Defence contribution to the UK’s pandemic response

From the evidence it is clear that there was a disconnect between the assessment of the threat of an infectious disease pandemic (flu or otherwise) and the preparations for such an event occurring. Subsequent government actions (such as the re-drawing of crisis machinery and the need to urgently procure large supplies of PPE) suggest that both organisational and practical preparations were not sufficiently mature. It is inexplicable that COBRA should have met only four times between 24 January and 2 March. This disconnect and its causes should be addressed at any future public enquiry into the UK’s response to the pandemic. (Paragraph 17) The Defence role in UK emergency planning and response

Civilian agencies will inevitably require assistance in a crisis of this scale and there should be no stigma in seeking help from the Armed Forces. However, it is clear that preparations for a non-man-made threat such as an infectious disease pandemic were afforded less priority than issues such as terrorism, despite being assessed as having both high likelihood and high impact in the National Risk Register. The Government must take steps to ensure that the civilian agencies which have statutory responsibilities prepare properly, and that Defence does not become the default ‘first responder’ to make good deficiencies exposed by a developing crisis. (Paragraph 22) 31 Manpower or Mindset: Defence’s Contribution to the UK’s Pandemic Response The Ministry of Defence’s role in the pandemic response

The Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces have made a vital contribution to the UK’s management of the coronavirus pandemic. This crisis has served to highlight once again the unique flexibility and versatility of our Armed Forces. We express our gratitude to the men and women of the Armed Forces for the vital role they have played in the national response to the pandemic. While Defence has deliberately played a ‘humble’ role throughout, this contribution must be explicitly recognised, perhaps through the creation of a formal award and through the Armed Forces pay settlement.

We believe earlier use could have been made of Defence’s unique capabilities and skills, notably in the areas of strategic planning and crisis management. We are surprised that lessons from earlier crises were not learnt and that as a result the Armed Forces’ unique capabilities were not properly used. It appears that there is more work to be done to fulfil the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review’s intent of better educating wider government, the Devolved Administrations and local government about what Defence can do. The Government must ensure that Defence is consulted as early as possible in future such scenarios and that other government departments and agencies are fully aware of the range of capabilities Defence can offer.

As the UK emerges from the pandemic, and in light of the UN Secretary General’s words that “in an interconnected world, none of us is safe until all of us are safe”, the Armed Forces may also have an important role to play in ensuring the vaccine reaches those in countries with less-robust healthcare systems or in areas of instability. We call on the government to ensure it makes best use of the Armed Forces’ skills in planning and logistics to assist with the distribution and administration of the coronavirus vaccine(s) within the UK, the Overseas Territories and perhaps further abroad. (Paragraph 42) Wider impacts and lessons learned

We encourage the Department to publish the outcome of its Lessons Summit to enable the learning from this experience to be promulgated as widely as possible. Defence must ensure that it evaluates its own response to the pandemic, while contributing to the wider cross-government review (and any public inquiry) to ensure that the UK learns from this once-in-a-century event and is better prepared for the future crises which will inevitably follow, and, in particular, understands that the unique military contribution is mindset rather than manpower. (Paragraph 52) 32 Manpower or Mindset: Defence’s Contribution to the UK’s Pandemic Response

In addition to delaying the publication of the Integrated Review, it seems inevitable that the pandemic must also influence its conclusions. Coronavirus has highlighted serious deficiencies in the UK’s domestic resilience in the face of an anticipated threat. We have agreed this Report before publication of the Integrated Review, but but believe that the Review and the funding of its conclusions must take into account the significance of Defence’s role in underpinning the UKs’ domestic resilience against future shocks of this magnitude, while enabling the Armed Forces to fulfil their primary role of defending our vital interests at home and abroad. (Paragraph 53) 33 Manpower or Mindset: Defence’s Contribution to the UK’s Pandemic Response