1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

The government's response

What the committee recommended 63

1. 1
   The UK’s relationship with China during the coalition and Cameron Governments was largely focused on... Conclusion · paragraph 31
2. 2
   While there appears to have been a shift in the mood of the UK towards... Conclusion · paragraph 40
3. 3
   A cornerstone of the recently published Integrated Review is the UK’s “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific. Conclusion · paragraph 53
4. 4
   The attempt of the three most recent governments to navigate across the complexity of economic,... Conclusion · paragraph 67
5. 5
   Current levels of China expertise within Government and the civil service are insufficient when compared... Conclusion · paragraph 68

See all 63 recommendations and conclusions

Sources

• 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void ↗The committee's report, parliament.uk
• Letter from Minister Milling to Baroness Anelay, on the Committee’s follow-up letter to the Government’s response to the UK-China report, 9 February 2022 ↗The government's response, 22 February 2022, parliament.uk
• Government Response to the Committee's The UK's Security and Trade Relationship with China report ↗The government's response, 23 November 2021, parliament.uk

Recommendations and conclusions 63

1. 1
   The UK’s relationship with China during the coalition and Cameron Governments was largely focused on... Conclusion · paragraph 31 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The UK’s relationship with China during the coalition and Cameron Governments was largely focused on the economic benefits of closer ties. The UK played a key role in the founding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but it is unclear whether it has retained its influence in the intervening years.
2. 2
   While there appears to have been a shift in the mood of the UK towards... Conclusion · paragraph 40 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   While there appears to have been a shift in the mood of the UK towards China, there remains considerable uncertainty over the current Government’s policy towards China. The Minister for Asia’s comments did not offer clarity.
3. 3
   A cornerstone of the recently published Integrated Review is the UK’s “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific. Conclusion · paragraph 53 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   A cornerstone of the recently published Integrated Review is the UK’s “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific. While we welcome the attention being paid to this important region, the Government needs to provide greater detail on its objectives and how it plans to achieve them, particularly with regard to China. However, given the Royal Navy’s home waters and North Atlantic obligations it is optimistic to believe the UK could contribute much.
4. 4
   The attempt of the three most recent governments to navigate across the complexity of economic,... Conclusion · paragraph 67 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The attempt of the three most recent governments to navigate across the complexity of economic, sovereignty, security and human rights issues in relation to China has led to inconsistencies, created uncertainty and points to a lack of a central strategy. There is no clear sense of what the current Government’s strategy towards China is, or what values and interests it is trying to uphold in the UK-China relationship.
5. 5
   Current levels of China expertise within Government and the civil service are insufficient when compared... Conclusion · paragraph 68 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Current levels of China expertise within Government and the civil service are insufficient when compared to the ambitious agenda and the tilt to the Indo-Pacific outlined by the Government in the Integrated Review.
6. 6
   The Government told us that it has made its approach to China clear in public... Conclusion · paragraph 69 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   The Government told us that it has made its approach to China clear in public statements and in the Integrated Review, but these statements, and those made to us during this inquiry, have been vague and do not constitute a strategy.
7. 7
   We call on the Government to produce a single, coherent China strategy, as recommended by... Recommendation · paragraph 70 Recommendation (the committee's words)

   We call on the Government to produce a single, coherent China strategy, as recommended by the Foreign Affairs Committee in April 2019, and a plan for how it will execute that strategy. The strategy should seek to resolve the ambiguities in the current Government’s China policy. The recommendations made in this report will help highlight what the strategy should contain.
8. 8
   Regime survival remains the key objective of the Chinese Communist Party delivered through continued strong... Conclusion · paragraph 78 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   Regime survival remains the key objective of the Chinese Communist Party delivered through continued strong economic growth and China’s rising international standing.
9. 9
   While China’s overall objective of protecting its rise has remained consistent over presidencies, its foreign... Conclusion · paragraph 79 Conclusion (the committee's words)

   While China’s overall objective of protecting its rise has remained consistent over presidencies, its foreign policy under Xi Jinping has been more outward looking and pro-active, and more aggressive.
10. 10
    China is taking an expanded view of security into non-traditional areas such as food, the... Conclusion · paragraph 83 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    China is taking an expanded view of security into non-traditional areas such as food, the environment, its financial system, investment, aid and debt. At the same time, it is rapidly growing its military expenditure (including its navy and coastguard) and now has the second-highest national spend after the United States.
11. 11
    China’s perception of threats to its national security is influenced by insecurities about its rise,... Conclusion · paragraph 91 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    China’s perception of threats to its national security is influenced by insecurities about its rise, history (including perception of ‘national humiliation’ and memory of its semi-colonial past), domestic security concerns, anti-Chinese sentiment, and fears of external interference.
12. 12
    There is insufficient understanding of whether China intends to take a more aggressive approach to... Conclusion · paragraph 92 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    There is insufficient understanding of whether China intends to take a more aggressive approach to the existing status of Taiwan and, if it does, how it might react to the consequences of those attempts. It is also unknown how China might respond to non-conventional, “grey zone” attacks.
13. 13
    The 14th Five-Year Plan introduced in March 2021 has signalled modifications to the previous model... Conclusion · paragraph 98 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The 14th Five-Year Plan introduced in March 2021 has signalled modifications to the previous model of Chinese economic governance, with a greater focus on self-reliance and emphasising the importance of the domestic market. China will remain a key participant in the global economy, but is likely to focus increasingly on its domestic market.
14. 14
    China’s policy on the international stage is partially motivated by its dissatisfaction with the current... Conclusion · paragraph 104 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    China’s policy on the international stage is partially motivated by its dissatisfaction with the current international rules-based system, but we heard mixed evidence on whether China seeks to reverse or overthrow this system. This, though, seems a distinction without a practical difference from the UK’s perspective. In either case the likely result would be an international environment that would, at least in part, be detrimental to the UK’s interests and values. This would run directly counter to the strategic objective set out by the Government in the Integrated Review. Nevertheless, as the world’s second largest economy it is inevitable that some international structures will need to adjust to reflect the modern reality of China’s position.
15. 15
    The Belt and Road Initiative, and the Digital Silk Road component, are key elements in... Conclusion · paragraph 111 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Belt and Road Initiative, and the Digital Silk Road component, are key elements in China’s drive to make the international order more ‘China-compliant’. Some argue that the BRI allows China to apply political leverage through debt, though we also heard that China is increasingly recognising that this approach may not be sustainable. The subversion of international institutions and indebted nations’ compliance with China’s wishes should be given greater prominence and consideration.
16. 16
    The United Kingdom has a strong and proud record in its development programmes and encouraging... Conclusion · paragraph 112 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The United Kingdom has a strong and proud record in its development programmes and encouraging other nations to act similarly. While there are many questionable elements of the Belt and Road Initiative, and BRI projects will always reflect China’s interests, some will equally benefit the receiving nation. Belt and Road investments may on such occasions be welcomed.
17. 17
    Although China does not consider the UK as a high priority country, the UK remains... Conclusion · paragraph 120 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Although China does not consider the UK as a high priority country, the UK remains important due to its membership of the UN Security Council. China also considers the UK an important economic partner in particular sectors.
18. 18
    China has a longstanding appreciation for the UK’s history, culture and universities, and these continue... Conclusion · paragraph 121 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    China has a longstanding appreciation for the UK’s history, culture and universities, and these continue to have a positive impact on China’s perception of the UK. However, political events such as Brexit and the UK’s response to Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang have led to cooling of the relationship, and a lowering of the UK’s importance in China’s view.
19. 19
    The UK-China relationship may also be improved by a greater degree of understanding of the... Recommendation · paragraph 122 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The UK-China relationship may also be improved by a greater degree of understanding of the Chinese culture and languages by the UK. We call on the Government to provide greater support for Chinese language teaching and cultural exchange with China.
20. 20
    The current US Administration wants closer co-operation with its partners and allies, and unlike the... Conclusion · paragraph 143 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The current US Administration wants closer co-operation with its partners and allies, and unlike the previous administration, recognises that the challenge posed by China will require co-operation and collaboration.
21. 21
    The deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific is seen in Washington as a... Conclusion · paragraph 144 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific is seen in Washington as a sign of UK’s interest in preservation of peace and support for the international rules-based order. The US also values the UK’s historical use of soft power in the region, including via Official Development Assistance.
22. 22
    Taiwan will be a crucial issue for the US and its allies, including the UK. Conclusion · paragraph 149 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Taiwan will be a crucial issue for the US and its allies, including the UK. Even if a military confrontation would be risky for China and perhaps not in its interests, similar things have been said about many past wars that did occur; the prospect of miscalculation is always present. Should such a conflict draw in China and the United States, the consequences for the UK—and indeed the wider world—could be catastrophic.
23. 23
    An assessment of risk should take into account both the probability and likely consequences of... Conclusion · paragraph 150 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    An assessment of risk should take into account both the probability and likely consequences of conflict in Taiwan; in this case the UK’s security relationship with the US, its global economic position and the Government’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific region mean that its interests would be directly threatened. The uncertainty over the future of Taiwan therefore represents a major risk to the UK.
24. 24
    India is largely aligned with the US’s policy towards China, though there are some key... Conclusion · paragraph 163 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    India is largely aligned with the US’s policy towards China, though there are some key differences in approach. Like other countries in the region, it would prefer to engage in initiatives that are not explicitly framed as anti-China.
25. 25
    India is interested in a pragmatic relationship with the United Kingdom, as part of a... Conclusion · paragraph 164 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    India is interested in a pragmatic relationship with the United Kingdom, as part of a diverse range of partners including, among others, Russia. India values the UK’s use of its soft power strengths, including the BBC.
26. 26
    Like India, Japan sees the US as a key ally, but also recognises the importance... Conclusion · paragraph 170 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Like India, Japan sees the US as a key ally, but also recognises the importance of productive engagement with one of its closest neighbours.
27. 27
    Japan sees the United Kingdom as an important partner and ally, which could help to... Conclusion · paragraph 171 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Japan sees the United Kingdom as an important partner and ally, which could help to support the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. Like other partners in the region, it values the UK’s soft power strengths in particular, including through the use of Official Development Assistance.
28. 28
    We call on the Government, in its response to this report, to set out its... Recommendation · paragraph 172 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We call on the Government, in its response to this report, to set out its soft power strategy in the Indo-Pacific and the scale of the allocated resources, especially in the light of the Government’s ambitions outlined in the Integrated Review regarding the Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’.
29. 29
    Not all EU states share the US’s assessment of threats posed by China. Conclusion · paragraph 179 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Not all EU states share the US’s assessment of threats posed by China. This seems to have influenced the common EU approach towards China, where economic interests appear to take priority over security concerns. Nevertheless, recent tensions between the EU and China mean that at the time of writing this report it seems unlikely that the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment will be approved by the European Parliament. We note that the European Parliament has made progress on the Agreement conditional on lifting the sanctions on members of its Parliament.
30. 30
    The UK’s partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific have welcomed the UK’s tilt towards the... Conclusion · paragraph 185 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The UK’s partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific have welcomed the UK’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, and are supportive of the UK joining existing formats of co-operation, or establishing new, bilateral ones.
31. 31
    Establishment of effective and reliable partnerships is critical if the UK and its allies are... Conclusion · paragraph 186 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Establishment of effective and reliable partnerships is critical if the UK and its allies are to respond to the challenges posed by China. These partnerships can take different forms, ranging from formal alliances to bilateral agreements, but they will need to represent sufficient aggregate political, economic and scientific power to be able to counter that of China, and to persuade uncommitted nations to align with these groupings.
32. 32
    Some potentially important partners may have systems and values that do not align with the... Conclusion · paragraph 187 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Some potentially important partners may have systems and values that do not align with the UK’s, nor do they all wish to be drawn into an overtly US-China confrontation. If the necessary co-operation is to be achieved the UK will need to take a pragmatic approach to the basis on which they are built. Focusing on issues rather than on western values is likely to be more productive and to draw in a wider range of partners.
33. 33
    The UK’s expertise in capacity building, first through the Department for International Development and now... Conclusion · paragraph 188 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The UK’s expertise in capacity building, first through the Department for International Development and now through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, is seen as a key strength by the UK’s regional partners in the Indo-Pacific. Witnesses stressed the importance of the BBC in terms of the UK’s soft power and influence in the region.
34. 34
    We welcome the principle underlying the Build Back Better World Initiative, particularly given the detrimental... Recommendation · paragraph 189 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We welcome the principle underlying the Build Back Better World Initiative, particularly given the detrimental impact of the cuts to UK Official Development Assistance and the opportunity this gives for China to expand its influence in Africa and elsewhere. We call on the Government to provide more detail about the UK’s intended contribution to the Initiative and how it will operate.
35. 35
    The UK’s position as a maritime trading power means that it places great importance on... Conclusion · paragraph 198 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The UK’s position as a maritime trading power means that it places great importance on the maintenance of international order and the law of the sea, including freedom of navigation. The UK’s deployment of a Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific this year underlines its commitment in this regard, but it should work to ensure clear policy co-ordination with European partners and allies, particularly France through the Lancaster House Treaties. We would like to hear more about the Government’s plans for a sustained presence in this region beyond the current Carrier Strike Group deployment.
36. 36
    A range of non-traditional security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region relate to the UK’s key... Conclusion · paragraph 209 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    A range of non-traditional security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region relate to the UK’s key interests. The UK should aim to be a leader in addressing non-traditional security challenges, given its expertise and experience in these areas.
37. 37
    There is disagreement over the extent to which China can be considered a threat to... Conclusion · paragraph 218 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    There is disagreement over the extent to which China can be considered a threat to the UK, and it is clear that there are nuances which mean it could be considered more of a security threat in some areas than others. However, the Government’s use of the ambiguous phrase “systemic competitor” does not help address these nuances and serves to create more uncertainty about the Government’s strategy towards China. We invite the Government to provide more clarity on these points.
38. 38
    The Government should consider whether its security assessment of China is aligned more with the... Recommendation · paragraph 222 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The Government should consider whether its security assessment of China is aligned more with the US or the EU, recognising that individual EU countries have differing views about the threat that China represents to their security and that through bilateral engagement the FCDO needs to understand these variations. These alliances may influence the level of involvement the UK can have in other alliances and partnerships in the region.
39. 39
    The challenge of climate change cannot be addressed without engagement with China. Recommendation · paragraph 231 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The challenge of climate change cannot be addressed without engagement with China. We call on the Government to explain how it will include considered co-operation with China on climate change as part of its China strategy. This is particularly important given the UK’s leadership role at COP26.
40. 40
    Since the publication of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change in 2006,... Conclusion · paragraph 232 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Since the publication of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change in 2006, and the Climate Change Act 2008, the UK has become a leader in climate change and decarbonisation, formerly leading the EU in its climate aspirations, and now globally. The UK must use this leadership position to encourage China to engage with the global community in tackling the climate change challenge.
41. 41
    Nevertheless, the Government should remain aware that China’s interests in tackling the climate crisis may... Recommendation · paragraph 233 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    Nevertheless, the Government should remain aware that China’s interests in tackling the climate crisis may not always be fully aligned with those of the UK. Co-operation must take into careful account China’s actions, not just words.
42. 42
    The UK’s interests in the Indo-Pacific are not unique and distinct from the interests of... Conclusion · paragraph 238 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The UK’s interests in the Indo-Pacific are not unique and distinct from the interests of its European partners, especially France. Both countries should coordinate deployments of military assets to assure a ‘persistent’ European presence.
43. 43
    We call on the Government to explain how the UK plans to support its regional... Recommendation · paragraph 239 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We call on the Government to explain how the UK plans to support its regional partners and allies in both traditional and non-traditional security areas such as training, joint exercises, institution building and capacity building.
44. 44
    Official Development Assistance is a vital aspect of the UK’s soft power, which can be... Recommendation · paragraph 240 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    Official Development Assistance is a vital aspect of the UK’s soft power, which can be used to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. As the UK seeks further engagement in the Indo-Pacific, Official Development Assistance cuts may create a void which may be exploited by China and the UK’s other competitors. We urge the Government to restore Official Development Assistance to 0.7% GNI before significant damage is done to the UK’s capabilities in this region and more widely.
45. 45
    China is a rapidly growing military power with an increasingly assertive policy towards its neighbours... Conclusion · paragraph 241 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    China is a rapidly growing military power with an increasingly assertive policy towards its neighbours and adjacent waters. It has an agenda to secure the integration of Taiwan into its jurisdiction; to secure all waters, islands and reefs within the ‘nine dash line’ within its sovereign territory; and to challenge the Sino-Indian Actual Line of Control. Even if not planned, there is a strong risk that future rhetoric from China will at some point provoke a major conflict. The ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific implies that the UK will be less able to isolate itself from such an event. It needs to carefully consider its contingency plans. With the future presence of the Royal Navy in the South and East China Seas, it is not impossible that a UK naval vessel (rather than the US fleet) could be used by China as the test of their sovereignty, and therefore the start of such a conflict.
46. 46
    The Government should seek to maintain the role and popularity of British higher education among... Recommendation · paragraph 260 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The Government should seek to maintain the role and popularity of British higher education among Chinese students. However, we are concerned about potential pressures put on Chinese students by the Chinese authorities. The Government and the higher education sector need to take steps to ensure that Chinese students (in particular graduate students) can maintain freedom of research.
47. 47
    While there are opportunities for increased economic engagement with China, they can only be realised... Conclusion · paragraph 271 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    While there are opportunities for increased economic engagement with China, they can only be realised in the right economic and political conditions. At present, there are still considerable barriers to an economic engagement with China that supports the UK’s core interests and values.
48. 48
    Trade cannot be considered in isolation. Conclusion · paragraph 272 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Trade cannot be considered in isolation. If the UK pursues certain security policies which China sees as running counter to its own interests, there will almost certainly be consequences for trade and investment.
49. 49
    Although there are aspects of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment that the UK could... Recommendation · paragraph 297 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    Although there are aspects of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment that the UK could replicate in a future investment deal with China, it is not clear that they will provide many additional benefits. The UK should instead focus on overcoming the barriers to investment that UK companies face. The Government should also take note of the political challenges facing ratification of the CAI.
50. 50
    The UK should avoid the extreme ‘trade war’ approach undertaken by the Trump administration in... Recommendation · paragraph 298 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The UK should avoid the extreme ‘trade war’ approach undertaken by the Trump administration in the US, which been shown to hurt the US’s interests more than China. The Government should carefully assess whether a more nuanced approach may be more effective when dealing with China.
51. 51
    We welcome the Government’s commitment to join the CPTPP. Conclusion · paragraph 306 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We welcome the Government’s commitment to join the CPTPP. While the extent to which it will allow the UK greater operation with China is uncertain (particularly while China is not a member), it will provide other benefits for UK engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and will be welcomed by partners and allies in the region.
52. 52
    The World Trade Organization, albeit with strong new leadership, faces challenges in its two core... Conclusion · paragraph 316 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The World Trade Organization, albeit with strong new leadership, faces challenges in its two core functions—multilateral trade negotiations and dispute settlement. As the world’s second largest economy, China will be active in any WTO reform discussions.
53. 53
    The UK can play an important role in reforming and strengthening the WTO, in particular... Conclusion · paragraph 317 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The UK can play an important role in reforming and strengthening the WTO, in particular in the rules and regulations covering sectors such as services, where the UK has extensive experience and influence.
54. 54
    We welcome the Government’s stated intention to play a role in reforming and strengthening the... Recommendation · paragraph 318 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We welcome the Government’s stated intention to play a role in reforming and strengthening the WTO, but regret that it has provided so little detail on how it intends to do so. We call on the Government to outline its specific areas of focus for WTO reform, and how these will help to support the UK’s economic and strategic objectives with China.
55. 55
    We welcome the National Security and Investment Act 2021 as an important step in ensuring... Conclusion · paragraph 325 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We welcome the National Security and Investment Act 2021 as an important step in ensuring the security of investments into the UK. We note, however, that the timing of the Act may have led to the perception that it targets China in particular. On the other hand, the timing of the Act was driven as much by China’s own actions as by anything else, so the perception is perhaps unsurprising.
56. 56
    We call on the Government to publish a detailed plan for implementation of the National... Recommendation · paragraph 326 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We call on the Government to publish a detailed plan for implementation of the National Security and Investment Act, to provide confidence to overseas investors. An explanation of the reversal of the Huawei decision would also provide greater confidence to overseas investors.
57. 57
    The current passage through Parliament of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill is a clear sign of... Recommendation · paragraph 334 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    The current passage through Parliament of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill is a clear sign of the Government’s concerns over supply chain vulnerability in that area, but such vulnerabilities are widespread in the economy. The COVID-19 pandemic has served to highlight this weakness. With dependency comes risk, and China has on several occasions demonstrated its willingness to use economic and supply chain coercion in support of its international policy. In order to retain its freedom of action towards China, the Government should conduct scenario planning on supply chain vulnerabilities and identify where action is needed to mitigate the risks.
58. 58
    We are particularly concerned about the vulnerabilities exposed during the pandemic relating to the procurement... Conclusion · paragraph 335 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We are particularly concerned about the vulnerabilities exposed during the pandemic relating to the procurement of PPE and lateral flow tests. We ask that in their response to us the Government provides further information on the cost to the UK of lateral flow tests from China and the companies that were involved, and outlines the measures it is taking to ensure that products of this kind can be manufactured in the UK where there are vital national security interests at stake.
59. 59
    Balancing the desire for increased economic engagement with upholding values such as human rights will... Conclusion · paragraph 350 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    Balancing the desire for increased economic engagement with upholding values such as human rights will be a particular challenge in the UK’s relationship with China. The Government needs to be pragmatic, but it also needs to show greater clarity and international leadership to ensure the balance does not tilt towards preserving economic relations at the cost of human rights. The Government cannot sit on the fence over this issue.
60. 60
    The Foreign Affairs Committee called for the Government to publish a strategy on China by... Conclusion · paragraph 351 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    The Foreign Affairs Committee called for the Government to publish a strategy on China by the end of 2020, which it has not done. The Government claims to have set out its approach towards China in various speeches, but this does not offer the clarity required. It seems that the Government is using a policy of deliberate ambiguity to avoid making difficult decisions that uphold the UK’s values but might negatively affect economic relations.
61. 61
    We again call for the Government to produce a clear and consistent written strategy on... Conclusion · paragraph 352 Conclusion (the committee's words)

    We again call for the Government to produce a clear and consistent written strategy on China. The issue of how the Government intends to balance economic relations trade concerns with upholding values such as human rights and labour protection should be front and centre of this strategy.
62. 62
    More generally, the Government should incorporate an atrocity prevention lens in its overall approach to... Recommendation · paragraph 353 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    More generally, the Government should incorporate an atrocity prevention lens in its overall approach to trade. Current atrocity prevention tools and strategies have fallen short, so we ask that the Government outlines how it intends to strengthen these tools, including the effective use of sanctions and other consequences once an atrocity is determined to have occurred.
63. 63
    We also call on the Government to confirm whether it has conducted an impact assessment... Recommendation · paragraph 354 Recommendation (the committee's words)

    We also call on the Government to confirm whether it has conducted an impact assessment of the potential consequences of increased political tensions between the UK and China on British businesses operating in China, or Chinese investment into the UK. If such an assessment has not been carried out, we recommend that it is.