Source · Select Committees · National Security Strategy (Joint Committee)

Recommendation 2

2 Not Addressed

The Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) would not describe China as posing an “active threat”...

Conclusion
The Deputy National Security Adviser (DNSA) would not describe China as posing an “active threat” to national security at the relevant time. We acknowledge the position from the Crown Prosecution Service that it would undermine their case that China represented such a threat if the DNSA, their central expert witness, refused to characterise China in such terms. (Conclusion, Paragraph 39)
Government Response Summary
The government welcomed the committee's findings of no improper influence or obstruction and a recommendation to consider support mechanisms for senior officials acting as witnesses. However, it did not directly address the committee's specific observation about the DNSA's phrasing regarding China as an 'active threat'.
Government Response Not Addressed
HM Government Not Addressed
The Government welcomes the Committee’s finding that there was no evidence of improper influence or coordinated high-level effort to collapse the prosecution. We thank the committee for clarifying that there was no deliberate effort to obstruct the prosecution, despite characterisations of a 1 September meeting of senior officials. The Government is also pleased the Committee is satisfied that the Attorney General and Law Officers acted with constitutional propriety. The Government welcomes the Committee’s recommendation to consider the support mechanisms and ensure line management structures are clear for senior officials, such as the DNSA, to ensure they are not left unduly exposed or isolated when acting as bound witnesses in high-profile cases. Before finalising his first witness statement, the DNSA sighted the then National Security Adviser and the then Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary noting that then CO Permanent Secretary and National Security Adviser had already agreed to him being a witness. Alex Chisholm was consulted because at this time the then Cabinet Secretary (Simon Case) was on medical leave. After the charging decision in April 2024, DNSA was a witness in criminal proceedings, whose evidence was not yet heard or tested in Court, and therefore his following two witness statements could not be shared with officials outside of the members of staff within NSS and Cabinet Office Legal Team who supported the DNSA to draft the statements. This was confirmed as such by the CPS. However, the Cabinet Secretary was aware that the case was going on and, in his capacity as the DNSA’s line manager, was available throughout the case to provide support or for the DNSA to raise any personal concerns, without touching on the specific evidence of the case. For any instances whereby the government, or in this case a government official, is asked to provide evidence to support a CPS criminal case it would be completely typical for the government to consult the relevant government legal team on how to approach a CPS request. In some cases, specialist external counsel may be engaged. In this case external counsel was instructed by departmental legal advisers to provide criminal law expertise. However, the Government welcomes the Committee’s recommendation to review the advice available to bound witnesses in sensitive national security cases to ensure they fully understand what is expected of them and to ensure that the wrap-around support provided to witnesses is sufficient. This will be specifically covered as part of the guidance product that the AGO, CPS, and Cabinet Office seek to produce. 3. Application of the Legislative and Legal Framework Relevant Conclusions and Recommendations: Conclusion: “We accept that the root cause of the problems with this case lies in the difficulties raised by the outdated Official Secrets Act 1911. We caution strongly, however, against concluding that the risk of future problems has been negated entirely by the new National Security Act 2023. The proximate cause of outdated legislation has been removed, but this episode has surfaced some deeper problems which remain.” [paragraph 8 of Executive Summary] Conclusion: “The Crown Prosecution Service determined that it required specific evidence that China posed an “active threat” to UK national security at the relevant time, following a Court of Appeal ruling known as “Roussev”. It is not within the Committee’s remit to second guess the decision-making and professional judgement of the independent Crown Prosecution Service and First Senior Treasury Counsel. However, we remain unclear as to why the Court of Appeal ruling altered the legal landscape so significantly.” [paragraph 38]