2026, alongside £1 billion of investment in health protection.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

The UK COVID-19 Inquiry is an independent statutory inquiry. As an independent body, it is responsible for determining its own scope, lines of investigation, and the evidence it seeks. Decisions about whether to include examination of specific scientific or technical matters, such as the evidence base relating to spike proteins or lipid nanoparticles, fall within the inquiry’s discretion.

The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has not received any specific correspondence or instruction from the inquiry relating to spike proteins or lipid nanoparticles.

Answering body: Department for Education

The government will consider the report’s findings and recommendations and will provide a full response to the report in due course.

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

The Government welcomes the COVID-19 Inquiry’s investigations and is committed to learning lessons from the pandemic, including those relating to the potential impact on children’s mental health and wellbeing. We continue to respond openly and transparently to the inquiry’s requests and reports, and will be paying close attention to the Module 8 report, Children and Young People, and the Module 10 report, Impact on Society, which will cover mental health and wellbeing. Whilst we wait for these reports, the Department is already embedding mental health considerations into pandemic preparedness planning.

In 2019, the UK Chief Medical Officers published a commentary on the findings of a systematic review on screen-based activities and children’s mental health. They found an association between screen-based activities and mental health but could not establish causality. The commentary can be accessed at the following link:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c5b1510e5274a316cee5be8/UK_CMO_commentary_on_screentime_and_social_media_map_of_reviews.pdf

On 2 March 2026, the Government published a consultation on how to ensure children have a healthy relationship with devices, introduce rapid trials on measures to reduce screentime and limit access at night, and produce evidence-informed screentime guidance for parents of children aged five to 16 years old. The consultation can be accessed at the following link:

https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/growing-up-in-the-online-world-a-national-consultation

Answering body: Department of Health and Social Care

Ensuring the United Kingdom is prepared for a future pandemic is a top priority for the Government, and we are embedding lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic in our approach to pandemic preparedness. We aim to have flexible, adaptable, and scalable capabilities that can respond to any infectious disease or other threat, rather than relying on plans for specific threats.

The Government is committed to learning the lessons from the UK COVID-19 Inquiry to protect and prepare us for the future. On 16 January 2025, the Government published its response to the inquiry’s module one report on resilience and preparedness. A copy of the response is attached. The Department has committed, as part of this response, to publishing a new pandemic preparedness strategy that will show how we are embedding our new approach to pandemic preparedness.

In the 2024 Autumn budget, my Rt. Hon. Friend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced that £460 million of investment has been allocated to strengthen the UK’s pandemic preparedness and health protection, including replenishing personal protective equipment, vaccine, and medicines stockpiles.

In autumn 2025, the Department and the UK Health Security Agency conducted Exercise Pegasus, a national exercise on the UK’s preparedness for a pandemic. It tested our ability to respond to a pandemic, involving all regions and nations of the UK and thousands of participants. The exercise has provided valuable experience which is being used to inform our strategy and planning. The Government has committed to communicating the findings through the post-exercise report this winter.

An established clinical countermeasures programme is a core component of our pandemic preparedness and set of response capabilities. These countermeasures include personal protective equipment and hygiene consumables, as well as vaccines and therapeutics, such as influenza antivirals and antibiotics.

Answering body: Cabinet Office

The UK Covid-19 Inquiry is independent of government. The systematic evidence review on the impact of the pandemic on mental health, commissioned by the UK Covid-19 Inquiry to support its investigation into the impact of the pandemic on society, will be published on the Inquiry's website during hearings for Module 10, to be held between 16th February 2026 and 5th March 2026.