Select committee: International Relations and Defence Committee

The UK’s security and trade relationship with China

Closed Opened 25 Feb 2021 Closed 20 Oct 2022 17 recommendations 46 conclusions
Inquiry scope (the committee's words)
The inquiry will consider the Government’s approach to China, and how this has evolved. It will examine the UK’s security interests vis-à-vis China, the UK’s partners and allies, including the Five Eyes partnership, and the UK’s diplomatic, defence and security resourcing for further engagement in China’s neighbourhood. It will also consider China’s importance as a trade partner and source of investment.

Where it stands

The inquiry is closed, opened 25 February 2021.

The committee has published 1 report, most recently 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void on 10 September 2021.

The government's response

Letter from Minister Milling to Baroness Anelay, on the Committee’s follow-up letter to the Government’s response to the UK-China report, 9 February 2022

Published 22 February 2022. The deadline was 17 November 2021.

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Government Response to the Committee's The UK's Security and Trade Relationship with China report

Published 23 November 2021.

Summary written by Accountability Index from the government's response. It is not the government's own words.

The government responds to the Committee's report by restating the approach set out in the Integrated Review, describing China as a "systemic competitor" and setting out how it will engage, trade and protect its security, without committing to the single China strategy the Committee called for.

  • On the call for a single China strategy, the government points to the Integrated Review and says the National Security Council "continues to provide clear direction". It says it will not publish information that could harm national security.
  • On China expertise, it says it "will continue to invest in China capability in line with the Integrated Review" and notes an additional £3million dedicated in 2020/21.
  • On trade, it says it is in the national interest to trade with China but "important we avoid strategic dependency". It says the National Security and Investment Act is "country agnostic" and will come into full force on 4 January 2022.
  • On the Indo-Pacific, it describes HMS Tamar and HMS Spey as "permanently stationed in the region", to be joined by a Littoral Response Group from 2023 and Type 31 frigates by the end of the decade.

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Recommendations and conclusions 63 shown

Conclusion 1

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s relationship with China during the coalition and Cameron Governments was largely focused on the economic benefits of closer ties. The UK played a key role in the founding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, but it is unclear whether it has retained its influence in the intervening years.

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Conclusion 2

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
While there appears to have been a shift in the mood of the UK towards China, there remains considerable uncertainty over the current Government’s policy towards China. The Minister for Asia’s comments did not offer clarity.

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Conclusion 3

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
A cornerstone of the recently published Integrated Review is the UK’s “tilt” to the Indo-Pacific. While we welcome the attention being paid to this important region, the Government needs to provide greater detail on its objectives and how it plans to achieve them, particularly with regard to China. However, given the Royal Navy’s home waters and North Atlantic obligations it is optimistic to believe the UK could contribute much.

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Conclusion 4

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The attempt of the three most recent governments to navigate across the complexity of economic, sovereignty, security and human rights issues in relation to China has led to inconsistencies, created uncertainty and points to a lack of a central strategy. There is no clear sense of what the current Government’s strategy towards China is, or what values and interests it is trying to uphold in the UK-China relationship.

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Conclusion 5

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Current levels of China expertise within Government and the civil service are insufficient when compared to the ambitious agenda and the tilt to the Indo-Pacific outlined by the Government in the Integrated Review.

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Conclusion 6

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The Government told us that it has made its approach to China clear in public statements and in the Integrated Review, but these statements, and those made to us during this inquiry, have been vague and do not constitute a strategy.

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Recommendation 7

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
We call on the Government to produce a single, coherent China strategy, as recommended by the Foreign Affairs Committee in April 2019, and a plan for how it will execute that strategy. The strategy should seek to resolve the ambiguities in the current Government’s China policy. The recommendations made in this report will help highlight what the strategy should contain.

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Conclusion 8

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Regime survival remains the key objective of the Chinese Communist Party delivered through continued strong economic growth and China’s rising international standing.

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Conclusion 9

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
While China’s overall objective of protecting its rise has remained consistent over presidencies, its foreign policy under Xi Jinping has been more outward looking and pro-active, and more aggressive.

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Conclusion 10

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
China is taking an expanded view of security into non-traditional areas such as food, the environment, its financial system, investment, aid and debt. At the same time, it is rapidly growing its military expenditure (including its navy and coastguard) and now has the second-highest national spend after the United States.

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Conclusion 11

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
China’s perception of threats to its national security is influenced by insecurities about its rise, history (including perception of ‘national humiliation’ and memory of its semi-colonial past), domestic security concerns, anti-Chinese sentiment, and fears of external interference.

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Conclusion 12

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
There is insufficient understanding of whether China intends to take a more aggressive approach to the existing status of Taiwan and, if it does, how it might react to the consequences of those attempts. It is also unknown how China might respond to non-conventional, “grey zone” attacks.

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Conclusion 13

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The 14th Five-Year Plan introduced in March 2021 has signalled modifications to the previous model of Chinese economic governance, with a greater focus on self-reliance and emphasising the importance of the domestic market. China will remain a key participant in the global economy, but is likely to focus increasingly on its domestic market.

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Conclusion 14

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
China’s policy on the international stage is partially motivated by its dissatisfaction with the current international rules-based system, but we heard mixed evidence on whether China seeks to reverse or overthrow this system. This, though, seems a distinction without a practical difference from the UK’s perspective. In either case the likely result would be an international environment that would, at least in part, be detrimental to the UK’s interests and values. This would run directly counter to the strategic objective set out by the Government in the Integrated Review. Nevertheless, as the world’s second largest economy it is inevitable that some international structures will need to adjust to reflect the modern reality of China’s position.

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Conclusion 15

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The Belt and Road Initiative, and the Digital Silk Road component, are key elements in China’s drive to make the international order more ‘China-compliant’. Some argue that the BRI allows China to apply political leverage through debt, though we also heard that China is increasingly recognising that this approach may not be sustainable. The subversion of international institutions and indebted nations’ compliance with China’s wishes should be given greater prominence and consideration.

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Conclusion 16

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The United Kingdom has a strong and proud record in its development programmes and encouraging other nations to act similarly. While there are many questionable elements of the Belt and Road Initiative, and BRI projects will always reflect China’s interests, some will equally benefit the receiving nation. Belt and Road investments may on such occasions be welcomed.

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Conclusion 17

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Although China does not consider the UK as a high priority country, the UK remains important due to its membership of the UN Security Council. China also considers the UK an important economic partner in particular sectors.

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Conclusion 18

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
China has a longstanding appreciation for the UK’s history, culture and universities, and these continue to have a positive impact on China’s perception of the UK. However, political events such as Brexit and the UK’s response to Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong and Xinjiang have led to cooling of the relationship, and a lowering of the UK’s importance in China’s view.

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Recommendation 19

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
The UK-China relationship may also be improved by a greater degree of understanding of the Chinese culture and languages by the UK. We call on the Government to provide greater support for Chinese language teaching and cultural exchange with China.

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Conclusion 20

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The current US Administration wants closer co-operation with its partners and allies, and unlike the previous administration, recognises that the challenge posed by China will require co-operation and collaboration.

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Conclusion 21

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific is seen in Washington as a sign of UK’s interest in preservation of peace and support for the international rules-based order. The US also values the UK’s historical use of soft power in the region, including via Official Development Assistance.

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Conclusion 22

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Taiwan will be a crucial issue for the US and its allies, including the UK. Even if a military confrontation would be risky for China and perhaps not in its interests, similar things have been said about many past wars that did occur; the prospect of miscalculation is always present. Should such a conflict draw in China and the United States, the consequences for the UK—and indeed the wider world—could be catastrophic.

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Conclusion 23

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
An assessment of risk should take into account both the probability and likely consequences of conflict in Taiwan; in this case the UK’s security relationship with the US, its global economic position and the Government’s tilt to the Indo-Pacific region mean that its interests would be directly threatened. The uncertainty over the future of Taiwan therefore represents a major risk to the UK.

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Conclusion 24

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
India is largely aligned with the US’s policy towards China, though there are some key differences in approach. Like other countries in the region, it would prefer to engage in initiatives that are not explicitly framed as anti-China.

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Conclusion 25

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
India is interested in a pragmatic relationship with the United Kingdom, as part of a diverse range of partners including, among others, Russia. India values the UK’s use of its soft power strengths, including the BBC.

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Conclusion 26

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Like India, Japan sees the US as a key ally, but also recognises the importance of productive engagement with one of its closest neighbours.

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Conclusion 27

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Japan sees the United Kingdom as an important partner and ally, which could help to support the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. Like other partners in the region, it values the UK’s soft power strengths in particular, including through the use of Official Development Assistance.

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Recommendation 28

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
We call on the Government, in its response to this report, to set out its soft power strategy in the Indo-Pacific and the scale of the allocated resources, especially in the light of the Government’s ambitions outlined in the Integrated Review regarding the Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’.

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Conclusion 29

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Not all EU states share the US’s assessment of threats posed by China. This seems to have influenced the common EU approach towards China, where economic interests appear to take priority over security concerns. Nevertheless, recent tensions between the EU and China mean that at the time of writing this report it seems unlikely that the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment will be approved by the European Parliament. We note that the European Parliament has made progress on the Agreement conditional on lifting the sanctions on members of its Parliament.

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Conclusion 30

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific have welcomed the UK’s tilt towards the Indo-Pacific, and are supportive of the UK joining existing formats of co-operation, or establishing new, bilateral ones.

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Conclusion 31

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Establishment of effective and reliable partnerships is critical if the UK and its allies are to respond to the challenges posed by China. These partnerships can take different forms, ranging from formal alliances to bilateral agreements, but they will need to represent sufficient aggregate political, economic and scientific power to be able to counter that of China, and to persuade uncommitted nations to align with these groupings.

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Conclusion 32

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Some potentially important partners may have systems and values that do not align with the UK’s, nor do they all wish to be drawn into an overtly US-China confrontation. If the necessary co-operation is to be achieved the UK will need to take a pragmatic approach to the basis on which they are built. Focusing on issues rather than on western values is likely to be more productive and to draw in a wider range of partners.

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Conclusion 33

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s expertise in capacity building, first through the Department for International Development and now through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, is seen as a key strength by the UK’s regional partners in the Indo-Pacific. Witnesses stressed the importance of the BBC in terms of the UK’s soft power and influence in the region.

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Recommendation 34

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
We welcome the principle underlying the Build Back Better World Initiative, particularly given the detrimental impact of the cuts to UK Official Development Assistance and the opportunity this gives for China to expand its influence in Africa and elsewhere. We call on the Government to provide more detail about the UK’s intended contribution to the Initiative and how it will operate.

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Conclusion 35

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s position as a maritime trading power means that it places great importance on the maintenance of international order and the law of the sea, including freedom of navigation. The UK’s deployment of a Carrier Strike Group to the Indo-Pacific this year underlines its commitment in this regard, but it should work to ensure clear policy co-ordination with European partners and allies, particularly France through the Lancaster House Treaties. We would like to hear more about the Government’s plans for a sustained presence in this region beyond the current Carrier Strike Group deployment.

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Conclusion 36

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
A range of non-traditional security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region relate to the UK’s key interests. The UK should aim to be a leader in addressing non-traditional security challenges, given its expertise and experience in these areas.

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Conclusion 37

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
There is disagreement over the extent to which China can be considered a threat to the UK, and it is clear that there are nuances which mean it could be considered more of a security threat in some areas than others. However, the Government’s use of the ambiguous phrase “systemic competitor” does not help address these nuances and serves to create more uncertainty about the Government’s strategy towards China. We invite the Government to provide more clarity on these points.

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Recommendation 38

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should consider whether its security assessment of China is aligned more with the US or the EU, recognising that individual EU countries have differing views about the threat that China represents to their security and that through bilateral engagement the FCDO needs to understand these variations. These alliances may influence the level of involvement the UK can have in other alliances and partnerships in the region.

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Recommendation 39

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
The challenge of climate change cannot be addressed without engagement with China. We call on the Government to explain how it will include considered co-operation with China on climate change as part of its China strategy. This is particularly important given the UK’s leadership role at COP26.

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Conclusion 40

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Since the publication of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change in 2006, and the Climate Change Act 2008, the UK has become a leader in climate change and decarbonisation, formerly leading the EU in its climate aspirations, and now globally. The UK must use this leadership position to encourage China to engage with the global community in tackling the climate change challenge.

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Recommendation 41

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
Nevertheless, the Government should remain aware that China’s interests in tackling the climate crisis may not always be fully aligned with those of the UK. Co-operation must take into careful account China’s actions, not just words.

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Conclusion 42

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK’s interests in the Indo-Pacific are not unique and distinct from the interests of its European partners, especially France. Both countries should coordinate deployments of military assets to assure a ‘persistent’ European presence.

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Recommendation 43

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
We call on the Government to explain how the UK plans to support its regional partners and allies in both traditional and non-traditional security areas such as training, joint exercises, institution building and capacity building.

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Recommendation 44

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
Official Development Assistance is a vital aspect of the UK’s soft power, which can be used to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges. As the UK seeks further engagement in the Indo-Pacific, Official Development Assistance cuts may create a void which may be exploited by China and the UK’s other competitors. We urge the Government to restore Official Development Assistance to 0.7% GNI before significant damage is done to the UK’s capabilities in this region and more widely.

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Conclusion 45

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
China is a rapidly growing military power with an increasingly assertive policy towards its neighbours and adjacent waters. It has an agenda to secure the integration of Taiwan into its jurisdiction; to secure all waters, islands and reefs within the ‘nine dash line’ within its sovereign territory; and to challenge the Sino-Indian Actual Line of Control. Even if not planned, there is a strong risk that future rhetoric from China will at some point provoke a major conflict. The ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific implies that the UK will be less able to isolate itself from such an event. It needs to carefully consider its contingency plans. With the future presence of the Royal Navy in the South and East China Seas, it is not impossible that a UK naval vessel (rather than the US fleet) could be used by China as the test of their sovereignty, and therefore the start of such a conflict.

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Recommendation 46

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
The Government should seek to maintain the role and popularity of British higher education among Chinese students. However, we are concerned about potential pressures put on Chinese students by the Chinese authorities. The Government and the higher education sector need to take steps to ensure that Chinese students (in particular graduate students) can maintain freedom of research.

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Conclusion 47

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
While there are opportunities for increased economic engagement with China, they can only be realised in the right economic and political conditions. At present, there are still considerable barriers to an economic engagement with China that supports the UK’s core interests and values.

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Conclusion 48

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Trade cannot be considered in isolation. If the UK pursues certain security policies which China sees as running counter to its own interests, there will almost certainly be consequences for trade and investment.

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Recommendation 49

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
Although there are aspects of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment that the UK could replicate in a future investment deal with China, it is not clear that they will provide many additional benefits. The UK should instead focus on overcoming the barriers to investment that UK companies face. The Government should also take note of the political challenges facing ratification of the CAI.

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Recommendation 50

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
The UK should avoid the extreme ‘trade war’ approach undertaken by the Trump administration in the US, which been shown to hurt the US’s interests more than China. The Government should carefully assess whether a more nuanced approach may be more effective when dealing with China.

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Conclusion 51

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the Government’s commitment to join the CPTPP. While the extent to which it will allow the UK greater operation with China is uncertain (particularly while China is not a member), it will provide other benefits for UK engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and will be welcomed by partners and allies in the region.

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Conclusion 52

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The World Trade Organization, albeit with strong new leadership, faces challenges in its two core functions—multilateral trade negotiations and dispute settlement. As the world’s second largest economy, China will be active in any WTO reform discussions.

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Conclusion 53

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The UK can play an important role in reforming and strengthening the WTO, in particular in the rules and regulations covering sectors such as services, where the UK has extensive experience and influence.

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Recommendation 54

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
We welcome the Government’s stated intention to play a role in reforming and strengthening the WTO, but regret that it has provided so little detail on how it intends to do so. We call on the Government to outline its specific areas of focus for WTO reform, and how these will help to support the UK’s economic and strategic objectives with China.

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Conclusion 55

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
We welcome the National Security and Investment Act 2021 as an important step in ensuring the security of investments into the UK. We note, however, that the timing of the Act may have led to the perception that it targets China in particular. On the other hand, the timing of the Act was driven as much by China’s own actions as by anything else, so the perception is perhaps unsurprising.

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Recommendation 56

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
We call on the Government to publish a detailed plan for implementation of the National Security and Investment Act, to provide confidence to overseas investors. An explanation of the reversal of the Huawei decision would also provide greater confidence to overseas investors.

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Recommendation 57

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
The current passage through Parliament of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill is a clear sign of the Government’s concerns over supply chain vulnerability in that area, but such vulnerabilities are widespread in the economy. The COVID-19 pandemic has served to highlight this weakness. With dependency comes risk, and China has on several occasions demonstrated its willingness to use economic and supply chain coercion in support of its international policy. In order to retain its freedom of action towards China, the Government should conduct scenario planning on supply chain vulnerabilities and identify where action is needed to mitigate the risks.

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Conclusion 58

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
We are particularly concerned about the vulnerabilities exposed during the pandemic relating to the procurement of PPE and lateral flow tests. We ask that in their response to us the Government provides further information on the cost to the UK of lateral flow tests from China and the companies that were involved, and outlines the measures it is taking to ensure that products of this kind can be manufactured in the UK where there are vital national security interests at stake.

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Conclusion 59

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
Balancing the desire for increased economic engagement with upholding values such as human rights will be a particular challenge in the UK’s relationship with China. The Government needs to be pragmatic, but it also needs to show greater clarity and international leadership to ensure the balance does not tilt towards preserving economic relations at the cost of human rights. The Government cannot sit on the fence over this issue.

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Conclusion 60

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
The Foreign Affairs Committee called for the Government to publish a strategy on China by the end of 2020, which it has not done. The Government claims to have set out its approach towards China in various speeches, but this does not offer the clarity required. It seems that the Government is using a policy of deliberate ambiguity to avoid making difficult decisions that uphold the UK’s values but might negatively affect economic relations.

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Conclusion 61

Conclusion · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Concluded (the committee's words)
We again call for the Government to produce a clear and consistent written strategy on China. The issue of how the Government intends to balance economic relations trade concerns with upholding values such as human rights and labour protection should be front and centre of this strategy.

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Recommendation 62

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
More generally, the Government should incorporate an atrocity prevention lens in its overall approach to trade. Current atrocity prevention tools and strategies have fallen short, so we ask that the Government outlines how it intends to strengthen these tools, including the effective use of sanctions and other consequences once an atrocity is determined to have occurred.

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Recommendation 63

Recommendation · 1st Report - The UK and China's security and trade relationship: A strategic void

Recommended (the committee's words)
We also call on the Government to confirm whether it has conducted an impact assessment of the potential consequences of increased political tensions between the UK and China on British businesses operating in China, or Chinese investment into the UK. If such an assessment has not been carried out, we recommend that it is.

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Oral evidence sessions

11 sessions

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Date Session and witnesses Source
9 Jun 2021
Oral evidence session
Graham Stuart · Department for International Trade, Mohin Rahman · Department for International Trade, Nigel Adams · Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, Rupert Ainley · Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
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26 May 2021
Oral evidence session
Didi Kirsten Tatlow · German Council of Foreign Relations (DGAP), Dr Alicia García-Herrero · Bruegel, The Rt Hon. the Lord Patten of Barnes KG CH
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18 May 2021
Oral evidence session
Fang Wenjian · China Chamber of Commerce in the UK, Linda Yueh · University of Oxford, Professor Wei Liang · University of Monterey, Sir Sherard Cowper Coles · British Business Council
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12 May 2021
Oral evidence session
The Lord O'Neill of Gatley, The Lord Sassoon
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26 Apr 2021
Oral evidence session
Bonnie Glaser · German Marshall Fund of the United States, Elizabeth C. Economy · Council on Foreign Relations
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21 Apr 2021
Oral evidence session
Dr Garima Mohan · The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Dr Tanvi Madan · Brookings Institution, Professor Akio Takahara · University of Tokyo, Professor Katherine Morton · Schwarzman College, Tsinghua University, Professor Shaun Breslin · University of Warwick, Professor Yongjin Zhang · University of Bristol
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14 Apr 2021
Oral evidence session
Dr Lynn Kuok · International Institute for Strategic Studies, Veerle Nouwens · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
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18 Mar 2021
Oral evidence session
The Lord McDonald of Salford GCMG KCVO, The Lord Sedwill GCMG · Cabinet Office
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17 Mar 2021
Oral evidence session
Rt Hon George Osborne · HM Treasury
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10 Mar 2021
Oral evidence session
Dr Janka Oertel · European Council on Foreign Relations, Professor Kerry Brown · King's College London, Professor Steve Tsang · School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
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3 Mar 2021
Oral evidence session
Charles Parton OBE · Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Dr Yu Jie · Chatham House
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Who gave evidence

31 witnesses

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WitnessOrganisationSessions
Bonnie Glaser · Director, Asia Program German Marshall Fund of the United States 1
Charles Parton OBE · Senior Associate Fellow Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 1
Didi Kirsten Tatlow · Senior Fellow, Asia Program German Council of Foreign Relations (DGAP) 1
Dr Alicia García-Herrero · Senior Fellow Bruegel 1
Dr Garima Mohan · Fellow, Asia Program The German Marshall Fund of the United States 1
Dr Janka Oertel · Director of the Asia Programme European Council on Foreign Relations 1
Dr Lynn Kuok · Shangri-La Dialogue Senior Fellow for Asia-Pacific Security International Institute for Strategic Studies 1
Dr Tanvi Madan · Director of the India Project, Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy Brookings Institution 1
Dr Yu Jie · Research Fellow on China Chatham House 1
Elizabeth C. Economy · Senior Fellow for China Studies Council on Foreign Relations 1
Fang Wenjian · Chair China Chamber of Commerce in the UK 1
Graham Stuart · Minister for Exports Department for International Trade 1
Linda Yueh · Fellow in Economics, St Edmund Hall University of Oxford 1
Mohin Rahman · Deputy Director, North America, China and Asia Pacific, Department for International Trade 1
Nigel Adams · Minister for Asia Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office 1
Professor Akio Takahara · Professor of Contemporary Chinese Politics University of Tokyo 1
Professor Katherine Morton · Professor of Global Affairs Schwarzman College, Tsinghua University 1
Professor Kerry Brown · Director, Lau China Institute King's College London 1
Professor Shaun Breslin · Professor of Politics and International Studies University of Warwick 1
Professor Steve Tsang · Director, China Institute School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 1
Professor Wei Liang · Middlebury Institute of International Studies University of Monterey 1
Professor Yongjin Zhang · Professor of International Politics University of Bristol 1
Rt Hon George Osborne · Former Chancellor of the Exchequer HM Treasury 1
Rupert Ainley · Interim Director North East Asia and China Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office 1
Sir Sherard Cowper Coles · Chair British Business Council 1
The Lord McDonald of Salford GCMG KCVO Not recorded 1
The Lord O'Neill of Gatley Not recorded 1
The Lord Sassoon Not recorded 1
The Lord Sedwill GCMG · Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service, 2018–20 Cabinet Office 1
The Rt Hon. the Lord Patten of Barnes KG CH Not recorded 1
Veerle Nouwens · Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 1