Source · Select Committees · Defence Committee
Foreign Involvement in the Defence Supply Chain
Defence Committee
HC 699
Published 14 February 2021
Recommendations
5
Para 27
The Ministry of Defence’s open and country-agnostic approach to foreign involvement means that the defence...
Recommendation
The Ministry of Defence’s open and country-agnostic approach to foreign involvement means that the defence supply chain has been open to potentially hostile foreign involvement, with reports of companies being owned and influenced by foreign Governments whose values and behaviours …
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Ministry of Defence
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15
The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the supply chains of defence businesses as well as their finances.
Recommendation
The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the supply chains of defence businesses as well as their finances. Global supply chains for defence represent a vulnerability, especially when these supply chains include materials from countries not closely aligned with the UK. The Ministry …
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Ministry of Defence
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Conclusions (12)
2
Conclusion
Para 13
As a result of the Ministry of Defence’s approach of encouraging inward investment, foreign involvement in the UK defence supply chain is widespread, with the UK hosting a broad range of UK-based and international suppliers. This approach has brought many benefits to the UK defence industry and wider economy.
3
Conclusion
Para 23
If the Ministry of Defence has the level of oversight of the defence supply chain that it claims, then it is clear that it was aware of purchases by Chinese companies into the UK defence supply chain and decided that such involvement was an acceptable risk. We do not agree.
4
Conclusion
Para 24
The Ministry of Defence should assess the implications of Chinese ownership of the companies listed within this report.
6
Conclusion
Para 29
Recent reports have highlighted the purchase of second-hand Chinese equipment by the Ministry of Defence. This is deeply concerning. The purchase of equipment from China for use by the Armed Forces should not be considered a viable option by the Ministry of Defence.
7
Conclusion
Para 32
The relative indifference of the Ministry of Defence to the possible relocation of General Electric’s Rugby facility was concerning. We are pleased that this important industrial capacity ultimately remained in the UK. The Ministry of Defence should prioritise the maintenance of sovereign capability within the UK defence industry.
8
Conclusion
Para 41
The UK previously lacked foreign direct investment screening legislation which left the defence supply chain, alongside other sectors of the UK’s economy, vulnerable to influence from hostile foreign investors. The National Security and Investment Bill, once law, will change this situation and offer greater protection to the UK’s economy. Alongside …
9
Conclusion
Para 46
Some commentators have questioned the placement of the ‘Investment Security Unit’ within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, suggesting that it does not have the necessary expertise and knowledge. We are content, however, that the unit will be able to draw on experience across Whitehall. The Ministry of …
10
Conclusion
Para 50
Venture capitalism helps to drive innovation in defence and associated industries. However, we heard concerns that venture capitalist funding could represent an avenue for hostile foreign investors to gain entry into the UK defence supply chain. The Minister for Business and Industry told us that the National Security and Investment …
11
Conclusion
Para 55
The new regime’s impact on foreign direct investment is, as yet, uncertain. If implemented efficiently the new regime should have little to no harmful impact on foreign direct investment to the UK defence supply chain, only preventing investment that is undesirable.
12
Conclusion
Para 59
The defence industry in the UK has remained broadly resilient in the face of financial pressures resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for all businesses within the defence supply chain, particularly those that also operate in commercial aerospace and are small 32 Foreign Involvement in …
13
Conclusion
Para 66
The Ministry of Defence and wider Government have provided substantial support to businesses in the defence supply chain. Unfortunately, we heard that this support has not always reached its intended beneficiaries or had the intended consequences. The Ministry of Defence should improve its communication strategy with small and medium sized …
14
Conclusion
Para 67
The commercial aerospace industry remains financially fragile. The Ministry of Defence should already be aware of the close links between this industry and the defence supply chain and should consider what more it can do to support businesses which operate here, particularly small and medium sized enterprises.